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Abstract  
Decentralisation of political, financial, and administrative powers to sub-national 
units has been, and remains to be, a major trend in both developing and developed 
states. Very often decentralisation is not optional for a state. However, a state has 
the option to choose what to achieve through its decentralisation programme. 
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After choosing what it intends to achieve through its decentralisation programme, 
a state may design it in such a way that it may attain the intended purpose.  
 
Many countries design their decentralisation programmes with the purpose of 
‘deepening’ democracy and empowering their citizens. Other states decentralise 
power with the purpose of achieving development. They do so based on the 
postulate that development is preferable when it is achieved through the 
participation of those who benefit from it and that decentralisation enhances the 
extent and quality of citizen’s direct and indirect participation. States also 
decentralise powers based on the assumption that decentralisation brings 
efficiency in planning and implementing development projects. Several states 
also use their decentralisation programme to respond to the ethnic, religious, or 
other diversities of their people. They use territorial and non-territorial 
arrangement to accommodate the diversity of their people. Therefore, in some 
cases they create ethnically structured regional and local units and transfer to such 
unit political powers including the power to decide on cultural matters.   
 
Like in so many countries, the wind of decentralisation has blown over Ethiopia. 
The country has been implementing a decentralisation programme starting from 
1991. Ethiopia has selected to achieve two principal purposes through its 
decentralisation programme namely, to achieve development and to respond to 
the ethnic diversity of its people. It is axiomatic that the success of a 
decentralisation programme, whether for achieving development or 
accommodating ethnic diversity, is greatly impacted on by its institutional design. 
This thesis, therefore, examines whether Ethiopia’s decentralisation programme 
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incorporates the institutional features that are likely to impact the success of the 
decentralisation programme for achieving its intended purposes.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1. BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS  
Until the 1970s, centralisation of political power was a major trend. 1 This trend 
was motivated by several factors. Central management of the economy was one of 
the key motives for the tendency towards incremental centralisation. A 
centralised system was deemed economically efficient and, therefore, the most 
appropriate means of planning and implementing a sound and equitable use of 
resources.2 The economic justification for centralisation gained impetus as the 
economic role of the state grew. Especially after World War II (WWII) the 
economic role of the state was recognised along the Keynesian economic theory 
which remained dominant for several decades after WWII.3 The failure of the 
market system from the 1950s to the 1970s also added force to the economic 
relevance of the state. 4  Moreover, the economic justification of centralisation 
found ideological support with the rise of socialism which sought to create a 
national economic system which was primarily, if not fully, controlled and run by 
the state. Decentralisation was, in contrast, viewed as wasteful, and liable to cause 
or exacerbate inefficiency and an inequitable distribution of resources. 5   
 
Centralisation was also necessitated by yet another policy rationale, viz. nation 
building.  With the birth of the concept of nation-state and sovereignty after the 
                                                 
1 Sharma (2004) 2. 
2 Sharma (2004) 2; De Vries (2000) 199. 
3 Rapley (2002) 7-10. 
4 Sharma (2004) 2. 
5 De Vries (2000) 199-200; Sharma (2004) 2. 
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signing of the Westphalia treaty in 1648, the quest began for nation-building.6 At 
the core of nation-building and the notion of a nation-state was the ‘ideal’ to 
create a common national identity. This ideal was underpinned either by a denial 
of the existence of the diversity of any form or by a conviction that diversity was 
inherently harmful to the security of the state and, thus, should be eliminated.7 
Diversity was, therefore, associated with ‘sectarianism, parochialism, narrow-
mindedness, and chauvinist bigotry’. 8 States implemented various mechanisms, 
including centralisation, to eliminate diversity. 9  Decentralisation, in contrast, 
was feared to augment ethnic, religious or other social divides, leading to conflict 
and, ultimately, to the disintegration of the state.  
 
Starting from the 1970s, however, the economic role of the state began to be 
reconsidered. With the rise of neo-liberalism, a new trend, restricting the 
economic role of the state, emerged.10 Unfettered state interference in the 
economy, coupled with a centralised system of decision making, was blamed for 
the economic crisis and stagnation in many countries.11 Nonetheless, the role of 
the state in economic and developmental matters was not entirely discarded. It 
was rather discovered that the state can play its role as agent of economic 
development efficiently at sub-national level.12 This, therefore, required a 
measure of decentralisation.   
                                                 
6 Tӧpperwien (2001) 67 & 195. 
7 Réaume (1995) 121. 
8 McGarry and O’Leary (1994) 103. 
9 Kymlicka (2007) 62-63. 
10 Sharma (2004). 
11 Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird (1998) 7. 
12 Sharma (2004); Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird (1998) 7. 
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In addition, globalisation diminished the economic significance of the national 
government.13 Technological advancement in communication and the ‘global 
integration of market factors’ reduced the size of government required to manage 
certain economic activities.14 Consequently, services and infrastructures that were 
essential for economic development could be efficiently delivered by smaller sub-
national political units, not necessarily by national government. Globalisation, by 
enhancing the economic role of sub-national political units further encouraged 
decentralisation. 15 Moreover, global financial institutions, such as, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), encouraged, even pressurised, 
developing states to undertake Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in order 
to receive loans and aids. Decentralisation was one of the central components of 
SAP. 16  Furthermore, several inter-governmental treaties including free trade and 
loan agreements included clauses that required a certain forms of 
decentralisation.17 In this manner globalisation led to localisation creating a 
phenomenon called ‘glocalisation’. 18  
 
States also began to reconsider their stance on the question of diversity. Efforts to 
eliminate ethnic or any other social diversity proved to be unsuccessful. Almost 
all states remained multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, or multi-religious. Not only did the 
attempt to suppress ethnic diversity fail, it also led to appalling identity related 
                                                 
13 Sharma (2004) 5. 
14 Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird (1998) 7. 
15 Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird (1998) 7. 
16 see Gore (2000). 
17 Sharma (2004) 5. 
18 Sharma (2004) 5. 
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conflicts in many countries.19 Therefore, states were forced to review their 
policies on diversity. Moreover, there was a change in outlook towards diversity. 
Diversity was no longer viewed as an inescapable vice, but as a desirable virtue. 
It was viewed as something which enriches the lives of individuals and which, 
therefore, should be preserved and promoted, not necessarily eliminated.20   
Accordingly, many states embraced the multi-cultural paradigm and began re-
structuring their territorial and government organisation to respond to the ethnic 
diversity of their people.  Decentralisation emerged as one of the mechanisms 
adopted by states for managing diversity. 21   
 
Decentralisation has now become a dominant, inevitable, and unstoppable trend.22 
It increasingly attracts the attention of academicians, professionals, and policy 
makers. There is barely any country now that has not implemented some form of 
decentralisation.  As Bird and Ebel remark:- 
  
‘Developed countries, developing countries, transitional countries, federal countries, 
and unitary countries—wherever one looks, some kind of decentralization is to be 
taking place, or is at least being discussed.’23  
 
Decentralisation of powers, functions and resources from the central government 
to sub-national governments and the growing influence of sub-national 
                                                 
19 Kymlicka (1995); Addis (2001); Yonatan (2010 a) 10. 
20 Kymlicka (1995).  
21 Kymlicka (2007).  
22 World Bank (1999) 124. 
23 Bird & Ebel (2005) 3. 
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governments in economic and political matters are seen as major trends of the 21st 
century.24  
1.1. Decentralisation in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is no exception to the trend towards decentralisation. Ethiopia has been 
incrementally centralised for over a century. The centralised system is believed to 
have caused, or at least exacerbated, the prevalence of poverty in the country. 25  
It is also alleged that it resulted in the concentration of political and economic 
powers in a single ethnic community resulting in political, economic, and cultural 
marginalisation of the scores of minority ethnic communities of the country. 26  
This in turn led to decades of gruesome civil war which came to an end only in 
1991 when the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
assumed power. 
 
Since 1991, Ethiopia has been implementing a decentralisation programme. The 
decentralisation programme was implemented in two phases. Ethiopia, a hitherto 
unitary state, became a federal state in the first phase of the decentralisation 
process. 27  As the federal system of the country was principally meant to respond 
to the ethnic question, the nine regional states, constituent units of the federation, 
were chiefly organised on the basis of ethnic criteria. Yet none of the constituent 
units were ethnically homogenous. Therefore, it was imperative to accommodate 
intra-regional minority ethnic communities. This entailed the need to consider 
                                                 
24 World Bank (1999) 108. 
25 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
26 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
27 See chapter 4; § 5. 
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local government as an alternative mechanism for accommodating these 
communities.  
 
The second phase of decentralisation began in 2001.28 This phase of the 
decentralisation process was meant to respond to the development question. The 
decentralisation process began when the federal government adopted a plan for 
poverty reduction which sought to use decentralisation as a strategy to achieve 
poverty reduction. 29  
2. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Ethiopia seeks to achieve two principal purposes through its decentralisation 
programme. It seeks to accommodate intra-regional minority ethnic communities 
that are found almost in every region of the country. It also aspires to use 
decentralisation as a strategy to reduce the prevalence of poverty. Several studies 
show that the institutional design of a decentralisation programme impacts on 
whether such programme can achieve a particular purpose. The research question 
that this thesis seeks to answer, therefore, is whether Ethiopia’s local government 
system demonstrates the institutional features that are likely to enhance the 
prospect of a decentralisation programme to achieve development and 
accommodate ethnic minorities. With a view to answering this question, the 
thesis defines concepts such as decentralisation, development, ethnic community, 
ethnic minority and the like. It also raises and answers related questions 
including:-  
                                                 
28 See chapter 4; § 5. 
29 See chapter 4; § 5. 
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 How does decentralisation impact development or accommodation of 
minorities? 
 What are the institutional features that are likely to impact on the success 
of decentralisation to achieve development? 
 What are the institutional features that are likely to impact on the success 
of decentralisation to accommodate ethnic minorities? 
3. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Ethiopia is a federal state composed of nine regional states and two autonomous 
federal cities.30 Local government, under Ethiopia’s federal system, is the 
competence of the regional states.  This study will cover the local government 
system of eight of the nine regional states. The federal cities will also be part of 
the discussion. 31  
4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
Decades have passed since Ethiopia has begun implementing its decentralisation 
programme. Yet, there is barely any academic work which comprehensively deals 
with the legal and constitutional principles governing the country’s local 
governance system. This thesis provides a comprehensive description of 
Ethiopia’s local government system. Moreover, poverty and ethnic diversity, the 
two challenges that Ethiopia seeks to tackle through decentralisation, are not 
unique to Ethiopia. Almost all African countries face these challenges. It is 
believed that important lessons can be drawn from the excellence and mediocrity 
                                                 
30  The regional states are Afar, Amhara, Benishnagul-Gumuz, Gambella, Hareir, Oromia, Somali, 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), and Tigray. 
31  Hareri, one of the nine regional states, is a small city state whose Constitution does not provide 
for a local government system. Therefore, the discussion in this thesis will not include the Hareri 
regional state. 
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of Ethiopia’s decentralisation programme as an institutional arrangement both for 
achieving development and accommodating ethnic minorities.   
5. ARGUMENT  
The argument of the thesis is developed in the following manner 
5.1. Decentralisation and development  
Development scholars and global development institutions claim, based on 
experience of the past several decades, that decentralisation has the potential to 
achieve development. They also warn that decentralisation may in fact result in 
inequity, corruption, and in the exclusion of the poor. However, a correct 
institutional design may optimise the developmental benefits of decentralisation 
and minimise the dangers it poses.  
5.1.1. Institutional features  
The study argues that what is considered to be a correct institutional design of 
decentralisation may vary depending on the particular circumstances of each 
state. However, there are certain institutional features that are critical to optimise 
the potential of decentralisation to achieve development. These institutional 
features are political, financial, and administrative autonomy and institutional 
arrangements for central supervision and inter-governmental co-operation.   
5.1.1.1. Political, financial, and administrative autonomy  
Political autonomy has four critical elements. The first element of political 
autonomy is the certainty of the existence of local government. The existence of 
local government in turn involves three interrelated matters viz. the existence of 
local government as an order of government, the establishment of local 
government units in every part of a country, and the protection of the institutional 
integrity of each unit of local government. The second element of political 
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autonomy is the establishment of political structures which are democratically 
constituted. The political structure may include legislative and executive organs. 
The third element of political autonomy involves transferring to local government 
of original, clearly defined, and relevant functions.  The fourth element of 
political autonomy is political power which may include policy making, planning, 
legislative, executive powers. Financial autonomy pertains to local government’s 
revenue raising and expenditure powers.  An administrative autonomy has two 
elements: the power of local government to determine the structure of its 
administrative organs and a personnel system that allows local government to hire 
and fire its own staff. Against the backdrop of these institutional features, the 
thesis examines whether Ethiopia’s local government units have political, 
financial and administrative autonomy.  
5.1.1.2. Central supervision and inter-governmental co-operation  
Local political, financial and administrative autonomy is critical for decentralised 
development. Unfettered local autonomy, however, is likely to cause several 
problems. It is therefore important to complement local autonomy with central 
supervision. Central government may supervise local government’s activities 
through regulation, oversight, and intervention.  
 
In addition, development related functions cannot be neatly divided among 
different levels of government. There are likely to be grey areas and overlaps. 
Inter-governmental co-operation is therefore important in order to deal with such 
grey areas and overlaps. Inter-governmental co-operation may involve co-
operation among local government units (horizontal co-operation) and co-
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operation between local government units and senior levels of government 
(vertical co-operation).  
 
Against the backdrop of the above institutional features, the thesis will examine 
whether the necessary institutional feature for central supervision and inter-
governmental co-operation are existing in Ethiopia.  
5.2. Decentralisation and accommodation of ethnic minorities  
An examination of international literature shows territorial and non-territorial 
means of accommodation of ethnic minorities which may be implemented 
through a scheme of decentralisation.  
5.2.1. Territorial autonomy at local level  
One of the principal means of accommodating an ethnic minority community is 
providing it with territorial autonomy. The most common way to provide an 
ethnic community with territorial autonomy is through regionalisation or some 
form of federal arrangement. However, the thesis argues that territorial autonomy 
may also be exercised at local level. This territorial autonomy may have elements 
of self-rule and shared-rule.    
5.2.1.1. Self-rule 
Territorial autonomy, by definition, allows the relevant ethnic minority 
community to exercise self-rule. Self-rule first and foremost entails the creation 
of a local unit which is demarcated along the settlement structure of the relevant 
minority ethnic community. It involves the establishment of a political structure 
in the autonomous locality. It also requires devolving functions which are 
relevant for the promotion and protection of the identity of the relevant ethnic 
community.  
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Against the backdrop of these institutional features, the thesis examines whether 
there are local territorial unit that are designed to provide a minority ethnic 
community territorial autonomy and allow it to exercise self-rule.  
5.2.1.2. Shared-rule  
Shared rule is an institutional principle often associated with federal systems. 
Shared-rule aims to ensure that the constituting units of a federation are 
represented in a central government. Conceptually, territorial autonomy does not 
entail shared-rule. It does not, therefore, demand that local units be represented in 
the sub-national and national government organs. However, the thesis argues, a 
scheme of decentralisation, which provides minority ethnic community with self-
rule, must also be complemented with shared-rule. The thesis then examines the 
constitutional principles allowing for the representation ethnic minorities or 
ethnic-based local territories at regional and federal level of government.    
5.2.2. Non-territorial means of accommodating ethnic minorities 
Territorial autonomy can only be used to accommodate territorially concentrated 
ethnic communities. When an ethnic community is territorially dispersed or when 
its size does not permit using territorial options, non-territorial arrangements 
should be considered. These may take the form of power-sharing or cultural 
autonomy.  The thesis argues that decentralisation may create an environment that 
is conducive for accommodating minority ethnic communities on non-territorial 
basis. Then it will examine whether ethnic migrants and other territorially 
dispersed communities in Ethiopia are accommodated at local level through non-
territorial arrangements.   
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6. STRUCTURE  
The thesis is divided into eight chapters including this introductory chapter. 
Chapter two has three main sections. The first section discusses different forms 
and types of decentralisation and identifies the working definition of 
decentralisation of the thesis. This section will also discuss the evolution in the 
conceptualisation of ‘development’ with a view to formulate a working definition 
of development of this thesis. Then it will discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of decentralisation as a strategy for achieving development.  It will 
then identify the institutional features that are claimed to optimise the potential of 
a decentralisation scheme to achieve development.   
 
The second section of chapter two will turn to the issue of accommodation of 
ethnic minorities. It will define the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic minority. It 
discusses why it is imperative to accommodate ethnic minorities and how 
decentralisation may serve as an institutional mechanism for doing so. It 
examines territorial and non-territorial schemes and the corresponding 
institutional design of decentralisation to accommodate ethnic minorities.     
 
Chapter three explores the history of local governance in Ethiopia with a view to 
identifying the historical factors that necessitated a scheme of decentralisation in 
Ethiopia. This chapter briefly describes the traditional local administrative 
authorities and institutions that existed before the emergence of ‘Modern 
Ethiopia’ in the 1850s. It then discusses how the country became increasingly 
centralised. The chapter will also assess the impact of the centralisation of 
political power on development and ethnic minorities. Finally the chapter 
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describes the historical factors and processes leading to the decentralisation 
programme being implemented. 
    
Chapter four has four sections. The first section will provide an overview of the 
federal and state governments’ structure, functions, and powers. The second 
section will identify the place and status of local government in the federal 
system. The third section will deal with the policy rationales behind 
decentralisation in Ethiopia. The fourth section will provide an overview of 
Ethiopia’s local government structure.  
 
Chapter five and six will deal with the issue of decentralisation and development 
in Ethiopia. The two chapters evaluate Ethiopia’s local governance system 
against the institutional features identified in chapter two. Chapter five will, 
therefore, examine whether Ethiopia’s local government has political, financial, 
and administrative autonomy. Chapter six will discuss the institutional features of 
central supervision and inter-governmental co-operation in Ethiopia.  
 
Chapter seven will deal with the issue accommodation of intra-regional ethnic 
minorities. It will discuss the territorial arrangements employed to accommodate 
territorially structured intra-regional minority ethnic communities and the role 
that local government plays in this respect. It also examines whether non-
territorial schemes are used to accommodate territorially dispersed ethnic 
communities.  
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Chapter 8 will summarises the findings of the thesis. It also provides an overall 
conclusion and recommendations.  
7. METHODOLOGY 
Chapter two of the thesis is based on the review of relevant literature from books, 
journal articles, and other materials. Ethiopia’s national and sub-national 
constitutions and laws are also consulted for the discussion in chapter three to 
seven. Moreover, government policy papers, reports, and other relevant materials 
are consulted.  
 
As the discussions in chapter four to seven show, the local government structure, 
functions, powers, sources of revenue, and administrative structure of the eight 
regional states under consideration are, very similar. Hence, the discussion will be 
conducted in general terms and the relevant constitutions and proclamations will 
be cited. Where there are differences in local government system among the 
regions, those differences will be specifically mentioned and the provisions of the 
specific proclamations and constitutions will be cited. 
 
As indicated above, national and sub-national constitutions and laws are used as 
the main sources of information for writing this thesis. However, accessing sub-
regional laws has been extremely difficult for the author. They are not available 
on the internet. Hence, it was imperative to find the hard copies of the regional 
laws and constitutions by visiting each region. Even then, the regional laws might 
not be available as they might not be published immediately upon approval by the 
relevant regional council. Several years pass before some of the regional laws are 
published. There are even instances where regional laws are amended before they 
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are published. The regional laws are not made available to the public even when 
they are published. They are generally kept in government offices. As a result, 
despite the effort made to find all relevant regional laws, there still might be 
relevant laws which are duly passed by a regional council and yet are not 
included the discussion in this thesis.   
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Chapter 2 
Decentralisation, development, and accommodation of diversity: A 
theoretical exposition  
1. INTRODUCTION   
As indicated in the previous chapter, this study aims to examine the suitability of 
the institutional framework of Ethiopia’s local governance system for achieving 
development and accommodation of minorities. This undertaking requires a clear 
understanding of the concepts of ‘decentralisation’, ‘development’ ‘ethnic 
community’ and ‘ethnic minority’. It also entails establishing the link between 
decentralisation and development and accommodation of minorities. 
 
To that effect, § 2 defines decentralisation and discusses the various features and 
forms of decentralisation. § 3 offers a definition of development and shows the 
link between decentralisation and development. It identifies the prerequisite 
institutional features for decentralised development. Next § 4 will deal with the 
issue of accommodating ethnic minorities and links the issue with 
decentralisation. Finally, § 5 will synthesise the whole discussion in this chapter.   
2. DECENTRALISATION DEFINED 
Decentralisation is generally considered to involve a transfer of political, 
administrative, and/or fiscal powers, functions, and resources from a political 
centre to another sphere/level of government.32 The ‘centre’ may be a national or 
a sub-national government. A national government is viewed as a centre vis-a-vis 
federating states where federalism is considered as a form of decentralisation.33 
                                                 
32 Ribot (2000) 453; Kauzya (2005) 4; Crawford & Hartmann (2008) 7. 
33  Gillette (1997)1352. Federalsim is not always a result of decentralisation. It may also be a 
result of centralisation. See Stepan (1999) 
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Each of the federating states may also be regarded as a centre in relation to local 
government.34 In a unitary state, the national government is often taken as the 
only centre from which power and resources are decentralised to localities.35 
2.1.Features of decentralisation  
Decentralisation has three key features; political, administrative, and fiscal.36 
Political decentralisation seeks to empower local communities and enhance their 
role in decision making processes.37 It is, therefore, directed at transferring 
political powers to citizens at grassroots level and/or their representatives.38 It is 
also often associated with ‘political pluralism’ and democratic governance.39 The 
administrative aspect of decentralisation pertains to transferring to local 
government the power to ‘hire and fire local staff without reference to higher 
level of government’.40 The fiscal aspect of decentralisation relates to providing 
local government with ‘clear expenditure assignments and budget autonomy’.41 
Decentralisation, for the purpose of this thesis, includes all of these three features.   
2.2. Forms of decentralisation 
Decentralisation takes various forms. The most common forms of decentralisation 
are deconcentration, delegation and devolution.42  
2.2.1. Deconcentration  
                                                 
34 Gillette (1997) 1352. 
35 Gillette (1997) 1352.  
36 Scott (2009) 4; Sharma (2005) 39-40; Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 159. 
37 Rondinelli (1999) 2; Shah (2004) 4.   
38 Sharma (2005) 39-40; Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 159; Shah (2004) 4; Cohen & Peterson (undated) 
29. 
39 Rondinelli (1999) 2; Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 159. 
40 Shah (2004) 4. 
41 Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 159. 
42 Rondinelli & Nellis (1986) 5. 
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Deconcentration is not decentralisation per se. It is rather a transfer of powers 
from ‘the central government and its agencies to field units of government 
agencies, subordinate units of government’.43 It is, therefore, an intra-
governmental ‘technocratic’ power transfer.44 The lower units to which powers 
and resources are transferred are considered parts of, and accountable to, the 
centre, and not autonomous units as such.45 Deconcentration is often referred to 
as ‘administrative decentralisation’ as it is meant to create administrative 
expediency.46 Deconcentration may be either general or functional. In the first 
case multiple tasks are deconcentrated to local units47 while in the latter case 
specifically selected tasks are deconcentrated to local units of the centre.48  
2.2.2. Delegation 
Delegation, unlike deconcentration, is an inter-governmental decentralisation in 
which powers and functions are transferred from a centre to lower levels of 
government.49 Specific responsibilities are transferred through delegation for a 
specific time and under specific conditions as fixed by the centre.50 The centre 
remains the principal holder of authority. Hence, it is entitled to withdraw the 
responsibilities it has so transferred through delegation when it so chooses. 
Nonetheless, the local unit enjoys a wide range of discretion regarding how it 
                                                 
43 Rondinelli & Nellis (1986) 5. 
44 Crook & Sverrisson (1999) 2; De Visser (2005) 14. 
45 De Visser (2005) 14. 
46 Manor (1999) 5; Rondinelli & Nellis (1986) 5. 
47  UNDP (1999) 7. 
48  UNDP (1999) 7. 
49 De Visser (2005) 14. 
50 De Visser (2005) 14. 
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exercises the delegated powers and functions during the validity of the 
delegation.51 
 
Delegation may also be functional. This happens when a government creates 
‘special-purpose agencies’ and provide them with functions appropriate to them.52 
Such entities may include library boards, special service districts, autonomous 
school districts and the like. 53 Such entities may also be allowed to collect fees 
for their services, and are often permitted to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy.54 
2.2.3. Devolution  
Devolution, also known as democratic decentralisation, is the most ‘genuine’ 
form of decentralisation.55 Devolution involves a transfer of political, 
administrative, and financial authorities to a lower level/sphere of government for 
an undetermined period of time through a constitution or other legislative 
instruments.56 Devolution also entails the creation of an autonomous level of 
government at local level with clearly demarcated geographical areas over which 
local government authorities exercise full political, administrative, and financial 
powers.57 The role of the central government becomes limited to standard setting 
and monitoring once powers are devolved to a lower level government. The lower 
                                                 
51 De Visser (2005) 14. 
52 Shah (2006) 7; Rondinelli (1999) 3. 
53 Shah (2006) 7; Rondinelli (1999) 3. 
54 Rondinelli (1999) 3. 
55 Manor (1999) 6-7; De Visser (2005) 15. 
56 Manor (1999) 6-7; De Visser (2005) 15. 
57 Rondinelli (1999) 2. 
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level government becomes accountable to the community within its territorial 
jurisdiction.58  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, decentralisation will be considered as devolution 
and is assumed to involve the transfer of political, financial and administrative 
functions and powers to local government units.    
3. DECENTRALISATION FOR DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
As indicated earlier, one of the aims this thesis is to examine whether the 
institutional design of Ethiopia’s decentralisation programme is suitable for 
development. This chapter, therefore, enquires into whether, how, and when 
decentralisation becomes an appropriate strategy for development. To this effect, 
the following sections will first create conceptual clarity on what development is. 
The subsequent sections will continue to examine the link, if any, between 
decentralisation and development.  
3.2. Conceptualising development  
The meaning of development has been discussed in various contexts for several 
decades. The industrial revolution was, for instance, viewed as a form of 
development.59 ‘Developing’ the colonies was also invoked to justify colonial 
occupation during the colonial era.60 Even the South African apartheid policy of 
racial segregation was embellished with a notion of development.61 However, 
serious attempts to conceptualise development and to determine the role that the 
                                                 
58 Manor (1999)  6-7; De Visser (2005) 15 
59 Anand (2009) 11.2. 
60 Pieterse (2001) 5-6. 
61 De Visser (2005) 10. 
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state can or should play in achieving development began only during the last days 
of World War II (WWII).62 Even then, the initial discourse on development was 
restricted to rebuilding the then war-ravaged Europe.63 
 
The discourse on development found a new thrust in the 1950s when a growing 
number of so called third world countries declared their political independence 
from colonial rule.64 These countries were generally typified by rampant poverty, 
manifested in low per capita income, short life expectancy, high rate of infant 
mortality, illiteracy, and other social ills.65 The discourse on development, 
therefore, began to focus on finding solutions to the social and economic 
quandaries of these countries.  
 
There was a general concurrence among developmental economists at the time 
that the social problems of the developing countries were rooted in their poor 
economic situation.66  The low level of industrialisation in these countries was in 
turn thought to be the main cause for their poor economic situation. From the 
1950s and for about three decades, therefore, the discourse on development 
centred primarily on whether and how the west should assist the developing states 
to achieve economic growth. 67 The modernisation and dependencia development 
theories, the two most influential development paradigms until the 1970s, 
accentuated the need to achieve economic growth through rapid industrialisation 
                                                 
62 Dube (1988) 1-3. 
63 Dube (1988) 1-3; Rapley (2002) 5-6. 
64 Rapley (2002) 5-6. See also Pieterse (2000); Coetzee (1989); Slater (1993); Carmen (1996). 
65 Rapley (2002) 10. 
66 Rapley (2002) 7. 
67 Rapley (2002) 7. 
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as sole solution for the social problems of developing nations. These two 
development theories also recognised that the state has a critical role to play in 
achieving economic growth in these countries. However, they diverged on 
whether the western countries should play any role in bringing about economic 
development in the developing countries. 68  
 
The above development paradigms paid little attention to the implications of the 
economic growth for the ordinary people. 69  Rather, the theorists assumed that 
economic growth, if realised, will eventually and naturally bring social benefits to 
the people in these countries in the form of access to education, adequate food, 
better health care, and the like. The positive impact of economic growth on 
human lives, if at all, was, therefore, to be an unintended offshoot of the 
economic growth.70  
 
Beginning from the 1970s scholars began to question the wisdom of 
conceptualising development solely in terms of economic growth. The proponents 
of the ‘alternative development’ paradigm, for instance, began to argue that 
development should be measured in light of human welfare it advances, and not 
                                                 
68 Modernisation theorists argued that the West should serve as a model and play central role in 
bringing about economic development in the developing countries by using its capital, 
‘entrepreneurial culture, and values’. Dependencia, on the other hand, blaming the west itself for 
the economic situation of the developing countries, maintained that the developing states should 
delink their economy from the west. They rather should formulate ‘autonomous national-
development strategy’. Matunhu (2011) 68; Anand (2009) 11.2 ff; Botchway (2001) 175; Pieterse 
(2001) 6; Gore (2000) 792; Coetzee (1989) 20; Webster (1995); Slater (1993) 421; Carmen (1996) 
92-95; Blaney (1996) 460; Smith (1979) 247; Vorster (1989) 55ff. 
69 Matunhu (2011) 67 & 70. 
70 Matunhu (2011) 67 & 70. 
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solely based on economic growth.71 They maintained that the effort rather should 
be ‘geared to the satisfaction of needs endogenous and self-reliant and in 
harmony with the environment’.72Alternative development advocated community 
centred and participatory development; hence it was dubbed ‘development from 
below’.73  
 
It was, however, in the 1990s that the discourse on development took another turn 
from advocating mere economic growth to promoting the need to ensure the 
betterment of human lives. It was well recognised at this time that the economic 
growth, though important, was not enough. It became increasingly accepted that 
the appropriate ‘goal and measure’ of development is human development which 
finds expression in improved living conditions of the citizens of a state.74 The 
‘human development’ paradigm was among the first development paradigms that 
rejected the idea of development as being exclusively economic growth.75 The 
premise of this paradigm is that economic growth, in terms of a rise in GNP and 
the amassing of commodities and wealth, on its own cannot be viewed as 
development. Rather, development should be measured against the ‘human 
goods’ that it advances. 76 Economic growth, therefore, should promote:- 
 
 ‘better nutrition and health service, greater access to knowledge, more secure 
livelihood, better working condition, security against crime and physical violence, 
                                                 
71 Pieterse (2001) 75. 
72 Pieterse (2001) 75. 
73 Pieterse (2001) 75. 
74 Pieterse (1998) 344. 
75 UNDP (1990) 9-16. 
76 UNDP (1990) 9. 
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satisfying leisure hours, and a sense of participating in the economic, cultural and 
political activities of their communities’. 77  
 
It is necessary to note that the concept of development as advancing human good 
recognises the value of national economic growth and increased per capita 
income. It, however, considers all these to have little worth unless translated into 
improved living conditions for the people. It was based on this perception that 
development or human development was defined as ‘a process of enlarging 
people’s choice’.78 The choices include a long and healthy life, education, and a 
decent living standard. The human choices are, however, not to be limited to the 
above. They may include a whole range of other choices which may be attained 
through time.79  
   
With a shift in the conception of development from mere economic growth to 
betterment of human lives, development is also articulated within the human 
rights discourse. From a human right perspective development is defined as: 
 
 ‘[A] comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the 
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals 
on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in 
the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom’.80 
 
                                                 
77 UNDP (1990) 9. 
78 UNDP (1990) 9-10. 
79 UNDP (1990) 9-10. 
80 General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 4 December (1986) Preamble. 
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After experimenting with several economic theories in the developing countries 
with a declared intention to bring about economic development, the World Bank 
also changed its approach to development in the 1990s. The 1999 World 
Development Report defined development as ‘sustainable improvements in the 
quality of life for all people...by reducing poverty, expanding access to health 
services, and increasing educational levels’.81 In short, development was defined 
as the opposite of poverty, poverty being a ‘pronounced deprivation in well-
being’.82 What is considered as poverty is not merely an economic deprivation in 
the form of low income and consumption.  It also encompasses lack of education, 
poor health, ‘voicelessness’, and ‘powerlessness’.83 
 
Furthermore, several writers have approached the concept of development from 
the point of view of human welfare. Amartya Sen rejects the conceptualisation of 
development exclusively in terms of economic growth, even though he admits 
that economic growth can be used to remove all ‘sources of unfreedom’. 84  
Sources of ‘unfreedom’, according to Sen, include ‘poverty, tyranny, poor 
economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public 
facilities as well as intolerance or over-activity or repression’.85  
 
De Visser also writes that development is more than mere economic growth. He 
contends: 
                                                 
81 World Bank (1999) 13. See also World Bank (2000) 1. 
82 World Bank (1999) 15. 
83 World Bank (1999) 15. 
84 Sen (2001) 1. 
85 Sen (2001) 1. 
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‘The argument that [economic] growth brings jobs, which expands the tax base, which 
then pays for service delivery misses the inevitability of the eschewed distribution of 
life chances.’86 
 
He then defines development as a ‘material wellbeing’ of the people which is 
achieved based on their ‘choices’ and on ‘equitable’ basis. 87   
3.3.Working definition of development  
As can be gathered from the above discussion, with a shift in the 
conceptualisation of development from mere economic growth to the betterment 
of human lives, certain elements stand out almost in all definitions of 
development. These are: the advancement of human good or welfare, fairness, the 
central importance of public participation in development, and sustainability. It 
should be stressed that no definition of development detracts from the 
significance of economic growth for development. However, the focus now has 
been on whether and how a state should use existing resources, no matter how 
little, to improve the lives of its people. This study will, therefore, take the above 
as the core elements of development.  
3.4. Why decentralisation for development?  
The discussion above has briefly depicted the evolution in the conceptualisation 
of development from mere economic growth to human good and welfare. The 
elements of development which will inform the discussion in this study also have 
been identified. The next task is to examine the link between development and 
decentralisation.  
 
                                                 
86 De Visser (2005) 12.  
87 De Visser (2005) 10-13.  
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Many scholars and global institutions, such as the World Bank, claim that 
decentralisation is an appropriate strategy for development. The case for 
decentralised development rests on the claim that decentralisation brings 
efficiency and institutional responsiveness in service delivery.88  It is also claimed 
that decentralisation enhances democracy and public participation which is a 
critical element of development. The following sections will discuss these and 
other justifications for decentralised development.  The dissensions against these 
claims will also be considered.     
3.4.1. ‘Deepening’ democracy  
Several scholars maintain that a genuine development can be achieved only 
through a democratic process which involves the direct and indirect participation 
of the people. As Botchway notes, development ‘is more visible in countries with 
a history of democratic governance’.89 Bahl also maintains that democracy is a 
‘necessary condition’ – and not merely a ‘desirable condition’- for successful 
                                                 
88 It is not clear whether decentralisation results in economic growth, especially in developing 
countries. There is no empirical evidence which either conclusively demonstrates or refutes the 
claim that decentralisation brings economic growth. Akai and Sakata, based on studies conducted 
in the USA, conclude that decentralisation results in economic growth. Conversely, other scholars 
such as Prud’homme, Zhang and Zou are sceptical about the suggestion that decentralisation 
brings economic growth in developing states. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab could not find 
conclusive empirical evidence that supports the argument that decentralisation brings economic 
growth.  Iimi, on the other hand, in a study conducted based on the macro-economic data of 51 
developed and developing states and using the analytical framework of Xie, Davoodi and Zou, 
who found in their studies that in developing countries decentralisation hampers economic growth 
and it had no relation with economic growth in developed states, found out that fiscal 
decentralisation has an optimistic impact on per capita GDP growth. Akai & Sakata (2002); 
Prud’homme (1995); Martinez-Vazquez & McNab (2005) 25ff; Iimi (2005) 450; Xie, Zou & 
Davoodi (1999). 
89 Botchway (2001) 195.  
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development.90 Crook and Sverrisson note that competitive and representative 
elections are the most preferable mechanisms to identify a community’s 
developmental preference.91 In addition, ‘voicelessness’ and ‘powerlessness’ 
themselves are forms of deprivation which result from a lack of democracy.92  
Based on these premises, scholars argue that decentralisation augments 
democracy and enhances the extent of public participation which is a condition 
for, and a central element of, development.  
3.4.1.1.Decentralisation, representative democracy, and development 
Crook and Sverrisson maintain that electoral democracy that aims to enhance 
development should be both representative and competitive.93 Representativeness 
is about ensuring that all opinions and political forces are somehow represented in 
local government.94 Competitiveness presupposes a ‘possibility of alternation’ in 
leadership which avails to ‘all political forces a real chance of winning’.95 
Competitiveness is critical since an unrelenting electoral triumph of one party is 
likely to lead to authoritarianism while an ever certainty of defeat creates apathy 
in community matters.96 It may even lead to violence. Hence, democratic 
competition should provide for a possibility of change in leadership.97 It is the 
possibility of being ousted from power through competitive elections that 
                                                 
90 Bahl (1999) 6. 
91 Crook & Sverrisson (1999) 8. 
92 World Bank (1999) 15.  
93 Crook & Sverrisson (1999) 8.  
94 Beetham (1996) 39.  
95 Sisk (2001) 120; Diamond (1996) 22. See also Arat (1995) 25. 
96 Sisk (2001) 120. 
97 Universal Declaration on Democracy (1997) Art 5. 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
motivates local authorities to be responsive to the public choices and to invest in 
pro-poor public services.98   
 
Several scholars argue that decentralisation augments the quality of 
representation. 99 This assertion is founded on the assumption that the existence of 
numerous electoral positions at multiple levels of government enhances the 
quality of representation.100  This, in turn, enhances the extent of public influence 
on developmental policies of a government.101 Therefore, as Crook notes, the 
existence of multiple representative institutions that results from decentralisation 
enlarges the degree of social representation.102 By so doing, it improves the 
effectiveness of elections as an expression of the kind of development members 
of a local community desire.  Manor also maintains that decentralisation enhances 
the quality of electoral participation by creating multiple representative 
institutions.103 Furthermore, as Lindberg notes, the very act of holding repeated 
elections ‘promotes and breeds democratic qualities: The more successive 
elections, the more democratic a nation becomes’.104 According to Lindberg, this 
is true even in African states where the most critical conditions for 
democratisation are seldom all to be present together.105  
 
                                                 
98 Gorden (2008) 238. 
99 Chhatre (2008) 15; Crook (2003) 79. 
100 Chhatre (2008) 15; Crook (2003) 79. 
101 Chhatre (2008) 15. 
102 Crook (undated) 408.  
103 Manor (1999) 8. 
104 Lindberg (2006) 149. 
105 Lindberg (2006) 149. 
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Crook also argues that decentralisation injects an element of competitiveness in 
elections even in countries where there are dominant political parties.106 The 
assumption here is that the policies, plans, and programmes of a single party are 
unlikely to satisfy all groups of the society in a country, even if they suit the 
majority of the people. Decentralisation affords minority parties opportunities to 
adapt their developmental agenda to suit the minority groups.107  This, in turn, 
increases the competitiveness of democratic elections in a country and provides 
small parties the opportunity to govern at local level. Crook invokes as examples 
South Africa, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mexico where decentralisation 
enhanced electoral competitiveness.108 The South Africa’s African National 
Congress (ANC) and the Ugandan National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) are 
dominant parties at national level in their respective countries. Yet a number of 
municipalities, including the City of Cape Town in South Africa and Kampala, 
the capital of Uganda, have been under the control of opposition parties 
 
However, many writers, including those who advocate decentralised 
development, let alone its critics, confess that the significance of decentralisation 
for deepening democracy and, therefore, for development, may not be as rosy as 
depicted above; especially not in developing African and other states.109  
Prud’homme, in particular, critically questions the validity of the democratic 
argument along with the assumptions on which the argument is founded. He is 
                                                 
106 Crook (undated) 408. 
107 Crook (undated) 408. 
108 Crook (undated) 408. 
109 Hiskey & Seligson (2003); Bardhan (2002) 188; Prud’homme (1995).  
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especially sceptical about the soundness of this argument so far as it relates to 
developing countries.110  
 
Prud’homme maintains that the above argument is founded on two flawed 
assumptions. Firstly, the democratic argument erroneously assumes that local 
citizens express their preferences through democratic elections and direct 
participation.111 Prud’homme contends that in developing countries voters seldom 
cast their votes based on issues. They rather vote by considering their ‘personal, 
tribal, or political party loyalties’.112 Besides, in many developing countries local 
elections are mere repetitions of national elections and hardly reflect local 
choices.113 Moreover, elections are not likely to be competitive in these countries 
as voters have no alternative choices. 114   
 
An empirical study in South Africa by Susan Booysen confirms this contention of 
Prud’homme for South African context. 115 According to this study, the African 
National Council (ANC) retained great support in local elections despite the fact 
that communities, in several ANC-run municipalities, were unhappy about the 
scale and quality of services they received. The communities rather opted to vote 
                                                 
110 Prud’homme (1995).  
111 Prud’homme (1995) 208. 
112 Prud’homme (1995) 208. 
113 Prud’homme (1995) 208. 
114 Alberto Porto and Natalia Porto refute this argument of Prud’homme based on their study in 
Argentina where voters replaced municipal officials of incumbent parties with that of the 
opposition parties as they were unhappy with the performance of the former. Their study also 
shows that the probability of a local official who performs poorly being replaced is greater in 
smaller communities. See Porto & Porto (2000) 145.   
115 Booysen (2007). 
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for the ANC but, at the same time, compel it through other mechanisms to 
improve service delivery.   
 
Second, Prud’homme argues, the democratic argument incorrectly assumes that 
elected officials would work to fulfil local preferences for they would lose their 
positions unless they do so. 116   Prud’homme says this is not necessarily true. In 
developing states elected officials are likely to retain their position even if they 
perform badly. Besides, they do not have the required resources to meet local 
preferences even if they desired to do so.117    
  
In addition, the claim that democratic competition translates to development is 
not supported with adequate empirical evidence.118  On the contrary, several 
empirical studies show that countries, which have little or no political 
competition, provide better services than those with competitive local democracy. 
As a UNDP report indicates the ineffectiveness of democratic countries, such as 
USA, in providing public health services attests to the fact that democracy does 
not necessarily translate to development.119 Likewise, Keefer and Khemani argue 
that in India the poor tend to vote in local elections than the middle class or the 
rich. Yet the poor often end up receiving poor services as politicians redirect 
resources to satisfy special interests of the rich. 120      
 
                                                 
116 Prud’homme (1995) 208.  
117 Prud’homme (1995) 208.  
118 UNDP (2010).  
119 UNDP (2010).  
120 See Keefer & Khemani (2004).  
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3.4.1.2.Decentralisation, public participation, and development 
Many scholars maintain that decentralisation enhances the scope of public 
participation which is, as indicated before,121a key element of development. This 
is based on two assumptions. The first is that communities prefer the decisions 
they make for themselves to those that are passed by another on their behalf. 122  
The second assumption is that the ‘degree of opportunity’ for participation is 
‘inversely proportional’ to the territorial and population sizes of a political unit.123 
This is so because direct participation entails direct and indirect personal contact 
between the people, the political institutions, and public authorities, which 
become possible only when a political unit is small in sizes.124 In a large 
community, as Blair maintains, a citizen’s voice is less likely to be heard. 
Therefore, the role of the citizens will be limited to rubber-stamping decisions 
made for them by others.125  
 
Based on the above premises, Briffault claims that decentralisation, by 
establishing small political units, enhances the extent of people’s participation.126 
As argued by several authors, decentralisation, by reducing the size of a state, 
                                                 
121 See above § 3.4.1.2. 
122 Schiller states while representative democracy is justified on the basis of efficiency, direct 
participation is justified because it realises political equality and actualises the claim that the 
people are the ‘final sources of legitimation for political decisions’. Schiller (undated) 4. See also 
Loughlin (2001) 19. 
123 Beetham (1996) 30; Tuene (1995) 15; Dowding (1996) 53. 
124 Tuene (1995) 15; Dowding (1996) 53; Blair (1981) 3; Beetham (1996) 30; Gillette (1997) 
1349. The European Charter on Local government provides that direct participation is ‘most 
directly exercised’ at local level. European Charter of Local Self-government (1985) Preamble. 
125 Blair (1981) 3; Kissam (2007) 60; Agrawal & Ribot (1999) 477. 
126 Briffault (1990) 395. 
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‘brings government closer to the people’.127 Local political institutions, in turn, 
amplify the chances of citizens to participate in political dialogues and debates.128 
As Agrawal and Ribot note, ‘at its most basic’ decentralisation seeks to satisfy 
one’s desire to have a say in one’s own affairs by transferring ‘power closer to 
those who are most affected by the exercise of power’.129 Frug states that 
‘individual involvement in decision-making is impossible except on a small scale’ 
which results from decentralisation.130 
 
Moreover, within the context of the public-participation argument, several writers 
maintain that decentralisation by enhancing direct participation provides a 
platform for public accountability.131 This argument is premised on the 
assumption that public control and accountability entail ease of access which in 
turn presupposes a physical proximity.132 Decentralisation establishes that close 
proximity between the citizens and their officials.133 Agrawal and Ribot maintain 
that by bringing government decisions to the people decentralisation enhances 
public accountability.134 
 
Furthermore, as Beetham argues, decentralisation not only increases one’s 
opportunity to participate, but also provides one with the incentive to 
                                                 
127 De Visser (2005) 24; World Bank (2004) 89; Shah (2004) 5; Smoke (2001) 3; Canel (2001) 26; 
Porras (2009).   
128 Kissam (2007) 60.  
129 Agrawal & Ribot (1999) 477. 
130 Frug quoted in Briffault (1990) 395.  
131 Tuene (1995) 15; Dowding (1996) 53; Beetham (1996) 38. 
132 Tuene (1995) 15; Dowding (1996) 53; Beetham (1996) 38. 
133 De Visser (2005) 24; Shah (2004) 5; Smoke (2001) 3. 
134 Agrawal & Ribot (1999) 477. 
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participate.135 Blair also argues that the many opportunities for participation at 
local level create a sense of common interest in community affairs.136 The 
immediacy of the effect of local decisions, according to Sisk, motivates the local 
community to play a part in the decisions.137 Thus, decentralisation provides the 
people not only with opportunities to participate in government but also with 
reasons and motivations to do so.138 
 
However, several writers critically question the above arguments. Parry and 
Moyser fear that participation may even reinforce inequality because the 
advantaged in a community may dominate the process.139 They also say that the 
most active participants do not necessarily represent the concerns of the majority 
of the people.140 Goetz and Jenkins also note:  
‘Poorer people usually have as little influence in their local settings as they do in the 
national political arena, and sometimes substantially less.....largely obscured from 
scrutiny of either the media or public advocacy groups, local political environment 
frequently reduce the incentive for elites to reorient their priorities.’141 
                                                 
135 Beetham (1996) 30. 
136 Blair (1981) 5.  
137 Sisk (2001) 11. See also Føllesdal (1998) 198 
138 Besides, frequent participation that results from decentralisation builds people’s skill to 
participate. As Brifault maintains, direct participation allows the public to learn ‘about the issues, 
processes and institutions of government’ and how to use and control them. Therefore, it affords 
the people the opportunity to build their ‘democratic skills’. Pateman (1985); Briffault (1990) 395.  
139 Parry & Moyser (1994) 54.  
140 Parry & Moyser (1994) 57. 
141 Goetz & Jenkins (1998) 10 quoted in Luckham, Goetz & Kaldor (2003) 32. 
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The issues of ‘elite capture’ and corruption are also often raised as counter-
arguments against the argument that decentralisation enhances public 
participation.142 The 2011 World Development Report states: 
‘Devolution can ... lead to a lack of local accountability and significant opportunities 
for corruption and reinforce or create elites who can use devolved power to pursue 
their own interests—to the detriment of both local and national interests.’ 143 
The ‘disadvantaged’, therefore, ‘may remain disadvantaged’ even in a 
decentralised system in spite of the enhanced representation and augmented 
opportunity for participation that decentralisation offers. Rather, local elites will 
use their ‘superior knowledge’ and connections to dominate and use local 
agendas for their own interest than for communal preferences.144 Veron and 
William argue that it is unlikely that the ordinary citizens will effectively 
participate if there is no developed tradition of political participation.145 It is 
much less likely where there is pervasive illiteracy, unfair distribution of 
economic power, lack of transparency in decision making, and the like.146  
3.4.2. Efficiency and institutional responsiveness 
The other argument in favour of decentralised development rests on the claim that 
decentralisation results in efficiency and institutional responsiveness in 
identifying and implementing development projects.147  The premise of this 
argument is that development, as a human good, entails the creation of efficient 
                                                 
142 Olowu (2001) 12; Bardhan (2002) 188; Shah (2004) 5; De Visser (2005) 29; Platteau & 
Gaspart (2003) 2. This phenomenon is called the ‘paradox of participation’. Crook & Sverrisson 
(1999) 3. 
143 World Bank (2011) 166. 
144 Olowu (2001) 12; Shah (2004) 5; De Visser (2005) 29; Platteau & Gaspart (2003) 2.. 
145 Veron & Williams (2006) 1925-1926. 
146 Veron & Williams (2006) 1925-1926. 
147 Porras (2009) 557; Robinsons (2007) 8; Barankey & Lockwood (2007) 1197ff; Bardhan (1996) 
140; Crook & Sverrisson (1999) 6; Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 151; Adamolekun (1991) 68. 
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and appropriate means of formulating and implementing development projects.148 
It also requires prompt response by a government to meet articulated priorities of 
the people.149  
 
Based on the above assumptions, scholars maintain that decentralisation enhances 
efficiency in a sense that it responds to people’s needs by creating ‘congruence’ 
between ‘community preferences’ and ‘public policies’.150 This argument either 
explicitly or implicitly assumes that decentralisation enhances democracy and 
public participation. 151   Democracy and public participation are, in turn, assumed 
to allow a smooth flow of information from the citizens to government and vice 
versa. The smooth information flow, in turn, is expected to make development 
programmes cost effective, efficient, and ‘responsive’ to the needs of the poor.152 
Shah states that ‘[l]ocal governments understand the concerns of local 
residents’.153 Bardhan also maintains that self-governing local communities have 
a superior mechanism of co-ordination and enforcement.154    
 
Within the context of efficiency and institutional responsiveness, it is claimed that 
decentralisation allows a simultaneous satisfaction of varied preferences.155 This 
argument is anchored in a postulate that communities in different localities are 
                                                 
148 Barankey & Lockwood (2007) 1198; Bardhan (1996) 140. 
149 Bardhan(1996) 140; Shah (1994) 7. 
150 Crook (2003) 78; Yilmaz (2001) 3; Ford (1999) 6-7; Crook & Sverrisson (1999) 6; Crook 
(1994) 341-342. 
151 Barankey & Lockwood (2007) 1198; Adamolekun (1991) 71. 
152 Porras (2009) 557; Barankey & Lockwood (2007) 1198; Robinsons (2007) 8; Bardhan (1996) 
140; Crook & Sverrisson (1999) 6; Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 151.  
153 Shah (1994) 16. 
154 Bardhan (1996) 141.  
155 World Bank (2004) 74-75; Smoke (2001) 6; Treisman (2007) 59. 
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likely to have different priorities. As Botchway argues, in a centralised system 
these priorities are liable to remain 'unaddressed’.156 A decentralised formulation 
and implementation of development programmes, in contrast, allows the various 
choices of the people of different localities to be observed.157 In addition, 
decentralisation allows the innovation of wide-ranging methods of tackling 
development related problems through trialling.158 As De Visser notes, 
‘constitutional scope for sub-national ‘dissent’ and a degree of competition with 
the central state is a fertile ground for innovative policies that benefit the entire 
state’.159  
 
Again within the efficiency argument, scholars maintain that decentralisation 
boosts constructive competition among local units. This is based on the postulate 
that individuals consider the variety and quality of services they will receive and 
the costs they will incur when choosing where to reside.  Hence, they ‘vote with 
their feet’ by relocating themselves and their businesses to localities where there 
is efficient service delivery.160 In a decentralised system, therefore, localities 
would strive to provide services efficiently in order to attract and retain 
investment and enlarge their tax bases.161   
 
                                                 
156 Botchway (2001) 208.  
157 Smoke (2001) 6; De Visser (2005) 23-24. 
158 De Visser (2005) 23-24. 
159 De Visser (2005) 24-25; Smoke (2003) 9. 
160 Shah (2006) 5; Bradhan (2002) 188; World Bank (1999) 108-109; Adamolekun (1991) 72. 
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Related factor is political accountability that decentralisation is claimed to 
promote. 162 This, according to Bardhan, makes the most important difference 
between an inefficient centralised system of service delivery and an efficient 
system of decentralised service delivery.163  Bardhan states that local politicians 
have a greater incentive to respond to local needs than politicians at national level 
since the former are accountable to small communities while the latter have 
‘wider constituencies’.164 In centralised systems, therefore, local communities are 
seldom able to correct the inefficiency of public authorities, even though they 
may be aware of it. A decentralised system, on the other hand, provides local 
communities with the institutional mechanism to correct such inefficiencies.165  
 
The efficiency argument is, however, critically questioned by several writers, 
especially to the extent that it relates to developing countries.166 Writers, such as, 
Prud’homme and Adamolekun argue that the efficiency and institutional 
responsiveness argument is based on an incorrect assumption that there are 
significant differences in the development choices of various localities of 
developing states.167  In developing countries the concern is not about satisfying 
‘thinly differentiated tests’ of various localities. It is rather delivering basic 
services to all localities.168  
 
                                                 
162 Bardhan (1996) 141. 
163 Bardhan (1996) 141. 
164 Bardhan (1996) 141.  
165 Bardhan (1996) 141. 
166 Bardhan (1996) 189; Prud’homme (1995) 208. 
167 Prud’homme (1995) 208; Prud’homme (2003) 21; Adamolekun (1991) 72.  
168 Prud’homme (1995) 208; Prud’homme (2003) 21. See also Bradhan (2002) 188. 
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Olowu, although in principle supportive of the efficiency argument, cautions that 
decentralisation may be too costly and administratively complex for African 
states as it involves institutional transformation.169  Prud’homme also states ‘[t]he 
poorer a country is, the less attractive decentralisation is’.170  The reason is that 
the creation and operation of a level of government entails several expenses 
which are only indirectly linked to development. 171 
 
Shah and others, while generally accepting the efficiency argument, maintain that 
decentralisation may result in ‘financial perversity’ harmfully affecting the 
national economy.172 The policy making power of lower level governments may 
hinder the power of the central government to use monetary and fiscal policies to 
ensure macro-economic stability (recession, inflation, balance of payments), 
equity (income distribution), and efficient resource allocation.173  
 
In addition, despite the theoretical elegance of the efficiency argument, several 
scholars who conducted empirical studies on the impact of ‘decentralisation’ on 
development maintain, decentralisation has little positive impact on 
development.174 Crawford, based on an empirical study in Ghana, maintains that 
                                                 
169 Olowu (2002) 13-14. 
170 Prud’homme (2003) 23. 
171 Prud’homme (2003) 23-24. 
172 Shah (2004) 5; Martinez-Vazquez & McNab (2005) 26; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider (2006) 2. 
173 Prud’homme (2003) 20; Sharma (2007) 38. On the other hand, some authors argue that 
decentralisation does not necessarily bring macro-economic instability. To the contrary, the 
countries with most stable macro-economy are the most decentralised countries such as 
Switzerland. Ebel & Ylmaz (2002) 152. 
174 See Scott (2009). 
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the success of ‘decentralisation’ in terms of reducing poverty is at best limited’.175  
Based on an empirical study in selected African, Asian and Latin American 
countries, Crook and Sverrisson observed that: 
 
‘The notion that there is a predictable or general link between decentralization of 
government and the development of more ‘pro-poor’ policies or poverty alleviating 
outcomes clearly lacks any convincing evidence.’176 
 
The study also found that ‘decentralisation' could not bring development in 
several countries. Rather, as another study by Crook shows, local units are used 
by the incumbent parties of many African countries, including Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda, to ‘create and sustain’ power-bases at local level and in the 
countryside.177  
 
 ‘In most of the African cases, by contrast, the linkage between the central 
government’s decentralisation scheme and local leaders had an entirely different 
purpose. Here, central governments were using funding either to create ab initio 
dependent local elite or to consolidate an alliance with local elites based on availability 
of patronage opportunities.’178 
 
In spite of the prevailing cynicism about the significance of decentralisation for 
development, many writers, including those who failed to find any positive 
factual connection between decentralisation and development, insist that 
decentralisation can deliver. Besides, it is unclear whether the institutional 
                                                 
175 See Crawford (2008). 
176 Crook & Sverrisson (2001) 52. 
177 Crook (2003) 85. 
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features that are deemed critical for decentralised development existed in the 
countries whose decentralisation programmes were alleged to have been 
unsuccessful. The existence of local authorities in a particular country does not 
mean the country is decentralised so long as the local authorities are unable to 
decide autonomously. 179 As some studies show, some elements which are critical 
for a successful decentralisation were lacking in the countries where 
decentralisation was allegedly failed to bring development.180 One such critical 
element is central government commitment. As Crook maintains, political 
commitment of the central government determines the institutional 
responsiveness of local government.181 According to Gordon, the major reason 
for the failure of decentralisation to bring development in Ghana was the national 
government’s lack of commitment to allow some measure of autonomy to local 
government.182 Measures that are taken by central governments to stifle local 
democracy, civil society engagement, public participation, accountability, and 
public discourses on poverty, are also considered factors harmfully affecting the 
success of decentralisation as a strategy for bringing about development.183      
3.4.3. Decentralisation and sustainable development   
As was stated above, sustainability is a critical element of development. 
Sustainable development bears the notion of preserving natural resources while, 
                                                 
179 See De Visser (2005) 30. 
180 See De Visser (2005) 30-31. 
181 Crook (2003) 77. 
182 Gordon (2008) 254. 
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simultaneously, ensuring the welfare of the people.184  It, therefore, bears a notion 
of inter-generational equity. As De Visser notes, the present generation has to 
take into account the rights of the generations-to-come while exploiting natural 
resources.185  
 
Scholars argue that decentralisation is a strategy preferable to a centralised one 
for implementing development projects while still conserving natural 
resources.186  This claim is based on another assumption that decentralisation 
enhances public participation which is in turn assumed to allow the 
implementation of development projects without harming natural resources. As 
Porras states, due to the fact that decentralised decision making is participatory, 
conservation of natural resources has increasingly become a local matter.187 
Westerland also argues that, in developing countries, decentralising control over 
environmental matters to local units is preferable as these countries lack capacity 
to implement a centralised and effective system of environmental conservation.188 
Bardhan maintains that communities in rural areas have more incentive to 
preserve the environment than national politicians,189 as their daily livelihood 
depends fundamentally on the local environmental resources.190 Central 
management of natural resources, he argues, not only is inefficient and 
                                                 
184 Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norway’s Prime Minister, defined sustainable development as ‘a 
development in which present generations find ways to satisfy their needs without compromising 
the chances of future generations to satisfy their needs’. Adam (2009) 6. 
185 De Visser (2005) 13. 
186 De Visser (2005) 13; Porras (2009) 542; Westerland (2007) 201; Bardhan (1996) 144.   
187 Porras (2009) 542.   
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ineffective, but also takes away the incentive for a local community to protect the 
environment.191    
 
Critics, however, maintain that a centralised system is economically efficient and, 
therefore, most appropriate means for planning and implementing a rational and 
an equitable use of natural resources.192  A decentralised system, on the other 
hand, is likely to be an impediment to efficient and rational use of natural 
resources.193 This is because conservation of natural resources and the interests of 
local communities are in conflict.194 Local communities are likely to destroy 
natural resources due to ‘ignorance’, ‘greed’, or ‘need’.195    
3.4.4. The danger of inequity   
As indicated above, equity or fairness in the distribution of resources and services 
is a central element of the notion of development. Some scholarly works show 
that decentralisation may result in inter-local inequity (also called vertical 
                                                 
191 Some empirical studies also demonstrate that democratic local institutions are effective in 
natural resource conservation. In India, a ‘Joint Forest Management Programme’ which enabled 
the government to put more than two million hectare of forest under local community protection, 
is found to be a less costly and more effective scheme of forest protection. There are also other 
similar initiatives in other countries including CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and the Gestion des 
Terroirs of Mali. Having recognised the importance of participatory natural resource 
conservation, Local Agenda 21 which stemmed from the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit recognises 
the need for the involvement of local communities. It thus, requires states to ‘promote and provide 
opportunities for the participation of interested parties, including local communities and 
indigenous people in the development, implementation and planning of national forest policies’. 
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inequity) and intra-local inequity (horizontal, personal, or household inequity). 196 
Intra-local inequity (horizontal inequity) is expected to arise for local units might 
be unwilling or unable to ensure equitable resource distribution among their 
residents.197 The argument that pertains to vertical inequity is predicated on the 
supposition of the existence of disparity in resources and tax bases among 
localities.198 Such disparity is liable to exist because ‘[i]ncome is often 
geographically concentrated, both because of agglomeration economies and 
initial endowments of natural resources and infrastructural facilities’.199 These 
variances, coupled with exclusionary use of resources, are feared to cause or 
exacerbate inequitable distribution of wealth which, in turn, is feared to extend 
the ‘intra-national’ poverty gaps.200 This is one of the strongest arguments 
levelled against decentralisation.  
 
Many scholars agree that the above concerns are not baseless. However some still 
maintain that equity should not be confused with uniformity:  A certain variation 
in the kind and extent of services that are delivered by different local units should 
be tolerated.201  Others argue, local government, in particular metropolitan cities 
may ensure equity through redistribution.202  Most importantly, it is incorrect to 
                                                 
196 World Bank (1999) 109; Bardhan (2007) 189; Prud’homme (2003) 21; Mckinlay (2006) 59. 
197 Bardhan (2007) 189; World Bank (1999) 109; Prud’homme (2003) 21. 
198 Prud’homme (2003) 21; Olowu (2001) 13; Bardhan (2007) 189.  
198 Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 155; Fjeldstad (2001) 12. 
199 Bardhan (2007) 189.  
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assume that the central government has no role in a decentralised system.203 
Inequitable distribution of resources is likely to occur where an institutional 
device for redistribution does not exist.204 Redistribution has two dimensions; 
inter-local equity and intra-locality equity.205 Horizontal equity is related to 
ensuring equivalent service delivery in all localities while intra-local equity refers 
to equivalent income distribution among local citizens. 206 The central 
government is expected to play a critical role maintaining horizontal equity 
through redistributive policies.207  As Shah argues, it is not preferable to put local 
governments in charge of re-distribution since they have limited resources and 
expenditure and re-distributional capacity.208 ‘Equalisation grants’, conditional 
and unconditional grants should rather be used by the central government to 
maintain horizontal equity.209 In maintaining intra-local equity, even though local 
government may play a role, still needs the assistance of the central 
government.210 
3.4.5. Concluding remarks  
The foregoing discussion shows that decentralisation may potentially bring about 
participatory, equitable, and sustainable development. It may, however, result in 
marginalisation of the poor and the uneducated, unfair distribution of resources, 
and environmental degradation. On The other hand, as indicated in the 
                                                 
203 De Visser (2005) 45.  
204 De Visser (2005) 45; Seer (1979) 11. 
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introductory chapter, 211 decentralisation is not an option that a state can 
disregard. Global economic and local political forces push countries to undertake 
some form of decentralisation, sometimes even if unwillingly. The question, 
therefore, is not whether a country should implement some form of 
decentralisation programme. It is rather how a state can design its decentralised 
system of governance in such a way that the developmental potential of local 
units can be utilised. The following sections will discuss the institutional features 
that are claimed by development scholars and institutions to be important for 
decentralised development.  
3.5.Institutional features of a decentralised development  
Decentralisation on its own is ‘neither good nor bad’: its success or failure hinges 
on the nature or design of the decentralisation process.212 Moreover, there is no 
specific institutional design of decentralisation that brings development under all 
circumstances.213 The design of a decentralised system, therefore, needs to be 
country-specific and contextualised.214 Yet, international development 
institutions, such as the Wold Bank, as well as development scholars maintain 
that there are certain institutional features that are likely to impact the success of a 
decentralisation programme. This claim is based on international practice and the 
experience of the past several decades. 215 These institutional features are political 
autonomy, fiscal autonomy, administrative autonomy, and central supervision and 
co-operation.  
                                                 
211 See chapter 1; § 1. 
212 World Bank (1999) 107; World Bank (2000) 106; Prud’homme & Shah (2002) 2; Sharma 
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3.5.1. Political autonomy  
Political autonomy is inherent in the notion of devolution.216 Moreover, according 
to Bahl, political autonomy is ‘the most crucial element’ of decentralised 
development.217 Political autonomy is fundamentally about the existence of local 
government that regulate its own affairs without interference from the centre. It, 
therefore, implies the certainty of the existence of local government. It also 
implies the establishment of local political structures Moreover, it implies 
devolving suitable functions and powers to local government.218  
3.5.1.1.‘Certainty of existence’  
The continuous existence of local government is the foundation of local 
government political autonomy.219  Local government cannot be considered 
politically autonomous if it can be freely abolished by a central government. 
Certainty of existence of local government involves three interrelated matters: 
The first element of certainty of existence relates to a secure and continued 
existence of local government as a sphere or level of government.220 Local 
government, as a level of government, should neither be created nor abolished at 
the caprice of the centre. An unrestrained central discretion in this regard puts 
local government under a constant threat of abolition and hinders its ability to 
formulate a long-term development plans.221 As the World Bank accentuates, a 
certain measure of permanency in a decentralisation programme ‘reduces 
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uncertainty’ and ‘provides a common ground for all players in the political 
processes’.222  
 
The question, therefore, is how the existence of local government can be ensured.  
Undoubtedly, the ultimate guarantee for the continued existence of local 
government emanates from a genuine conviction of the centre in the 
developmental merits of local government. As the earlier discussion shows, a lack 
of such conviction is the main cause of the failure of decentralisation programmes 
in several countries.223 The formal mechanism for ensuring the existence of local 
government is its being recognised as a sphere/level of government in a national 
constitution.224 This is why various international instruments, including, the 
Aberdeen Agenda225  and the European Charter of Local Self-Government, and 
the 1993 International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) World Wide Toronto 
Declaration of Local Self-government, call for the constitutional recognition of 
local government as ‘a sphere of government’.226  
 
The constitutional recognition of local government as an autonomous level of 
government is also in keeping with the increasing political and economic role that 
local government units are playing. Local government units, especially 
                                                 
222 The World Bank (2000) 113.  
223 See above at § 3.4.2. 
224 Steytler (undated) 14. 
225 The ‘Aberdeen: Commonwealth principles on good practice for local democracy and good 
governance’ was passed in the conference of the Common Wealth Local Government Conference 
that was held in Aberdeen, Scotland. 
226 The European Charter of Local Self-Government (1986) Art 2. Aberdeen Agenda (2005) Art 1. 
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international mega-cities, play central role in economic and political affairs. 227 
Their growing social and economic role calls for corresponding constitutional 
recognition to local government.228 This is why countries such as Germany, India, 
and South Africa, have constitutionally recognised local governments ‘as 
autonomous political [entity]’.229  
 
The second element of certainty of existence pertains to ensuring that local 
government is established in every part of a country on a wall-to-wall basis. 230 As 
De Visser argues, developmental local government is not needed only in certain 
parts of a country. Fairness dictates that, if decentralisation brings development, 
all people, regardless of where they live, should be able to share from its 
benefits.231 This does not, however, mean that all local units across a country 
should assume an identical structure or function. Localities with different social 
and economic realities may require different structures. For instance, rural and 
urban local government units may have different structures.232 According to the 
World Bank, it may be necessary to establish a local government structure with 
different tiers and jurisdictions depending on a country’s ‘physical characteristics, 
its ethnic and political makeup, and possibly its income level’.233 
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The third element of certainty of existence relates to ensuring the continued 
existence of each individual unit of local government. This does not, however, 
mean that no change may be introduced to the boundaries of local government. 
Rather, it means that it is useful to have clear criteria and transparent procedures, 
which involves the community, for so doing. The World Bank, therefore, 
accentuates that it is important to take into consideration, in demarcating local 
boundaries, factors, such as, territorial and population sizes, resources, 
developmental level and rural-urban differences. 234  It is also important to consult 
the relevant community in the process altering local boundaries.235  Once 
established, the territorial boundaries of individual local unit should not be 
haphazardly altered. The central government should, therefore, be restrained from 
randomly altering local boundaries through, for instance, division or 
amalgamation. 
3.5.1.2.Political structure and local democracy 
The other institutional feature of political autonomy is the establishment of a 
political structure at local level. As was indicated above the establishment of 
political organs such as representative councils and other political organs is a 
defining element of devolution. 236 The notion of political autonomy implies that 
the political organs, in particular the representative councils, are democratically 
constituted.237 This is especially important because the efficiency and 
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responsiveness of decentralised development depends on the success of local 
government as a democratic institution.238 Local democracy is also critical for 
development, not to be an imposition from above but to be achieved through the 
‘active, free and meaningful’ participation of the people.239 A representative and 
competitive local democracy is, therefore, considered an important feature of 
political autonomy and a crucial prerequisite for decentralised development.  
  
Local democracy, in turn, implies conducting regular, free, and fair elections. 
This, in turn, depends on several institutional requirements. These may include: a 
suitable electoral system, constituency delimitation, political parties, an 
independent or balanced election administration organ, dispute settlement 
mechanism and the like.240 However, one issue persist as far as local elections 
and decentralised development are concerned. This is whether local elections 
should involve political parties.  
Political parties 
There is a disagreement among some writers on whether local elections should be 
partisan or non-partisan. There are arguments both for and against the 
involvement of political parties in local elections. Those who oppose partisan 
local elections maintain that local government deals with ‘bread and butter’ issues 
and no division along party lines should exist regarding these matters.241 Besides, 
partisan local elections are likely to contaminate policy with patronage, 
clientelism, and temporary political gains, thereby diverting the focus from the 
                                                 
238 See above at § 3.4.1 & 3.4.2.  
239 See above at § 3.3. 
240 See Goodwin-Gill (2006). 
241 Packel (2008) 3. 
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essential issues.242 Furthermore, party politics discourages openness, stifles 
debate, and takes decisions away from the local community.243  
 
Supporters of partisan local elections, on the other hand, maintain that partisan 
local elections facilitate the link between local government and the central 
government.244 It also signifies the recognition of the key role that local 
government plays in a democratic process. In addition, the ‘butter and bread’ 
argument does not hold water given the growing political and economic role of 
local government. Moreover, excluding the involvement of political parties would 
take away from small parties the opportunity that results from decentralisation. 
Moreover, according to Koryakov and Sisk, political parties can formulate 
comprehensive policies that articulate and combine public interests and 
preferences on a wide range of issues unlike other organisations which deal with 
specific issues. 245 In addition, political parties train political leaders and educate 
and mobilise citizens to be a politically active society.246  
 
In any case, political parties would not refrain from influencing local politics by 
instilling people amenable to them even if they are formally excluded from local 
elections. In the USA, for instance, where local elections are mostly held on non-
partisan basis, political parties often interfere by endorsing and campaigning on 
                                                 
242 Packel (2008) 3. 
243 This was more or less the finding of the New York City Charter Revision Commission. Staff 
Report to the New York City Charter Revision Commission (2003).  
244 Packel (2008) 3. 
245 Koryakov & Sisk (undated) 23. 
246 Koryakov & Sisk (undated) 23. 
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behalf of certain candidates. 247  In South Africa it is alleged that political parties 
often interfere in the work of ward committees which are legally designed to be 
non-partisan. Such practices allow a backdoor deal and veil transparency.248 The 
above controversy aside, practice shows that in many countries, local elections 
are conducted on multi-party basis.  
 Institutional framework for direct public participation  
As was pointed out above, public participation is a key element of decentralised 
development. Public participation is a process ‘continuum’ that takes place at 
different ‘levels’ and may bring various outcomes.249 The various levels of public 
participation may need various institutional arrangements.  As a minimum, local 
government should be transparent about its works and allow the local community 
to access information. In addition, local government may take active measures to 
publicise its performances. To this effect, a legal framework may require that 
local government to be transparent and publicise how it works. 250  Public 
participation may also require an institutional system for public consultation and 
lodging petitions which251 should involve local communities both in their 
individual and collective capacities through civic society organisations (CSO).252   
                                                 
247  Staff report to the New York City Charter Revision Commission (2003). 
248  Packel (2008) 3. 
249 Smith (2003) 36; Steytler & De Visser (2007) 6-11.  
250 Smith (2003) 36; Steytler & De Visser (2007) 6-11.  
251 Steytler & De Visser (2007) 6-11. 
252 Civil organisation or civil society organisations (CSOs) are 'associated movements and 
individualities which participate in exercising social control over political class, without formally 
or exclusively belonging to it’. Currently, there is a general consensus that no democracy can 
thrive devoid of CSO. The Universal Declaration on Democracy provides that an active CSO is an 
essential element of democracy. The Aberdeen Agenda also provides that ‘[t]he building of a 
robust relationship between local government and civil society is central to local democracy’. 
According to McGinnis civil society organisations have greater influence in a decentralised 
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3.5.1.3.Devolution of original, relevant, suitable, and clearly defined functions  
Devolution of functions to local government is another key element of political 
autonomy. Scholars argue that local government should have original, suitable, 
and clearly defined developmental mandates.253  
Original functions  
De Visser argues that local government’s functions should be ‘original’ on which 
it is a ‘primary decision maker’. The way to do so is to define local government’s 
functions in a national constitution.254 This is in line with the international 
trend.255 The constitutions of several countries contain a list of local government 
functions. For instance, local government competences are listed in Schedule 4B 
and 5B of the South African Constitution.256  The Nigerian Constitution also 
contains a list of functions from which the states may select and transfer to local 
government.257  
Relevant for development and suitable for local government   
De Visser stresses that it is important to ensure that the functions that are 
transferred to local government are relevant for decentralised development. A 
function is considered relevant for development if it is useful for enhancing the 
welfare of local communities.258  Functions relating to public health, education, 
housing, drinking water etc are considered relevant for development. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
system and at local level. Sèhouèto (1997); Ake (2000) 134; Universal Declaration on Democracy 
(1997) Art 18; Aberdeen Agenda (2005) 5; McGinnis (2002) 491. 
253 De Visser (2005) 39. See also World Bank (1999); Bahl (1999); Shah (2004). 
254 De Visser (2005) 271. 
255 See Watts (2000). 
256 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). 
257 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). 
258 De Visser (2005) 40; World Bank (1999); Shah (2004) 9. See also Tapscott (2004).  
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As stated above, the functions are devolved to local government should be not 
only relevant for development but also suitable for local government. ‘Suitability’ 
has to do with the human and institutional capacity of a local government unit to 
effectively and efficiently exercise a particular function. 259 According to Manor, 
it is not prudent to devolve complex functions which are beyond the human and 
institutional capabilities of local government.260 It is not also sensible to devolve 
functions that extend beyond a geographical jurisdiction of a local unit. 261  
According to Shah, in determining the suitability of a function to local 
government, an asymmetrical approach, rather than ‘one-size-fits-all’, is 
preferable which takes into account the nature, size, capacity, and financial 
resources of local units. 262  For instance, it is necessary to consider whether the 
particular local unit is an urban or rural to determine the appropriateness of a 
particular function to it.263  
 
There are different theories regarding the best way to determine functions that 
may be devolved to local government units.264 In general, the principle of 
subsidiarity is proposed as the most preferred approach for determining local 
government functions.265 
                                                 
259 Manor (1999) 81. 
260 Manor (1999) 81. 
261 Manor (1999) 81. 
262 Shah (2004) 9.  
263 De Visser (2005) 40. 
264 These include the fiscal equivalency theory, the decentralisation theorem, the correspondence 
principle, and the principle of subsidiarity.  Shah (2006) 3-4.   
265The Aberdeen Agenda (2005) Art 5. The principle of subsidiarity, even if not expressly 
mentioned, is provided impliedly in international treaties such as the European Charter of Local 
government and the Toronto Declaration. European Charter of Local Government (1987) Art 4(3). 
See also The Toronto Declaration (1993) Art 3(1).     
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The principle of subsidiarity  
The principle of subsidiarity is a complex concept with multitude of features. 266  
The feature of subsidiarity that is relevant for this discussion, however, is what is 
called ‘institutional subsidiarity’: 
 
‘Institutional subsidiarity, as a force in societal life, constrains any more encompassing 
or superordinate institution (or body or community) to refrain from taking for its 
account matters which a more particular, subordinate institution (or body or 
community) can appropriately dispose of, irrespective of whether the latter is an organ 
of State or of civil society.’267   
 
The principle of institutional subsidiarity, in its classical sense, regulates the 
centralisation of competences rather than their decentralisation.268 Under 
institutional subsidiarity a decentralised exercise of power is the norm. It does not 
assume the existence of a centre with original powers from which power streams 
down to the local units like decentralisation does. On the contrary, it views the local 
units as the original custodians of political power and regulates when and how the 
centre can justifiably assume some of these powers and functions. 269   
 
The principle of institutional subsidiarity has certain philosophical 
underpinnings.270 The liberal conception of individual sovereignty is one of the 
                                                 
266There are also similar concepts such as strategic subsidiarity, jurisdictional subsidiarity, 
adjudicative subsidiarity etc. For a detailed discussion see De Visser (2010) 91. See also Du 
Plessis (2006) 209-218. 
267 Du Plessis (2006) 209-10; See also Føllesdal (1998) 190.  
268 De Visser (2010)104. 
269 De Visser (2010)104 
270 For detailed discussion of these justifications see Føllesdal (1998).  
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philosophical bases of subsidiarity.271  The reasoning is that associations of a 
family, communal or cultural nature are essential for the development of the 
individual, and that government should not assume the role of these associations.272  
Similarly, the Catholic religious conception of social philosophy, as espoused 
initially by Pope Pius XI and later by Pope Leo XIII, emphasises the importance of 
family and civic associations for the individual.273 Thus, it rules out any 
government interference with these bodies except where justified by a ‘common 
good’.274 Subsidiarity is also linked to the efficiency argument that was discussed 
above.275  Within the context of development this argument is based on the premise 
that developmental preferences vary depending on ‘external or internal parameters 
such as geography and tastes and values’.276 Local decisions should be left to local 
decision makers as they ‘have a better grasp of affected preferences and 
alternatives, making for better service’.277 The principle is also defended on 
democratic principles. The argument in this respect is that only those who have a 
direct interest in a particular public service should be allowed to deliberate on its 
delivery.278 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is, thus, in a sense ‘proscriptive’ or ‘protective’ as it 
restricts the central government from assuming a particular task unless it is justified 
                                                 
271 Føllesdal (1998) 200-205 
272 Føllesdal (1998) 208. 
273 Føllesdal (1998) 207-208; De Visser (2010) 92. 
274 Føllesdal (1998) 208. 
275 See above at § 3.4.2. Føllesdal (1998) 205. 
276 Føllesdal (1998) 205-206. 
277 Føllesdal (1998) 206. 
278 De Visser (2010) 93. 
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by efficiency or necessity.279 Subsidiarity protects local units from undue intrusion 
by the centre.  Subsidiarity may also be considered as ‘prescriptive’ for it enjoins 
the centre to assume a particular task when its assumption of the task is justified by 
‘comparative efficiency’ and/or dictated by ‘necessity’.280 Moreover, the principle 
of subsidiarity both as a proscriptive and prescriptive principle is ‘biased’ in favour 
of local units. It thus presupposes that power ‘originally rests with the subnational 
units and is delegated upward at [their] discretion and not at the discretion of the 
central authority’.281  
  
Even though initially  the principle of subsidiarity is conceptualised with a 
‘automatic bias’ in favour of sub-national units in the allocation of competencies, 
now, however, it is given a rather toned down meaning in different constitutional 
and legal instruments.  De Visser, for instance, argues that there is no automatic 
assumption under the European Charter on Local Government that power belongs 
to local units. However, there is a ‘preference’ in their favour in the allocation of 
competencies.282 De Visser also argues that the approach to the subsidiarity 
principle which has been infused in the South African Constitution is that of 
‘functionality’'.283       
 
 
                                                 
279 Føllesdal (1998) 195. 
280 Føllesdal (1998) 195. 
281 De Visser (2010)104. 
282 De Visser (2010) 99. 
283 The principle of subsidiarity as provided under section 156(4) of the South African Constitution 
requires the assignments functional competences to local government to be based on the principle of 
‘functionality’ which embodies both ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’.De Visser (2010) 102. 
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Clearly defined functions  
Clarity in the definition of local government functions is an important 
consideration in devolving functions to local government. 284  This prevents 
uncertainty about who does what. It also helps ensure that locally identified 
priorities are implemented at local level as opposed to ‘populist’ projects with no 
or transient benefits or ‘centrally determined programmes’.285 Moreover, clarity is 
a key for ensuring downward accountability.286 Based on an empirical study in 
seven African countries, Olowu and Smoke maintain that clearly defined local 
government function is a precondition for a successful decentralisation 
programme.287 Lack of clarity, in the division of competences among different 
levels of government, results ‘in wasteful redundancy in service provision’.288 It 
also creates confusion about which level government is responsible for the 
provision of certain service.289 Moreover, it makes holding local authorities 
accountable difficult, if not impossible, as local citizens will not be able to know 
the kinds and extent of services that they may justifiably expect from local 
government. 290 McLure and Martinez-Vazquez maintain that one of the critical 
errors in the design of decentralisation in some Latin American countries was the 
transferring of revenue to local government without clearly defining its 
                                                 
284 Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 161; De Visser (2005); World Bank (1999) 115; Olowu & Smoke 
(1999) 8; Steytler & Fessha (2007) 324. 
285 Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 161. 
286 World Bank (1999) 115 
287 Olowu & Smoke (1999) 8. 
288 Steytler & Fessha (2007) 324; Olowu & Smoke (1992) 8. 
289 Olowu & Smoke (1992) 8. 
290 Steytler & Fessha (2007) 324. 
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competences.291 The lack of clarity in functional competences resulted in a ‘weak 
decentralised system’ and financially ‘overburdened’ centre.292 
 
Yet, the definition of local government competences should not be too detailed. 
As Botchway argues it is important to afford local government a certain measure 
of discretion. 293 ‘Extreme formalism’ discourages creativity in tackling social 
problems. Moreover, it counters local autonomy by allowing the centre to decide 
developmental projects that should be undertaken at local level under the pretext 
of defining the functional competences of local government.294  
3.5.1.4.Political Power 
The notion of political autonomy implies the transfer to local government of full 
and exclusive political powers in certain functional areas.295 Political power may 
include the power to formulate policies, to legislate, and to execute local 
legislation and decisions. Thus, political power embodies the power of local 
government to have a ‘final say’ on its functions to the exclusion of any other 
level of government. As De Visser notes if development is to be based on the 
preferences of the local community, local government should be able to ‘translate 
locally generated [policies] into [laws]’.296 The legislative powers of local 
government should be original and emanate directly from a constitution. Thus, 
                                                 
291 McLure and Martinez-Vazquez (undated) 1. 
292 McLure and Martinez-Vazquez (undated) 1. 
293 Botchway (2001) 201. 
294 Botchway (2001) 201. Steytler calls the over-regulation of local government in South Africa 
‘strangulation of local government’. See Steytler (2008). 
295 European Charter of Local Government (1987) The World Wide Declaration of Local Self-
Government (1993) Art 3(4). 
296 De Visser (2005) 272. 
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local government should be ‘the first entity to fill legislative space with 
regulation’.297    
3.5.2. Financial autonomy 
Financial autonomy is a defining element of devolution.298 It is also among the 
most critical institutional features of a successful decentralisation programme that 
achieves development.299 The World Bank states ‘independent tax bases and 
sources of credit’ directly affect the political and administrative autonomy of 
local government.300 
3.5.2.1.Taxes and fees 
Financial autonomy implies revenue raising and expenditure powers.301 The 
revenue raising power of local government involves taxing and borrowing 
powers.302 The taxing powers of local governments include the power to 
determine the tax rates, to collect the taxes, and to spend the revenues collected 
from the taxes.303 This will help local government preserve its political and 
administrative autonomy and render it responsive to the preference of, and 
accountable to, local citizens.304  It is stressed in many scholarly works that it is 
important to maintain a balance between the revenue raising powers of local 
government and its developmental responsibilities and expenditure needs.305 This 
is, according to Shah, critical for shielding local government’s political and 
                                                 
297 De Visser (2005) 272.   
298 Rondinelli (1999) 2. 
299 Gordon (2008) 253; Olowu & Smoke (1999) 8. 
300 World Bank (1999) 117. 
301 Shah (2004) 17ff; World Bank (1999) 117; Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 147; Bahl (1999) 10. 
302 Bahl (1999) 7.  
303 Shah (2004) 21. 
304 Bahl (1999) 10; De Visser (2005) 41; Shah (2004) 38. 
305 World Bank (1999) 117; Sharma (2005) 39; Bahl (1999) 7; Shah (2004) 18. 
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administrative autonomy from central intrusion and to maintain its downward 
accountability.306 McLure states:- 
 
‘Subnational governments that lack independent sources of revenue can never truly 
enjoy fiscal autonomy; they may be– and probably are – under the financial thumb of 
the central government.'307 
 
The taxes that are considered suitable to local government are direct taxes such as 
user charges, property taxes, and personal incomes taxes.308 However, local 
government’s taxing and expenditure power should not be totally unfettered. 
Unfettered local taxing power has the potential to harmfully impact on the 
capacity of the central government to maintain equity and regulate national 
macro-economy. 309 
3.5.2.2.Borrowing  
There is a prevailing apprehension about local borrowing.  Many fear that local 
borrowing has the potential to destabilise the national macro-economy.310  This is 
based on the assumption that local borrowing often presupposes an explicit or 
implicit guarantee by the central government which encourages lenders to extend 
unwarranted loans to local government. 311  It also allows local government to 
                                                 
306 Shah (2004) 17. 
307 McLure & Martinez-Vazquez (undated) 2. See also Weingast (2007) 14. 
308 World Bank (1999) 120; Sharma (2005) 39; Bahl (1999) 7; Shah (2004) 18. 
309 World Bank (1999). 
310 Ahmad (1999) 32. 
311 Ahmad (1999) 32. 
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spend excessively. 312  In the end, the central government will be faced with 
‘unplanned fiscal liabilities’. 313  
 
The World Bank, therefore, stresses that the central government should use its 
regulatory power to control local government borrowing, if local borrowing is at 
all permitted. 314  It may, for instance, impose a limit on the amount that local 
government may borrow annually.315  It may also require a local government to 
secure prior authorisation before borrowing, especially borrowing from foreign 
sources. The World Bank also accentuates that the central government should 
consistently refrain from guaranteeing local government’s loan or from bailing 
out local government units if the latter default. 316 This will encourage lenders to 
take extra care before extending loans to local government units.   
3.5.2.3.Inter-governmental transfers  
Whilst internally raised revenue is inherent in local autonomy and vital for 
downward accountability, the reality is that local government is rarely able to 
raise sufficient own revenue.317 This is especially true in Africa where local 
government, save for a few urban areas, suffers from severe financial limitations. 
Moreover, there is almost always a disparity in resources and tax-bases among 
localities. This necessitates a scheme of revenue transfer from the central 
                                                 
312 Ahmad (1999) 32. 
313 This was the case in countries such as Brazil and Argentina where uncontrolled sub-national 
borrowing led to inflation destabilising the macro-economy of these countries. Ahmad (1999) 32. 
See also Hoffman (1999) 89. 
314 World Bank (1999) 120. 
315 World Bank (1999) 120. 
316 World Bank (1999) 117. 
317 Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 148; World Bank (1999) 117. 
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government to local government. It may also require financial equalisation 
scheme that favours local units with weaker financial sources in order to maintain 
horizontal equity.318  
 
Shah argues it is preferable to use formula-based general purpose grants to 
transfer revenues to local government units, rather than those that are determined 
on discretionary basis.319 Such grants, he maintains, are expected to ‘augment the 
budget resources’ of local government without compromising its autonomy.320 
General purpose grants are also in keeping with the assumption that local 
government is better informed of the preference of a local community than the 
central government.321 A grant made on a discretionary basis, on the other hand, 
is prone to ‘political manipulation’ which would lead to uncertainties and, 
therefore, discourage local ‘fiscal planning and effective budgeting’.322  
 
Moreover, the central government should cover the financial costs of functions 
which local government discharges on the central government’s behalf.323 It may 
also use financial transfers to ensure that a particular sector is given special 
attention by local government.   
 
                                                 
318 World Bank (1999) 117; Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 148. 
319 Shah (2010) 3. 
320 Shah (2010) 3. 
321 Prud’homme & Shah (2002) 2-3. 
322 Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 148. 
323 World Bank (1999) 117. 
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The World Bank warns that grants should not replace local internal revenue nor 
should they be excessively large.324 Local taxes are necessary to ‘ensure that 
subnational governments face, at least to some degree, the political consequences 
of their spending decisions’.325   
3.5.3. Administrative autonomy  
Administrative autonomy is a defining element of devolution.326  Administrative 
autonomy is essentially about local government being able to implement its own 
policies, by-laws, and decisions using its own administrative structure and 
personnel. Administrative autonomy, therefore, has two elements. The first 
element is the power of local government to determine the structure of its 
administrative.327 The power of local government to determine its own 
administrative structure provides it a certain degree of flexibility to respond to 
local situation. The second element of administrative autonomy relates to whether 
local government may hire and fire its own personnel, and to hold them 
accountable.328 This is important because, as Olowu and Smoke state, in many 
African countries the central government is in charge of hiring and firing local 
personnel. The local personnel are, therefore, controlled by the line ministries at 
national or state level rather than to the political organs of the local government. 
They maintain that the ‘stifling’ effect of such control is among the critical 
reasons for the failure of decentralisation to bring development in many of these 
                                                 
324 World Bank (1999) 117.  
325 World Bank (1999) 117. See also Shah (2010) 3.  
326  Rondinelli (1999) 2; Olowu & Smoke (1999) 3; Gordon (2008) 253. 
327 These two elements are visible in the European Charter of Local government (1987) 6 (1). See 
also the World Wide Declaration of Local Self-Government (1993) Art 5 (1). 
328 Shah (2004) 5; World Bank (1999) 122. 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
states.329 Therefore, local administrative staff should be controlled by and 
accountable to local political organs.  
3.5.4. Central supervision and inter-governmental co-operation    
Devolution is by definition only about local political, financial and administrative 
autonomy. However, as was discussed above unfettered local autonomy has 
several negative effects including inequity, corruption, elite capture and the 
like.330 In order to ensure the success of decentralisation as a strategy for 
development, while at the same time mitigating its harmful consequences, many 
scholars suggest that it is important to complement local autonomy with central 
supervision and inter-governmental co-operation.  331  
 
Supervision is meant to allow a senior level of government to harmonise the 
activities of local government with national/sub-national developmental 
policies.332 It is, therefore, conducted on the basis of seniority of the national level 
of government. Many scholars and development institutions, including the World 
Bank, accentuate the importance of supervision. 333   
 
In addition, based on the South African Constitution and practice, De Visser 
argues that decentralised development requires inter-governmental co-operation. 
Inter-governmental co-operation is conducted on the basis of equality of local and 
national government. 334    It is predicated on the assumption that it is unattainable 
                                                 
329 Olowu & Smoke (1999) 3; Gordon (2008) 253. 
330 See above at § 3.3.1- 3.3.4 . 
331 Watts (2001) 2. 
332 De Visser (2005) 45. 
333 World Bank (1997) 120; Shah (2004); Bahl (1999); De Visser (2005) 43. 
334 De Visser (2005). 
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to neatly divide powers and functions among different tiers of government as 
there is always 'interdependence and interpenetration’ among the different tiers of 
government.335 The main objective of inter-governmental co-operation in general 
is to ‘avoid unnecessary overlaps’.  Inter-governmental co-operation is, therefore, 
important wherever there is a multi-level or multi-tiered government, for 
example, in federal states and decentralised unitary states.336 
3.5.4.1.Central supervision  
As stated above, there is a general consensus that unchecked local autonomy is as 
harmful as its total absence. The World Bank states that decentralisation, in the 
absence of certain rules that restrain local government, will simply pass down to a 
lower level the crisis that troubles centralised governments.337 De Visser notes 
that the success of decentralised development depends on the ‘correct balancing’ 
of local autonomy with central co-ordination.338 Sharma also stresses the 
importance of ‘central regulatory powers’ for solving decentralisation related 
problems.339 Supervision is, therefore, necessary to maintain a certain degree of 
uniformity across a country. It is also important to ensure that ‘national priorities 
are not undermined’ by local units.340 Moreover, the central government has an 
interest in ensuring that local government functions properly and within its 
mandates and means. Or else, the crisis that arises from unrestrained local 
autonomy will creep back to the centre, for instance, as a request for ‘bailout'.341  
                                                 
335 Watts (2001) 22.  
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337 World Bank (1997) 120. 
338 De Visser (2005) 34. 
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341 World Bank (1999) 117. 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Furthermore, central co-ordination can serve as a ‘safeguard’ against ‘elite 
capture’ and the alienation of the poor in the process of decision making.342  
 
There are four recognised mechanisms of supervision; regulation (standard 
setting), monitoring, support, and intervention.343  Regulations aim to set a 
minimum standard that ought to be met by local government in its public service 
delivery.344 The involvement of the centre by way of setting minimum standards 
is justified by the need to ensure ‘horizontal equity’ and minimum standards of 
service in all jurisdictions.345 However, the importance of balancing the 
regulatory power of the centre with the autonomy of local units should be given 
due consideration.346 The centre should refrain from imposing a requirement of 
absolute homogeneity on all local units under the pretext of standard setting, as it 
will compromise local autonomy.347 De Visser accentuates the need to make 
regulatory frameworks ‘reasonably permanent’ since ‘a continuously changing 
institutional environment is harmful for the local government’s ability to achieve 
optimal service delivery and development results’.348  
 
The other interrelated elements of supervision are oversight (monitoring), support 
and intervention.349 The World Bank stresses the importance of central oversight 
                                                 
342 World Bank 2000 (106); World Bank (2011) 166-67; Smoke (2001) 18. 
343 De Visser (2005).  
344 De Visser (2005).  
345 Shah (1994) 18. 
346 De Visser (2005) 44. 
347 McKinlay (2006) 61; De Visser (2005) 44. 
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349Olowu & Smoke (1992) 11; Smoke (2001) 26; De Visser (2005) 44.  
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over whether the local units are performing up to the required standard.350   If the 
oversight reveals a notable deficiency in performance on the part of local 
government, the centre should attempt to rectify the problem by extending 
support to that particular local government. Where support does not resolve the 
problem, the centre will be justified to intervene in local matters.351 De Visser 
argues that local autonomy and central interventions are ‘complimentary’ though 
may appear to be in utter conflict with each other.352 He argues that the power to 
observe and intervene provides incentives to central government to hand over 
more power and autonomy to local government.353    
 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to ensure that supervision does not stifle the smooth 
functioning of local government. 354 As Smoke and Olowu write:  
 
‘There is...a delicate balance to be maintained between ensuring that national 
priorities are being met and protecting as great a degree of local autonomy as 
possible. Too much control is likely to undermine administrative and economic 
efficiency, particularity if it is exercised arbitrarily or under excessive political 
manipulation.’ 355 
                                                 
350 World Bank (1999) 117. 
351 Olowu & Smoke (1992) 11; Smoke (2001) 26; De Visser (2005) 44. 
352 De Visser (2005) 45  
353 De Visser (2005) 45. 
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Therefore, it is important to create a mechanism of ensuring compliance with 
national (state) laws and standards without compromising local government’s 
autonomy.356 
3.5.4.2.Inter-governmental co-operation 
As was explained above, the importance of central supervision for decentralised 
development is emphasised in many scholarly works and reports of the World 
Bank.357 Inter-governmental co-operation is mainly discussed in the context of 
federal system and in terms of co-operation between federal and state 
governments.358 Little is said about the importance of involving local government 
in inter-governmental co-operation for development. Trench maintains that inter-
governmental co-operation is not limited to federal systems. 359 De Visser also 
based on the South African Constitution, maintains that a decentralised system 
which aims to be developmental must have an institutional arrangement for co-
operation among the various orders of government: including local 
government.360 He provides three justifications for his submission. First, co-
operation is necessary because it provides the central government with the 
incentive to ‘genuinely relinquish power to local government’.361 It also mitigates 
the danger of promoting narrow local interests at the expense of national 
development. Secondly, the impracticability of neatly demarcating competences 
among the different orders of government necessitates co-operation among the 
                                                 
356 European Charter of local government (1987); The World Wide Declaration of Local Self-
Government (1993) Art 7.  
357 World Bank (1999); Sharma (2005); Shah (2004).  
358 See for instance Conlan (2006); Wright (2003); Kinckaid (1990); Watts (2006).  
359 Trench (2006) 226.  
360 De Visser (2005) 210.  
361 De Visser (2005) 210  
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various levels of government.362 Thirdly, the need to communicate local needs, 
which cannot be addressed by local government, to senior level of government 
requires an institutional device of co-operation.363  
 
According to De Visser inter-governmental co-operation has three elements.364 
The first element is a normative framework of co-operation. Inter-governmental 
co-operation must be based on a relationship of ‘equality’; not on subordination. 
Hence, there must be a principle that requires the various levels of government to 
co-operate based on ‘mutual respect’ and ‘recognition’ of each other’s 
‘institutional statuses’.365 The second element is horizontal co-operation. The 
trans-boundary effects of most local government developmental activities require 
co-operation among local governments.366 The third element is institutional 
framework for vertical co-operation. Local government activities should be 
harmonised with those of the national and state governments. This entails not 
only that the activities of local government be in line with national policies and 
strategies but that also national policies take into account the interests of local 
government.367 This in turn requires the institutionalisation, through a legal 
framework of vertical co-operation.368  
 
                                                 
362 De Visser (2010) 210. 
363 De Visser (2005) 210. 
364 De Visser (2005) 211. 
365 De Visser (2005) 278. 
366 De Visser (2005) 212. 
367 De Visser (2005) 212. See also Watts (2006) 207. 
368 De Visser (2005) 212. 
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It is debatable whether inter-governmental co-operation should be 
institutionalised, especially at the initial stage of a decentralisation process. Watts 
writes that there is a risk of rigidity in institutionalising inter-governmental co-
operation which prevents purposeful and evolutionary development of IGR 
structures.369 De Visser is also in favour of an IGR structure that evolves from 
practice. However, he acknowledges that the need to ensure inclusivity, better 
attendance, transparency, and to increase the structure’s political significance 
may entail a certain degree of institutionalisation from the outset.370  
3.5.5. Concluding remarks 
The above sections have outlined the institutional features that are likely to 
optimise the success of decentralisation in achieving development. It is important 
to note that the above discussion does not attempt to formulate a model 
institutional design for a decentralised development. It was rather meant to 
identify those institutional features that are likely to impact on decentralised 
development. It is against these institutional features that Ethiopia’s local 
governance and its efficacy for development will be examined. Before that, the 
next section will deal with the second central issue of the study, namely whether 
and how local government may be of use for accommodating ethnic minorities.  
 
4. DECENTRALISATION AND ACCOMMODATING ETHNIC 
MINORITIES  
4.1. Introduction  
As indicated earlier, the second principal purpose of the decentralisation 
programme in Ethiopia is to accommodate ethnic minorities. It is also one of the 
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370 De Visser (2005) 213. 
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two main aims of this thesis to examine the suitability of the institutional design 
of Ethiopia’s local governance system for this purpose.  
 
To this effect, the next sections will first define concepts such as ‘ethnic 
community’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘minority’. Next, the justifications for 
accommodating ethnic minorities will be discussed. A discussion of the various 
institutional forms of accommodating ethnic minorities will follow along with a 
discussion on how local government features in this.  
4.2. Ethnic groups and ethnicity  
There is little agreement on the meaning of the terms ‘ethnic group’ or ‘ethnic 
community’. Different meanings are attached to the term ‘ethnic’ in different 
disciplines.371  Most commonly, a group of people is considered as an ‘ethnic 
community’ when it differs from others in terms of ‘cultural criteria’.372 The 
‘ostensible’ cultural ‘markers’ of ethnicity are language, tradition, beliefs, values, 
religion, and history.373 Some writers maintain it is critical for a group of people 
to have a real or mythical affinity in the form of common ancestor in order to be 
considered an ethnic community.374  Still others argue that the particular group of 
people must occupy a certain identifiable territorial area which members of the 
                                                 
371 The lexical origin of the term ‘ethnic’ is a Greek word ‘ethnos’ which is translated as a 
‘nation’.  However, the lexical origin of the term provides no clue as to what ‘ethnic group’ is as it 
has evolved throughout the ages to denote several meanings. From a sociological perspective, 
some equate ethnicity with race. Still others consider as an ethnic group those racial or religious 
or linguistic ‘subgroups’ that live amidst a dominant group. For instance blacks, Hispanics and 
Jews in USA are considered as ethnic groups while the dominant whites are not considered so. 
This notion of ethnic group however creates another conceptual confusion by incorrectly equating 
‘ethnicity’ with the status of being a minority.  Pieterse (1996) 25; Le Vine (1997) 46. 
372 Le Vine (1997) 46. 
373 Le Vine (1997) 46. 
374 Johnson  (1997). 
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group consider as their ‘homeland’ while others maintain that territory is not a 
necessary element of ethnic identity even though it may reinforce it.375 
 
For the purpose of this study, a group of people that demonstrate cultural 
markers, such as, language, beliefs and values, religion, or history will be 
considered an ethnic community.  
4.2.1. Ethnic identity as a political identity  
Accommodation of ethnic minorities and the relevance of decentralisation in this 
respect become important only when ethnic identity becomes a political identity. 
Ethnic identity becomes a political identity when the above mentioned cultural 
markers, rather than being viewed as mere social peculiarities, are used to further 
a particular political cause.376 Even though the how and the whys of this 
transformation are far from clear, there are two generally accepted lines of 
explanation to this transformation. The first line of explanation is known as a 
primordialist explanation.377 Primordialism explains the transformation of an 
ethnic identity to political identity as a natural (biological or genetic) 
phenomenon. 378  The primordialists maintain that people naturally identify with, 
and emotionally attach themselves to, the community to which they biologically 
relate.379 They do so not rationally, but they are forced by ‘socio-psychological 
forces internal to [them] and related to primordial human needs for security and, 
more importantly, survival’.380 This emotional and biological tie, which 
                                                 
375 Le Vine (1997) 46. 
376 Ghai (2000) 4. 
377 Ghai (2000) 4. 
378 Ghai (2000) 4. 
379 Harvey (2000) 40.  
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primordialists assume to be ‘durable’, if not unchanging, naturally and necessarily 
leads to a political demand. 381   
 
The other line of explanation is called the instrumentalist (also circumstantialist) 
approach. For the instrumentalists, ethnic communities themselves are ‘rational 
associations of self-interested actors’ not, as the primordialists claim, 
‘irrational...groupings governed by emotional attachments’.382 Ethnicity for an 
instrumentalist is ‘artificial’ not natural, and changing not static.  The 
transformation of ethnic distinction to political identity has, therefore, little to do 
with nature. The transformation is rather ‘rational’, ‘situational’ or 
‘instrumental’.383 This is so since the transformation is driven by rational 
individuals who seek to advance their own political, social, and economic goals 
by using ethnicity as an instrument of political mobilisation.384    
 
Several scholars are of the view that neither primordialism nor instrumentalism in 
itself fully explains the transformation of an ethnic identity to a political 
identity.385   Ethnic identity is not unchanging as the primordialists claim, since 
the aforementioned objective cultural markers are not the only drivers for the 
transformation of ethnic identity to political identity. Ethnic identity has also 
subjective elements.386  The manner in which members of a certain group view 
themselves is equally important. The subjective element of ethnic identity is 
                                                 
381 Ghai (2000) 4. 
382 Gil-White (1999) 792. 
383 Ghai (2000) 4; Henders (2010) 33; Nagel (1994) 152ff. 
384 Nagel (1994) 152ff; Henders (20) 33. 
385 Nagel (1994) 152ff; Yonatan (2008) 25. 
386 Nagel (1994) 152ff; Yonatan (2008) 25. 
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liable to change depending on the benefits that the transformation of the ethnic 
identity to a political identity is likely to bring to members of the relevant ethnic 
group.  On the other hand, the subjective attitude of individuals towards their 
ethnic identity and its relevance as a political identity cannot be totally devoid of 
certain objective cultural markers. Therefore, unlike the claim of the 
instrumentalists, the political relevance of ethnic identity is not purely artificial.387    
4.2.2. Ethnic minorities   
The majority-minority distinction, be it ethnic or otherwise, is principally based 
on two important considerations; namely numerical size and political weight.388 
In general, a group of people which constitutes more than 50 percent of a 
country’s nationals is considered a majority.389  The rest of the groups are 
regarded as minority groups. A numerically minority group, however, might be 
considered a majority if it has a political ascendancy. A case in point is the status 
South African whites during the apartheid era. 390 Therefore, the simultaneous 
existence of both elements (numerical inferiority and political lowliness) is 
essential for an ethnic community to be considered a minority. 391  
 
The above is even true in a state which is composed of minority ethnic 
communities with no particular dominant ethnic community. In such 
                                                 
387 Nagele (1994):152ff. 
388 The most accepted definition of a minority is that of Capotorti who defines minority groups as 
‘[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, 
whose members – being nationals of the state –possess ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics different from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a 
sense of solidarity directed towards perceiving their culture, tradition, religion or language.’ 
Capotorti quoted in Henrard (2000) 22; see also Wheatley (2005) 19; Casals (2006) 20f. 
389 Wheatley (2005) 19. 
390 Ramaga (1992) 108. 
391 Wheatley (2005) 19. 
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circumstances (this is the case in many African countries) each ethnic community 
is considered a minority.392  This, however, is subject to the proviso that none of 
the numerically minority groups should have political control.393   
 
In addition, intra-substate (also intra-provincial or intra-regional) ethnic minority 
communities may be considered as minorities when and to the extent the sub-state 
government has the power to make decisions impacting on them. 394  Two types 
of intra-substate minorities can be considered here. First, some members of an 
ethnic community, which is dominant either nationally or in a particular region or 
province of a country, may find themselves in a minority in another region, state, 
or province of the country where another minority ethnic community is dominant. 
Cases in point are: English speakers in Quebec, Spanish speakers in Catalonia, 
and the Dutch speakers in Wallonia.395 Secondly, there may be an ethnic 
                                                 
392 Wheatley (2005) 19. 
393 Wheatley (2005) 19; Ramaga (1992) 108. 
394 The definition of a minority under international law did not include an intra-substate minority. 
For instance, the United Nations Human Right Commission was of the view that minorities that 
are referred to under Article 27 of ICCPR are ‘minorities within a state not minorities within any 
province’. Henrard, however, argues that, if members of a nationality dominant ethnic community 
are found in the minority in a particular region or province wherein a national minority constitute 
a majority, the former may be considered a minority if the sub-national government is 
autonomous and can pass laws affecting intra-substate minorities. The European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (also known as the Venice Commission), with respect to Belgium, stated 
that whether an ethnic community is a minority may need to be assessed both at national and sub-
national level. In India the Court ruled that when a state law affects the interests of a group of 
people, the group may be considered a minority if it is numerically inferior to the population of 
the state (not necessarily to the whole nation of India).  Henrard (2001); Wheatley (2005) 108; 
Toggenburg (2003) 282; Ramaga (1992) 108. 
395 The English speakers and Spanish speakers are nationally dominant groups in Canada and 
Spain, respectively. The Dutch speakers are dominant in the Flemish region of Belgium while 
French speakers are dominant in the Wallonia region.  Many English speakers are found in 
Quebec which is an autonomous homeland of the French speaking Canadians. Spanish speaking 
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community which is dominant neither nationally nor regionally. Such 
community, also known as ‘double minority’, may be found in a minority in a 
particular region, state, canton, or province, amidst another national minority 
which is however dominant in the particular area.396 Two examples are Cree-
speakers in Quebec and Aran-speakers in Catalonia. These intra-regional 
minorities are considered as minorities.  
 
The central issue here is whether and how local government can be used as an 
institutional mechanism for accommodating ethnic minorities. Before discussing 
this issue, it is necessary to raises yet another and broader issue: why is 
accommodation of an ethnic minority, be it national or intra-subnational ethnic 
minority, a matter of concern in the first place?    
4.3. Managing ethnic diversity  
Countries have experimented with different methods to respond to challenges that 
are associated with the ethnic, racial, religious, or other diversity of their people. 
The methods that are used to this effect have been underpinned by different 
rationales. Depending on the particular objective they sought to achieve, states 
used eliminating diversity itself, protecting individual rights of members of 
minority communities, integration, and/or accommodation to deal with the ethnic 
diversity of their people. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
minority groups are also found in Catalonia which is an autonomous region of the Catalans. The 
same is true with regard to the Dutch speaking groups that are found in the predominantly French 
speaking Wallonia region and vice versa.  Deschouwer (2005) 49f; Kymlicka (1995) 119; Ghai 
(2000) 3; Henders (2010); Suksi (2011). 
396 Patten (2004) 138. 
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4.3.1. Eliminating diversity  
The first method that was used by many states to ‘manage’ diversity, ethnic or 
otherwise, was to eliminate diversity itself. States sought to eliminate diversity 
and to build an ethnically, linguistically, and religiously homogenous or 
homogenised nation-state.397 They sought to do so for either or both of two major 
reasons. The first major reason is a conviction that human beings would be better 
off if they have ‘more common values and avoid or minimise those values and 
beliefs that divide them. 398 Those with such conviction, the best example being 
France, associated diversity with ‘sectarianism, parochialism, narrow-
mindedness, and chauvinist bigotry’.399 In order to achieve the ideal of nation 
building, states took measures which were meant to remove all cultural practices 
failing to conform to dominant cultural practices. States coerced minority ethnic 
and cultural groups to assimilate into the culture of the dominant group. A refusal 
to assimilate resulted in minorities being politically, socially, and/or economically 
marginalised.400 
 
The second key reason for the quest to eliminate diversity was a belief that 
humankind is naturally divided into different nations: Each person belongs to one 
nation and each nation to one state.401 This required keeping ethnic or cultural 
groups apart. In this scenario even assimilation was not an option for minorities. 
To achieve this ideal, as was the case in South Africa during the apartheid era, 
                                                 
397 McGarry & Oleary (1994) 95; Orentlicher (1998) 7; Marko (2006) 503-506; Moore (2004) 
1324;  Töpperwien (2001) 68-69;  Kymlicka (2007) 62; Kamusella (2009) 24. 
398 Réaume (1995) 121. 
399 McGarry and O’Leary (1994) 103. 
400 Kymlicka (2007) 62-63; Moore (2004) 1324; Töpperwien (2001) 68-69; Kamusella (2009) 48. 
401 Réaume (1995) 121. 
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states forced ethnic minorities to migrate to the states where those who look like 
them were found.402 As was done by Turkey and Greece after the conclusion of 
World War I, states also exchanged populations with other states.403 In some 
extreme cases, they engaged in the act of ethnic cleansing.404 
 
The above efforts of the states to eliminate ethnic differences, however, have not 
succeeded since there is hardly a single state which has ethnically or culturally 
homogenous population. 405  
4.3.2. Neutrality  
The second method that was used by several states for managing diversity was 
declaring a state’s neutrality on cultural matters. This approach, which is also 
known as the ‘individual liberal approach’ seeks to be indifferent towards ethnic 
diversity. 406  It rather assumes that ‘identity’ is a private matter; not a public 
matter.407 An attempt by the state to protect minority group rights will lead to the 
violation of individual rights.408 The state therefore should not be obliged to 
provide institutional recognition to identity groups. It suffices for the state to 
recognise the basic human rights of the individual members of any identity 
group.409 The individual approach assumes that the rights of minorities and 
minority cultures can be protected by providing citizenship to the individual 
                                                 
402 McGarry & Oleary (1994) 97. 
403 Réaume (1995) 121; Coakley (1992) 350-352; Kamusella (2009) 11; McGarry & Oleary 
(1994) 94ff. 
404 Réaume (1995) 121; Coakley (1992) 350-352; McGarry & Oleary (1994) 97 
405 Kymlicka (1995); Addis (2001); Yonatan (2010 a) 10. 
406 McGarry et al (2008) 41f; Addis (2001) 736; Casals (2006) 88. 
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members of the communities and by recognising the basic civil, political and 
cultural rights of same. It was, otherwise, unnecessary to confer any institutional 
recognition on any specific identity group so long as the rights of the individual 
members of the group were protected.410 Besides, to do so was considered to be 
against the principle of equality.411 This approach assumes that the state has no 
obligation to promote the culture of any particular group. Its sole obligation rather 
is, or should be, to simply be indifferent to cultural differences and refrain from 
interfering in the enjoyment of cultural rights.412 If a group’s rights are to be 
recognised, it will augment the political relevance of ethnicity and inevitably lead 
to perennial conflicts413 and ‘prejudice, intolerance and stereotypes’.414 Ethnic 
minorities therefore, cannot and, in fact, should not be entitled to or granted 
special rights.415 
 
However, as many scholars point out, this approach is inherently self-
contradictory. The critical problem with the approach is that states simply cannot 
be neutral on ethnic issues.416 They lose their neutrality the moment they select 
and use a particular language for official purposes.417 Moreover, equal 
opportunity for individual members of minority communities does not always 
translate into equal access to ‘cultural goods’ and the ‘protection of minorities’. 
                                                 
410 Kymlicka (1995) 3. 
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Rather the ‘majority rule’ results in ‘demographic and political dominance’ of 
minority communities by the majority community, leading to cultural 
assimilation.418 Therefore, the institutional recognition of group rights is 
indispensable.419  
 
Now the trend is in general towards multiculturalism. The attempt to eliminate 
diversity and to be neutral on the issue of diversity are losing acceptance. There is 
still, however, a disagreement on the best strategy to institutionally recognise 
minorities.  The two most commonly proposed methods are integration and 
accommodation.  
4.3.3. Integrationist approach  
The integrationists argue that minorities and their culture should be given 
institutional recognition. Yet, they maintain, majorities and minorities should be 
prevented from ‘from breaking perfectly along ethnic lines’.420 The 
integrationists, therefore, aim to eliminate the political relevance of ethnicity by 
promoting integration amongst the various ethnic communities of a state.421 
Horowitz, for instance maintains that there should be institutional arrangements 
that ‘encourage moderate behaviour’, reward ‘conciliation’, and ‘compromises’ 
among members various ethnic communities. 422 Among such institutional 
arrangements is an electoral system that ‘induces political parties to rely for their 
margin of victory on the votes of members of groups other than their own’. 423 
                                                 
418 Deets & Stroschein (2005) 287 
419 Deets & Stroschein (2005) 287 
420 Horowitz (2001) 92.  
421 Hadden (2005) 34.  
422 Horowitz (2001) 92.  
423 Horowitz (2001) 94.  
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Horowitz suggests the ‘alternative vote’ as the best electoral system for this 
purpose.424 The integrationists also seek to create an executive system which is 
composed of individuals ‘who rise above religious, linguistic, and ethnic 
factions’. 425 
 
The integrationist approach is however criticised for providing no room for 
accommodating minorities. It rejects all institutional arrangements of 
accommodation including proportional representation, territorial and non-
territorial arrangements. 426 By so doing, as Lijphart notes, the integrationists 
permanently deprive minorities of any form political representation. 427    
4.3.4. Accommodation approach 
Accommodation of minority groups is a method of conferring institutional 
recognition on ethnic minorities. Accommodation recognises and aims to 
preserve a minority’s identity by adjusting a state structure, territorial or 
otherwise, and by providing ‘formal recognition [to] the cultural or ethnic 
diversity of [a state’s people]’. 428  Many scholars, including some of those within 
the liberal school, argue that diversity, at least to some extent, must be given 
institutional recognition and be accommodated. 429 The normative argument for 
the accommodation of diversity is based on the supposition that an individual’s 
rights and dignity are interwoven with the dignity of the group to which he/she 
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belongs.430 Scholars, such Kymlicka, maintain that a failure to protect a group’s 
rights will necessarily result in a failure to protect the rights of the individual 
members of the group.431 One’s dignity will, therefore, be violated if the group of 
which one is a member is held in a low regard. 432 As Magnet maintains, 
‘individuals can only find fulfilment by being members of a social group’.433 
Kaplan also argues that there is a difference in the value that different societies 
attach to individual rights and group rights. While western states value individual 
freedom, in other societies people do not desire personal freedom in isolation 
from their collective freedom.434 They rather yearn ‘for the sense of belonging 
that comes from seeing their ethnic, religious, tribal or other sectarian group 
actualise its many beliefs and govern its own affairs’.435  
 
In the human rights sphere the link between group rights and individual human 
rights is also increasingly recognised. 436  Former international human rights 
instruments, which were underpinned by the individualist approach, are now re-
interpreted to require accommodation of diversity and positive measure for the 
protection of minorities as part of the protection of the rights of their individual 
members.437 In addition, new declarations and conventions which seek to 
                                                 
430 Kaplan (2008) 53; Kymlicka (1995) 89; Deets & Stroschein (2005) 287.  
431 Réaume (1995) 121ff; Kymlicka (1995) 89; Kaplan (2008) 53. 
432 Kymlicka (1995) 89.  
433 Magnet (1986) 32. 
434 Kaplan (2008) 53. 
435 Kaplan (2008) 53. See also Mackerras (2003) 5. 
436 See Kymlicka (2007). 
437 It was based on the individualist approach that all major international human right instruments 
including were drafted. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other human right 
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preserve minorities’ identity have been adopted by international, regional and 
sub-regional organisations including the specialised agencies of the UN.438  
 
Therefore, the issue now is how ethnic minorities can be protected and 
accommodated, and the obligation that the state has in this respect.439 At the 
centre of this issue is what positive measures should a state take to accommodate 
ethnic minorities. For the purpose of this thesis the issue include the role that 
local government is expected to play in this respect.  
4.4. Local government and accommodation of minorities  
4.4.1. Introduction 
Coakley identifies four principles of accommodating ethnic minorities that can be 
achieved at different levels depending on the demands of a particular minority 
ethnic community.440 At the first level, members of an ethnic minority 
community may demand simple equal social and economic opportunities.441 In 
such cases, the individual approach suffices to ensure that members of ethnic 
minorities are not discriminated against. 442 At the second level, ethnic minorities 
may demand non-territorial cultural autonomy through the use of their languages 
                                                                                                                                                        
belong to minority groups not that of the groups per se. This was also the reason why no mention 
of minority rights was made in the UN Charter. See Kymlicka (2007); Hadden (2005) 31. 
438 See General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December (1992) Art 1(1); ILO Convention 
169 (1989) Preambles; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
Strasbourg, 1.II. (1995) Art 1; Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity Art 5; General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December (1992) Art 1(1); Document 
of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
(1990) Art 31.  
439 Gurr (1994) 347-348. 
440 Coakley (2003) 7. 
441 Coakley (2003) 7. 
442 Coakley (2003) 7. 
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in educational and other public institutions.443 This calls for a system that protects 
and promotes the language, culture, and religion of ethnic minority communities 
through non-political institutions such as special schools or other institutions.444 
At the third level, minorities may be politically mobilised to demand ‘institutional 
political recognition’ in the form of internal self-determination through territorial 
autonomy and the establishment of local or regional governments. Their demand 
may also extend to a power sharing scheme at central government level, which is 
known as consociationalism.445 At the fourth level, ethnic minorities may demand 
secession.446 This study principally focuses on accommodation ethnic minorities 
at the third level and, to some extent at the second level. The following sections, 
therefore, considers whether and how local government can be of use to 
accommodate ethnic minorities.  
4.4.2. Territorial autonomy at local level 
There is a little agreement among scholars on the exact meaning of territorial 
autonomy.  Hechter defines territorial autonomy447 as any territorial arrangement 
‘falling short of sovereignty’. 448 According to Gurr territorial autonomy is a 
territorial scheme that provides a minority community ‘a collective power base, 
usually a regional one, in a plural society’.449 Nordquist defines an autonomous 
                                                 
443 Coakley (2003) 7. 
444 Coakley (2003) 7. See also Henders (2010) 280; Moore (2004) 1330; Cornell (2002) 249. 
445 Coakley (2003) 7. 
446 Coakley (2003) 7. 
447 The term ‘autonomy’ originated from two Greek words ‘auto’ which means ‘self’ and ‘nomos’ 
which means ‘law’ or ‘rule’. The original meaning of autonomy is the right to make one’s own 
law. Lapidoth (1994) 276.  
448 Hechter  M   Containing nationalism  Oxford: Oxford University Press (2000) quoted in Wolff 
(2010)  .  
449 Henders (2010) 12; Lapidoth (1994) 277; Steiner (1991) 1542; Wheatley (2005) 108; Cornell 
(2002) 249; Weller (2009) 115.  
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territory as ‘a territory with a higher degree of self-rule than any comparable 
territory of a state’. 450 For Palley territorial autonomy may range from 
‘devolution of power to small communities, through regionalism, to federal 
government’.451 Territorial autonomy is also understood as ‘an arrangement 
which grants a certain degree of self-determination’452  to a distinct minority 
group which constitutes the majority in a specific region or locality.453 
 
There are certain common elements that resonate in almost every definition of 
territorial autonomy. First and foremost, territorial autonomy involves a carving 
out of a certain territorial entity primarily on the basis of ethnic criteria, in 
contrast to on the basis of administrative, economic, or geographic criteria. 454 
Secondly, territorial autonomy entails the transfer, and not a mere delegation, of 
certain political power to the autonomous territorial entity. The political powers 
necessarily include legislative and executive powers.455 The territorial entity must 
be allowed to exercise these powers with a certain measure of autonomy. 456  
                                                 
450 Nordquist K A ‘Autonomy as conflict solving mechanism’ in Suksi M (ed) Autonomy: 
Applications and implications The Hague: Kluwer Law International (1998) quoted in Benedikter 
(2009) 18.  
451 Palley C (1991) ‘Introduction, in minority rights group’ in Palley (ed) Minorities and 
autonomy in western Europe London: Minority Rights Group International quoted in Wolff 
(2010) 8.   
452 The right to self-determination has internal and external aspects. The external aspect of self-
determination pertains to determining the ‘international status of [a] territory’. The internal 
aspects of the right to self-determination, in contrast, relates to ‘the right of all people to pursue 
freely their economic, social and cultural development’. Wheatley (2005) 107. 
453 Gurr T R Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts Washington D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press (1993) quoted in Wolff (2010)  .  
454 Wolff (2010) 7; Henders (2010) 12.  
455 Wolff (2010) 10; Benedikter (2009) 20.  
456 Wolff (2010) 7; Henders (2010) 12.  
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Thirdly, territorial autonomy entails the transfer of specific, mainly culture-
related, governance areas to the particular territorial entity.457 Territorial 
autonomy does not imply independence nor does it allow secession.458 Moreover, 
unlike federalism or simple devolution, territorial autonomy may not cover an 
entire territorial area of a country. An autonomous area, therefore, may be 
established only in specific area/s where ethnic minority community/communities 
are found. 459      
 
It is only when members of ethnic community are found to be geographically 
concentrated that territorial autonomy serves as a means to accommodate a 
minority ethnic community. In the main, multi-ethnic states use federalism or 
regionalism to provide territorial autonomy to ethnic minority communities 
within their territory.460 For instance, Nigeria has adopted what is often described 
as ethnic federalism since the boundaries of the constituent units of Nigeria’s 
federation are demarcated largely on the basis of ethnic criteria.461 The federation 
of Switzerland is a classic example of a federation designed to accommodate 
diverse linguistic and religious communities.462 The Belgian federation also aims 
to accommodate the French and the Dutch speaking communities. 463  In Canada, 
Quebec is viewed as the homeland of the French speaking communities while 
Spain has used regionalisation to empower the Catalan, the Basque, and the 
                                                 
457 Suski (2011) 1; Wolff (2010) 7; Henders (2010) 12.  
458 Benedikter (2009).  
459 Wolff (2010) 10; Benedikter (2009).  
460 See Gurr (1993) 229; Kymlicka (2000); Cornell (2002); Steiner (1997); Erk & Anderson 
(2010); Benedikter (2009). 
461 See Osaghae (1991) & Osaghae (2004). 
462 See Fleiner & Fleiner (2009). 
463 Deschouwer (2005) 49f. 
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Galicia.464 Puerto Rico in the USA, Aland Islands in Finland, Zanzibar in 
Tanzania, South Tyrol in Italy, Nagas in India, and Miskitos in Nicaragua are also 
autonomous regions.465  
 
Regional structure, nevertheless, may not be sufficient to accommodate ethnic 
minorities. First, a territorial unit that is occupied by a particular ethnic 
community that demands territorial autonomy may not be as large as a territorial 
area that is considered as a region.  Second, a region, that is structured to 
empower a minority ethnic community, may not be ethnically homogenous. Other 
intra-substate minorities may still be found amongst the regionally empowered 
ethnic community. The regional dominant ethnic community may deal with the 
intra-regional minority communities in the same way that the national majority 
group have dealt with the former.466As a result the majority-minority tension may 
still continue at intra-regional level.  
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, regionalisation is not the only mechanism of 
providing ethnic minorities with territorial autonomy even if in most cases 
autonomous regimes are created though regionalisation. As indicated above, the 
most critical element of territorial autonomy is the constitutional transfer of full 
political power, chiefly legislative and executive powers, to an ethnically 
organised territorial unit.467 Otherwise, there is no hard and fast rule that requires 
territorial autonomous regimes to be established only through regionalisation. As 
                                                 
464 Weller (2009) 116; Erk (2008) 44ff; Kymlicka (1995) 119; Ghai (2000) 3; Henders (2010) 
Suksi (2011). 
465 See Kymlicka (1995) 119; Ghai (2000) 3. 
466 Yonatan (2011) 17. 
467  Benedikter (2009) 20; Wolff (2010) 8-9. 
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Lapidoth writes, autonomy is ‘a flexible concept’. 468 As Gilbert also notes   
‘autonomy is a continuum’. 469 Elazar states territorial autonomy may range ‘from 
classic federation to various forms of cultural home rules’.470 The creation of 
regional units is, therefore, only one of the many territorial options available to 
accommodate minorities. Therefore, Wheatley writes, local government can be 
considered as territorial autonomy where it is established based on ethnic criteria 
and if it allows a particular ethnic community to exercise sufficient political 
powers.471 Frankovits states that self-determination may include local 
autonomy.472 Lapidoth also seems to suggest that the establishment of local 
government through decentralisation may be considered as territorial autonomy if 
it is accompanied by a transfer (as opposed to mere delegation) of relevant 
powers to the local level government.473 Buchsbaum observes that ‘the problems 
of minorities can be solved through greater autonomy at local or regional 
level’.474 Likewise, Crook argues that local government, by creating ‘an 
autonomous sphere of political power or community’ may serve as a ‘strategy 
that addresses the issue of exclusion or subordination of a mobilised minority’.475 
 
In addition, various international instruments provide for the accommodation of 
ethnic minorities through the establishment of ethnic-based local government 
units. Recommendation 1201 (1993) of Experts of Commission on Security and 
                                                 
468 Lapidoth (1994) 285. 
469 Gilbert (2002) 340. 
470 Elazar (undated). 
471 Wheatley (2005). 
472 Frankovits (2001) 19. 
473 Lapidoth (1994) 284. 
474 A speech of D Thomas Buchsbaum quoted in Welhengama (2000) 194.  
475 Crook (undated) 403-404. See also Erk & Anderson (2010) 2; Braathen & Hellevik (2008) 14.  
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Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) provides that minorities ‘shall have the right to 
have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a 
special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation’.476 
Likewise, the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of 
the CSCE, 29 June 1990, states that local self-government could be used ‘to 
create conditions for the promotion of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of certain minorities’.477 Similarly, the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities in its resolution declared that territorial autonomy may be effective 
for accommodating minorities where they are found concentrated in a certain 
municipality. 478  The Congress further expressed ‘its conviction that territorial 
autonomy for minorities should not be restricted to States having federal or 
regional structures’.479 Thus, local government units, such as, districts and 
municipalities, may serve as autonomous territorial units of minority groups. A 
local government unit can be considered as an autonomous area of a particular 
ethnic community if it is organised on the basis of ethnic criteria and if it has the 
prerequisite (legislative and executive) political powers.   
 
Practice in some countries, though very limited, also show that local territorial 
units, such as municipalities, serve to manage ethnic diversity both in unitary and 
federal states. For instance in the ‘inter-war’ period the Free City of Danzig, the 
                                                 
476 Recommendation 1201 (1993)  
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta93/EREC1201.HTM. (last accessed on 28 May 
2012). 
477 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) (1990) Art 35. 
478  The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities Resolution 52 (1997) Para 10. 
479  The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities Resolution 52 (1997) Para13.   
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majority of whose residents were Germans, became part of Poland as a result of 
the Versailles Treaty of 1918.480  As part of the agreement, the City became an 
autonomous area of the German minority. 481 In Hungary Act LXXVII of 1993 
allows ethnic minorities to establish self-government and enjoy territorial 
autonomy at local level.482 Therefore, a local unit is considered a ‘minority local 
government’ if the majority of the residents of a local unit belong to a particular 
minority ethnic community.483 This is viewed, Teller writes, as ‘a form of 
territorial autonomy’ at local level.484  Likewise, in Macedonia minorities, such 
as, ethnic Albanians, Serbs, and Turks, enjoy local territorial autonomy where 
they are found in majority.485 Local government is also used for accommodating 
Serb minorities in Kosovo.486 In Russia, there are territorial units known as oblast 
and autonomous okrug. These units, according to Welhengama, are found at the 
lowest level of the federal structure487 and are meant to accommodate sub-
regional minorities.488 In Belgium, local government is used to accommodate 
minority ethnic Germans,489  while in Finland it is used to accommodate ethnic 
Swedes.490 According to Benedikter ‘the German Community forms an 
autonomous entity ... within a precisely defined territory’. 491 Moreover in 
                                                 
480 Ramaga (1992) 107; Wolff (2010) 6. 
481  Hungarian Act LXXVII of (1993) on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, Art 5 (91). 
482  Hungarian Act LXXVII of (1993) on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, Art 5 (91). 
483 Teller (2002) 74. 
484 Teller (2002) 74. 
485 Todorovski (2002) 40. 
486 See Tahiri (2009); Monteux (2006) 177ff. 
487 Welhengama (2000) 106-107. 
488 Welhengama (2000) 106-107. 
489 Deschouwer (2005) 49f. 
490 Kymlicka (1995) 119. 
491 Benedikter (2009) 119. 
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Switzerland local units are used to accommodate ethnic minorities. Fleiner and 
Basta Fleiner note that local government units in Switzerland are structured in the 
form of small municipalities. This has allowed the territorial management of 
ethnic diversity at local level in multi-ethnic or multi-lingual cantons.492  A 
typical example is the ‘tri-lingual’ canton of Garison where one finds ‘small 
Romansh-speaking Protestant as well as Catholic municipalities and German 
speaking Protestant as well as Catholic municipalities side by side within a small 
area’. 493 The municipalities have the power to decide on cultural matters and on 
matters relating to education. As they have tax revenue to implement their 
decisions, the communities ‘do not fall into conflicts’.494   
4.4.2.1.Concluding remarks  
The above discussion shows that one approach to accommodating politically 
mobilised minority ethnic community is providing the community with territorial 
autonomy. The discussion also shows that territorial autonomous regimes are in 
the main created though regionalisation. However, if local territorial units are 
ethnically organised, and if they have sufficient and relevant political powers, 
they may also be considered as autonomous territorial units of the relevant ethnic 
community. This raises another question i.e. what are the benefits of providing an 
ethnic community with territorial autonomy? What are the dangers it poses, if 
any? The following section will answer these questions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
492 Fleiner & Basta Fleiner (2009) 609.  
493 Fleiner & Basta Fleiner (2009) 609.  
494 Fleiner & Fleiner (2009) 609.  
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4.4.2.2.The advantages and disadvantages of territorial autonomy  
Advantages  
Territorial autonomy, whether it is established at regional or local level, has 
several benefits both for the relevant minority ethnic community and the state as a 
whole. The most evident advantage of territorial autonomy is that it provides the 
relevant ethnic minority with the necessary territorial space to preserve its 
identity, culture, and language. 495 This is based on the premise that preserving 
ethnic and cultural differences is an ‘ideal’ which ‘[enriches] human experience 
and [expands] human potential’. 496 Based on this premise scholars argue that 
territorial autonomy counters homogenisation. By so doing autonomy not only 
ensures the ‘survival’ but also a ‘complete development’, of the cultures and 
languages of minority ethnic communities.497 As Cornell argues, territorial 
autonomy sustains, promotes, and enhances identity. 498  
 
It is also claimed that territorial autonomy allows minorities, who are often not 
included in the political process at national level, to participate in the process in 
their ‘immediate environment’. 499  It also strengthens self-determination and self-
rule of minority groups. This provides the state as a whole a measure of 
legitimacy.500  Such arrangement also introduces a certain degree of 
‘constitutionalism’ by distributing power to different levels of government. 501    
                                                 
495 Steiner (1991). 
496 Steiner (1991) 1552. See also Erk & Anderson (2010) 2. 
497 Steiner (1991). 
498 Cornell (2002) 254. 
499 Sasaoka (2008) 7-8.  
500 Sasaoka (2008) 7-8.  
501 Benedikter (2009) 54.  
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Scholars also argue that autonomy has the potential to prevent an imminent 
conflict or to resolve an on-going one. This argument is based on the assumption 
that ethnic conflicts often have a territorial dimension.502 Braathen and Hellevik 
maintain that in many African countries, conflicts are caused when claims for 
territorial autonomy are rebuffed.503 A promise of some form of territorial 
autonomy is, therefore, often seen as a condition for conflict resolution. Most of 
successfully settled conflicts have also involved some form of territorial 
autonomy.504  
 
Territorial autonomy also allows minorities to exercise a certain measure of 
control over natural resources within the territorial entity. 505  This also impacts 
on peace since ethnic conflicts are caused by real and perceived discriminatory 
resource distributions and violations of rights of a particular group occupying a 
particular territory.    
Disadvantages  
The idea of creating ethnic-based autonomous territorial units also causes 
immense practical challenges and poses serious risks, particularly in Africa. As 
has been discussed above, some European and other states have attempted, and to 
some extent succeeded, to accommodate ethnic minorities by establishing 
autonomous regimes at regional or local level.  However, most of these states 
have only one or a few more ethnic minority communities. Therefore, in these 
                                                 
502 Braathen & Hellevik (2008) 8. 
503 Braathen & Hellevik (2008) 6.  
504 Braathen & Hellevik (2008) 5. 
505 Benedikter (2009) 54. 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
countries, the use of territorial schemes to accommodate minorities was 
undertaken fairly easily. It is debatable, however, whether this can be achieved 
with same ease in the African context. 506   Most of the sub-Saharan African states 
are so ethnically diverse that many of them do not have even an ethnic 
community which constitutes a national majority. It is controversial whether it is 
feasible or even desirable to afford either regional or local autonomy for each 
ethnic community in such contexts. 507   
 
In addition, it is not an ‘ideal’ in a state with many ethnic communities, to create 
a territorial unit for each ethnic community, even if it could be achieved. As 
Seiner maintains, it rather constitutes ‘a counter ideal of locking into place the 
historical differences among groups’.508 Such measure renders a state ‘a museum 
of social and cultural antiquities’.509 It accentuates division, legitimises 
separateness, 510 alienates groups from one another, makes social cohesion 
unattainable, and enfeebles a ‘sense of common humanity’.511 Hence, by 
restricting interaction among groups, territorial autonomy destroys all unifying 
elements.512  
 
                                                 
506 Mozaffar and Scarritt write that there are more than 1, 200 ethnic communities in Africa. Many 
of these ethnic communities are also divided into several tribes and clans. Moreover, most of the 
ethnic communities are too small to exercise territorial autonomy.  Mozaffar and Scarritt (1999) 
236. 
507 Mozaffar & Scarritt (1999). 
508 Steiner (1991) 1552. 
509 Steiner (1991) 1552. 
510 Cornell (2002) 250.  
511 Steiner (1991) 1554. 
512 Monteux (2006) 165. 
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In addition, the territorial approach cannot be implemented to the satisfaction of 
every ethnic community, especially in Africa. This is because, even if local 
territorial units are established based on ethnic criteria, it is not likely that such 
local units will be ethnically homogenous. This is likely to create new minorities, 
within the minority regime, who may be subjected to domination.513 Thus, this 
may ‘simply reproduce and [entrench] the problems of the national level’.514 
Furthermore, territorial autonomy puts all individuals who reside in the 
autonomous local territorial unit under the jurisdiction of the local unit. 515  This is 
despite the fact that there may be internal migrants who do not belong to the 
minority community which is meant to enjoy territorial autonomy in the territorial 
unit. This often creates minorities within minorities that are vulnerable to 
discrimination or assimilation.516   
Concluding remarks 
 
As the above discussion shows, territorial autonomy as a means of 
accommodating minority ethnic communities has several shortcomings. 
However, even if territorial autonomy is not an ‘ideal’ solution, in some contexts, 
the need to resolve on-going conflicts or to prevent conflicts may justify the 
establishment of autonomous regimes either at regional or local level.517 Hence, 
the usefulness or otherwise of local territorial autonomy should be evaluated in 
context.  One thing is clear though: territorial autonomy can be a risky project 
unless ‘designed, created, and maintained with necessary safeguards’.518 What are 
                                                 
513 Monteux (2006) 165. 
514 Cook (undated) 405; Monteux (2006) 165. 
515 Deets & Stroschein (2005) 289. 
516 Deets & Stroschein (2005) 289. 
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then the institutional features of a workable territorial autonomous regime? The 
following section will deal with this matter.  
4.4.2.3.Institutional features of territorial autonomy at local level 
Introduction  
As the preceding discussion shows, ethnic minorities may justifiably demand 
territorial autonomy. Local government units, such as, municipalities and 
districts, with sufficient political power, may also be used to provide a certain 
measure of territorial autonomy to ethnic minorities (both national and intra-
regional minorities). The most obvious objective of providing territorial 
autonomy to an ethnic community is to allow it to exercise self-rule.519 As the 
discussion below shows, territorial autonomy may also be complimented with 
shared-rule.  
Self-rule 
Self-rule embodies the idea of political autonomy.520 Political autonomy in turn 
implies ‘the exercise of final responsibility by the sub-national governments on a 
range of matters’.521 Therefore, self-rule embodies the idea of ‘constitutionally 
entrenched powers ...to exercise control over some or all of ... own economic, 
political, social and cultural affairs’.522  Self-rule has a territorial dimension 
which entails that local boundaries be demarcated based on the settlement 
structure of the ethnic group which seeks to exercise territorial autonomy. 523 It 
also entails the establishment of government institutions, including political and 
                                                 
519 Henders (2010) 12. 
520 Watts (2008) 8. 
521 Watts (2000) 948. 
522 Yonatan (2010 a) 41. 
523 Benedikter (2009) 19. 
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administrative organs, which are necessary for exercising self-rule. 524 Moreover, 
it entails the division of functions and powers, and resources. 525 The above three 
elements are enshrined in a national and, where applicable in sub-national 
constitutions, as constitutional principles.  
Constitutional principle   
One of the central elements of territorial autonomy, whether it is established at 
regional or local level, is that the central government has limited power to revoke 
the autonomous regime. 526 The abrogation of the autonomous regime can take 
place only in accordance with constitutionally defined procedures and often with 
the consent of the minority community enjoying territorial autonomy at local 
level. 527 To this end, a national constitution provides a general principle 
recognising the right to self-determination or territorial autonomy of a minority 
ethnic community in a country. 528  It may also specifically refer to the particular 
autonomous areas.  
      
In addition, as indicated earlier an ethnic minority community may be an intra-
regional or intra-provincial minority which is found among other ethnic 
community which is constitutionally empowered to exercise self-rule at regional 
level. Often when an ethnic community enjoys territorial autonomy at regional 
level through regionalisation or some form federal arrangement, it is also 
                                                 
524 Cornell (2002) 254. 
525 Cornell (2002) 254. 
526 Lapidoth (1994) 285. 
527 Lapidoth (1994) 285. 
528 The Spanish Constitution (1978) Art 143 (1) provides a general right to establish autonomous 
communities to those with ‘common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, island 
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empowered to decide on its internal affairs and to determine its political structure 
by adopting its own constitution or a legislative instrument with similar content, 
purpose, and status.529 Through the sub-national constitution, the regional unit, 
among other things, is entitled to set its ‘social and political goals’ and define the 
rights it seeks to protect. It is also entitled to determine the structure of its 
governmental institutions, to decide on its official language, to create and 
structure local government, and to determine who its citizens are.530 In effect, 
matters relating to intra-regional minority communities become the competence 
of the autonomous regional unit. In such cases, a regional constitution may also 
provide a safeguard for the autonomous territorial regime which is created at local 
level within such autonomous region. 531   
Ethnically organised territorial entity   
                                                 
529 This is the case, for example, in most federal and quasi-federal systems, including Switzerland, 
South Africa, Canada, and the USA, where the constituent units are allowed to adopt their own 
constitutions. The autonomous communities of Spain also have the power to determine their 
internal structure including local government. Thus, Catalonia and Basque have a quasi-
constitutional instrument called ‘the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia’ and ‘Statute of the Basque 
Country’, respectively. Quebec has a set of legal rules which together constitute the Constitution 
of that province. Watts (2000); Tarr (2008). See also the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (1996) S 104(a); Spanish Constitution (1978) S 146.     
530 Tarr (2008) 192. 
531 Watts (2000) 946; Tarr (2008) 192. Yonatan suggests that the national constitution should not 
deal with intra-substate matters; matters relating to sub-regional governance included.  Local 
matters should be left to the sub-national units; a contrary arrangement would allow the national 
government to undermine the autonomy of the regional unit under the pretext of protecting intra-
substate ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, the regional unit cannot be fully entrusted with the 
protection of intra-substate ethnic minorities. To balance regional autonomy with the need to 
protect intra-subregional ethnic minorities, the national constitution should provide a general 
normative principle which requires the regional units to guarantee the right to self-rule of intra-
substate ethnic minorities.  The details should be provided in sub-national constitutions. Yonatan 
(2010 b) 12ff. 
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  As was mentioned above, territorial regimes serve the purpose of accommodating 
ethnic minorities when the latter are found concentrated in a particular 
geographical area. In order for an ethnic minority group to be able to exercise 
self-rule at local level, therefore, members of the minority group must be found 
geographically concentrated in a particular locality, constituting a majority  in 
that locality. Local self-rule, therefore, involves the creation of a territorial unit 
which is organised chiefly based on ethnic criteria.532 A clear demarcation of the 
boundaries of such territorial unit is critical to territorial autonomy since 
boundaries determine the territorial space where the benefit of autonomy is 
enjoyed. Moreover, the territorial space where the local government unit may 
legitimately exercise its political powers is determined through boundary 
demarcation. Boundaries also determine the territory based resources over which 
the local self-government may exercise a certain measure of control. Besides, a 
clear demarcation of local boundaries also helps prevent conflicts and maintain 
peace and stability as boundary related disputes often lead to violent conflicts.     
Governance structure and democracy  
As indicated above, one of the most critical elements of territorial autonomy is 
the power to exercise legislative and executive powers over certain cultural 
matters are among. This in turn entails the establishment of government 
institutions through which an ethnic minority may exercise these political 
powers.533 The government institutions which need to be established must include 
representative assemblies, and executive and administrative organs. As Cornell 
writes, ethnic-based autonomous units ‘typically’ have representative council and 
executive organs ‘that act as legitimate representatives of their ethnic 
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constituencies and constitute legitimate decision-making bodies’.534 Benedikter 
also argues that an autonomous territorial unit by definition has a ‘locally elected 
legislative assembly...with a minimum power to legislate in some basic 
domain’.535 It must also have an executive which is elected either directly by the 
voters or by the local council. 536 The executive organ should be responsible for 
implementing the decisions of the former. 537        
 
The establishment of representative institutions, in turn, entails conducting 
regular democratic elections which is a vital component of self-rule. As Loper 
argues, the notion of the right to internal self-determination implies a 
representative democracy.538 Democracy is essential for the enjoyment of local 
territorial autonomy. First, democracy mitigates the possibility of the central 
government (whether the regional or national government) undermining the 
autonomy of the intra-substate unit and tramping on local decisions.539 Secondly, 
competitive democracy prevents the possibility of the central government playing 
a role of ‘patronage’ by appointing loyalists from among the members of the 
ethnic minority groups.540 As Ghai states, democracy not only ‘compels’ local 
leaders to protect the autonomy of the local units but also ‘empowers them to do 
so’.541 Thus, as Tranchant notes, democracy should be ‘a perquisite for local 
                                                 
534 Cornell (2002) 254. 
535 Benedikter (2009) 38. 
536 Benedikter (2009) 38. 
537 Benedikter (2009) 49. 
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empowerment’.542 Without democracy the establishment of local self-government 
will result in the location of the oppression being shifted from the centre to the 
local level; which may be even worse.  
Electoral system  
An issue related to local democracy is whether there is any particular electoral 
system that is particularly suitable where an autonomous area is created for a 
particular ethnic community at local level. In general there are two options as far 
electoral system is concerned; a plurality system and a proportional representation 
system.543 The plurality electoral system, which uses electoral constituencies, 
aims to identify a winner in elections.544 Representativeness of electoral outcomes 
is of secondary consideration, if at all.545 The proportional representation system, 
in contrast, principally seeks to ensure representativeness.546  The strength of the 
PR system, therefore, is that it prevents unfair and exclusionary distribution of 
seats in representative assemblies.547 
 
Clearly, the electoral system should allow the ethnic community on whose behalf 
a local territorial unit is established, to be in control of the council of the 
territorial unit. Otherwise the whole purpose of the establishment of an 
autonomous area for an ethnic community would be defeated. Territorial 
                                                 
542 Tranchant (2007) 3. 
543 Plurality-majority electoral system (in short plurality system) has different variations. The 
plurality system is called First-past-the–post (FPTP or FPP)) when it uses a single member district 
and block -voting system when it uses multi-member districts. The PR system also may take the 
form of Mixed Members Proportional (MMP), list PR or Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems 
of which the list PR is the most known. Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis (2005) 28. 
544 Reynolds (1999) 94.  
545 Sartori (1994) 3.  
546 Sartori (1994) 58; Reynolds (1999) 97-98; Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis (2005). 
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autonomy at local level presupposes carving out a territorial area wherein an 
ethnic minority group is found to be in the majority.  It can be, therefore, safely 
assumed that a proportional representation electoral system would result in a sub-
regional council which is largely dominated by the particular ethnic community 
on whose behalf the sub-regional territorial unit is created. 548 A plurality electoral 
system may also have similar results if the ethnic community is found in the 
majority in most of the electoral districts of the autonomous territorial unit.549 It is 
nonetheless likely that there will still be other minorities amid the ethnic minority 
groups which is provided with territorial autonomy. The need to ensure the 
accommodation of these communities without compromising the interests of the 
ethnic community which is meant to enjoy territorial autonomy at local level may 
necessitate a proportional representation electoral system. Moreover, members of 
the ethnic community on whose behalf the local territorial unit is created cannot 
be expected to hold a single political view. A political competition is, therefore, 
liable to occur within the ethnic community. In such cases, the plurality system 
may allow the representation of the relevant ethnic community. It may not, 
however, ensure the representation of all ‘significant’ political views within the 
ethnic community.550 Therefore, for the purpose of ensuring that various political 
views within a minority ethnic community are adequately represented, Wolff that 
maintains proportional representation is the preferable electoral system. 551  
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Competences 
The other element of self-rule is transferring powers and functions to the 
government of the sub-regional territorial unit.552 The competences that are to be 
so transferred may depend on whether the local unit is meant to address only 
cultural issues or, additionally, other social, economic and developmental matters. 
As Henders states the competences so transferred may include matters relating to 
‘economic development, environmental protection, and social policy’. These may 
include local planning, natural resources, economic development, housing, health, 
and other social services.553 These governance areas are ‘important to the ability 
of a community to protect its values and way of life’. 554   
 
There are, however, certain culture-related functions that should in any event be 
transferred to ethnic-based local territorial units. The first in this respect is a 
competence in respect of language.555 It is axiomatic that language is central to 
ethnic identity. As Smith argues, language is not only mere speech but ‘also a 
carrier of culture, of individual, community and even national identity’.556 Hence, 
it is important to provide some form of official status to the minority language in 
the autonomous locality. This may include using the language of the ethnic 
minority group in schools, as a means of instruction, and as the working language 
of the legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial organs of the local self-
government. Therefore, legislative and administrative acts of local government 
may be published in the language of the ethnic group. Documents, such as, 
                                                 
552 Lapidoth (1993) 277. 
553 Benedikter (2009) 52. The Lund Recommendations (2009) S 15. 
554 Henders (2010) 12. 
555 Benedikter (2009) 52; Deets & Stroschein (2005) 289; Henders (2010) 12. 
556 Smith (2008) 212. 
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identification cards, birth, death and marriage certificates may also be issued in 
the language of the ethnic group. Moreover, street signs and other adverts may be 
written in the official language of the local self-government. In Macedonian, for 
instance, a municipality may adopt as its official language the language which is 
spoken by 20 percent of the local community.557   Therefore Albanian, Turkish, 
Serbian and Romani languages are used for official purpose in various 
localities.558   
 
Education is also important function that needs to be transferred to local self-
government.559 Control over education is critical for minority ethnic groups 
because education ‘is central vehicle of cultural transmission’.560 Moreover, 
schools have been used to discriminate against ethnic minority groups by 
excluding them as ‘uneducable’. 561  Public schools also exclude the history and 
culture of ethnic minority groups from their curricula ‘leading minorities to 
feelings of invisibility, inferiority and second-class citizenship’.562  
 
There are also other culture-related functions which may be transferred to local 
self-government, including, radio, television, public libraries, cultural centres, and 
the like. 563  
 
                                                 
557 Lyon (2011) 34. 
558 Lyon (2011) 34. 
559 Benedikter (2009) 52; Riech (2004) 210; Cornell (2002) 254; Deets & Stroschein (2005) 289. 
560 Riech (2004) 210; Cornell (2002) 254. 
561 Yi (2007). 
562 Riech (2005) 210. 
563 Benedikter (2009) 52; Cornell (2002) 255. 
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Revenue 
Henders argues that fiscal autonomy is critical for a political autonomy of an 
autonomous territorial unit. 564   Fiscal autonomy is also likely to impact on the 
effectiveness of the local self-government in promoting and developing the 
culture and language of the ethnic group for which it is established. Building 
schools, publishing books in the language of the ethnic minority, hiring teachers, 
and establishing other cultural centres, all require adequate funds. In addition, it 
impacts on peace given that ethnic conflicts are often caused or exacerbated by 
unjust resource distributions.565  Therefore, it is essential that there is some form 
financial sources over which the ethnic based local territorial unit has unhindered 
control 
 
In order to ensure the financial autonomy of an autonomous regime, Henders 
suggests that such territorial units must be able to ‘raise and keep locally 
generated tax revenue, set tax rates, and determine how revenue is spent’. 566  Bird 
and Ebel also argue that internal revenue may be complemented with inter-
governmental transfer. 567 They argue a system of inter-governmental revenue 
transfer may help create a ‘sense of national-solidarity’. 568 
4.4.2.4. Shared-rule? 
 Shared rule is an institutional principle which is often associated with a federal 
system and aims to ensure that the constituting units of a federation are 
                                                 
564 Henders (2010) 47. 
565 Braathen & Hellevik (2008) 13. 
566 Henders (2010) 47. 
567 Bird & Ebel (2005) 8. 
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represented in a central government. 569 Territorial autonomy conceptually does 
not entail shared-rule so as to allow local units to be represented in the sub-
national and national government organs.570  However scholars argue that 
territorial autonomy, whether exercised at regional or local level, should be 
complimented with shared rule. As Henders writes:  
‘Regardless of form or degree, territorial autonomy is not independence, and it cannot 
do away with interdependence. Autonomous territories are subject to the authority of 
state-wide governments in some policy areas. Its people also have common citizenship 
rights with the population of the state as a whole, even if they also possess distinctive 
rights connected with the substate territory. Moreover, territorial autonomy is not only 
about separation, in the sense of protecting the minority territorial community from 
external preferences that can harm its distinctive values. Territorial autonomy is 
necessarily also a means of organizing relations of interdependence with the wider 
state and other political communities within and beyond. As such, territorial autonomy 
arrangements often include the sharing of some competencies with state or other 
substate authorities.’ 571   
In general shared-rule is considered to be important for three reasons. First, it is 
essential to protect the autonomy of an autonomous unit (whether regional or 
local) from undue interference by national and sub-national governments. The 
decisions of national and sub-national governments are likely to affect the 
autonomy of a local or regional autonomous entity. Therefore, the representation 
of ethnic minorities or the autonomous local units in sub-national and national 
institution allows them to influence the policies and decisions that have a bearing 
on their autonomy. 572  Secondly, the representation of ethnic minorities in sub-
                                                 
569 Watts (2008) 136. 
570 Benedikter (2009). 
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national and national institutions is an integrative institutional arrangement which 
promotes unity. 573  Thirdly, shared rule helps harmonise local preferences with 
national and sub-national priorities. This is especially important because, even if 
territorial autonomy is accompanied by devolved power which is carefully 
defined, the lack of clarity which is liable to arise from the practical application 
of devolved powers and competences requires co-operation among the various 
levels of government for it to be resolved.574  
Concluding remarks  
The discussion in the above sections shows that in certain instances establishing 
autonomous territorial units at the local level may be a suitable method of 
accommodating a minority ethnic community. Territorial autonomy first and 
foremost allows ethnic minority to exercise self-rule. Self-rule in turn allows 
ethnic a minority ethnic community to enjoy political autonomy. Hence it 
involves a constitutional principle recognising the right to self-rule of an ethnic 
community, an ethnically organised territorial unit, governance structures 
(including legislative and executive organs) and sufficient sources of revenue. 
Self-rule should be complemented by shared-rule. Shred-rule is about the 
representation of the autonomous local unit, or the ethnic community for whom 
such unit is established, in regional and national government organs.  
 
As indicated earlier, a minority ethnic community may be accommodated through 
schemes of power sharing or by providing it cultural autonomy depending on its 
demand.575 The following sections will examine these two methods of 
                                                 
573 See Assefa (2007a) 141.  
574 Lapidoth (1995) 278. 
575 See above at § 4.4.2. 
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accommodating ethnic minorities and the relevance of local government in this 
regard.    
4.4.3. Consociationalism for accommodating minorities at local level 
Consociationalism, also known as power-sharing or consociational democracy, is 
an institutional arrangement that seeks to ensure that political power is shared 
among various ethnic, religious, racial, or any other social groups of a country 
depending on the social divide in a particular country.576 Power-sharing, as 
formulated by Lijphart, takes place through the co-operation of the leaders of the 
various social groups. 577 In a country where society is divided along ethnic line, 
consociation democracy advocates power sharing and co-operation among the 
leaders of key ethnic communities of the country.  
 
Consociationalism is considered to be a workable arrangement in a society which 
is segmented by social divides and where ‘overarching loyalty’ and ‘social 
mobility’ between the social segments is absent.578  Therefore, it aims to maintain 
a political ‘equilibrium’ by preventing a ‘permanent exclusion’ from power of 
any ethnic or other social group. This is based on the premise that majoritarian 
democracy does not work in divided societies as it allows state power to be 
concentrated into a particular social group. This, in turn, relegates others to a 
‘permanent minority position’. 579 Consociationalism, therefore, seeks to prevent 
decision making on a majoritarian basis and seeks to accommodate various 
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577 Lijphart (2006). 
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political interests ‘through compromise or amicable agreement’ among the 
political elites.580    
 
Consociational democracy or a power-sharing is in the main implemented at 
national government level. Several states, including the Netherlands, Lebanon, 
Belgium, Bosnia, the former Czechoslovakia, Northern Ireland, and South Africa, 
have implemented consociational democracy at a particular point in time. 581  
Recently, some form of power-sharing scheme has become the most preferred 
arrangement in post-conflict countries such as Kosovo, Cypress, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Macedonia. 582     
 
Some scholars, however, argue that the usefulness power-sharing is not limited to 
‘national politicking’; it may also take place at local level.583  Power sharing 
might be even more useful in ethnically heterogeneous localities to ensure the 
representation of minorities in local councils, local executive bodies, and 
administrative offices. 584  Such kind of special representation at local level is 
important because minorities are affected more by ‘local situations’ than at 
national level.  A scheme of power sharing at local level has the potential to 
enhance the prospect of maintaining ‘inter-ethnic power equilibrium’ even where 
it is unbalanced at the national level.585 Hence, through decentralisation and the 
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creation of autonomous local government, the representation and accommodation 
of diverse segment of a community can be ensured.  
 
There are certain examples, though limited, of accommodating ethnic minorities 
in local government through power sharing schemes with a degree of success. In 
Slovenia, for instance, the autochthonous communities of Hungarian and Italian 
origin are guaranteed representation based on a power sharing scheme in local 
councils. In local councils these communities are represented by one or more 
councillors.586   In Macedonia, not only are the various ethnic communities are 
proportionately represented in local councils, special voting procedure is also 
used for passing certain decisions with a view to ‘ensure greater consensus’. 587  
Hence certain decision ‘cannot be approved without a qualified majority of two-
thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes from those 
claiming to belong to non-majority communities’.588   
4.4.3.1.Deficiencies of consociational democracy  
As some scholars point out, power sharing arrangements have a number of 
shortcomings. The most critical deficiency of such a scheme is that is it goes 
against democratic principle as it shuns the participation of the relevant ethnic 
community and encourages backdoor deals among the elites.589 Moreover, power-
sharing does not strive to create social cohesion. It rather aims to prevent contact 
among ethnic communities and thereby not only maintaining ethnic divisions but 
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also reinforcing them. 590 Many authors agree that in a post conflict period, power 
sharing arrangements may create some calm and provide a window of 
opportunity for formulating more democratic and permanent political 
arrangements.591 However they maintain that it cannot be a long-lasting solution.   
4.4.3.2.Institutional features consociationalism  
There are three institutional features of consociational democracy. The first is 
‘segmented’ or ‘group’ autonomy. 592  This aims to allow each ethnic community 
to autonomously decide on its own affairs. Matters relating to education and 
culture fall in this category.593 The autonomy may take territorial or non-
territorial form. 594  The second is proportional representation. 595   This entails the 
establishment of an executive coalition with the representation in the executive of 
the leaders of each ethnic community. 596 It also requires the proportional 
representation of the main ethnic communities in representative assemblies. To 
this effect, consociational democracy requires proportional representation 
electoral system. Consociational democracy also requires the equitable 
distribution of public offices among members of the various ethnic communities.  
The third element is mutual veto. 597   Decisions are passed with consensus and 
minorities should be able to veto decisions that most directly affect them.598       
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4.4.4. Cultural autonomy  
Cultural (also personal) autonomy599 is a non-territorial form of autonomy which 
aims to protect territorially dispersed ethnic, cultural or religious groups in 
heterogonous countries or regions.600 Cultural autonomy aims at protecting and 
promoting the language, culture, and religion of ethnic minority communities 
through non-political institutions such special schools for ethnic or religious 
minorities.601  
  
The earliest form of cultural autonomy can be traced back to the 18th century in 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which provided cultural autonomy to the 
Jewish community. The Jewish community had a local council which decided on 
cultural matters and which was also represented at regional council (kahal), and 
national council (vaal).602  These institutions decided on religious, cultural and 
even economic issues of the Jewish community in the Commonwealth.  Cultural 
autonomy was also used in the Ottoman Empire to accommodate non-Muslim 
minorities such as the Jews and the faithful of Greek Orthodox Church.603 With 
the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungary Empire after WWI, the newly created 
countries such as the former Czechoslovakia, Estonia, and Latvia attempted to 
accommodate their territorially dispersed ethnic minorities through non-territorial 
mechanism. In Finland the Swedish minorities run their own school wile in 
Estonia an ethnic community, with 3000 and more members who voluntarily 
                                                 
599 Also known as ‘segmental autonomy,’ ‘functional autonomy,’ ‘corporate autonomy,’ and 
‘corporate federalism’. Moore (2004) 1330. 
600 Cornell (2002) 249.  
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identified themselves as members of the group, was given a legal personality. 604  
Once given a legal personality, the group could have its own cultural council 
which had the power to levy taxes on its member and decide on matters such as 
‘[e]ducation, culture, libraries, theatres, museums, sports and youth affairs’.605 
More recently, a tri-cameral parliament was established in South Africa for the 
Whites, Asian and Coloured communities whose members were elected on non-
territorial basis. Despite its racist underpinnings this arrangement was considered 
as a form of cultural autonomy. 606     
 
Even now, certain countries attempt to accommodate minorities on non-territorial 
basis.  In New Zealand the Maoris, in Canada the Indians, and in Norway the 
Saamis are accommodated on non-territorial basis. 607    
4.4.5. Concluding remarks  
The discussion in the preceding sections has outlined the institutional principles 
that can be employed for accommodating intra-substate ethnic minorities through 
territorial and non-territorial arrangements. The following section will bring 
together and synthesises the entire discussion of this chapter.    
5. DECENTRALISATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
ACCOMMODATION OF MINORITIES: A SYNTHESIS 
The §.3 and § 4 have separately analysed whether, how, and when 
decentralisation can serve as an institutional arrangement to achieve 
development and accommodate ethnic minorities. The discussion has 
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identified the strengths and deficiencies of decentralisation as an institutional 
device for development. It has also shown how local government can serve as 
an institutional response to the challenge of accommodating minority ethnic 
communities. The institutional prerequisites which are likely to optimise the 
effectiveness of local government in achieving these two objectives have been 
identified.  
 
Achieving development and accommodating minorities is not an either-or 
matter. An ethnic minority is sure to be disgruntled unless its developmental 
needs are not fulfilled even if it is allowed to decide on its cultural matters. 
Achieving both objectives is therefore critical.  Moreover, as the summary in 
the table below shows, the institutional principles that have to be employed for 
achieving the two objectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive even 
though they may not be identical. 
Table 1 A summary the institutional principles for decentralised 
development and accommodation of minorities  
Institutional features  Development  Accommodating 
minorities  
Constitutional recognition  Constitutional recognition of 
local government as a 
level/sphere of government  
Constitutional 
recognition of the right 
to self-rule of ethnic 
communities  
Area of establishment   On wall-to-wall basis Only in a specific 
geographical area where 
a minority ethnic 
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community is found  
Boundary demarcation  Should take into 
consideration urban/rural 
differences, development 
level, financial viability, 
territorial and population 
size,  
Based on the settlement 
structure of an ethnic 
community 
Electoral system  Proportional 
representation  
Competences  Development related matters 
such as health, education, 
water, housing   
Cultural matters such as 
language, education, 
media  
Political powers Legislative and executive 
powers  
Legislative and 
executive powers 
Inter-governmental relations  Based on the principle of 
supervision and co-operation  
Based on the principle of 
shared-rule 
 
Therefore, a well-considered harmonisation of these institutional features will be 
necessary. This chapter does not seek to discuss on how these institutional 
principles can be harmonised.  Rather based on these institutional principles, the 
successive chapters will examine Ethiopia’s local governance system.  
6. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed whether, how, and when decentralisation may serve as 
an effective institutional device for achieving development and accommodating 
ethnic minorities.  It has also outlined the various institutional principles that are 
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suggested by scholars and institutions that a decentralisation programme should 
fulfil in order to effectively achieve either of these two objectives. 
 
Against these institutional principles, the succeeding chapters will evaluate 
Ethiopia’s decentralisation programme and its appropriateness to the objective 
that it has set out to achieve, namely realising development and accommodating 
intra-substate ethnic minority communities. To this effect, the next chapter will 
provide a historical background on Ethiopia’s previous local governance system. 
The historical discussion is necessary as the decentralisation programme aims to 
correct problems allegedly caused by previous centralised system of governance.    
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Chapter 3 
Local administration, development, and ethnicity in Ethiopia: A historical 
perspective 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The appropriateness of Ethiopia’s local government system for achieving 
development and accommodating minorities cannot be fully explained or fairly 
evaluated without reference to the country’s political, social, and legal history. 
The historical discussion is especially important because the new local 
governance system was introduced based on an explicit or implicit supposition 
that the previous centralised system of governance either caused or exacerbated 
the prevalence of poverty and in the country. 608  It is also based on an allegation 
that the former system has caused or resulted in the political, economic, and 
cultural marginalisation of scores of ethnic communities of the country.   
 
This chapter, therefore, provides a brief account of Ethiopia’s previous system of 
local of governance. In view of that, § 2 briefly describes Ethiopia’s geography, 
demography and economic system. §3 will briefly describe the system of local 
governance that existed since the emergence Ethiopia as a state until the 
emergence of ‘Modern Ethiopia’ in the 1850s. This section also briefly explains 
the various traditional authorities that existed in Ethiopia and their role. § 4 and § 
5 will look at the emergence of ‘Modern’ Ethiopia and the gradual centralisation 
of power and bureaucratisation of local administration of the country. These 
sections will also assess the impact of centralisation on development and 
management of the ethnic diversity the Ethiopian people. The factors and 
                                                 
608 See the discussion in chapter 4 § 5. 
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processes that led to the current process of decentralisation will be highlighted in§ 
6 and 7. 
2. GENERAL FACTS ABOUT ETHIOPIA  
Ethiopia is found in the Eastern African Region which is commonly referred to as 
the Horn of Africa. The country shares borders with Djibouti, Eretria, Somalia, 
Kenya, the Sudan, and South Sudan. With a total area of 1 104 300 sq. km. 
Ethiopia is among the largest countries in Africa. 609  Ethiopia’s elevation ranges 
between -125m below sea level at Danakil depression to 5,620 at Ras Dejen 
(Dashen) Mountain in the north. The landscape of the country is principally a 
high plateau, with chains of mountains in the east and west, running parallel from 
north to south, with the Great East African Rift Valley cutting through the 
mountain ranges from north to south. 610   The country also has a wide expanse of 
lowlands in the south-east and north-east. 611   
 
The population of the country is estimated at 80 million.612 The majority of the 
people (62 %) are Christians (Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant).613 Muslims 
account for 34 % of the population.614 There are approximately 80 ethnic 
communities in Ethiopia. The Oromos constitute the largest ethnic community in 
                                                 
609 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/et.html (last accessed on 19 May 2012). 
610 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/et.html (last accessed on 19 May 2012). 
611 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/et.html (last accessed on 19 May 2012). 
612 FDRE Population Census Commission (2008) 8. 
613  FDRE Population Census Commission (2008) 17. 
614 FDRE Population Census Commission (2008). 
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Ethiopia, accounting for 34.5 percent of the total population, followed by the 
Amharas 26.9 percent, the Somali 6.2 percent and the Tigre 6.1 percent.615  
 
Ethiopia’s economy has traditionally been based on agriculture which contributed 
up to 90 percent to the country’s GDP. There are, however, some reports that 
show that the service sector has overtaken the agriculture sector as the leading 
economic sector.616 In 2009/2010, for instance, the average contributions to the 
national GDP of the agriculture, the industry, and the service sector were 41.6 
percent, 12.9 and 45.5 percent respectively. 617    
3. LOCAL GOVERNANCE FROM AXUM TO THE EMERGENCE OF 
‘MODERN ETHIOPIA’ 
Historian claim that Ethiopia has a more than 2000 years of existence as a state 
tracing the country’s origin to the Axumite Civilisation (Axumite Kingdom) 
which arose in the northern part of the country around the 10th Century B.C.618 
They maintain that the Axumite Kingdom was one of the most powerful, rich, 
and well known civilisations in the world and demonstrate as evidence for their 
claim relics of stelae, ruins of palaces, and other artefacts.619 There is no 
concurrence among historians concerning the territorial extent of the Axumite 
Kingdom, in particular its southern boundaries.620 There is a general agreement 
                                                 
615 See chapter 4 at Table 2. 
616 MoFED (2010) 4-5. 
617 MoFED (2010) 4-5. 
618 Markakis (1975) 1; Bahru (2002) Teshale (1994). 
619 Bahru (2002) 8. 
620 Bahru (2002) 8; Teshale (1995); 41. 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
though that the present day the State of Eritrea, Tigray, and Amhara were within 
the domain of Axume.621 
 
From the time of the Axumite Kingdom until the emergence of ‘Modern 
Ethiopia’ in the 1850s, decentralised rule was the dominant feature of the 
country’s political structure in which ‘triple layers of authority’ co-existed. 622 At 
the centre was an emperor who exercised a central authority. Regional or 
provincial and local authorities also exercised power autonomously within their 
respective territorial domains.623 Some scholars maintain that the country’s 
governance system was characterised by the co-existence of ‘double’ authorities; 
regional lords and a central throne. 624 It is important, however, to note that local 
authorities were equally autonomous within their realm. Hence, Ethiopia’s 
decentralised system can be characterised as a co-existence of triple authorities; 
local, regional, and central.  
 
Ethiopia was a decentralised state primarily due to its colossal territorial size, its 
rugged and broken landscape, the economic and cultural diversity of the people, 
and the absence of infrastructure, especially roads connecting the various 
regions.625 These factors hindered centralised rules and led to the creation of 
historical regional and local boundaries which, in turn, reinforced the social and 
economic diversity of the people.626 Thus, localities had significance in the lives 
                                                 
621 Bahru (2002) 8; Teshale (1995) 41. 
622 Gebru (1991)36. See also Assefa (2007a) 17; Solomon (2006) 11-13. 
623 Gebru (1991) 36; Assefa (2007a) 16. 
624 Assefa (2007a) 16; Solomon (2006) 11. 
625 Solomon (2006) 12; Gebru (1991) 36. 
626 Gebru (1991) 36. 
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of the Ethiopian people.  In fact localities often had a more prominent impact on 
the people’s life than the regions.627 As Teshale notes, in Ethiopia ‘the parish… 
defined one’s identity’ even though ‘Ethiopian nationalism’ was felt strongly at a 
time of foreign aggression.628 Even now people tend to identify themselves with 
the localities of their birth. It is common to hear people say that ‘I am Manzé, she 
is Yifaté, or he is Agamé’.629 Manze, Yifat and Agame are, but small localities in 
the present day Amhara and Tigray regions. Most of the current local government 
boundaries are also drawn based on these historical boundaries.630  
3.1. Traditional institutions of local governance   
3.1.1. Introduction  
Ethiopia’s territorial enormity and the rough terrain together with the social, 
economic, and cultural diversity of the people had resulted in the emergence of 
diverse endogenous local administrative institutions throughout the country. A 
detailed discussion of each of the traditional institutions local administration is 
beyond the scope this thesis. The following section will, therefore, provide a brief 
depiction of some of the traditional local authorities and institutions of local 
administration of northern and southern Ethiopia.   
3.1.2. Traditional local administrative institutions of northern Ethiopia   
The area which is referred to as the ‘northern Ethiopia’ is that part of Ethiopia 
which was within the domain of the Axumite Kingdome. This included, as 
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indicated above, the area of the present day State of Eritrea, Tigray and Amhara 
region. 631  This part of Ethiopia was also known as the Abyssinian Empire.632   
 
The Abyssinian Empire had five provinces or regions: The Tigre (which includes 
the present Tigray and Eretria), Gojam, Wollo, Gonder (Begemidir), and 
Showa.633 Each of these regions was ruled either by a Ras (head) or a Nigus 
(king).634 At the centre was the Niguse-Negest (King of Kings or Emperor) whose 
central authority was recognised by the regional rulers. The regional rulers 
exercised power autonomously even though the extent of their autonomy 
depended on the strength of the Emperor at the centre. 635   
 
                                                 
631 Solomon (2006) 11. 
632 It was also in this part of Ethiopia where Christianity was first introduced in the 4th century. 
The Abyssinian Empire is also called the ‘Christian Kingdom’.  The Abyssinian Empire was first 
ruled by emperors belonging to the Axumite dynasty. With the decline of Axume in the 7th 
century, mainly due to the rise of Islam, power shifted to the Zagwe dynasty of the Agaw people 
who ruled the Empire until they were ousted in 1270 by Yikuno Amlak who established the 
Solomonic dynasty. Emperors from the Solomonic dynasty ruled the country until Emperor Haile 
Selassie I, the last Ethiopian monarch, was dethroned in 1974. Assefa (2007a) 22. 
633 Abbera (2000) 222. 
634 Abbera (2000) 222. 
635 When the centre was weak, the regions enjoyed unhindered autonomy. For instance, the 
regional rulers enjoyed unfettered autonomy during Ethiopia’s historical epoch known as Zemene 
Mesafint (The Age Princes) (1769-1855) in which the central throne was extremely weakened. 
The provincial leaders also attempted to control the central throne whenever one of them felt 
militarily strong. Therefore, the seat of the central throne moved from one region to the other 
depending on the regional ruler who asserted power. For instance, Gonder was the seat of the 
throne until power shifted to Showa when Emperor Menilik II ascended to the throne. What is 
remarkable is that the provincial ruler sought to control the centre; hardly ever did they seek to 
break away from it. Assefa (2007a) 20-21; Bahru (2002) 11; Keller (1981) 316. 
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Each of the five regions or provinces was further divided into several districts. A 
district governed by a district level authority who took the designation of either 
melkegna or abegaz or gult-gejzi.636 The districts were divided into sub-districts 
and each of the sub-districts was ruled by a local authority known as misle’ene.  
There was also a village level authority called chiqa shum below the misle’ene.637 
In most cases, the offices of traditional provincial and local authorities in northern 
Ethiopia were hereditary while in a few cases the positions rotated among the rist 
land holders.638  
 
The traditional local authorities at all levels exercised both administrative and 
judicial functions.639  They, therefore, had the duty to maintain peace and order, 
resolve disputes, collect taxes, and implement orders of the Niguse-Negest as well 
as the regional rulers.640 The traditional local authorities in northern Ethiopia 
were hierarchically organised in that the administrative and judicial decisions of a 
lower level local authority were reviewed by a higher level local authority.  For 
instance, a chiqa-shum’s administrative and judicial decisions were reviewed by 
misle’ene or melkegna.641 As part of their administrative functions, local 
                                                 
636 Markakis (1975) 106-108; Teshale (1995) 82-84; Abbera (2000) 51. 
637 Abbera (2000) 46 &50. 
638A rist is a land holding system which was practiced in the northern Ethiopia. It was based on an 
‘ancestral descent claim and effective possession of land’. A rist was a communal ownership of 
land which was not measured and the possessor of which had no right to depose it by sale or by 
any other means. Being a rist holder brought to the holder not only economic benefit but also 
social prestige among them being holding administrative office. In practice all of the peasants in 
the northern part were rist holders. Teshale (1995) 73; Abbera (2000) 134-135; Markakis (1975) 
99-104. 
639 Abbera (2000) 46 &50. 
640 Abbera (2000); Teshale (1995); Markakis (1975) 107. 
641 Abbera (2000) 222ff. 
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authorities also served as liaisons between a higher level of administration and the 
people at local level. Accordingly, they communicated government decisions and 
laws to the people and the people’s grievances and wishes to the senior rulers.642 
 
In return for their services, local authorities were entitled to retain a certain 
percentage of the taxes they collected from within their jurisdiction. For instance, 
a chiqa shum was entitled to retain up to 3 percent of the taxes that he collected 
from the village under his chieftainship.643 A gult-gejzi or melkegna was also 
permitted to collect tribute, which could amount to a fifth of the produce of each 
rist holder or from the gebars who were rist holding peasants in his gult.644 
3.1.3. Traditional administrative institutions of southern Ethiopia    
‘Southern Ethiopia’ is that part of Ethiopia which, arguably, did not form part of 
the Abyssinian Empire even though it had commercial relation with it.645  The 
southern regions were fully incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire only in the 
second half of the 19th Century following the expansion of the latter. In the 
southern part of Ethiopia there were (still are) numerous ethnic communities 
whose political ‘organisations ranged from communal societies to states with 
powerful kings and elaborate mechanisms for the exercise of authority’.646  Each 
of these ethnic communities had its own traditional local authorities and 
administrative institutions. 647  The Oromos, for instance, had a socio-political 
system known as gada which consisted of ‘age grade classes that succeed each 
                                                 
642 Teshale (1995) 124. 
643 Teshale (1995) 125. 
644 Markakis (1975) 107. 
645 Bahru (2002); Assefa (2007a) 17-18. 
646 Bahru (2002) 16. 
647 Assefa (2007a) 17. 
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other every eight years in assuming economic, political, and social 
responsibilities’.648 There were also strong kingdoms in the southern part of 
Ethiopia, including, the kingdoms of Kaffa and Wolyita which had various local 
level administrative institutions.649 The Gurage, also an ethnic community of 
Southern Ethiopia, had well developed traditional local administrative institutions 
at village, clan and regional level which were known as yejoka (gordana), agar 
and samugnet respectivelly.650 In the east and north east, there were the Sultanate 
of Afar, the Emirate of Harer and the Somalis with their own regional and local 
administrative institutions. 651    
3.1.4. Assessment 
The institutions of the Ethiopian traditional local authorities were numerous and 
diverse. Hence, a general assessment of their excellence or mediocrity as 
institutions of development and accommodation of ethnic diversity is simply 
impossible. It is safe however to say that the traditional local institutions and 
authorities enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant community. They were 
home-grown and the local authorities often held power with the ‘explicit or 
implicit consent of the relevant community’, and derived their authorities mainly 
from the ‘respect and support’ of their community.652  
 
                                                 
648 Mohammed (1995) 10. 
649 The kingdom of Kaffa, for instance, had provincial sub-divisions known as worafo, rashe-
showo, gudo and gafo which were administered by sub-kings. It also had three autonomous 
districts, manok, nao and sewo, which were administered by local authorities called werabe 
rasheras or waraki. Bahru (2002) 16; Bekele (2005) 15. 
650 Bahru (2008) 62-63. 
651 Bahru (2002) 19-20; Assefa (2007a) 17. 
652 Markakis (1975). 
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There were also democratic local institutions in southern Ethiopia, such as, the 
gada of the Oromo. In the gada system the local authorities held power with the 
consent of the people and for a limited period of time, which is a key feature of a 
democratic system.653 The yejoka and samugnet of the Gurage people also had 
features which were democratic. The legitimacy of the local authorities in the 
eyes of the people is self-evident even in the instances where local administrative 
positions were hereditary.  
 
Development and service delivery were foreign concepts to Ethiopia’s traditional 
local authorities.654 The local authorities viewed their responsibility to be limited 
to maintaining law and order, administering justice, and collecting taxes. 
However, local officials, such as the chiqa shum, mobilised the local people to 
engage in what could be viewed as developmental activities, such as building 
roads. The role of the samugnet of the Gurage in maintaining an equitable use of 
resources such as grazing land, among members of a clan can be considered a 
developmental function.655 The developmental significance of the local officials’ 
role in maintaining peace and order and amicably settling disputes in the 
localities, and in administering justice is also self-evident. 
 
A further, and perhaps the strongest, aspect of the decentralised structure of the 
Ethiopian state was its accommodation of diversity. The system allowed each 
ethnic and cultural group, starting from village level, to administer itself in 
accordance with its tradition and culture.  
                                                 
653 Hussien (2006) 258. 
654 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 37. 
655 Abbera (2000) 59; Bahru (2006) 21. 
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However, the traditional institutions and authorities were not flawless. In 
particular, the traditional local authorities of the northern regions with their 
feudalistic character were not only undemocratic but also exploitative. In the past 
the only productive section of the Ethiopian society was the peasantry also known 
as in Amharic gebar, which literally means a tax payer. 656 The government and 
the nobility depended on the gebar for their sustenance. In order to sustain itself, 
the government, with the help of local authorities, exacted excessive taxes, 
tributes and other dues from the gebars.657 The local officials were particularly 
hard-hearted towards the peasants since what accrued to them depended on the 
amount they could collect in the form of taxes and tributes. By so doing, local 
authorities were ruining the only productive section of the society instead of 
bringing about development to it.  
4. THE BIRTH OF ‘MODERN ETHIOPIA’: ‘CREEPING 
CENTRALISATION’ (1855-1930)  
The emergence of ‘modern Ethiopia’ is associated with the beginning of 
processes of territorial expansion and centralisation of political power.658 These 
two processes, undertaken in the name of nation building, were first initiated by 
Emperor Tewodros II (1855-1868) in 1855.659 The process of territorial 
expansion, which also continued during Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-1889), 
                                                 
656 Bahru (2002) 87. 
657 Bahru (2002); Tehsale (1995); Tekle-Hawariat (1998 Ethiopian Calendar) 362.  
658 Teshale (1995) 31; Bahru (2002) 27-31.   
659 Teshale (1995) 31; Bahru (2002) 27-31.   
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reached its climax under Emperor Menilik II (1989-1913) in the late 1890s 
resulting in Ethiopia taking its current shape. 660  
 
Emperor Menilik II, who was a Showan King until he assumed the Emperorship 
after the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, expanded the Ethiopian Empire mainly 
to the southern and south-eastern Ethiopia using both diplomacy and military 
force.661 Following the incorporation of the southern regions into the Ethiopian 
Empire, the various ethnic communities of the southern regions became 
politically, economically, and culturally marginalised.662  
4.1. Political marginalisation  
As stated above Menilik used both diplomacy and military to expand his empire. 
In some cases Menelik’s diplomatic effort secured him the peaceful submission 
of some regional and local rulers to his authority. As a reward for their peaceful 
submission, he allowed them to retain their positions. He also left the local 
administrative institutions in the areas largely unaltered.663 However, he expected 
the regional and local leaders who so submitted to him to serve him as 
‘vassals’.664 Menilik persuaded, even coerced, these rulers to convert to Orthodox 
Christianity, the official religion until 1974 and to learn the Amharic language, 
the language of the Amhara ethnic community to which Menilik belonged.665  
 
                                                 
660 Bahru (2002) 60-68.   
661 Teshale (1995) 42. 
662 Yonatan (2010 a) 161. 
663 Teshale (1995) 42. 
664 Among the kingdoms in this category were Jimma Abba Jiffar, Leqa Naqamte, Leqa Qellam, 
Assosa and Bella Shangul, Awsa of Afar and Gubba of western Gojjam. Markakis (1975) 132; 
Teshale (1995) 42 
665 Mekruia (1997) 325 ff. 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
The regions that resisted Menilik’s authority were militarily overpowered and put 
under Menilik’s direct rule. The Emperor personally appointed each regional 
administrator to these areas thereby abolishing the traditional rulers and 
institutions of the southern regions.666 This was the case, for instance, in the 
Kaffa, the Gibe, the Sidama, and the Emirate of Harer. Menilik appointed the 
military leaders who led his military campaign as administrators of these 
regions.667 The military leaders, who were in most cases Showan-Amharas, in 
turn, subdivided the conquered regions into different localities and appointed 
their subordinates as administrators of the localities.668  
 
The traditional regional and local institutions of administration of the southern 
regions were virtually abolished altogether.  In their place, the local institutions of 
northern Ethiopia such as chiqa shum, gult gedzi and the like were imposed in 
these regions along with northern rulers. 669 The endogenous institutions of the 
southern regions were allowed to exist only where they were found to be useful 
for exerting control over the local population. Even in such cases they were 
subordinated to the northern local institutions which were ‘superimposed’ in the 
southern regions. 670  
 
However, the traditional leaders of the southern localities were indispensable for 
exerting certain control over the local population. They were, therefore, placed 
                                                 
666 Keller (1981) 313; Teshale (1995) 42. 
667 Markakis (1975) 133. 
668 Markakis (1975) 133. 
669 Abbink (1997) 323. 
670 Abbink (1997) 323. 
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under the northern provincial and local rulers to serve as ‘liaison-men’.671 The 
traditional local authorities of the southern regions, commonly known as 
balabbats, did not however have formal administrative authority.672 Their 
function was limited to maintaining security and assisting the centrally appointed 
local rulers in collecting taxes and tributes. They also mobilised local 
communities whenever their services were needed by the central government. In 
return for their services, the balabbats were allowed to retain their lands when, as 
will be shown below, the land in the southern regions were expropriated. 673  
  
In the north-eastern and south-eastern lowland areas of the country where the 
pastoral people of the Somali and Afar ethnic communities are found, the direct 
control of the central government was minimal.674 Direct control of these 
communities by the central government was impossible as they were in constant 
movement in search of grazing land and water. Therefore, the central government 
had to rely on the clan and tribal leaders of these communities to exert indirect 
control. 675  
4.2. Economic marginalisation  
Two-thirds of the southern regions was expropriated by Menilik and was given to 
settlers who moved from northern Ethiopia. 676  Settlement sites and military 
garrisons were established as a large number of Amhara settlers moved to the 
southern regions as soldiers, administrators, and priests.677 The settlers suppressed 
                                                 
671 Abbink (1997) 322. 
672 Abbink (1997) 323. 
673 Markakis (1975) 134. 
674 Hess (1970) 132. 
675 Hess (1970) 132. 
676  Keller (1981) 313; Markakis (1975) 136. 
677 Keller (1981) 313; Teshale (1995) 46. 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
any resistance against the Emperor, and ensured security and ‘the smooth flow of 
tribute’ to Menilik’s ‘imperial treasury’.678   
4.3. Cultural marginalisation  
Amharic was imposed as the sole official language of the Ethiopia Empire.  The 
ethnic communities of the southern regions were therefore, encouraged, if not 
coerced, to abandon their languages and to adopt Amharic as their language. 679   
Their cultures and traditions were viewed as inferior to the Amhara culture.680 
They were also required to convert to Orthodox Christianity which was then a 
state religion. 681    
4.4. Assessment  
The southward territorial expansion that was carried out by Emperor Menilik is of 
critical significance in the Ethiopian history. The territorial expansion is given 
conflicting interpretation by different historians. For some, Menilik’s expansion 
was a mission of nation building and a process of re-unifying hitherto lost 
territories to the Ethiopian Empire. For others, it was an undertaking of colonial 
subjugation.682  It is not the purpose or within the scope of this thesis to provide 
‘the correct interpretation’ to this epoch in Ethiopia’s history. However it cannot 
be gainsaid that the process of territorial expansion and administrative 
centralisation that Menilik undertook resulted in the political and cultural 
marginalisation of scores of ethnic communities of the country. The ethnic 
                                                 
678 This direct control and militaristic administration of the southern regions came later to be 
disreputably known as the ‘neftegna system’. ‘Neftegna’ means ‘one with a gun’ and it implies the 
militaristic nature of the local administration in the southern part of the Ethiopia. Markakis 
(1975); Abbink (1997); 322; Bahru (2002); Keller (1981) 313; Teshale (1995) 46. 
679 Markakis (2004) 12. 
680 Bahru (2002). 
681 Markakis (2004) 12. 
682 See Yonatan (2010) 163; Teshale (1995). 
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conflicts that plagued the country for more than a century are one way or the 
other related to this era. This is why one of the alleged purposes of the 
decentralisation process is to curtail the more than a century long inter-ethnic 
hostility.   
5. FORMAL CENTRALISATION UNDER EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I 
(1930-1974) 
The political and administrative centralisation process continued even after 
Emperor Menilik. Emperor Haile Selassie I took the centralisation process to its 
extreme. Haile Selassie, who reigned for over five decades, is best known for his 
use of formal constitutional and legal means to centralise power.  
 
Haile Selassie began his part of the centralisation process in 1931 when he 
promulgated the first written Constitution of the country. 683 The Constitution was 
intended to serve three objectives. The first objective was to provide a 
constitutional foundation for the authority of the Emperor which was hitherto 
founded on a ‘convention based on “divine kingship”’. 684 The second was to 
define the line of succession to the throne.685  The third objective, which is most 
relevant here, was to ‘define’ the relationship between the Emperor and the 
nobility. 686 This, in effect meant to centralise all powers in the Emperor through 
constitutional means and to strip provincial and local rulers of their traditional 
hereditary claims to provincial or local leadership.687 In other words, the Emperor 
used the Constitution to exclude ‘the nobility from any political position not 
                                                 
683 Keller (1981) 320. 
684 Abbera (2000) 167. 
685 Abbera (2000) 167. 
686 Abbera (2000) 167; Bahru (2002) 140. 
687 Abbera (2000) 167. 
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derived directly’ from him.688 The Constitution, therefore, served as a starting 
point towards formal centralisation of political power.  The Emperor took the 
most critical formal and practical measure of centralisation in 1942 when he 
reclaimed the throne after the Italian occupying forces had been ousted from the 
country. 689  
 
The five year occupation of the country by the Italian forces had facilitated Haile 
Selassie’s subsequent centralisation in various ways. 690 The Italians built roads 
linking each province with Addis Ababa, which later helped overcome the 
difficulty that the topography of the country posed for a centralised 
administration.691 Furthermore, hoping to smoothly run the administration of their 
East African colonies, the Italians had introduced a hierarchical, centralised and 
bureaucratised administrative structure which Haile Selassie used as a model.692  
These factors facilitated Haile Selassies’ post-Italian occupation centralisation 
which was put into effect with the 1942 local and provincial administrative 
reform. The centralisation that was carried out by Haile Selassie had military, 
administrative, and judicial aspects.693 Only the administrative aspect is discussed 
here. 
                                                 
688 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 7. 
689 From 1931 until 1935 the Emperor was in exile as the country was under Italian occupation. 
He began the 1942 provincial and local reforms a few years after the expulsion of the Italian 
forces. 
690 Teshale (1995) 107. 
691 Teshale (1995) 107. 
692 Bahru (2002) 162.  
693 Teshale (1995) 107. 
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5.1. The 1942 administrative reform  
In 1942 Haile Selassie issued Decree 1 (1942) in order to reform and modernise 
the country’s administrative structure. The 1942 local administrative reform 
involved three measures: redrawing provincial and local boundaries, centralising 
the appointment of provincial and local administrators, and deconcentrating 
‘central ministries through the establishment of subordinate field offices staffed 
by appointed officials’. 694 Each of these measures was intended and contributed 
to the centralisation of powers in the person of the Emperor. 
5.1.1. Re-drawing provincial boundaries  
After the completion of the territorial expansion during Emperor Menilik and 
until Italian occupation in 1930, Ethiopia was divided into 32 ghizats 
(governorates).695  Until Decree 1 (1942) was promulgated, the ghizats, in 
particular those in northern Ethiopia,696 enjoyed a wide range of autonomy from 
the centre. As Teshale notes, each territorial unit was ‘a kind of a state within a 
state’ despite the fact that the Emperor exercised overall authority.697  The 
boundaries of the ghizats were re-drawn after the enactment of the Decree and the 
32 ghizats were reduced to 12 awrajas (provinces).698 In the process, some 
                                                 
694 Teshale (1995); Cohen & Koehn (1980) 8. 
695 Danie (1994) 97. 
696 Under Emperor Menilike the hereditary and semi-hereditary system of local administration 
was maintained in northern Ethiopia. In the southern part however, new governors were sent from 
the centre. The traditional leaders of the southern part played only complimentary role to the 
centrally installed administration. Teshale (1995) 128.    
697 Teshale (1995) 115. See also Keller (1981) 314. 
698 Daniel (1994) 98. Latter, the number of the provinces increased to 14. The 14 provinces were 
Arusi, Balé, Begemider (Gonder), Eretria, Gamo-Gofa, Gojjam, Harergé, Illubabor, Keffa, 
Showa, Sidamo, Tigray, Wollega, and Wollo. 
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provinces were amalgamated while others were dissected or reduced in size.699 It 
should be stressed that the main aim of this re-drawing of provincial boundaries 
and the standardisation of provincial administration was to weaken the hitherto 
autonomous provincial or regional rulers, especially those of northern Ethiopia.700  
As Teshale notes, ‘[b]y redrawing the internal territorial boundaries of Ethiopia, 
Haile Selassie destroyed the traditional power base of the nobility’.701  
5.1.2. Centralising the appointment of provincial administrators 
The 1942 reform centralised the appointment of provincial and local governors in 
the person of the Emperor.702 The centralisation of the appointment of provincial 
governors formally abolished any hereditary provincial governorship. It also 
reduced the status of provincial governors to the agents of the Emperor. A 
provincial governor was expected to exercise government power in the name and 
on behalf of the Emperor.703    
 
Provincial governors were prohibited from demanding taxes and tributes for 
themselves.704 They were instead required to collect taxes and dues on behalf of 
the Emperor and to transfer the revenue so collected to the Government 
Treasury.705  For their services, they were paid salaries from the central 
                                                 
699 Teshale (1995) 115. 
700 Keller (1981) 321; Teshale (1995) 115-116. 
701 Teshale (1995) 115-116. 
702 Decree 1 (1942) Art 1. 
703 Hess (1970) 131; Cohen & Koehn (1980) 8-9; Decree 1 (1942); Art 1 &2. This was even 
reflected in the governor’s title which became ‘enderase’, the literal translation of which is ‘like 
myself’ or ‘on my behalf’.  This title was in contrast to the former title of provincial governors 
which was either Negus (king) or Ras (head) both of which signify a certain level of autonomy. 
Teshale (1995) 
704 Decree 1 (1942) Art 6. 
705 Decree 1 (1942) Art 6. 
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government treasury. Provincial governors, therefore, became simply salaried 
employees of the state.706  
 
The Amhara and, to some extent, the Tigray nobilities remained the ‘main pool of 
recruitment’ and appointment for provincial governorship even if they lost their 
autonomy as a result of the reform. 707 The Emperor also used ‘traditional criteria’ 
for recruiting provincial governors, the most important criterion being strong 
loyalty to him.708 Therefore, in the northern regions one of the sons of a 
provincial governor was allowed to inherit the position so long as the latter 
showed loyalty to the Emperor.709 The governors of the southern regions were, 
however, almost exclusively Amharas even though in some cases one from 
among the balabbats was appointed as deputy to the Amhara governor. 710 In this 
way Haile Selassie continued the political marginalisation of the various ethnic 
communities of the southern regions which began during Menilik.    
5.1.3. Local administration after the 1942 reform 
The 1942 reform created a three tiered local administrative structure throughout 
the country.711 The 12 awrajas (provinces) were sub-divided into 60 woredas 
(districts).712 The woredas were in turn divided into 339 sub-districts (mislene)713 
                                                 
706 Decree 1 (1942) Art 7. See also Keller (1981) 321. 
707 Markakis (1975) 277ff. 
708 Markakis (1975) 278. 
709 Markakis (1975) 278. 
710 Markakis (1975) 278. 
711 Daniel (1994) 99-100; Cohen & Koehn (1980) 9. 
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and the sub-districts into 1176 village level administrative units (mikitl 
mislene).714  
5.1.3.1.Centralising the appointment of local authorities  
The Decree also centralised the appointment of woreda administrators and 
mislenes in the person of the Emperor: The Emperor appointed administrators up 
on the recommendation of the Ministry of the Interior.715 In effect, all forms of 
traditional hereditary and semi-hereditary local administrative positions were 
formally abolished. The Decree further provided that the governors at each level 
would act as the agents of the Emperor.716   
5.1.3.2.Functions of local authorities  
The functions of local administrators were left without any significant change 
despite centralising the appointment and removal the administrators. Provincial 
and local administrators retained their traditional functions of maintaining 
security and order and collecting taxes.717  
 
                                                 
714 In 1946 slight adjustments were made to local level administration, which were basically 
limited to re-naming the administrative unit without any change on its territorial size. The three 
tiered local administration was maintained. Thus, the provincial administrative unit that up until 
then was called awraja became teklay ghizat (Governorate General). The sub-provincial 
administrative unit that was referred to as woreda under the 1942 Decree was renamed awraja 
ghizat. The mislene became ‘woreda ghizat’ and the sub-district level unit which had been mikitil 
mislene became mikitl woreda.   Following the incorporation of Ogaden in 1954 into Ethiopia and 
the unification of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1962, the number of the teklay ghizats in the country 
grew from 12 to 14.  The country was also divided into 103 awrajas (sub-provinces), 505 woredas 
(districts) and 949 mikitl woredawoch (sub-districts). Daniel (1994); Cohen & Koehn (1980) 9. 
715 Decree 1 (1942) Art 36. 
716 Decree 1 (1942) Art 2. 
717 Decree 1 (1942) Art 6-20. 
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The notion of development and service delivery hardly featured at the time. Prior 
to 1974, therefore, the great majority of Ethiopians, especially those in the rural 
area, did not expect to receive any service either from the local administrative 
units or the field agents of the various ministries of the central government.718 As 
Cohen and Koehn note; 
 
‘A number of people used roads and the courts, but few could take advantage of 
education or health stations, and rarely did rural people see agricultural extension 
officers, much less a telephone or postal service. What did touch the lives of rural 
people was the tax collector of the Ministry of Finance and the policemen of the 
Ministry of the Interior.’719  
 
The people, therefore, had to organise themselves to raise funds to finance certain 
development projects, such as, building roads, bridges, schools, clinics and other 
facilities. 720 A number of self-help organisations which were known as meredaja 
mahiber or lemat mahiber were formed.721  These associations were established 
in Addis Ababa and other towns by the ‘natives’ of a given district or province 
and bore the name of the area or ethnic community for whose benefit the 
development associations were organised. However, these associations were 
accused of engaging in ‘subversive action’ against the government and were 
banned. 722  
                                                 
718 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 37. 
719 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 37. 
720 Markakis (1975) 212. 
721 Markakis (1975) 212. 
722 Metcha and Tulema of the Oromo, the Sidamo voluntary associations, and the Alem-Gena-
Wollamo Road Construction Association were among the best known development associations. 
Markakis (1975) 220-221; Hamer (2007) 214. 
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5.1.3.3.Central supervision  
As indicated, above third element of Haile Selassie’s centralisation scheme was 
the deconcentration of central ministries at local level. In order to supervise the 
provincial and local administrative units, therefore, the ministries stationed field 
agents in all provinces and localities.723 Each awraja, woreda or mislene 
administrator was under the administrative supervision of the Ministry of the 
Interior. It was also under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Finance 
pertaining to financial matters.724 Whether a decision was technical or 
administrative was a source of incessant controversy among the field agents of 
the various ministries of the central government. 725 The directives of the different 
units of the central government often contradicted each other. Such disputes had 
to be taken to the Emperor for final decision, which clearly meant ‘delay in or 
abandonment’ of the implementation of local development projects.726 In short, 
the Decree established an extremely centralised, complex, inefficient, and highly 
bureaucratised local administrative system. 
5.1.3.4.Urban administrations in the 1942 administrative reform 
The 1942 Decree regulated the establishment and administration of urban areas 
separately.727 It was, however, Proclamation 74 (1945) that in detailed regulated 
urban administrations. Proclamation 74 (1945) categorised urban areas into 
municipalities and towns.728 Addis Ababa, Gondar, Harar, Jimma, Dessie and 
                                                 
723 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 9. 
724 Decree 1 (1942) Art 2. 
725 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 9. 
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Dire Dawa became municipalities.729 Asmara also joined this category after the 
unification of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1963. The Proclamation also provided 100 
urban areas with the status of towns.730  The towns were, in turn, divided into 
first, second and third class towns, even though the distinction between the 
different classes of the towns was unclear. 731  
Municipal councils  
Proclamation 75/1945 provided for the establishment of a municipal council in 
each urban area.732 The councils consisted of seven elected representatives of the 
residents of a town and the representatives of the ministries of the central 
government. Only a resident of a municipality or a town who had immovable 
property could vote for and be elected to the municipal councils.733 Moreover, the 
Emperor personally appointed mayors for the municipalities and city officers for 
the towns upon the recommendation of the Ministry of the Interior. In many cases 
the provincial governors assumed the office of mayors or town officers of some 
or all of the cities in the provinces under their authority.734  
 
In 1954 Addis Ababa became a chartered city with the power to prepare and 
adopt laws of local scope, and by-laws which were necessary for the 
                                                 
729 Proclamation 74 (1945) Schedule A. 
730 The Proclamation gave the power to create new municipalities and townships and to change 
the category of an urban area to the Ministry of Interior. After the issuance of Proclamation 
74/1945 the Ministry created more than one hundred townships. However the number of 
municipalities remained the same. Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 6 (1) (a) & Schedule B. 
731 Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 6 (1). 
732 Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 3 (2). 
733 Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 3(2). 
734 Cohen & Koehn (1980).   
734 Cohen & Koehn (1980). 
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implementation of national laws.735 The autonomy of the city was, however, 
undercut as the Mayor of the City was accountable to the Emperor and the City’s 
Council needed approval of the Ministry of the Interior for every decision.736 
Functions of urban administrations  
Proclamation 74(1945) contained a list of municipal functions including streets, 
squares, bridges, public gardens, sewerage, and alignment of buildings.737 A 
municipal council had the power to decide on municipal services, such as, water, 
electricity, market areas, cemeteries, abattoirs, fire fighting, municipal welfare 
institutions, municipal health services, and the like.738 Finance and capacity 
related constraints, however, rendered most of the towns and municipalities 
unable to provide basic services. 739 Furthermore, as indicated above any decision 
that was adopted by a municipal council had to be submitted to the Ministry of 
the Interior for approval.740 This long and often ‘politicised’ process of seeking 
approval hindered the prompt implementation of locally adopted development 
programmes. 
Financial sources of urban administration   
Proclamation 74 (1945) authorised a municipal council to impose certain taxes 
and to decide on the municipal or town budget.741 A municipality or a town could 
impose and collect property rates, trade, and professional licence fees, market 
                                                 
735 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 106. 
736 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 106. 
737 Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 4 (1-3). 
738 Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 4 (3) (a-f). 
739 Cohen and Koehn (1980) 147. 
740 Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 4. 
741 Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 4 (i). 
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fees, and municipal service fees.742 In addition, municipalities and towns received 
funds from the central government.743 The revenue that was collected from the 
aforementioned taxes was not sufficient to allow the municipalities and the towns 
to undertake any significant development project. First, a municipal council’s 
decision to adopt a budget or to impose rates, fees, or dues had to be submitted to 
the Ministry of the Interior for approval.744 The lengthy process of approval in the 
Ministry of the Interior hindered the municipalities from effectively utilising 
these sources of revenue.  Second, the city councillors were not willing to impose 
considerable taxes. To do so was against their personal interest as all of them 
were property owners. They, therefore, levied ‘flat, nominal, and static land tax 
rates’ out of self-interest.745 Third, there were large tracts of church and 
government land which was exempted from taxation. Fourth, the absence of 
competent staff and the limited economic base of the cities and the towns put 
further limitations on the revenue raising capacity of the urban areas.746       
5.1.4. The ‘attempted decentralisation’ of 1966 
By Decree No. 43, 1966, the Emperor attempted to decentralise power to the local 
level administration, in particular to the awraja (sub-provincial level) 
administration. This move was prompted by development experts who argued 
that the centralised system had thwarted ‘local innovation’.747 Some provincial 
                                                 
742 Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 11 (1-4). 
743 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 135. 
744 Cohen and Koehn state that prior to submitting municipally adopted budget to the Ministry of 
Interior for approval, the approval of the provincial administrator was sought. Cohen & Koehn 
(1980) 141; Proclamation 74 (1945) Art 11(5). 
745 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 135. 
746 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 135 
747 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 52. 
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administrators, in support of this proposal, argued that the inefficiency in the 
Ministry of the Interior, which had an extensive supervisory role over the 
provinces, made provinces unresponsive to local needs.748 The decentralisation 
attempt sought to make awraja administration autonomous administrative units.  
However, the plan was rejected by Parliament and the decentralisation scheme 
was applied only in 17 selected awraja administrations on an experimental 
basis.749 
5.1.5. Local administration and ethnic minorities of southern Ethiopia     
The political, cultural and economic marginalisation of the southern population, 
which began during Menilik, continued during the reign of Haile Selassie I.750 As 
was indicated above, in Southern Ethiopia, awraja and woreda governors were 
appointed, almost always from among the Amhara settler community who had 
moved southward from the north.751 The local communities therefore had no say 
in the appointment of the governors of their localities. Their traditional 
institutions were abolished. Their traditional local leaders were allowed to exist 
but only to serve as auxiliary to the centrally appointed local officials. As was the 
case under Menilik, the balabbats were allowed to exercise some form of quasi-
administrative functions.752 Below the balabbat, the institution of chiqa shum - 
which was essentially a local institution of northern Ethiopia - was installed in the 
region.753  Even where the office bearers were among the original inhabitants of 
                                                 
748 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 52. 
749 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 52. 
750 Keller (1981) 322. 
751 Clapham (1975) 75. 
752 Abbink (1997) 322. 
753 Abbink (1997) 322. 
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the southern region, the institutions of balabbat and chiqa shum were at odds ‘the 
local leadership pattern based on indigenous socio-cultural ranking’.754  
 
The land that was expropriated during Menilik remained in the hands of the 
Showan-Amhara nobility. Hence the economic marginalisation of the 
communities of the southern regions was perpetuated. The cultural 
marginalisation also continued. The southern population were encouraged, if not 
coerced, to learn Amharic and abandon their own languages. 755  Whenever the 
local residents wanted to lodge petition to the local rulers or judges, they had to 
do so in Amharic or take an interpreter with them.756  Moreover, Amharic became 
the sole language of instruction in primary schools. 757    
 
The reach of the central government remained minimal with respect to the north-
eastern and south-eastern lowland areas of the country, where the pastoral Somali 
and Afar ethnic groups were found.758 The central government, therefore, had to 
rely on clan and tribal leaders of these communities in order to exert some level 
of control. 759     
5.1.6. Assessment 
It is submitted that the local governance system which was created by the 1942 
Decree and the subsequent legislation was, non-developmental and un-
accommodative of the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian people. 
                                                 
754 Abbink (1997) 323. 
755 Markakis (2004) 12. 
756 Markakis (2004) 12. 
757 Markakis (2004) 12. 
758 Hess (1970) 132. 
759 Hess (1970) 132. 
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5.1.6.1.Non-developmental  
The local administrative system that was put in place through the 1942 reform did 
not create a local institutional structure conducive for development. To the 
contrary, the reform was a hindrance to development. Several reasons can be 
given for this submission. Firstly, as was seen above, it was with a declared 
motive of modernising local administration that the 1942 reform was introduced. 
The reform however did little to modernise the local administration of the 
country. Local and provincial administrative structures and the manner in which 
local administrators were recruited and appointed remained traditional. As 
Markakis states: 
 
‘Provincial administration remains the preserve of the traditional ruling group. 
Recruitment methods have not changed greatly, except the process has become more 
closely controlled by the Emperor, and the nobility’s ancient privilege to office in its 
home province has been somewhat circumscribed.’760  
 
Local administrators were appointed on the basis of loyalty, connections, and 
favouritism rather than competence. The appointment to a local administrative 
position was often regarded as an ‘apprenticeship’ for members of the royal 
family and the nobility to prepare themselves for higher appointments.761 In some 
cases the appointment to a particular local administrative position was used as a 
form of punishment of one who had fallen from grace in the eyes of the 
Emperor.762  
 
                                                 
760 Markakis (1975) 352. 
761 Markakis (1975) 354. 
762 Natty (2002) 61 252. 
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Second, democratic representative institutions, which are critical for local 
development, were virtually non-existent in the rural areas both at provincial and 
at local levels. Even if in some municipalities representative institutions were 
established, as was seen above, only property owners could vote for and be 
elected to these councils. In short, municipal councils were councils of the rich 
few. Public participation in decision making was unknown. Thus, the post-1942 
reform of local government was far from democratic. On the contrary, the reform 
did away with all traces of the democratic elements of the pre-1942 traditional 
institutions of local administration.   
 
Third, local authorities were not intended to be agents of development. Rather, 
they were meant to serve as instruments of control. This can be inferred from 
their functions which were focused on maintaining security and collecting taxes. 
In fact, the concept of public services was barely known. As a consequence, very 
few people had access to education, primary health care, clean water, and 
electricity. That is why the rate of illiteracy was soaring at 96 percent when Haile 
Selassie was removed from power.763   
 
Fourth, no development related mandates were devolved to local units. Local 
administrators were left with their traditional functions of tax collection and 
maintenance of law and order. As Melakou notes, development was not the 
regime’s agenda.764 Moreover, the reform did not provide a clear functional 
division between the provincial and local levels of administrative units. The 
vagueness in power division caused perennial jurisdictional conflicts between 
                                                 
763 Gilkes (1979) xvi.   
764 Melakou (2005) 92.  
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provincial units, local units, and the field agents of the Ministries of the central 
government. A complex and bureaucratic system of central control was imposed 
on the local administrative units which hindered independent local developmental 
actions unattainable.  
 
‘The formally deconcentrated, loosely defined system provided a fertile context for 
conflicts over centralisation, local autonomy, resource exploitation, and administrative 
co-ordination. Moreover structural constraints and persistent conflict reinforced 
independent, security conscious, rather than development oriented behaviour on the 
part of local officials…Under Emperor Haile Selassie, the national center never 
seriously attempted to use... municipal government units as vehicles of social and 
economic change or political mobilisation and support.’765  
 
5.1.6.2.Repressive of ethnic minorities  
The political, economic, and cultural marginalisation of the communities of the 
southern regions worsened after the 1942 reform. They were not allowed to 
administer themselves according to their custom and tradition. Their traditional 
rulers and institutions were abolished. Where the traditional rulers were allowed 
to exist, they played an informal support role only. Moreover, all local 
government institutions in the southern regions were staffed and run by settlers 
who came from the north. As Clapham notes, in 1967, two of the six provinces in 
southern Ethiopia were governed by army generals, the other four provinces by 
Amhara or Tigray noblemen.766  Almost all of the local governors, the clerks, 
judges and police officers were from the north.767  
                                                 
765 Cohen & Koehn (1980) 12. Emphasis added  
766 Clapham (1975) 75. 
767 Clapham (1975) 76. 
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In brief, the 1942 provincial and local government reform and subsequent 
legislative measures created a system of local administration which was non-
developmental, and repressive of ethnic and cultural minorities. 
6. LOCAL GOVERNANCE UNDER THE DERG (1974-1991) 
Starting from his early days in power, Haile Selassie had been facing sporadic 
public rebellions from different sections of the public.768  The rebellions were 
mainly due to his never-ending centralisation and the inefficiency and corruption 
that ensued from it.769  The opposition against the Emperor intensified in the 
1970s. Several uprisings took place in various urban areas, in which every section 
of the public took part, including the teachers, peasants, solders, students, taxi 
drivers, and trade unions.770  Prolonged strikes, boycotts, and mutinies were 
widespread during the last days of Haile Selassie. 771   
 
The public protests revolved around two issues: development and the ethnic 
question. The demand for development was advanced under the revolutionary 
motto ‘land to the tiller’. The ethnic question was mainly raised by the Addis 
Ababa University (then Haile Selassie I University) students and their political 
groups. 772  
 
                                                 
768 The 1940 Woyanne rebellion of the Tigray province, the peasant rebellion of the Bale 
province, and the military insurrection in Eritrea are among the recorded uprisings against the 
Emperor. McCann (1985); Gebru (1984); Andargachew (1994) 18; Solomon (2006) 17-18. 
769 Andargachew (1994) 18. 
770 Andargachew (1994) 37; Markakis (1979) 6. 
771 Markakis (1981) 11. 
772 Balsvik (2005). See also Teshome (1999) 79. 
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After several months of protracted protest and urban uprising, on 12 September 
1974 a committee of 120 military officers called the Derg, which was formed by 
representatives of the various divisions of the imperial army, carried out a coup 
and dethroned the Emperor.773  Soon after ousting the Emperor, the Derg 
established itself as a military government.774   
6.1. The Derg on the ethnic question  
A few months after deposing the Emperor, the Derg formulated a ‘Ten Point 
Programme’ on a range of issues, including development and ethnicity.775  The 
initial position of the Derg on the issue of ethnicity was ‘denying the existence of 
ethnic and related differences’. 776 The Derg made it clear that maintaining the 
territorial integrity of the country was its main concern. Hence, it adopted 
‘Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia first)’ as its main slogan. 777  It also averred in the first 
paragraph of the programme that ‘Ethiopia shall remain a united country, without 
ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural differences’. 778    
 
On 20 April 1976 the Derg adopted another programme known as ‘Programme of 
the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia’ (frequently referred to as the 
NDR). In this programme the Derg made a turnaround in its policy direction on 
the ethnic question.779 The shift in the Derg’s policy on the ethnic question was a 
‘concession’ that the Derg made to Meison, a leftist political group, when the 
                                                 
773 Markakis (1981) 12. 
774 Markakis (1981) 12. 
775 Clapham (1988) 46. 
776 Clapham (1988) 46. 
777 Clapham (1988) 46; Markakis (2004) 17. 
778 The ten-point programme quoted in Markakis (2004) 17; Clapham (1988) 46. 
779 Clapham (1988) 199; Teshome (1999) 81.  
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latter joined the Derg’s government.780  The NDR not only acknowledged the 
past injustices that the various ethnic communities of the country had suffered, 
but also recognised the right to self-determination of the ethnic communities of 
the country. 781   The right to self-determination was meant to be enjoyed ‘on the 
basis of equality and within the framework of local self-government’. 782  
 
The Derg, however, took no significant practical measure to implement this 
programme. The territorial structure of the provincial and local administration 
remained unchanged. The Derg retained Amharic as the only working language 
of the country. 783 In fact the ethnic question was ignored for almost 10 years as 
the government was preoccupied with countering other challenges.784 Only in the 
1980s did the ethnic question became an issue among the Derg officials and this 
was mainly because the regime was facing sustained military assaults from 
several ethnic-based rebellious groups including the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).  To appease these 
                                                 
780 Clapham (1988) 199.  
781 ‘The right to self-determination of all nationalities will be recognized and fully respected. No 
nationality will dominate another one since the history, culture, language and religion of each 
nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism. Given Ethiopia’s 
existing situation, the problem of nationalities can be solved if each nationality is accorded full 
right to self-government. This means that each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide 
on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the 
contents of its political, economic and social life use its own language and elect its own leaders 
and administrators to head its internal organs.’ Quoted in Clapham (1988) 199 & Cohen & Koehn 
(1980) 278-279; Teshome (1999) 81. 
782 Markakis (1981) 19. 
783 Markakis (2004) 21.  
784 From within the country, the EPRP and other political groups were engaged in urban armed 
struggle against the Derg. And from without the country, Said Bare of Somalia, with an eye to 
establish his ‘Greater Somalia’, had launched offensive against Ethiopia and had invaded much of 
south-eastern part of Ethiopia.  
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rebellious groups, the Derg established the Institute of Nationalities with 
mandates to study the ethnic composition of the country, to draft a new 
constitution, and to propose on how the administrative units of the country could 
be re-designed to respond to the ethnic question. 785 As will be discussed below, it 
was based on the proposal of the Institute that the Derg attempted to re-organise 
the boundaries of the provincial administrative units of the country in 1987. 786     
6.2. The debate on local administration: Addressing the development 
question  
The ‘Ten Point Programme’ stated that ‘every regional administration and every 
village shall manage its own affairs and be self-sufficient’.787 This was an 
indication of the Derg’s initial intention to decentralise power. The programme 
also gave an indication that an economic transformation would take place in the 
country which included nationalisation of lands and industries. This was also 
reiterated in the NRD. This economic transformation in fact took place when the 
Derg nationalised rural and urban lands, urban extra-houses, private industries, 
banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. 788   
 
The Derg also began transforming the provincial administration. It changed the 
title of the provinces from tekaly ghizat to kifle hager (sub-state unit) and the title 
of a provincial governor from ‘enderase’ to a ‘chief administrator’. This was 
meant to symbolise the fact that a provincial administrator no longer was a ‘ruler 
                                                 
785 Yonatan (2010a) 174-175.  
786 See below § 6.2.4.  
787 The ten-point programme quoted in Clapham (1988) 46. 
788 Clapham (1988). 
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or a governor of a passive population’.789  The Derg also abolished the 
institutions of balabbat and replaced the previous woreda and awraja 
administrators with new ones. 790   
 
At the same time, a debate began within the Derg about what the future local 
government system should look like, what role it should play in terms of 
development, and how it should involve the people in the planning and 
implementation of development projects.791 There was an agreement among the 
Derg officials on the need to decentralise power and to ensure public 
participation. 
 
‘As far as possible, the participation of the people in administration has to be 
encouraged. For all cases solely affecting their localities, the people, of necessity, 
should be authorized to take part in the decision making. Local development programs 
can easily be realized when there is a wide participation of the people in the 
administration mechanism.’ 792   
 
The form the decentralisation was supposed to take was however unclear.  Some 
officials of the Derg were of the view that service delivery functions should be 
devolved to woreda while others opted for ‘the wholesale implementation of self-
administration at awraja level’. 793   
 
                                                 
789 Cohen & Koehn (1981) 280. 
790 Cohen & Koehn (1981) 280. 
791 Cohen & Koehn (1981) 280. 
792 Editorial of the Ethiopian Herald 25 April (1975) quoted in Cohen & Koehn (1981) 280. 
793 Cohen & Koehn (1981) 280. 
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In the end, the Derg opted to establish two institutions of local administration; the 
Urban Dwellers Associations (UDAs)794 and Peasant Associations (PAs) in the 
rural and urban areas respectively.795 The purpose of the establishment of these 
associations was to organise and enable urban dwellers and peasants at each level 
to run their own affairs, solve their own problems, and directly participate in 
political, economic, and social activities of the country.796  
6.2.1. The UDA 
6.2.1.1.Institutional structure  
UDAs were established in urban areas at kebele (neighbourhood), kefitegna, and 
depending on the size of a city, at city levels.797 Each kebele had a general 
assembly consisting of all the residents of the kebele.798 The general assembly 
elected a ‘policy committee’.799 The policy committee, which had around 15 
members, was divided into an executive committee, financial inspection 
committee, and judicial tribunal.800  In towns and cities with more than two 
kebeles, there was a higher UDA, commonly known as kefitegna.801 A kefitegna 
                                                 
794 It was also called co-operative society of urban dwellers. 
795 Derg also issued the Urban Dwellers Association Consolidation and Municipalities 
Proclamation No 104 (1976) and the Peasant Association Organisation and Consolidation 
Proclamation No. 71 (1975) in which the organisational structures and functions of UDAs and 
PAs were provided for in detail. Proclamation 47 (1975) Art 22; Proclamation 31 (1975) Art 8.   
796 Proclamation 104 (1976) Preamble; Proclamation 71 (1975) Preamble. 
797 Proclamation 47 (1975); Arts 22, 25(1), 26(1); Proclamation No 104 (1976) Arts 2(3), 2(4) & 
2(5).  
798 Proclamation 47 (1976) Art 23; Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 4(2); Proclamation 206 (1981) 
Art 14(1) (a) read with Art 15(1). 
799 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 2 (8). 
800 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 2 (8). 
801 Proclamation 47 (1975) Art 25 (1); Proclamation No. 104 (1976) Art 13 (1). 
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had a Council in which each kebele was represented.802  For the towns with more 
than two kefitegnas a city council which was called a Central Urban Dwellers’ 
Association (CUDA) was established.803 The CUDA had a congress in which 
each kefitegna was represented by two persons. Furthermore, each of the 
ministries and offices of the central government was also represented on the city 
councils, but without vote.804  The two largest cities, Addis Ababa and Asmara, 
which at the time had more than four kefitengnas, had another intermediary 
administrative institution above the kefitengas and below the CUDA which was 
called a zone. Addis Ababa had five zones while Asmara had two. 805 In this 
hierarchical administrative system the zones (where they existed) supervised the 
kefitegnas, and the kefitegnas, in turn, supervised the kebeles. 
6.2.1.2. Powers and functions of UDAs 
   The kebeles in the urban areas were given a number of developmental mandates. 
They were, for instance, authorised to build roads, markets, low cost houses, and 
other facilities, and to provide primary health services, and education, to preserve 
forests, to register houses, residents, births, deaths and marriages, and to maintain 
peace and security.806  
 
The kefitegna had the power to co-ordinate and supervise the kebeles.807 The 
kefitegna was also responsible for maintaining an equitable income distribution 
                                                 
802 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 15 (1). 
803 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 19 (1). 
804 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 21 (2). 
805 Clapham (1988). 
806 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 9. 
807 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 17.  
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among its kebeles.808 It discharged this responsibility by using contributions from 
the kebeles within it.809 It also received funds from a city council where such 
council existed.810 Moreover, the kefitegna liaised between the kebeles and the 
CUDA in the provision of social services.811 A CUDA had the competence to 
provide municipal services including streets, squares, bridges, resorts, parks, 
sewerages, abattoirs, water and electric supplies, and markets.812 Organising and 
maintaining urban transportation, fire brigades, and ambulance services were also 
within the competences of the CUDA.813 
6.2.1.3.Financial sources of UDAs  
Proclamation 104 (1976) authorised the kebeles to collect urban land and house 
rents.814 The kebeles were allowed to retain and use the revenue they collected 
from house rents and other sources. However, they were required to transfer 15 
percent of the revenue they collected to kefitegnas.815 A kefitenga financed itself 
by using the contribution that it received from the kebels. It also received funds 
from the CUDA.  
 
 
                                                 
808 Proclamation  104 (1976) Art 17 (1). 
809 Each kebele contributed 15% of its income to the higher or kefitegna level UDAs, 
Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 9 (18). 
810 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 17 (9). 
811 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 17 (10). 
812 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 23 (2). 
813 Where there was no CUDA, those responsibilities were discharged by the kefitenga level 
UDA. Where there was no kefitegna, the kebeles discharged the responsibilities of both the 
kefitegna and the CUDAs. Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 23 (4) & Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 
40(1) (b). 
814 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 9 (6-11). 
815 Proclamation 104 (1976) Art 9 (1) & 9 (18). 
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6.2.2. The Peasant Associations (PAs) 
6.2.2.1.Institutional structure  
In the rural areas, PAs were established at kebele816 woreda, and awraja level.817 
The territorial jurisdiction of the chiqa shum was taken as the basis for delimiting 
the territory of each PA at kebele level.818  A PA at kebele level had an average 
membership of 281 households.819 It had a general assembly which consisted of 
all peasants in the PA and an executive committee which was elected by the 
general assembly.820    
6.2.2.2.Powers and functions PAs  
The kebele level PAs were responsible for effecting land re-distribution as per the 
nationalisation and redistribution policy of the Derg.821 In addition, they were 
authorised to administer and conserve public property, establish market centres, 
credit and other co-operatives, build schools, clinics and other similar institutions, 
cultivate the lands of elders, minors and widows, and undertake villagisation.822  
 
                                                 
816 Proclamation 31 (1975)  Art 8 read with Proclamation 71 (1975) Art 2(4) 
817 Proclamation 31 (1975) Art 8, 11(1), & 11(3); Proclamation 71 (1975) Art 2(4).   
818 Proclamation 31 (1975) Art 8. 
819 Clapham (1988) 158. 
820 Proclamation 71 (1975) Arts 12 & 15. Proclamation 71 (1975) established a Revolutionary, 
Administrative and Development Committees (RADC) at awraja and kifle hager and at central 
levels in which woreda level PA was represented. The RADCs were, however, replaced in 1977 
with the establishment of the All Ethiopian Peasant’s Association (AEPA) which was set up with 
a structure similar to that of the RADC. Clapham (1988) 157 
821 Proclamation 31 (1975) Art 10 (1). 
822 Proclamation 31 (1975) Art 10 (2-9). A villagisation program involved the re-settlement of 
scattered peasants into centralised villages. Making service delivery to the peasants convenient 
was the declared reason for the villagisation program. Clapham (1988) 175. 
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6.2.3. Re-centralisation and the weakening of UDAs and PAs 
In the 1980s, the Dreg centralised the UDAs and PAs under the pretext of 
providing them ‘guidance’.823 The kebele was deprived of its power to collect and 
use certain taxes. It was required to transfer all revenue it collected to the 
CUDA824  thereby making it dependent on grants. Furthermore, all kebele 
projects were required to be submitted to the CUDA for approval and funding 
which, needless to say, caused delay and even neglect of development projects.825 
The PAs, likewise, came under the control of central government and began to act 
as administrative arms of the central government rather than as institutions of 
self-administration.826  The central government began using the PAs for enforcing 
its socialist policies in the rural areas.827      
6.2.4. The formation of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
After ruling the country without a constitution and on a provisional basis for 13 
years the military government issued a new Constitution in 1987. The 
Constitution established the country on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
structure, and operation at the heart of which was the principle of ‘democratic-
centralism’.828 A one party system was introduced with the establishment of the 
Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WEP).  Ethiopia formally became a republic (The 
People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (the PDRE)).829 The Constitution also 
provided that Ethiopia was a unitary state with hierarchically structured 
                                                 
823 Proclamation 206 (1981) Preamble. See also Clapham (1988) 133 
824Proclamation 206 (1981) Art 13 (1-4).  
825 Proclamation 206 (1981) Art 13 (6-10); Clapham (1988) 134. 
826 Clapham (1988) 161. 
827 Clapham (1988) 161. 
828 Clapham (1988) 92. 
829 Clapham (1988) 92-100. 
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administrative areas and autonomous regions in line with the principle of 
democratic-centralism.830 With this Constitution, the military government 
transformed itself into a civil government. Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam, the 
chairman of the provisional military government since 1974, was ‘elected’ 
President of the PDRE.  
 
With the establishment of the PDRE, the administrative boundaries of the 
country, which were maintained without any significant change since 1942, were 
re-drawn. This change was made, as indicated before, based on the 
recommendation of the Institute of Nationalities. Ethiopia was accordingly 
divided into 25 ‘administrative areas’831 and 5 ‘autonomous regions’.832 In spite 
what their name, the ‘autonomous regions’ were not actually autonomous. Both 
the administrative regions and the autonomous regions had similar administrative 
structures, functions, and powers under the Constitution. 833 
 
Every administrative area and autonomous region was further divided into 354 
awrajas.834 The kebele level UDAs and PAs were retained. The woreda was 
abolished.835A representative assembly, which was known as ‘shengo’’, an 
executive committee, various commissions, and sectoral offices were established 
                                                 
830 The Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1987) Art 59 & 60(1). 
831 The administrative regions were North Gondar, South Gondar, North Wollo, South Wollo, East 
Gojam, West Gojam, Metekel, Assossa, Wollega, North Showa, Addis Ababa, West Showa, 
South Showa, West Hararge, East Hararge, Arsi, Bale, Gambella, Illubabor, Keffa, Gamu Gofa, 
Sidamo, Omo, and Borena. 
832 Eritrea, Assab, Tigray, Dire Dawa and Ogaden were declared autonomous regions.  
833 Proclamation 14 (1987). 
834 Eretria was first divided into a number of special administrative regions and each 
administrative region was further divided into awrajas. Proclamation 14 (1987) Art 4 (1). 
835 Proclamation 14 (1987) Art 4 (3). 
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in each of the administrative and autonomous regions and their awrajas.836 The 
shengo was directly elected by the people while the executive committee, which 
ran regional and local administration, was elected by the shengo.      
6.2.5. Assessment  
Its true political and ideological motive aside, the Derg’s initial programmes and 
measures were promising, even though lamentably short-lived, in terms of 
introducing democratic processes, articulating the need for development, and 
recognising the plight the ethnic minorities. As was explained in the previous 
sections, prior to 1974, virtually no representative institutions existed in the 
country other than Parliament and a few municipal councils. Parliament was the 
domain of the nobility. Even if in some urban areas municipal councils were 
established, democratic practice was limited to property owners. On the other 
hand with the establishment of UDAs and PAs people were afforded the 
opportunity to directly deliberate on their own affairs. They were also given the 
chance to elect their representatives at local level which was a democratic 
exercise unprecedented in the country’s history. The significance of public 
participation for the purpose of realising development was clearly articulated in 
the Derg’s programme. The establishment of the UDAs and PAs, even if short-
lived, was a significant stride towards democratisation.  
 
Furthermore, the Derg stated in its programme that local administrative units 
would serve as development agents. It was with this objective that the UDAs and 
PAs were initially established and given with development oriented functions. 
This was a noteworthy departure from the past in which local authorities’ main 
                                                 
836 Proclamation 14 (1987) Art 6(1). 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
purpose was to collect taxes and suppress resistance against the Emperor. 
Moreover, as result of this measure, a significant improvement was recorded in 
expanding the provision of social services such as health care and education. The 
number of students with access to primary education in 1974 was only 811,114. 
This number quadrupled to 3, 076 948 in 1984, 837 presumably, due to the role 
that the UDAs and PAs played. The UDAs and PAs are also credited for 
implementing the adult literacy programme, which is claimed to have halved 
illiteracy in the country. In short, as Andargachew points out, ‘the establishment 
of UDAs and the granting to them of such powers and responsibilities was an 
admirable exercise of devolution of power’.838   
 
On the ethnic question, as was seen above, the NRD of the Derg recognised the 
political, economic, and cultural marginalisation of ethnic minorities. It also 
pledged to use the establishment of regional and local self-government as a means 
to accommodate ethnic minorities. As indicated previously this move was a 
political manoeuvre by the Derg to win over the Meison to join the government. 
It cannot be gainsaid, however, that the recognition of the plight of ethnic 
minorities was another important ‘departure’ from the past. A pledge to allow 
each ethnic community to administer itself, to determine its political destiny, and 
to use its own language was unheard of in the past 100 years of the country’s 
history.  
 
Despite the Derg’s promising start, the reforms were short-lived and the promises 
were reneged upon. The Derg quickly recoiled back to authoritarianism. The 
                                                 
837 Clapham (1988) 150. 
838 Andargachew (1994) 117. 
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focus of the regime became on how to maintain power. Development became, if 
at all, secondary to protecting the political power of Colonel Mengistu and his 
cronies. The UDAs and PAs began serving, as was previously the tradition, as 
instruments of control. They were effectively used for eliminating the Derg’s 
arch-rival, the EPRP, in the so called Red Terror campaign. 839  They were used 
for implementing the villagisation programme of the Derg. 840  UDAs and PAs 
also helped the Derg’s war effort against the TPLF and other rebel groups 
through forceful conscription which was known in Amharic as affessa. 841 
 
The status quo was maintained with regard to the right to self-determination of 
the various ethnic groups of the country. Amharic was still the only language of 
work and academic instruction. The cultures of the various ethnic communities, 
which were regarded as backward and anti-revolutionary, were displaced. 842   
 
Even if there was an endeavour to reform the provincial and local administration 
by providing formal autonomy to certain areas, it was not done out of a genuine 
                                                 
839 The EPRP, having declared urban armed struggle against the Derg, began assassinating several 
Derg officials. It even made an attempt to assassinate Colonel Mengistu himself, wounding him in 
the process. EPRP’s attack against the Derg was named ‘white-terror’. The Derg immediately set 
out to eliminate EPRP in an operation that it termed ‘Red Terror’. The UDAs and PAs played a 
central role in carrying out the ‘Red Terror’ operation.  Andargachew (1994) 209; Bahru (2008) 
428-444; Kinfe (1994).  See also Kissi (2003).  
840 The Derg’s villagisation programme involved the resettlement of scattered peasants into 
centralised villages. The programme necessitated the forceful removal of peasants from their 
localities to other areas.  The declared policy reason of the Derg for the villagisation programme 
was creating convenience for service delivery to the peasants. The true motive was, however, to 
create a convenient way of controlling the peasants. Once again, local officials were instrumental 
in the implementation of this programme. Clapham (1988) 161.   
841 See Tele (1999 Ethiopian Calendar), Eyob (2002 Ethiopian Calendar).See also Zemelak 
(2011).   
842 See Dereje (2006).  
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intent to devolve power. It was rather to appease the ethno-national insurgent 
groups who were intensifying their attacks on the government.843 Moreover, 
practical measures were not implemented to allow the autonomous regions to 
make use of their ‘autonomy’.   
7. THE END OF THE DERG AND THE BEGINING OF RE-
DECENTRALISATION (1991-1995)   
7.1. Introduction  
From the day it assumed power, the Derg was confronted with multitudes of 
challenges, its biggest challenge being ethnic-based armed insurrections in 
different parts of the country. The armed insurrection in Eritrea that was led by 
the EPLF since the 1960s further escalated.844 The TPLF also intensified its 
attack against the Derg in northern Ethiopia.845 Other armed groups, including, 
the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ethiopian People Democratic Movement 
((EPDM) which later became the Amhara National Democratic Movement 
(ANDM)), and the Oromo People Democratic Organisation (OPDO), were also 
formed and began waging war against the regime.  In the late 1980s the TPLF, 
EPDF (ANDM), OPDO, and other rebellion organisations came together and 
formed an umbrella organisation called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and intensified their co-ordinated military attack 
against the Derg. 846  The 1984-87 famine and the mishandling of the disaster by 
                                                 
843 Keller (1995) 130. 
844 This rebellion began following the 1962 termination of the federation between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea which was established in the 1950s by the United Nations. Young (2004) 25.  See also UN 
General Assembly Resolution 390 (V) (1950). 
845 Young (1996) 534f. 
846 Young (1996) 534f; Vestal (1999) 3. 
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the Derg farther sharpened the conflict. 847 The Derg also lost a ‘powerful ally’ 
and its ‘only source of arms’ when the U.S.S.R. fell into its own crisis.848 As a 
consequence, the Derg began to lose one battle after the other. Finally, on 21 May 
1991 Colonel Mengistu fled the country to seek asylum in Zimbabwe. Eight days 
after Mengistu’s flight, the EPRDF forces took control of Addis Ababa. Almost 
at the same time the Eritrean People Liberation Front captured Asmara. With that 
the 17 year gruesome civil war, which claimed the lives of more than a million 
Ethiopians, came to an end.  
7.2. The formation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
After one month of interim rule, on 1 July 1991, the EPRDF convened ‘the 
Peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia’. The Conference 
was attended by delegations from 24 ethnic-based movements, representatives of 
international organisations, and religious organisations.849  This Conference 
debated and discussed the future of the country and on 22 July 1991, adopted a 
‘Transitional Period Charter (TPC)’ which served as a Constitution until the 
promulgation of the 1995 Constitution.850  
7.2.1. The TPC on the ethnic question  
The TPC laid down the groundwork for the first phase of the decentralisation 
process in Ethiopia. This phase of the decentralisation process was aimed 
primarily at responding to the ethnic question. The TPC recognised the right to 
self-determination for ‘each nation, nationality and people’ of Ethiopia.851 The 
                                                 
847 Kinfe (1994); xx; Vestal (1999) 3. 
848 Kinfe (1994) xx. 
849 Vestal (1999) 7; Kinfe (1994) 21. See also Young (1998) 193-194. 
850 Vestal (1999) 7; Kinfe (1994) 21. 
851 Transitional Period Charter (TPC) (1991) Preamble 2nd paragraph. 
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right to self-determination of each ethnic community became the ‘governing 
political principle’ of the country.852 This principle was to find expression in the 
right of each ethnic community to administer its own affairs within the territory it 
inhabited, and to participate in the central government.853 The right to self-
determination also included the right of each ethnic community to secede from 
the country and declare its own independence, if it so chose.854 The TPC, 
therefore, established a de-facto ethnic federal system. 
 
The TPC also provided for the establishment of a central transitional government 
which had a ‘multinational council’ called ‘the Representative Council’ and an 
executive body.855 The Representative Council was composed of the 
representatives of the ethnic-based movements that participated in the conference 
and other ‘prominent individuals’.856 The Representative Council served as 
Parliament until 1995. Meles Zenawi was elected the Chairperson of the Council 
and the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE).857  
Ethnic-based regional and local units under the TGE 
                                                 
852 Transitional Period Charter (TPC) (1991) Preamble 2nd paragraph. 
853 TPC (1991) Art 2 (b). 
854 TPC (1991) Art 2 (c). This right was conditional which could be exercised only if an ethnic 
community was convinced that its right to self-government was denied, abridged or abrogated. In 
addition, the right could be exercised if a nation and nationality’s right to participation in the 
central government freely and on an equal basis was ‘denied, abridged or abrogated’. As will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters, this was changed under the 1995 Constitution which 
recognises each ethnic community’s right to an unconditional secession. 
855 TPC (1991) Art 6. 
856 TPC (1991) Art 7. 
857 The Representative Council had the power to elect its own chairman. According to the TPC, 
the chairman of the Council would be the Head of State of the country. TPC (1991) Art 7. 
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The TPC provided that a law would be issued to establish transitional local and 
regional councils.858 The TPC also provided that the boundaries of the regional 
and local units would be demarcated based on the geographical settlement 
structures of the ethnic communities of the country.859 In view of that, the 
Representative Council issued Proclamation No 7 (1992). The Proclamation 
identified 63 territorially concentrated ethnic communities.860 Forty-seven out of 
the 63 ethnic communities were declared capable of establishing their own self-
government, starting from woreda level.861 The boundaries of each ethnic-based 
self-government area were demarcated based on the pre-1974 woreda 
boundaries.862 Hence, woredas, the majority of whose residents belong to a 
specific ethnic community were brought together to form a regional or a sub-
regional self-governing area of the particular ethnic community. 863  
 
In the manner described above, 14 self-governing regions were established: The 
regions were Amhara, Afar, Harari, Benishangul, Kambata, Gambella, Gurage, 
Hadiya, Keffa, Addis Ababa, Oromia, Sidama, Tigray and Somali.864  Under 
                                                 
858 TPC (1991) Art 13. 
859 TPC (1991) Art 13. 
860 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 3(1). 
861 Proclamation 7(1992) Art 3(2) 
862 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 4 (2).    
863 Proclamation 7 (1992): Art 4 (2). See also Kinfe (1994) 26.    
864 According to Kinfe an agreement was signed by the national movements on October 18th, 1991 
to the effect that Afar, Agew, Amhara, Benishangul, Kambata, Gambella, Gurage, Hadiye, Kaffa, 
Omo, Oromia, Sidama, Tigray and Somali were established as regions. The agreement also 
provided that Harar and Addis Ababa cities would be granted a special charter status with a full 
right to the minorities who inhabit them. Furthermore the agreement provided that major 
Ethiopian towns with significant Amhara populations will be given special status within their 
regions. As it turned out in the end the Agews were not given their own region. Rather nationality 
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Proclamation 7 (1992) smaller ethnic communities could by agreement join 
together to create a larger unit. 865  Accordingly, Gurage, Kambata, Hadiya, 
Sidama, and Kaffa ‘opted’ to unite and create the region now known as the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples region.  The other 17 ethnic 
communities (also called ‘minority nationalities’) were found to be too small in 
size to exercise self-governance even at the woreda level. 866   The Proclamation, 
nevertheless, guaranteed them fair representation in the woreda and other 
councils.867   
7.2.2. Local government and development under the TGE 
The woreda became the ‘basic’ unit in the hierarchy of national, regional and 
local transitional self-governments.868 As indicated above, the pre-1974 territorial 
boundaries of woreda were adopted as the boundaries of the woreda 
administrations under the new dispensation.869 Proclamation 7 (1992) provided 
for the establishment of a representative council (woreda council) and an 
executive committee in each woreda. The Proclamation also provided that 
members of a woreda council would be directly elected.870 It also provided that 
minority nationalities in a woreda would be represented in a woreda council 
                                                                                                                                                        
zones were established to them within the Amhara region. Harari was established as a regional 
state. Kinfe (1994). 
865 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 3(2) (b).    
866 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 5(3). 
867 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 5(3). 
868Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 5(1).  
869 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 4(2). 
870 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 5(2). 
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regardless of their numerical size.871 The kebele was retained by the Proclamation 
as the lowest administrative unit.872 
Local elections 
The TPC provided that regional and local elections would be held within three 
months of the establishment of the Central Transitional Government.873 However, 
the elections could not be held as was planned and were postponed to June 
(1992). In order to administer the June (1992) local elections, provisional local 
administrations were established in each district (woreda) and sub-district 
(kebele).874 The elections (called ‘snap elections’) were held at public meetings 
on non-partisan basis. These kebele and woreda committees administered the 21 
June 1992 regional and woreda elections in which EPRDF claimed to have won 
96 percent of the seats in the regional and woreda councils.875  
Powers and functions of local government  
Proclamation 7 (1992) states that a woreda administration could exercise both 
legislative and executive powers with a view to planning and implementing social 
services and economic development programmes for the woreda.876 The woreda 
administration was also entrusted with the responsibility of implementing the 
laws, policies and directives of the Central Transitional Government.877 In 
addition, it was authorised to establish security and police forces for the area, to 
                                                 
871 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 5(3). 
872 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 5(1). 
873 TPC (1991) Art 13.  
874 Proclamation 9 (1992) Preamble & Art 3(1). 
875 Keller (1995) 136. 
876 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 40 (1) read with 42. 
877 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 40(1). 
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appoint the heads of judicial organs, and to establish public prosecution offices, 
audit offices, and a police force for the woreda.878 
Local finances under the TGE 
The Proclamation did not provide any clear source of income of the woreda 
administration. However, it put the responsibility of identifying the source of 
income on the woreda itself, and of preparing and approving the woreda budget, 
on the woreda administration.879  
7.2.1. Assessment 
The TGE invested all its energy during the transitional period in responding to the 
ethnic question. The TPC and Proclamation 7 (1992) also went a long way to 
responding to the ethnic question. Local government’s role in this regard was also 
clearly articulated. Important practical measures were taken to respond to the 
ethnic question. The right to self-determination of each ethnic community was 
recognised. Local and regional boundaries were reorganised along ethnic line. 
This is a great departure from the past.  
 
However, the TGE was so preoccupied with the ethnic question that the 
development question was not given as much attention. The developmental role 
of local government was not clearly articulated.  Neither the TPC nor 
Proclamation 7(1992) clearly defined the precise developmental functions of 
woredas. The TPC merely provided that local government could decide on local 
socio-economic matters. It did not spell out the socio-economic matters that could 
be decided at woreda level. Moreover, the Proclamation 7 (1992) provided that 
the regional and local governments were ‘in every respect, entities subordinate to 
                                                 
878 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 43(1) 
879 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 43(1) (d). 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
the Central Transitional Government’.880 By so doing it maintained the pre-1991 
hierarchical government structure. 
 
Furthermore, the June 1992 woreda elections were far from competitive.  They 
were marred by controversies and irregularities. The independence of the 
provisional local administrators, who administered the June 1992 elections, was 
contested. As indicated above, the provisional administrators were supposed to be 
elected on a non-partisan basis, in public meetings. However, it is alleged that the 
EPRDF ensured that individuals who were loyal to it were installed in each 
woreda and kebele. As Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen write: 
 
 ‘These public meetings were orchestrated to elect the representatives of the EPRDF. 
Where the public did not comply with wishes of the EPRDF, election results were 
declared invalid on formal grounds and the elections were repeated, in some places up 
to three times, until the EPRDF candidates were installed. In few places, the results of 
the snap elections were simply disallowed and EPRDEF cadres were appointed.’881  
 
This ‘allowed [the EPRDF] to determine when and to whom voter registration 
materials were distributed’.882 Alleging such irregularities, the major political 
parties and other small parties withdrew from the elections.883 The withdrawal of 
the opposition parties from the elections undermined the representativeness of the 
result. As Keller states, due to the withdrawal of these parties from the elections, 
                                                 
880 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 3(3).  
881 Pausewang, Tronvoll & Aalen (2002) 31. 
882 Lyons (1996) 127. 
883 These included OLF, the All Amhara People Organisation (OAPO), the Ethiopian Democratic 
Action Group (EDAG), Joireman (1997) 402. 
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an estimated 50-60% of those who were eligible to vote were left 
unrepresented.884      
7.3. The FDRE Constitution: the groundwork for local level 
decentralisation 1995- 
In 1995 a new Constitution was promulgated. The promulgation of the 
Constitution formalised the de facto ethnic federal system that had already been 
formed under the TPC. The establishment of Ethiopia on a federal basis 
completed the first phase decentralisation process. The nine regional states which 
were already established during the transitional period were confirmed to be the 
constituting units of the federation.885 Addis Ababa, the capital of the country, 
became a self-governing city.886    
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The discussion in this chapter shows that historically, Ethiopia was a 
decentralised state in which local, regional and central authorities co-existed and 
exercised government powers autonomously. This decentralised system was the 
result of Ethiopia’s rugged topographical landscape and the absence of modern 
means of communication, which rendered centralised rule impracticable. The 
diversity of the socio-economic systems and cultures of the people led to the 
creation of a variety of traditional local governance institutions. In many respects 
these institutions were democratic, legitimate and even to a great extent 
developmental. 
 
                                                 
884 Keller (1995) 136. 
885 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47. 
886 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 49 (1 & 2). 
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Nevertheless, a process of centralisation began in the second half of the 19th 
century and continued until 1991. The centralisation of political powers and the 
bureaucratisation of local administration resulted in inefficiency and corruption 
which in turn led to a pervasive and multi-faceted poverty. The centralisation also 
led to the concentration of political power within members of a single ethnic 
community and the marginalisation of the rest of the ethnic communities of the 
country. In short, the centralised system of administration which existed in the 
country prior to 1991 was undemocratic, non-developmental, and repressive of 
ethnic and cultural differences. It was merely a system for central control.  
 
Subsequent to the demise of the Derg, Ethiopia was formally re-decentralised 
through the TPC. However, while the TPC succeeded in providing a 
constitutional ground for the establishment of a local governance system which 
was democratic and accommodative of the interest of minority ethnic groups, it 
fell short of clearly articulating the developmental role of local government.   
 
With the promulgation of 1995 Constitution, Ethiopia formally became a federal 
state. Now, the questions remain: what kind of local government is envisaged in 
the Constitution? Does the Constitution require the establishment of autonomous 
local government in Ethiopia? What are the measures taken in establishing local 
government? What are the policy considerations behind the creation of local 
government that exists in Ethiopia? The following chapter will provide answers 
to these and other related questions.  
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Chapter 4  
Ethiopia: From federalism towards local level decentralisation  
1. INTRODUCTION  
As indicated in the preceding chapter, Ethiopia is a federal state. Decentralisation 
within a federal system involves the formation of an autonomous level of 
government within an autonomous sub-national unit. The constitutional status of 
local government in a federal dispensation is likely to impact on its significance 
for development and for management of ethnic diversity. Therefore, it is crucial 
to provide a brief overview of Ethiopia’s federal system and to locate the place of 
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local government within the federal milieu in order to better address the central 
issues of the thesis. It is also necessary to provide an overview of the political 
rationales that underpin the decentralisation programme, since these are crucial in 
understanding the design of the country’s local government system. This chapter, 
therefore, provides such a background.  
 
This chapter has four main sections. First, § 2 and 3 will provide an overview of 
Ethiopia’s federal system and the governance structures of the federal and 
regional governments. § 4 will discuss the type of local government envisaged by 
the FDRE Constitution. This section identifies the place and status of local 
government in the federal structure. § 5 then will discuss the political process and 
motives that led to decentralisation and the establishment of local government. 
Finally, § 6 will provide an overview of the local government structure with a 
view to making subsequent discussion more comprehensible.  
2.  ETHIOPIA AND ITS ETHNIC-BASED FEDERAL SYSTEM  
As was indicated in the preceding chapter, Ethiopia formally became a federal 
country with the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution.887 Ethiopia’s federation 
is conceptualised as a ‘federation of ethnic groups’ in which the various ethnic 
groups are ‘joined together in a federal union’.888 This is reflected in various parts 
of the 1995 Constitution. The Preamble to the Constitution states that the federal 
                                                 
887 The fact that Ethiopia is a federal country is clearly depicted in the various parts of the 
Constitution. The Constitution itself is titled ‘Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia’. The very first provision of the Constitution provides that ‘[t]his Constitution establishes 
a Federal and Democratic State structure’. The provision goes on to state that ‘the Ethiopian state 
shall be known as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’. FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 1.  
See also Assefa (2007a) 236-237.  
888 Herther–Spiro (2007) 321–371. 
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system is a result of a concurrence among the ‘the nations, nationalities and 
peoples’ of the country.889 The Constitution also provides that ‘sovereign power 
resides in the nations, nationalities and peoples’ of the country.890 This departs 
from the commonly held conceptualisation of ‘popular sovereignty...based on “a 
body of citizens” acting in their capacities as individuals’.891 Ethiopian citizens, 
therefore, are no longer viewed as ‘a people’.892 The Constitution, in addition, 
recognises the unconditional right of each ethnic community to self-determination 
which also includes the right to secession.893 Under the federal dispensation, 
therefore, Ethiopia is seen as a state which is ‘founded by and belongs to all 
ethnic groups’.894 
 
Within the federation the right to self-determination of the ethnic communities 
finds expression in their ability to exercise self-rule. 895  Hence, the Constitution 
provides that the boundaries of the constituent units of the federation would be 
demarcated ‘on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and 
consent of the people’.896 It is based on this constitutional principle that, as was 
                                                 
889 FDRE Constitution (1995) Preamble. The Constitution defines nation, nationality and people 
as: ‘[A] group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar 
customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common 
psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.’ 
FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (5). 
890 FDRE Constitution (1995) 8(1). 
891 Alemante (2003) 55.  
892 Fasil (1997) 51. 
893 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (1).  
894 Alemante (2003) 55. 
895 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3). 
896 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 46 (2). 
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indicated in chapter three, the nine ethnically organised regional states were 
created.897   
2.1. Intra-regional ethnic diversity  
The federal Constitution recognises the right to self-government of each ethnic 
community in the country.898  However, as is indicated in the table below, the 
ethnic federal system has not created a single ethnically homogenous regional 
state. Each regional state hosts several ethnic communities.  The Amhara, 
Oromia, Tigray, Afar, and Somali regional states have a dominant ethnic 
community each.  For instance the Amhara constitute 91 percent of the 
population of the Amhara region while Tigrawiyans constitute 96 percent of the 
Tigray region. Each of these five regions actually bears the name of the dominant 
ethnic community on whose behalf it is established. These regions are also 
considered the ‘mother state’ or ‘homeland’ of the ethnic communities whose 
name they bear.899 
Table 2 Intra-regional ethnic diversity  
Region                                         Ethnic groups 
Amhara    Amhara (91%), Agew (5%), Oromo (3%) others (2%) 
Oromia  Oromo (87 %), Amhara (7 %), Ghurage (1 %) Somai (1%) others (4 %) 
Tigray  Tigrawi (96.55%), Kunama (0.7%) (, Irob/Saho (0.71%) Others (2.4 %) 
 
SNNPR 
Surma 
(0.17%) 
Zeyise 
(0.10) 
Gidecho 
(0.03%) 
Arbore 
(0.04%) 
 Geleb     
 
Kore   
(1.01%) 
Gideo     
Gurage  
(7.52%) 
Hamer  
(0.31)    
Gewada 
(0.43%) 
Basketo 
(0.52%) 
  Burji     
(0.37%) 
Alaba   
(1.35%)  
 Bena   
(0.17%)   
Kambata 
(3.81%) 
Shinasha 
(0.01%) 
Dawro 
(3%) 
Bumi        Dime      
 
Tembaro  
(0.64) 
Shekicho 
(0.44%) 
                                                 
897 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47 (1). 
898 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3). 
899 See Assefa (2007a) & Yonatan (2010) 201.  
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Kafficho 
(5.43%) 
Wolaita 
(10.71%) 
Gacho 
 
Nao    
(0.05%) 
Tsemay 
(0.13%) 
Hadyia 
(8.02%)   
   Alaba 
(1.35%) 
 
Qebena  
(0.29%) 
 Gamo 
(6.96%)     
Derashe 
(0.19%) 
Bench 
(2.33%) 
    Yem    
(0.50%) 
Konta  
(0.54%) 
Amhara  
(2.79%)    
Konso 
(1.46%) 
 Sidama  
(19.%)      
Me’enite 
(1%) 
Mareko    
(0.38%)     
   Oida 
(0.05%) 
Ari  
(1.89%)    
Gedeo 
(4.92%)    
Gofa 
(2.39%) 
Oromo 
(1.57%) 
Silte 
(5.%) 
Desenech 
(0.32%) 
Surma 
(0.11%) 
  
 
Afar    Afar (90.3%), Amhara (5.22%) Argoba (1.5) other (2.98%) 
Gambella    Anywaa (21.17%), Nuer (46.65%), Mejenger (4%), Amhara (8.42%), Oromo 
(4.33%) Other (18%) 
Benishangul-Gumuz    Berta (25.90%), Gumuz (21.11%), Shinasha (7.5%), Mao (2%), Koma (1%)          
  Agew (5%) Amhara (21.25) Oromo (13.32%), Other (2.92%) 
Hareri    Hareri (8.65 %), Oromo (56 %), Amhara (22.%), Somali (3.87%), Ghuraghe 
(4%) Others (5.8%)  
Somali    Somali (97%) Others (3)  
Source: FDRE Population Census Commission (2008) 
The rest of the regional states do not have even a dominant ethnic community, let 
alone being ethnically homogenous. As can be seen from the table above, for 
instance, the Sidama, the ethnic community with the largest population in 
SNNPR, does not even constitute 20 percent of the region’s population. 
 
In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of ethnic migrants in many urban 
areas of most of the regional states. For instance, more than 3 million ethnic 
migrants live in many cities of Oromia.900  It is this intra-regional ethnic 
heterogeneity that brings to the fore one of the two central questions that this 
thesis aims to address, namely whether local government plays a role in 
managing diversity at intra-regional level.   
                                                 
900 FDRE Census Commission (2008) 93. 
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2.2.Territorial, social, and economic variations among the regional states  
 The regional states exhibit wide variations in terms of territorial and population 
sizes, and political and socio-economic development levels even if they have 
identical functions and powers under the federal Constitution.901 Oromia, 
containing more than 30 percent of the country’s population, stands out as the 
largest region followed by the Amhara regional state. At the other extreme there 
is Hareri, a small city-state with just more than 150, 000 inhabitants. 902 
  
There is also variation in terms of the level of social and economic development 
each of the regional states has attained. 903 Evidently, all of the regional states 
have attained low level social and economic development as Ethiopia itself is one 
of the least developed African countries. Yet, the so called ‘low land’, 
‘emerging’, or ‘least developed’ regions, which include the Afar, Somali, 
Gambella and Benishangul-Gumiz regions, have even lower economic 
development, due to historical reasons.904 The low level of economic and 
infrastructure development in these regions is attributed to the neglect and 
marginalisation of the regions by the previous regimes.905 The pastoralist 
livelihood of the communities in these regions which requires them to constantly 
move from one place to the other has also hampered the establishment of an 
‘indigenous settled administration’.906 Therefore, as Assefa writes, the lowland 
regions are still unable to articulate their own interests and ‘to evolve into viable 
                                                 
901 Young (1999) 328; Aalen (2002) 73. 
902 FDRE Census Commission (2008). 
903 Young (1999) 328; Aalen (2002) 73. 
904 Young (1999) 328; Aalen (2002) 73. 
905 Young (1999) 322; Aalen (2002) 73.  
906 Young (1999) 342.  
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entities’.907 As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, the difference in 
socio-economic development among the regional states has a direct impact on the 
design and effectiveness of the local government system of each regional state. 
3. FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES 
3.1. Introduction 
The FDRE Constitution, true to Ethiopia’s federal dispensation, provides for the 
establishment of two orders of government that are structured at federal and state 
level.908 The federal government and the regional governments have three 
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. 909   
3.2. Federal government  
The federal government has two federal houses, the House of Peoples 
Representatives (HoPR) and the House of Federation (HoF), 910 a parliamentary 
executive, 911 and a judiciary.912 
3.2.1. Federal legislature  
 
3.2.1.1. HoPR 
 
The HoPR is the lower house of Parliament. It has a maximum of 550 seats which 
are held by parliamentarians who are directly elected for a five year term.913 The 
electoral system that is used in general elections is first-past-the-post (FPTP). 914 
The woredas, which have approximately 100 000 residents, are used as electoral 
                                                 
907 Assefa (undated) 22. 
908 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 50 (1). 
909 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 50 (2, 5, 6 & 7). 
910 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 53. 
911 FDRE Constitution (1995) Arts 72-78. 
912 FDRE Constitution (1995) Arts 78-79. 
913 FDRE Constitution (1995) 54 (1 & 3).  
914 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 54 (2).  
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districts in national elections. 915 Around 20 of the 550 seats are reserved for 
minority ethnic groups.916 
Political parties  
There are more than 79 registered political parties in Ethiopia which contest in 
national elections.917 These political parties, most of which are organised along 
ethnic lines, operate alone or in coalition. The political parties, based on their 
political standing, are divided into three categories: the first category comprises 
ethnic-based political parties which are members of the ruling party. In the 
second category are those that are affiliates to the EPRDF and in the third 
category are opposition parties.918 
 
The EPRDF itself is composed of four political parties which are organised along 
ethnic lines.919  These are the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the 
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), and the Oromo People 
Democratic Organisation (OPDO), and, the Southern Ethiopia Democratic 
Movement (SEPDM).  SEPDM is a coalition of 20 small ethnic-based political 
parties.920   
 
                                                 
915 FDRE Proclamation 532 (2007) Art 20. 
916 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 54 (3).  
917 The official website of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia  
http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/ (last accessed on 28 February 2012). 
918 Wondwosen (2009) 62ff; Vaughan (2004) 15; Pausewang et al (2002) 14; Aalen (2002) 83 ff. 
919 Wondwosen (2008) 790. 
920 South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM) 
 http://www.eprdf.org.et/EPRDFE/faces/ssi/member.jsp?type=SEPDM (last accessed on 28 
January 2012). 
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Political parties which are affiliate to EPRDF are those parties which are 
organised along ethnic lines and are considered allies of the ruling party, without 
formally being members of it. 921 These are the Somali People Democratic Party 
(SPDP), the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Benishangul-Gumuz 
Peoples Democratic Unity Front (BPDUF), the Gambella Peoples’ Unity 
Democratic Movement (GPUDM), and Hareri National League.922 Each BPDUF 
and GPUDM is a coalition of two ethnic-based political parties.The affiliate 
parties are allegedly created by the EPRDF itself and not opposition parties per 
se.923  
 
There are also opposition parties which supposedly have policies and 
programmes that differ from the EPRDF and its affiliate parties.924 Most of the 
opposition parties are ethnic-based and operate alone or in coalition with other 
ethnic-based parties. Almost for every ethnic-based party which is a member of, 
or an affiliate to, the EPRDF, there is a counterpart in the opposition camp.925 
 National elections  
Since 1995, four national elections have been held. In all of these elections, 
EPRDF came out victorious. Opposition parties registered their major success in 
the 2005 general elections, the most contested elections in Ethiopia’s history, by 
                                                 
921 Wondwosen (2009) 62ff; Vaughan (2004) 15; Pausewang et al (2002) 14; Aalen (2002) 83 ff. 
922 Ishiyama (2009); Aalen (2002) 83. 
923 Aalen (2002) 83; Vaughn (2004); 16; Merera (2002) 2.   
924 Vaughan (2004) 17; Wondwosen (2009) 66. 
925 For instance the Ethiopia Federal Democratic Unity Forum (in short FORUM) is composed of 
a number of ethnic-based opposition political parties. The Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic 
Coalition (SEPDC) which is one of the members of the FORUM is a coalition of a number of 
ethnic-based parties which claim to represent certain ethnic communities in SNNPR. The SEPDC 
can be considered as the counterpart of the SEPDM in the opposition camp. See Wondwosen 
(2009).  
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winning more than 170 seats in the HoPRs along with all the seats in Addis 
Ababa City Council.926 However the post-election dispute which arose when 
leaders of the opposition parties accused EPRDF of vote rigging and refused to 
join Parliament led to violence in many parts of the country.  All the leaders of 
the opposition parties were accused of inciting violence and were arrested, tried 
and sentenced to life imprisonment, even though they were released latter as a 
result of a Presidential Pardon.927 In the 2010 elections EPRDF and its affiliates 
claimed to have won 99.6 percent of the seats in HoPRs. 928   
 3.2.1.2. HoF 
 
The HoF, the upper house of the federal government, is composed of one or more 
representatives of each ethnic community in the country929 depending on the size 
of the population of the particular ethnic group.930 Each ethnic group is 
represented by one representative in this House. An ethnic community with a 
population of more than a million is represented by one additional representative 
for each extra one million people belonging to it.931  
 
Only the HoPR has legislative power.932 The HoPR issues proclamations on all 
federal matters that are listed under Article 51 of the Constitution. The 
proclamation is the highest statutory law that the highest federal or regional 
                                                 
926 International Crisis Group (ICG) (2009) 8-10; See also Wondwosen (2009).  
927 ICG (2009) 10.  
928 National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) (2010) http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/ (Last 
accessed on 27 May 2012).  
929 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 61(1). 
930 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 61(2). 
931 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 61(2). 
932 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 55. 
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legislative council issues.933 The HoPRs also has the power to approve the 
country’s fiscal and monetary policies as well as policies on social and economic 
development. 934 The HoF deals only with non-legislative matters pertaining to, 
among other things, self-determination of ethnic communities, inter-state 
disputes, division of revenue, and the like. 935  In addition, the HoF has a final say 
on disputes involving the interpretation of the federal Constitution.936  
3.2.2. Federal executive  
The Council of Ministers, which is composed of a Prime Minister (PM) and other 
ministers, forms the highest executive organ of the federal government.937 The 
PM, who heads the executive council, is elected by and from among the members 
of the HoPRs.938 The other members of the Council of Ministers, which includes 
the deputy PM, ministers, and others, are nominated by the PM and appointed by 
the HoPR.939 The Council of Ministers has subsidiary legislative powers over and 
                                                 
933 Fasil (1997) 82 
934 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 54 (10). 
935 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 62. 
936 It was believed that there was no other federal organ other than the HoF that was better suited 
for interpreting the Constitution considering the fact that the Constitution is ‘a political contract’ 
among the ethnic communities that the HoF is composed of the representatives of the ethnic 
communities, ‘the authors’ of the Constitution. Moreover, if the power to interpret the  
Constitution was to be given to the judiciary, there was a fear that judges, while interpreting the 
Constitution, might indulge in  ‘judicial adventurism’; ‘in the process of interpreting vague 
clauses of the Constitution, [the judges would] put their own preferences and policy choices. 
[T]his might result in hijacking the very document that contains the ‘compact between the 
nationalities’ to the judges’ own personal philosophies’. Assefa (2007a). FDRE Constitution 
(1995) Art 62 (1). 
937 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 72. 
938 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 73 (1). 
939 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 72 (1), 76 (1) & 74 (2).  Meles Zenawi, the Chairman of the 
EPRDF, has been serving as the Prime Minister of the Country since 1995. He was also the 
President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia from 1991 to 1995. Following the 2005 
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above its executive powers: It issues executive regulations based on the 
proclamations enacted by the HoPR.940 
3.2.3. Federal courts  
The Federal Supreme Court is the highest judicial organ at the federal level.941 
Several benches of the Federal High Court and a Federal first Instance Court are 
also established in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. In the regional states, the powers 
of the federal First Instance and High Courts are delegated to and exercised by the 
state High Courts and State Supreme Courts, respectively.942 However, the 
federal government is busy establishing benches of federal First Instance and 
High Courts in some of the regions. Federal courts apply federal laws in deciding 
cases. 943 It is unclear though whether they may apply the Constitution in deciding 
cases as the power to interpret the federal Constitution is given to the HoF. 944 
                                                                                                                                                        
national elections Meles declared his intention not to seek office of the PM of the country after 
serving until 2010. However, sometime in 2009 it was declared that the EPRDF has set a 
procedure of alternation (kibibilosh) in which the leadership of the party which took part in the 
war against the Derg would retire one after the other, leaving the leadership position to the new 
generation.  The alternation is to take place at different stages. In the first stage some of EPRDF’s 
heavy weight politicians including Siyum Mesfin, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Addisu 
Legesse the former deputy chairman of the EPRDF and Deputy Prime Minister have left their 
ministerial post. They did not also participate in the 2010 elections. Meles, according to the rule 
of kibibilosh, will be the last to retire, which is expected to take place in 2015. 
940 FDRE Constitution (1995) 77 (13). 
941 FDRE Constitution (1995) 78 (2).  
942 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 78 (2). 
943 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 80. 
944 Assefa argues that despite the fact that the HoF has a final say on constitutional issues, federal 
courts may still interpret and apply the Constitution to decide cases. Yonatan, in contrast, argues 
whenever a resolution of a particular case involves the interpretation of the Constitution, the Court 
must transfer the case to the HoF. See Assefa (2007 b) & Yonatan (2008) 
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3.3. The regional governments 
A state government that is established in each regional state has legislative, 
executive, and, judicial branches.945  
3.3.1. State legislature  
All of the regional states, except SNNPR, have a unicameral legislative house 
called a State/Regional Council. 946 In SNNPR there is an upper house which is 
called the Council of Nationalities (CoN). It has a structural organisation and 
function that is similar to the HoF. 947 The Regional Council is the highest 
regional political organ.948 It has the power to draft, adopt and enact a regional 
constitution as well as proclamations on state matters.949  
3.3.2. Regional executive  
Each regional state has an Executive Council which is headed by a regional chief 
administrator or president.950 The regional states have structured their 
governments based on the parliamentary system. Members of a regional council, 
therefore, elect a regional chief administrator (also called regional President) 
from among themselves.951 The regional chief administrator is nominated from a 
                                                 
945 FDRE Constitution (1995) 50 (3, 6, &7).  
946 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 50 (3).  
947 See the SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 58 & 59. 
948 FDRE Constitution (1995) 50 (3).  
949 FDRE Constitution (1995) 50 (5).                                                               
950 FDRE Constitution (1995) 50 (6). 
951 Amhara Rregional State (ARS) Constitution (2001) Art 59 (1); Afar Regional (AfRS) 
Constitution (2001) Art 58 (1); Somali Regional State (SRS) Constitution (2001) 60 (1); 
Gambella Regional State (GRS) Constitution (2001) 63 (1); Oromia Regional State (ORS) 
Constitution (2001) Art 56 (1); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 67 (1); Tigray Regional 
Constitution (TRS) (2001) Art 49 (3) (e); Benishnagul-Gumuz Regional State (BGRS) 
Constitution (2002) 49 (3) (5).    
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party or coalition of parties’ occupying the majority of the seats of the regional 
council.  
 
The regional executive council is responsible for executing regional laws. It is 
charged with formulating regional economic and social policies.952 It is also 
responsible for implementing the policies when approved by the regional 
council.953 Under the regional constitutions, the executive council exercises 
subsidiary legislative power. Hence, it issues regulations based on a regional 
proclamation. 954   
3.3.3. State judiciary  
State judicial power is entrusted to the states courts. All of the regional states 
have state First Instance, High, and Supreme Courts which have first instance 
and/or appellate jurisdiction.955 State courts apply state laws to decide cases 
except when they act as federal courts. It is not clear whether they may apply 
state constitutions in deciding cases. 956   
                                                 
952 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 58; AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 56; BGRS Constitution (2002) 
Art 57; SRS Constitution (2001) 59; GRS Constitution (2001) 62; ORS Constitution (2001) Art 
55; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 66; TRS Constitution (2001) Art 56. 
953 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 58; AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 56; BGRS Constitution (2002) 
Art 57; SRS Constitution (2001) 59; GRS Constitution (2001) 62; ORS Constitution (2001) Art 
55; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 66; TRS Constitution (2001) Art 56. 
954 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 58 (7); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 56 (5); BGRS Constitution 
(2002) Art 59(7); SRS Constitution (2001) 59 (7); GRS Constitution (2001) 62 (7); ORS 
Constitution (2001) Art 55 (6); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 66 (6); TRS Constitution (2001) 
Art 56(7). 
955 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 50 (7). See also chapter 7; § 2.3.2.2. 
956 In all regions, the power to interpret the regional constitution is given to a constitutional 
interpretation commission (CIC) which is composed of representatives of woredas, regional 
states, and where applicable, nationality zones. In the SNNPR, the CoN has the final say on the 
interpretation of the state’s Constitution.  The CIC or the CoN interprets the state Constitution 
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3.4. Division of functions 
The Constitution divides government functions between the federal and regional 
governments. Article 51 of the Constitution contains a list of exclusive federal 
competences.957 The Constitution provides that all residuary powers (i.e. those 
neither exclusive to the federal government nor concurrent state-federal 
competences) exclusively to the regional states.958 Besides, the Constitution 
explicitly authorises the regional states to formulate and approve policies on 
regional economic and social matters. 959  The Constitution also authorises the 
regions to administer land and other natural resources.960 
 
Scholars disagree on whether the FDRE Constitution provides sufficient powers 
to the regional states.  Abbera and Andreas are of the opinion that the division of 
government functions favours the federal government.961 Andreas even suggests 
that the federal system is an ‘administrative decentralisation’ as the regional 
                                                                                                                                                        
based on the opinion of a constitutional inquiry commission which is composed of judges and 
lawyers. See chapter 7; § 2.3.2.2. .  
957 According to Assefa, the exclusive competences of the federal government are not, however, 
limited to those listed under Article 51. The Constitution mentions additional exclusive federal 
powers which are not listed under Article 51 in the provisions that deal with the powers of the 
different branches of the federal government. For instance under Article 55 the Constitution 
authorises the House of People’s Representatives to enact labour law, a commercial code and a 
penal code and to approve the appointment of federal judges, ministers, commissioners, the 
auditor general and other appointees. As Assefa notes, the powers of the regional government can 
be ascertained only after deducting the federal powers which are mentioned throughout the 
Constitution. Assefa (2007a) 337. 
958 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 52 (1). 
959 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 52 (2) (b). 
960 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 52 (2) (d). 
961 Abbera (1999) 191. 
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states have little powers.962 Assefa and Yonatan conversely argue that the regions 
have significant functions.963 Yonatan, for instance, argues that there are many 
areas that are not within the list of federal competences on which the states may 
exercise legislative power.964 These include ‘intra-state transport, state roads, 
state tourism, health services, agriculture, disaster management, housing, intra-
state trade, vehicle license, firefighting services, traffic regulation, electricity, 
liquor license’.965   There is an agreement though that the Constitution is generous 
to the regional states so far as matters pertaining to ethnic and cultural identities 
are concerned.966 
 
 In practice the federal government plays a dominant role. It makes excessive use 
of its power to formulate policies on matters relating to social and economic 
development.967 The federal policies and strategies relating to social and 
economic matters are so detailed that they leave little room for regional action.968 
According to Assefa, the centralisation of policy formulation is the upshot of the 
centralised structure and operation of the ruling party. Most of the policy papers 
‘originate’ as ‘party documents’. 969 After being discussed by the party leaders at 
the federal and state government levels, the documents are tabled for approval by 
Parliament and published as government policy papers.970 As the discussion in 
                                                 
962 Andreas (2003) 167. 
963 Assefa (2007a) 142; Yonatan (2010) 211-212. 
964 Yonatan (2010) 212. 
965 Yonatan (2010) 212. 
966 Andreas (2004) 167; Yonatan (2010) 211-212; Assefa (2007a) 142. 
967 Assefa (2006) 139. 
968 Assefa (2006) 143. 
969 Assefa (2007a) 395.  
970 Assefa (2007a) 395.  
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chapter five and chapter six shows, the dominant role that the federal government 
plays in policy making impacts on local government. 971   
3.5. Financial powers   
The allocation of financial sources between the state and federal governments is 
likely to have bearing on the financial autonomy of local government. As will be 
argued below, whatever taxing power is devolved to local government must be 
deducted from the taxing power of the regional governments. The financial 
powers of the federal and state governments are therefore, briefly discussed 
below. 
3.5.1. Taxes 
 The federal Constitution provides for four categories of taxes; exclusive federal 
taxes, exclusive state taxes, concurrent taxes, and undesignated taxes. 972  The 
first two categories of taxes are imposed and collected by federal and state 
governments, respectively. Article 96 lists federal taxes which include custom 
duties, import and export taxes, and income taxes from federal employees and 
employees of international organisations. Article 97 of the Constitution contains a 
list of regional taxes which includes land taxes, agriculture income taxes, and 
income tax from regional government employees as well as from employees of 
private enterprises which are licensed by and operate in a regional state. 973  
 
The concurrent taxes are levied and administered by the federal government and 
the proceeds are shared by the federal government and the relevant regional 
                                                 
971 See chapter 5§ 2.5.2.  
972 FDRE Constitution (1995) Arts 96-99. 
973 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 97 (9-10). 
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government.974 These taxes include taxes on profit, sales, excise and personal 
income of enterprises which are jointly owned by federal and state 
governments.975 An undesignated tax becomes either a federal, regional, or 
concurrent tax when so decided in a joint session of the two federal Houses.976   
          3.5.2. Federal grants 
The federal Constitution provides that the federal government may grant to the 
regions certain financial assistance.977 The HoF is charged with the responsibility 
to determine the manner in which the federal grants would be divided among the 
regional states.978 The Constitution further enjoins the federal government to 
cover the costs of discharging functions that it has delegated to the regional 
states.979 In practice, the federal government transfers two types of federal grants 
to the regions: unconditional block grants and specific purpose grants. 980 The 
bulk of the federal grant takes the form of formula-based unconditional block 
                                                 
974 The Constitution provides that the concurrent taxes shall be levied and collected jointly by both 
the federal government and a regional government. However this provision was interpreted to 
mean that concurrent taxes are levied and administered by the federal government and the 
proceeds are shared between the federal government and the region. Solomon (2006) 141; FDRE 
Constitution (1995) 98. 
975 FDRE Constitution (1995) 98 (1). 
976 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 99. However, the Constitution seems to assume that there will 
be an agreement on whether or not a particular tax is undesignated or otherwise. What if there is a 
dispute regarding whether a particular tax is designated or not? The Constitution is silent in this 
respect. Should such a dispute arise, as it raises the interpretation of the Constitution, it seems that 
the House of Federation will have the power to decide whether or not the tax in question is 
designated. If it is not designated, the level of government which has the power to collect the tax 
would be decided by the two houses in accordance with the above procedure. 
977 FDRE Constitution (1995) 94 (2). 
978 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 62 (7). 
979 FDRE Constitution (1995) 94 (1). 
980 Solomon (2006) 193f. 
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grants over which the regional states have unrestricted expenditure autonomy. 981 
On the other hand, programmes that are mandated by the federal government and 
executed by regional and local governments are funded through Special Purpose 
Grants (SPG). 982 The SPGs are conditional grants which the regions may spend 
only for the purpose of executing federal programmes. 
3.5.3. Financial power; fairly divided?  
The federal government is superior as far as financial power is concerned since 
the most buoyant categories of taxes, such as import and export taxes, are within 
its control.983 The regional taxes are far from buoyant since very little revenue is 
collected from rural land use tax and agriculture income tax. Moreover, the 
regional states have poor tax bases. In addition, tax administration of the regional 
states is inefficient.984 In effect, the states are dependent on federal grants. 
According to some studies, between 70 to 80 percent of the regional states’ 
budgets is covered by federal grants.985  
 
As will be discussed in chapter five, the inadequacy of the taxing power of the 
regional states directly impacts on the revenue raising capacity of local 
government. 986             
3.5.4. Concluding remarks  
                                                 
981 Solomon (2006) 193f. 
982 Solomon (2006) 193f. 
983 Over and above that, the federal government owns almost all major public enterprises 
including banks and insurance companies. In addition, the federal government has a monopoly on 
telecommunication, electricity, and water. These enterprises, as Solomon states, ‘are not only a 
major sources of income to the [federal] government but also...the primary sources of personal 
income tax, excise tax, and business profit tax’. Solomon (2006) 155. 
984 Solomon (2006) 155. 
985 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 16. 
986 See chapter 5; 3. 
 
 
 
 
194 
 
The above sections have briefly described the structure, functions, powers, and 
financial sources of the federal and state governments. The next crucial issue to 
be discussed here is whether the FDRE Constitution envisions the establishment 
of local government. If it does, what are the features of local government that it 
envisions to be established? Related to this issue is the question where the FDRE 
Constitution positions local government in the federal arrangement. The 
following section addresses these issues.                                                                                                   
4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS ENVISIONED IN THE FDRE 
CONSTITUTION 
4.1. General 
The constitutional status of local government is contentious in many federal 
systems. The idea of creating constitutionally entrenched local government is 
often perceived by the constituent units of a federation as a threat that may upset 
the federal equilibrium.987 This does not, however, mean that federal countries do 
not have autonomous local government. In fact, most federal states have three 
levels of government: at federal, state/regional, and local.988 The disagreement is 
rather about the constitutional status of local government.989  
                                                 
987 In the classical federal systems of the USA, Canada, and Australia local government is 
established as an institution of service delivery, not as a level of government with a democratic 
pertinence (Steytler (2005) 2; Steytler (2009) 40). In USA and Australia local government is not 
even mentioned in their constitutions. In federal countries, such as Canada, where local 
government is mentioned in the national constitution, it is unambiguously stated that local 
government is states’ competence.Young (2009) 113; Steytler (2009) 406. 
988 Steytler (2005) 1. 
989 In Australia, for instance, the referenda which were conducted on two different occasions with 
the intention of providing local government a constitutional recognition failed to achieve their 
purpose (Sansom (2009) 12). This was, among other things, because the move was seen by the 
states as the central government’s plan to marginalise them and to centralise power (Saunders 
(2005) 51). Furthermore, the constitutional entrenchment of local government was seen as 
 
 
 
 
195 
 
 
The constitution of a federal state is viewed as a covenant that is entered into by 
the constituent units of the federation. In a federal system, therefore, the 
constitution is a supreme law to which all levels of government are expected to 
adhere.990 The constitution guarantees undisrupted existence and broad autonomy 
to each sphere/level of government in exercising the power allocated to it.991 The 
main distinction between a unitary system - where sub-national units may be 
eliminated by national government at any given time - and a federal system is the 
constitutional protection that is afforded to all spheres/levels of government.992 
As Anton states, in a federal system ‘[a]ll constituent units…are guaranteed 
existence so long as the system exists because they are the system’.993 In short, 
the constitution is a defining element of a federal system. The constitution is such 
an important document in a federal system that, as Saunders maintains, it is the 
‘ultimate goal’ of local government of a federal state to be recognsied in a federal 
constitution.994 Providing local government with a constitutional status is a 
manifestation of its significance. It is also important since, as was stated in 
chapter two, the recognition of local government in a national constitution is 
related to the very existence of local government as an order of government. 995   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
undesirable as it would create ‘another level of government which would be in competition with 
the States’ (Saunders (2005) 56-57). 
990 Assefa (2007a) 121. 
991 Watts (2008) 83. 
992 Chandler (1987) 4; Watts (2008) 83. 
993 Anton (1989) 3. 
994 Saunders (2005) 47. 
995 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
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Ethiopia is a federal state. The fact that Ethiopia is a federal state raises the 
question: what are the place and status of local government under the FDRE 
Constitution? Does the Constitution provide for the establishment of local 
government? What type of local government does it envisage?  
 
It will be argued in the following section that the FDRE Constitution envisions 
the establishment of two different systems of local government. The two systems 
of local government will be referred to in this thesis as Article 39 local 
government and Article 50 (4) local government based on the Articles in the 
FDRE Constitution that refers to each of them. These two categories of local 
government envisaged by the Constitution differ from each other both in structure 
and purposes. 996  
4.2. Article 39 local government 
As was mentioned earlier, the Ethiopian federal system is viewed as a ‘federation 
of ethnic groups’.997 It is assumed to be a federation which came to be when 
various ethnic communities came together in a federal union. The federal 
Constitution is also regarded as a confirmation of the covenant that was entered 
into by and among the ethnic groups of the country based on their right to self-
determination.998 The covenant is not assumed to have been entered into only by 
the major ethnic communities that are given their own regional states. Rather it is 
assumed to be a covenant of and for all ethnic groups of the country; including 
the ethnic minority communities that are found within each regional state. 999  The 
                                                 
996 For more on this see Zemelak & Yonatan (2012). 
997 See above at § 2. 
998 FDRE Constitution (1995) Preamble. 
999 FDRE Constitution (1995) Preamble. 
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type of local government that is envisaged under Article 39 of the Constitution is, 
therefore, linked to the right to self-determination of the ethnic communities of 
the country; a principle which serves as the foundation of Ethiopia’s federal 
system.1000  Article 39(3) of the Constitution provides that:  
 
‘Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of 
self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the 
territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and Federal 
governments.’ 
 
The above provision clearly provides that each ethnic community in the country 
has the right to establish self-government in its own territory.1001 Evidently, the 
right to self–government is not a right which is exercisable only by those ethnic 
communities that have their own regional states. Rather, it is a right which is 
constitutionally entrenched for all ethnic communities of the country.1002  
Moreover, the right to a full measure of self–government is not necessarily to be 
effected through the establishment of a regional state for every ethnic community. 
The Constitution could not have sought to provide each ethnic community with 
its own regional government; to do so would have resulted in the establishment of 
80 or so ethnically defined regional states. This would have simply been 
unfeasible. On the other hand, the Constitution could not have merely recognised 
the right to self-government of each ethnic community without the intention to 
somehow give it effect. The Constitution, thus, implies that self-government 
                                                 
1000 See Assefa (2007a) 237.  
1001 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3).   
1002 See Assefa (2007a) 237.  
 
 
 
 
198 
 
might be established at local level or sub-regional level in order to give effect to 
the right to self-government of each ethnic community. 1003 
 
What is envisaged under Article 39 (3) is a special type of local government. It is 
not a regular system of local government that is established in every part of the 
country. It is rather constitutionally envisaged to be established only in those 
parts of the country where territorially concentrated intra-regional minority ethnic 
communities are present. This can be inferred from the Constitution itself which 
provides that each ethnic community would establish self-government ‘in the 
territory it inhabits’. Therefore, the boundaries of Article 39 local government are 
to be demarcated based on the geographical settlement structure of a sub-regional 
ethnic minority group.  
 
Secondly, ‘self-determination’, as per Article 39 (3) of the FDRE Constitution, 
evidently, implies political autonomy. Political autonomy in turn implies a final 
say on certain matters.1004 Political autonomy, therefore, of necessity entails the 
establishment of a devolved local government; not a deconcentrated 
administrative unit of the regional states. Moreover, a ‘full measure of self-
government’ implies the establishment of a government which has all political 
(legislative and executive), administrative, and even possibly, some judicial 
powers, and one which can autonomously exercise these powers. Therefore, 
Article 39 (3) local government is meant to be an autonomous sub-regional 
                                                 
1003 See Tsegaye (2004) 5.  
1004 Watts (2000) 948. 
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government which has devolved powers. It certainly is not intended to be an 
administrative structure of the regional states with deconcentrated power. 1005  
4.3. Article 50(4) local government  
The second system of local government envisioned by the Constitution is 
mentioned in Article 50(4) of the Constitution.  In this study this type of local 
government will be referred to as Article 50(4) local government. Article 50(4) of 
the 1995 Constitution provides that-  
 
‘State government shall be established at State and other administrative levels that they   
find necessary. Adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to 
enable the People to participate directly in the administration of such units’.1006 
 
Clearly, local government is what the Constitution referrers to as ‘other 
administrative levels’ or ‘lowest unit of government’. Here the Constitution 
noticeably makes Article 50(4) local government the creation of the regional 
states.  The Constitution also provides that the regional states may establish ‘other 
administrative levels’ where and when they ‘find [it] necessary’. This suggests 
that the regional states have the option not to establish Article 50(4) local 
government. Moreover, the Constitution refers to local government as 
‘administrative levels’ or ‘lowest units of government’ and not as a level of 
‘government’. This may be interpreted to mean that the regional states may 
establish their own deconcentrated administrative apparatus; not necessarily 
autonomous local government.   It is submitted here that the above is not what the 
Constitution envisages. It is argued below that, when Article 50 (4) is read with 
                                                 
1005 For a discussion on deconcentration see chapter 2 § 2.2.1. 
1006 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 50(4). 
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other related parts of the Constitution, it leads to the conclusion that the 
Constitution envisages Article 50 (4) local government to be an autonomous level 
of government.  The drafting history of Article 50 (4) also shows that the framers 
of the Constitution intended Article 50 (4) local government to be an autonomous 
level of government.  
4.3.1. A logical interpretation of Article 50 (4) 
A careful perusal of the Constitution reveals that the Constitution envisages an 
autonomous local government; and not a mere structure of local administration. 
To begin with, the second sentence of Article 50 (4) provides that ‘[a]dequate 
power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the [p]eople to 
participate directly in the administration of such units’.  As indicated earlier, it is 
unambiguous that local government is what the Constitution refers to as the 
‘lowest unit of government’. Here the Constitution imposes a binding obligation 
on the states to transfer ‘adequate’ powers to local government. Impliedly, it 
enjoins the states to create a system of local government that has ‘adequate 
powers’. It can be argued that, under the Constitution, the regional states have the 
options to determine the number of tiers of local government they may 
establish.1007 They have also the discretion to determine the number of local 
government units they may create. It is, however, not logical to maintain that the 
creation of local government itself is optional, and, at the same time, to maintain 
that the regional states are subject to an obligation to transfer adequate powers to 
local government units.  
4.3.2. Local government and self-rule 
                                                 
1007 See Solomon (2006) 79. 
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The establishment of Article 50 (4) local government can be linked to the right to 
self-rule as enshrined under Article 88 (1) of the Constitution. Article 88 (1) of 
the Constitution provides that the promotion of the people’s right to democratic 
‘self-rule at all levels’ is one of the political objectives of Ethiopia’s 
constitutional system that must guide the interpretation and  implementation of 
the Constitution and other laws .1008 The right of the people to self-rule, as the 
Constitution clearly states, should be exercised at all levels. This includes the 
local level of government. Therefore, the establishment of local government must 
be informed by the need to promote the citizens’ right to self-rule. The right to 
self-rule as provided under Article 88 (1) is a principle that is broader than the 
principle of the right to self-government that was discussed above in relation to 
the right to self-determination of ethnic communities within the framework of 
Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system.  The right to self-rule, as provided in Article 88 
of the Constitution, is based on the notion of democracy as a self-rule.1009 This is 
clearly indicated in Article 88 (1) which provides that ‘guided by democratic 
principles, Government shall promote the people’s right to self-rule at all level’. 
Self-rule as a democratic principle embodies the idea of communal control over 
collective decisions.1010 Community control over collective decisions is exercised 
either indirectly through elected representatives or through direct personal 
participation.1011 This principle requires Article 50 (4) local government to be 
structured in such a way that it enhances the communities’ right to democratic 
self-rule.  
                                                 
1008 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 88 (1). 
1009 See FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 88(1). 
1010 Beetham (1999) 5; Arblaster (1987) 8. 
1011 Beetham (1999) 5. 
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4.3.3. Local government and public participation  
It is clear from the Constitution that the need to enhance direct public 
participation is one of the constitutional objectives that underpin the 
establishment of Article 50 (4) local government. The assumption behind this 
constitutional objective appears to be that the establishment of autonomous local 
government will best promote direct public participation. This line of 
interpretation of the Constitution is also consistent with the general view at 
international level that local government is ‘the terrain most amenable to effective 
public participation’.1012 The European Charter of Local Self-Government, for 
instance, provides that ‘it is at local level that [the people’s right to participate] 
can be most directly exercised’.1013 Shah also argues that the current trend in 
governance is a steady change from a ‘bureaucratic to a participatory mode of 
operation’.1014 According to a World Bank report, there is an increasing trend 
towards the establishment of autonomous local government predicated on 
enhancing the role of the public in governance.1015 The drafters of the FDRE 
Constitution seem to have intended to make local government a site of public 
participation. It also appears that they were influenced by the aforementioned 
global trend. That must be why the Constitution clearly provides that the purpose 
for the establishment of local government is ‘to enable the [p]eople to participate 
directly in the administration of such units’. 1016   
4.3.4. The drafting history of Article 50 (4) 
                                                 
1012 Porras (2009) 542. 
1013 European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985) Preamble. 
1014 Shah (2004) 4. 
1015 World Bank (1999) 108ff. 
1016 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 50(4). 
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The drafting history of Article 50 (4) of the Constitutions, as narrated by Assefa, 
sheds some light on the intention of the drafters of the FDRE Constitution with 
respect to the constitutional status of Article 50 (4) local government. Assefa 
writes Article 50 (4) was a result of a compromise to accommodate two important 
interests.1017  The first interest was to leave the responsibility regarding the 
creation of local government to the regional states. The other was to ensure the 
establishment of autonomous local government. The compromise was that, in 
keeping with the dual federal system, local government would remain the 
competence of the regional states.  However ‘it was clearly stated that the local 
governments should not merely be agents of the state government but should have 
some level of autonomy’.1018   
4.4. Conclusion  
In chapter two, the institutional features of a developmental local government 
were identified based on international literature.1019  Local government must be 
constitutionally recognised as an order of government and established throughout 
a country on wall-to-wall basis.1020  On the other hand, a local territorial unit 
which is meant to serve as an autonomous territorial regime for accommodating 
minority ethnic communities is not expected to be established throughout a 
country. It is rather expected to be established only in specific area wherein 
politically mobilised and territorially concentrated minority ethnic community is 
found. 1021   
 
                                                 
1017 Assefa (2007a) 341. 
1018 Assefa (2007a) 341. Emphasis added. 
1019 See chapter 2; § 3.5. & 4.4.2.3. 
1020 See chapter 2; § 3.5. 
1021 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2.3. 
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As the discussion in the preceding two sections show the FDRE Constitution 
envisages two categories of local government (Article 50 (4) and Article 39 
categories of local government respectively) that demonstrate the aforementioned 
feature. The Constitution does not in fact explicitly recognise Article 50 (4) local 
government as an autonomous order of government. However, the constitutional 
objectives that underpin its establishment (self-rule and public participation) 
requires this category of local government to be autonomous level of government. 
Moreover, these constitutional objectives are of general relevance as everyone in 
every part of the country has the right to participate in communal matter. The 
purpose that Article 50 (4) local government intended to achieve entails the 
establishment of this category of local in every part of the country on a wall–to-
wall basis.  
 
Article 39 local government, on the other hand, has specific purpose namely to 
allow minority ethnic communities to enjoy territorial autonomy. The 
constitutional principle that underpinned its establishment is the right to self-
determination of every ethnic community which is recognised under Article 39 of 
the FDRE Constitution. Hence, unlike Article 50 (4) local government, Article 39 
local government is not meant to be established for every part of the country, but 
only in parts of the country where there are territorially concentrated intra-
regional minority ethnic communities.  
 
§ 5 will discuss the political motives and processes that led to and underpinned 
the decentralisation of powers to local government. § 6 then will provide a brief 
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overview of the organisational structure of the two categories of local government 
envisaged by the Constitution.  
5. TOWARDS LOCAL LEVEL DECENTRALISATION  
5.1. Introduction 
In accordance with the constitutional prescription discussed above, the regional 
states have established either or both of the Article 39 and Article 50(4) local 
government. The establishment of the two categories of local government took 
place at different times. Moreover, different policy and political motives 
underpinned the establishment of the two types of local government.  
5.2. Establishing Article 39 local government 
As was discussed in chapter three, the Transitional Period Charter (TPC) 
recognised the right to self-government of each ethnic group even before the 
formal establishment of the Ethiopian federal system. 1022 Proclamation 7 (1992), 
which was issued during the transitional period, identified the ethnic communities 
that could establish their own self-governments starting from woreda. 1023  Some 
of the Article 39 local government units were, therefore, established during the 
transitional period, that is even before Ethiopia’s federal system was formally 
introduced. The regional states adopted their own regional constitutions shortly 
after the promulgation of the federal Constitution.1024 Some of the regional 
constitutions which were adopted in 1995 merely formalised the existing ethnic-
based local territorial units.1025 Hence, the establishment of Article 39 local 
                                                 
1022 See chapter 3; § 7.  
1023 See chapter 3; § 7.  
1024 See FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 50 (5).  
1025 The 1995 regional constitution of the SNNPR, for instance talk about nationality zones and 
liyu woredas. See Article 68 ff. For the discussion on nationality zones and liyu woredas see 
chapter chapter 4; § 6. 2. 
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government can be viewed as part of the first phase of the decentralisation 
process which began during the transitional period and was concluded with the 
establishment of the federal system in 1995. 1026   
5.3. District level decentralisation programme (DLDP): The second phase 
decentralisation 
5.3.1. Introduction  
The system of local government which is envisaged under Article 50(4) of the 
FDRE Constitution did not exist before 2001 in any of the regional states. 1027   
This does not, however, mean that no local administrative structure existed until 
2001. In fact, among the first tasks undertaken by the EPRDF during the 
transitional period was to establish a local administrative structures.1028  As was 
stated in the preceding chapter, the woreda was retained as the basic unit of 
government by the transitional government.1029 However, prior to 2001, the 
woreda was a deconcentrated structure of local administration without autonomy.  
 
In 2000, the federal government launched the DLDP which marked the beginning 
of the second phase of the decentralisation process. 1030   The decentralisation 
programme, as will be discussed in the next sections, was underpinned by official 
and unofficial political motives. The official political motives are detailed in 
several federal policy papers. The ‘Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS)’ 
briefly outlined the DLDP. 1031 In 2002 ‘the Sustainable Development and 
                                                 
1026 Tegene (2002) 1. 
1027 Tegene (2002) 1. 
1028 See chapter 3; § 7.  
1029 See chapter 3; § 7.2.1.2.  
1030 Tegene (2002) 2. 
1031 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development: Ethiopia (MoFED) (2000). 
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Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP)’1032 and in 2005 the ‘Plan for Accelerated 
and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)’ further elaborated on the 
DLDP.1033  Other policy documents which were prepared as sub-programmes of 
the main development programmes also complemented the DLDP.1034   
5.3.2. Drivers of the formulation of the DLDP 
The preparation for the IPRS began in 1998, seven years after the end of the two 
decade long war. 1035  The civil war, aggravated by chronic drought and famine, 
had taken a heavy toll on the population.1036 Ethiopia’s already troubled economy 
had further plummeted as a result of 17 years of command economy under the 
Dreg.1037 At the time the IPRS was being formulated the great majority of the 
Ethiopian people were living below the national poverty line.1038  
 
The poverty in the country was not only widespread but also multi-faceted, 
manifested by economic deprivation, hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, diseases, 
and the like. 1039 More than 45 percent of the population could not afford to 
consume the minimum 2200 calories of food per day.1040 Life expectancy was 
                                                 
1032 MoFED (2002). 
1033 MoFED (2005). 
1034 These include ‘Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP)’, ‘Capacity Building for 
Decentralised Service Delivery (CBDSD)’, ‘Plan for Urban Development and Urban Good 
Governance (PUDUGG)’. These documents elaborated and complimented the decentralisation 
programme. 
1035 MoFED (2000). 
1036 See chapter 3; § 7. 
1037 Dercon (2000). 
1038 MoFED (2000) 3. 
1039MoFED (2000) 3. 
1040MoFED (2000) 3. 
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below 50 years of age.1041 Infant mortality was high at 118 per 1000 infants while 
child mortality was 117 per 1000 children.1042 Maternal mortality was also 
soaring at 7 per 1000 mothers.1043 The rate of illiteracy was high at 77 and 55 
percent for women and men respectively.  Access to education was so limited that 
the gross enrollment to primary education in 1995 was only 23 percent.1044  
 
Poverty was prevalent both in urban and rural areas, even though it was much 
harsher in the rural areas where 90 percent of the poor lived.1045  Urban centres 
were characterised by ‘a poorly developed economic base, a high level of 
unemployment and a worrying incidence of poverty and slum habitation’.1046 
Besides, they lacked effective urban management, infrastructure, and systems of 
efficient service delivery.1047  
 
With a declared intention to curb these problems, the national government, 
initiated several measures to transform the economic system from a command 
economy to a market-based economic system.1048 The transformation of the 
economic system was undertaken as part of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) in collaboration with the World Bank and the IMF.1049  
                                                 
1041 MoFED (2000) 3. 
1042 MoFED (2000) 3. 
1043 MoFED (2000) 3. 
1044 MoFED (2000) 3. 
1045 MoWUD (2007) 16. 
1046 MoWUD (2007) 3. 
1047 MoFED (2002) 125. 
1048 Dercon (2000). 
1049 World Bank Country Office in Ethiopia (2001); MoFED (2000) 3. The SAP was prescribed in 
1990s by World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to developing states, including 
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Around the same time the Millennium Declaration (also known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)) was adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations in the Millennium Summit. The Declaration committed the 
member States of the UN, including Ethiopia, to work to improve the living 
conditions of their peoples.1050 At the Summit, the heads of states and 
governments pledged to halve poverty in its various forms by 2015.1051  
5.3.4. Decentralisation as poverty reduction strategy 
The above were the drivers that prompted the federal government to position 
poverty reduction at the ‘core’ of the country’s development agenda.1052The 
government, therefore, planned to achieve economic growth so as to redirect the 
wealth created ‘towards poverty reducing sectors’.1053 The poverty reduction 
strategy was also pointed towards maintaining equitable inter-regional and intra-
regional development through a scheme of re-distribution.1054 The inter-regional 
aspect of equitable development intended to reduce the difference in development 
among the regional states. This, in particular, aimed at elevating the development 
level of the lowland regions.1055 The intra-regional aspect of equitable 
development was meant to reduce inequality between the urban and rural 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ethiopia, as one of the conditions for obtaining loan. At the centre of the SAP were privatisation 
and liberalisation of that country’s market. On SAP see Gore (2000). 
1050See the Millennium Declaration, United Nations Resolution 55/2 (2000).  
1051 Millennium Declaration (2000) Para 19.   
1052 MoFED (2000) 8; MoFED (2002).  
1053 MoFED (2002) 47. 
1054 MoFED (2002) 26. 
1055 As the discussion in § 2.2 of this chapter reveals, there is wide variation in the socio-economic 
development between the highland and lowland regional states. MoFED (2002) 26. 
 
 
 
 
210 
 
communities within each region. Moreover, the poverty reduction strategies 
sought to incorporate and implement the MDGs.1056  
 
The poverty reduction and development plan rested on four ‘pillars’, of which 
one was decentralisation.1057 The programme of decentralisation, as a poverty 
reduction strategy, was focused on tackling ‘poverty directly at the grassroots 
level’.1058 To this end the woreda was chosen as the key local level government 
because it already served as a constituency in national and regional elections. 1059  
It was viewed, therefore, as ‘a suitable point of merger between political 
empowerment and economic development at the grassroots level’.1060 The 
decentralisation programme also sought to enhance direct public participation in 
local development programmes. Primary education, primary health care, rural 
water supply, rural roads, and agricultural extension services, were chosen as 
areas of development to be undertaken through decentralised system.1061  
                                                 
1056 MoFED (2002) 26.  
1057 The other three pillars of the poverty reduction strategy were agriculture development led 
industrialisation (ADLI), judicial and civil reform, and capacity building in public as well as 
private sectors. ADLI is an economic strategy which attempts to put agriculture and 
industrialisation within a single framework of development in which agriculture serves as 
springboard for industrialisation by providing the industry raw material, capital as well as a 
market base. ADLI is also meant to create food security. ADLI is premised on the assumption that 
given the acute capital shortage, the large number of working population and vast arable land, 
‘faster growth and hence economic development could be realised if the country adopts a strategy 
that help raise the employability of ... labour resources and enhance productivity of land resources 
aimed at capital accumulation’. ‘Capacity building is taken to comprise the development of 
human resources, building and strengthening of institutions, and establishment of effective 
working practices in combination’. MoFED (2000) 8-12; MoFED (2002) 38-40 
1058 MoFED (2000) 13. 
1059 MoFED (2000) 13. See also above chapter 4; § 3.2.1. 
1060 MoFED (2000) 13. 
1061 MoFED (2000) 13. 
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In order to allow woredas to undertake developmental activities, the policy papers 
pledged that woredas would be ‘fully empowered to take up expenditure and 
revenue assignments within their competences’.1062 A woreda would be entitled 
to unconditional block-grants so that it may decide and make use of a grant to 
respond to local needs and priorities.1063 To that effect, each region was required 
to develop its own equitable formula for transferring to woredas block grants.1064  
 
The need for enhancing urban development was also considered in the policy 
papers. As was pledged in the SDPRP, a fully-fledged urban policy was adopted 
in 2007 by the federal government. 1065 The policy focused on urban governance, 
infrastructure provision, housing, and land management, creating employment 
opportunities, and protecting the urban environment.1066 Furthermore, the 
programme recognised the need to harmonise the activities of woredas and urban 
local government.1067   
 
The decentralisation programme was further complemented by a ‘multi-sectoral, 
inter-governmental programme’ of capacity building.1068 A ‘Ministry of Capacity 
Building’ was established in 2001.1069 The Ministry was mandated to provide 
                                                 
1062 MoFED (2002) 138. 
1063 MoFED (2002) 138-139. 
1064 MoFED (2002) 139. 
1065 See MoFED (2007).  
1066 MoFED (2007) 20 f  
1067 MoFED (2007) 20.. 
1068 Spielman et ale (2008) 6. 
1069 See FDRE Proclamation 256 (2001) Art 4 & Art 5 and FDRE Proclamation 471 (2005) 9(1).  
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policy directives in relation to capacity building.1070 It was also mandated to 
programme and finance several capacity building sub-programs; one of which 
was DLDP.1071 
5.3.5. Local democracy for development   
In the aforementioned policy papers, political reform at local level was 
considered to be critical for achieving decentralised development. By shifting 
decision making power from the centre to the woreda, the government pledged to 
empower local communities, in particular the poor, to take part in and enjoy the 
full advantages of developmental activities.1072 Furthermore, the government 
declared its plan to enable local communities to ‘participate, negotiate and 
influence’ the decision making processes concerning local matters.1073 
 
‘A democratic system, which is based on the realisation of people's participation … 
and which ensures good governance, is a vital instrument for combating poverty 
and backwardness. It is therefore mandatory that democratisation be one of our 
major objectives....The on-going reforms [of]...devolution to [local government] are 
critical measures that would help deepen the democratisation process and good 
governance in Ethiopia.’1074 
 
                                                 
1070 FDRE Proclamation 256 (2001) Art 6(1); FDRE Proclamation 471 (2005) Art 9(1). 
1071 Meanwhile, the World Bank launched two projects namely ‘Capacity Building for 
Decentralised Service Delivery (CBDSD)’ and ‘Public Sector Capacity Building Program 
(PSCAP)’. The projects were launched in 2000, with the intent to assist capacity building at local 
level. It, in particular, sought to strengthen local governments financially so that it could develop 
the ability and the incentives to improve service delivery, especially in the rural areas. Spielman et 
ale (2008) 6. 
1072 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (2005). 
1073 CIDA (2005). 
1074 MoFED (2002) 50.  
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To this effect, the policy papers pledged that regular local elections would be 
conducted and that the capacity of local representative councils and other 
democratic institutions would be strengthened.1075  Furthermore, in order to 
enhance local democracy, the SDPRP stated that the capacity of communities and 
civil society groups would be strengthened.1076 The civil society organisations in 
this regard are expected to play a role in the process of democratisation by 
facilitating ‘interaction, and mobilising groups and communities to participate in 
social, economic and political activities’ in particular at local level.1077 
 
The need to empower women was also considered as an integral part of the 
decentralisation programme. The IPRP, SPRDP, and PASADEP considered 
empowering women and reducing gender inequality among the most important 
objectives that the decentralisation programme was to achieve.1078 To this effect, 
the SPRDP pledged to increase the membership of women in local government 
councils, especially in kebele councils. 1079 
5.3.6. Concluding remarks  
In chapter two it was stressed that human welfare should be the core element, as 
well as the goal and measure, of development.1080 Moreover, public participation 
in developmental activities, fairness, and sustainability were identified as the 
central elements of development. 1081 As can be gathered from the discussion in 
                                                 
1075 MoFED (2002) 40.  
1076 MoFED (2002) 40; MoFED (2006) 177.  
1077 MoFED (2006) 176. 
1078 MoFED (2000) 13; MoFED (2002) 40. 
1079 A Women Affairs Office was established within the Office of the Prime Minister. Women 
affairs offices were also established at regional and zonal levels in all parts of the country.  
1080 See chapter 2; § 3.2. & 3.3.  
1081 See chapter 2; § 3.2. & 3.3.  
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the preceding sections, these critical elements of decentralised development are 
canvassed in the various policy papers of the Ethiopian federal government. The 
urgency to reduce poverty is clearly recognised. Development is articulated in 
terms of elevating the living conditions of the people; not merely from the angle 
of economic growth. Central elements of development, including equity and 
sustainability, have found their way into the policy papers. Local democracy and 
public participation are viewed as critical elements of decentralised development. 
The need to ensure the articulation of the special needs of women is also taken 
into account. Moreover, the need to follow a differentiated approach in 
addressing the developmental needs of rural and urban areas is also 
conspicuously stated.  
 
However, these benign purposes were not the only drivers of the decentralisation 
process. The following section discusses the unofficial and less benevolent 
political motives that underpinned the second phase decentralisation process.  
5.3.7. Beyond the decentralised development rhetoric      
The first non-official driver of the decentralisation programme was the need to 
diminish the power of the regional government. This became necessary due the 
division that arose within the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), a 
dominant member of the EPRDF. The other unofficial motive is the need to 
discourage the demand for the establishment of ethnic-based local units. 
5.3.7.1. Political division as a driver of the decentralisation programme  
The political division within the TPLF arose out of a disagreement between 
Meles Zenawi (the Prime Minister and the Chair Person of both the EPRDF and 
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the TPLF) and some of the top brass of the TPLF.1082 However, the split in the 
TPLF occurred in 2001, 1083 in the same year that the EPRDF-led regional states 
began to revise their constitutions with the alleged purpose of decentralising 
powers to woredas. 1084  The true reason for the dispute remains unclear.1085 That 
aside, it is clear that the PM faced formidable opposition from senior party 
members. Furthermore, some of the leaders of the other members of the EPRDF 
coalition sided with the dissenters following the split in the TPLF. This led to an 
extensive political ‘purge’ within the TPLF, other EPRDF member parties, and 
affiliate parties. Dissenters were expelled from the TPLF and the EPRDF.1086 
Those among the dissenters who had been elected to national and regional 
representative councils representing the EPRDF were ‘recalled’. 1087 
 
The political scuffle also led to structural reforms, in particular at regional 
government level. These aimed at diminishing the power of the regional 
government, especially of the regional presidents. Before 2001, the regional state 
                                                 
1082 The dispute allegedly began back in 1998 while Ethiopia was still at war with Eritrea over a 
border dispute. Medhane & Young (2003) 390. See also Bereket (2003 Ethiopian Calendar) & 
Daniel (2003 Ethiopian Calendar). 
1083 Medhane & Young (2003) 391. 
1084 See below at § 6. 
1085 Those who stood opposing the PM allege that the disagreement related to on how to handle 
the Ethio-Eritrean war. Members of the dissenting groups claim that they were in favour of a 
forceful regime change in Asmara. Meles was, however, against such suggestions due to 
international pressure. Meles and his supporters, on the other hand, maintain that the dispute 
related to corruption and lack of discipline that prevailed in the party. Bereket (2003 Ethiopian 
Calendar); Medhane & Young (2003); Solomon (2007) 239; Assefa (2007a) 388. 
1086 Bereket (2003 Ethiopian Calendar); Medhane & Young (2003); Solomon (2007) 239; Assefa 
(2007a) 388.  
1087 Bereket (2003 Ethiopian Calendar); Medhane & Young (2003); Solomon (2007) 239; Assefa 
(2007a) 388.  
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president (also called chief administrator) was immensely powerful. Not only was 
he or the head of a regional executive council but he or she was also the speaker 
of the regional council.1088  This gave the regional president enormous influence 
over both branches of a regional government. Moreover, as indicated above, the 
pre-2001 regional constitutions had created local administrative units – as 
opposed to local government units - which were structurally subordinate to the 
regional governments. The woredas and municipalities were deconcentrated units 
of the regional governments and under the direct control of the regional 
presidents.  
 
It was, therefore, decided that the power of the regional presidents as well as of 
the regional government should be diminished. To this effect, it was decided that 
more powers would be transferred to the regional governments to local 
government. A process was initiated in 2000 to revise the constitutions of the four 
highland regional states. The revision of the regional constitutions took place in 
the PM’s office on the order of the PM himself and without the involvement of 
the regional states. 1089  In fact, not only were the regional states not involved in 
the revision, the regional officials were unaware of what was taking place.1090   
 
With a view to weaken the power of the regional chief administrators separation 
of powers was introduced in the new regional constitutions between regional 
councils and regional executives. The regional chief administrator was no longer 
                                                 
1088 See Tsegaye (2004) 9. 
1089 Tsegaye (2004) 10; Solomon (2008) 239. 
1090 Solomon (2008) 239. 
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a speaker of the regional council. Furthermore, autonomous woredas were created 
over which the regional president no longer had absolute control.1091   
5.3.7.2. Decentralisation to discourage ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’  
A further unofficial motive that might have influenced the second phase of 
decentralisation was the exigency to discourage the demands for autonomous 
ethnic-based local territorial units.1092 As was discussed above, the federal 
Constitution implies that ethnically structured autonomous local government 
units may be established.1093 As will also be discussed in chapter seven, more 
than 28 ethnically structured local units have been established in the country. 1094 
Often the establishment of such local units is perceived to allow the elites of a 
particular ethnic community access to increased regional funding and other 
resources.1095  Motivated by the increased financial and other resources, elites of 
every ethnic community were engaged in ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’.1096 They 
established political parties organised along ethnic lines and began demanding 
their own ethnic-based local units. The EPRDF on the other hand had a change of 
heart on the establishment of a large number of such territorial units, despite 
initially encouraging their creation. The party said that the creation of so many 
ethnic local units was leading to inefficiency.1097 The party therefore decided to 
curtail the further establishment of ethnic-based territorial units. It even tried to 
                                                 
1091 Medhane & Young (2003) Solomon (2007) 239. 
1092 Assefa (2007a).  
1093 See above chapter 4; § 4.2. 
1094 See above chapter 7; § 2.2.1. 
1095 Vaughn (2003) 228ff.   
1096 Vaughn (2003) 228ff.   
1097 Aalen (2007) 128; Vaughn (2003) 249; Assefa (2007a) 347. 
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amalgamate some of the already established ethnic-based local units.1098 With the 
intention to discourage ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ from demanding the establishment 
of more ethnic-based local units, the party also decided to transfer more powers 
and resources to Article 50 (4) local government units.1099     
5.3.8. Concluding remarks 
Poverty reduction was the official rationale for Ethiopia’s decentralisation 
programme. There was a clear understanding by the federal government that 
decentralisation was an appropriate arrangement to tackle the challenges of 
poverty. Several federal government policies, including the IPRP, SPRDP and 
PASDEP, clearly indicated that. However, poverty reduction was not the only 
driver of the second phase of decentralisation programme. The central 
government sought to use decentralisation to weaken the regional states. 
Moreover, the decentralisation process sought to remove factors that motivated 
‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ to demand ethnic-based local units. The subsequent 
chapters will examine which rationale was given prominence in the design of the 
local government system of the country.  Before that, the following section will 
first introduce Ethiopia’s local government structure.  
6. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ETHIOPIA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURE  
As indicated above, the Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR, and Tigray regional states 
revised their constitutions in 2001 with the intention to redesign their government 
structure to fit the policy objectives described above: they were followed by 
Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, and Somali regional states.1100  With the 
                                                 
1098 See chapter 7; § 2.2.1. 
1099 Assefa & Mohammed (2010) 156.  
1100 Tegene (2007) 2.  
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revision of the regional constitutions, various types and tiers of Article 50(4) local 
government units were created. Furthermore, the regional constitutional revisions 
were followed by the enactment of other local government related laws. This 
section provides a brief description of Ethiopia’s local government structure. 1101    
 
As was stated in § 4.4, the federal Constitution envisages the establishment of 
two types of local government: Article 39 and an Article 50(4) local government. 
All of the regional states have established Article 50 (4) local government units. 
Five out of the nine regional states have established Article 39 local government 
units. 
 
 There are two types of Article 39 local government units: nationality zones and 
liyu woreda (special districts). Similarly, there are two types of Article 50(4) local 
government units; rural woreda (districts) and urban local government units 
which include cities and municipalities. The following section will provide an 
overview of the structural organisation of both categories of local government.  
6.1. Article 50 (4) local government  
As indicated above, the category of Article 50 (4) local government can be 
classified into rural and urban local units. The woreda is a rural local government 
unit while the city and the municipality are urban local government units. In 
regions, such as, Oromia and Afar, there is a zonal administration which covers 
several woredas and cities. A zonal administration is a ‘deconcentrated arm’ of 
                                                 
1101 The discussion in § 6.5.1, § 6.5.2, & § 6.5.3 are based on an overview of eight regional 
constitutions and several proclamations. A particular provision in a regional constitution or 
proclamation is cited only where there are differences among the regions. In the subsequent 
chapter the relevant provisions will be cited.  
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the regional state which is meant to serve as liaison between woredas or cities and 
regional government. It is also run by regional appointees.1102 Therefore, a zonal 
administration will not be the focus of this thesis; it will be mentioned in thesis 
only when it is necessary to do so.     
6.1.1. Woredas  
The woreda is the most important unit of Article 50 (4) local government.  The 
criteria for establishing a woreda are unclear as the regional constitutions are 
silent on the issue. However, as some government policy documents indicate the 
main criteria for the establishment of a woreda is the population size of a 
particular territorial area: Generally, a woreda is established in an area which is 
inhabited by approximately 100, 000 people.1103 However, in some of the regional 
states, woredas have been established in territorial areas with significantly 
smaller or larger population sizes. 1104   
 
There is no official figure on the number of woredas existing in the country. It is 
also unclear how they are demarcated. As already discussed previously, when the 
current government seized power, the woreda boundaries that existed previously 
were taken as the basis for establishing the regional states.1105  At that time there 
were around 600 woredas.1106 According to a National Electoral Board report, 
                                                 
1102 See Oromia Regional (ORS) Constitution (2001) Arts 70-75. 
1103 MoFED (2000) 13. 
1104 For instance Benishangul-Gumuz regional state has 20 woredas (BGRS Proclamation 86 
(2010) Art 9 (1). The total number of the population of the region is 670, 847. The average 
population of each woreda in this region is therefore approximately 33, 000 people.  
1105 See chapter 3; § 7.2. 
1106 See chapter 3; 7.2. 
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there are 623 woredas.1107 A report by Yilmaz and Venugopal indicates there are 
671 rural woredas. 1108   
 
The SPRDP1109  indicated that a re-demarcation of woredas’ boundaries would 
take place so as to create ‘financially viable local government jurisdictions’.1110 
However, no major re-demarcation of woreda boundaries has taken place, save 
for intermittent adjustments of woreda boundaries in some regions which also 
entailed the establishment new woredas.   
6.1.2. Urban local government  
There are 925 urban areas in Ethiopia.1111 In these areas the regional states have 
established urban local government units. Urban local government in Ethiopia 
can be classified into cities and municipalities.  
6.1.2.1.Municipalities  
Municipalities are urban settlements which are found within a woreda, and which 
do not have their own separate autonomous city government. More than 820 of 
the 925 urban centres fall within this category.1112 While within a woreda, a 
municipality provides its residents with municipal (urban specific) services, such 
as, ambulance services, sewerage, fire fighting and the like. The non-municipal 
functions - or what are called state functions – which include education and 
public health, are implemented by the woreda within which the municipality is 
                                                 
1107 NEBE (2008) 33. 
1108 Yilamaz & Venugopal (2008). 
1109 See above § 5.3.4. 
1110 MoFED (2002) 40. 
1111 MoWUD (2007) 2.  
1112 MoWUD (2007) 6. 
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found.1113 There are municipalities in the Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, SNNPR, 
and Tigray regional states. Before 2006, the Oromia regional government had 
municipalities which were referred to as third and fourth grade cities.1114  
However, the regional government abolished the municipalities in 2006 reducing 
them to kebele status.1115  
6.1.2.2.Cities  
A city is an autonomous urban local government unit which is outside a woreda 
structure and which has the status of a woreda. There are 98 cities.1116 More and 
more urban areas are joining this category. Most of the cities (94 of them) are 
found in the four highland regions. 1117  In the low land regions, only the capital 
cities are organised as autonomous cities. 
6.2. Article 39 local government system 
There are two types of local government units which fall under Article 39 local 
government category: a nationality zone (special zone) and a liyu-woreda (special 
districts).  Nationality zones are established, as institutions of self-government, 
for regional ethnic minority groups who occupy a territorial area covering two or 
more woredas. A liyu-woreda, on the other hand, is - in terms of territorial and 
population size - comparable to a regular woreda. The territorial demarcation of a 
nationality zone or a liyu-woreda follows the territorial settlement structure of the 
                                                 
1113 See chapter 5; § 2.4.3.2 for a discussion on the distinctions between municipal functions and 
state functions.  
1114 See ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 6. 
1115 See ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 2 (7). 
1116 MoWUD (2007) 6. 
1117 Yilamaz & Venugopal (2008). 
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particular ethnic community for whom it is established.1118 A nationality zone or 
a liyu woreda not only is an autonomous local territorial unit, it may also secede 
from a region wherein it is found and become a separate regional state should the 
ethnic community for whom it is established so prefer.1119  Article 39 local 
government units are found in the Afar, SNNPR, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, 
and Amhara regions.  
Fig. 1 Organisational structure of local government  
 
6.3. The kebele 
The kebele, which is the lowest territorial and administrative unit of the regional 
state, is also recognised recognised in regional constitutions.1120 As was discussed 
                                                 
1118 AfRS Constitution (2002) 43 (2); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 45(2); ARS Constitution 
(2001) Art 45(2); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 45(2); GRS Constitution (2002) Art 46(2).  
1119 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47 (2) recognises the right to secession from a region. It 
provides that ethnic communities within the existing regions have the right to establish their own 
regional state. See for more on this chapter 7; § 2.2.2.2. 
1120 There are other sub-kebele territorial units and institutions such as gott, mengistawi-budin and 
lemat budin which are not constitutionally recognised and which are established with the declared 
intention of enhancing public participation. Helland (2004) 16; Bevan & Pankhurst (2007) 134. 
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in chapter three, the kebele as an administrative unit was created by the Derg and 
is still retained.1121 Presently each woreda (including liyu woredas) is sub-divided 
into a number of kebeles.1122 The kebele is also the second sub-division of a 
city.1123 As is the case for the woreda, the main criterion for establishing a kebele 
is the size of the population. In general, a kebele is established in a territorial area 
which is occupied by 5000 to 10,000 people. A kebele is not an autonomous local 
government. It is rather an administrative arm of a woreda or a city within which 
it is found.  
6.4. Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa  
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are autonomous federal cities. Addis Ababa is the 
capital of Ethiopia and the seat of the federal government. With more than three 
million people, the city holds the largest number (25%) of urban dwellers in the 
country.1124 It is also a hub for several international organisations, including the 
head-quarter of the African Union. Addis Ababa is a cosmopolitan city and a 
melting pot of many ethnic communities.  
 
Dire Dawa is found in the eastern part of the country close to the Ethiopia-
Djibouti border. With a total population size of 342, 827, it is the second largest 
city in Ethiopia. 1125 Dire Dawa is located adjacent to the railroad which runs from 
Djibouti to Addis Ababa, which made the City the economic as well as the 
                                                 
1121 See chapter 3; § 6.2.1. 
1122 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 45 (1); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 43(1); SRS Constitution 
(2001) Art 45; GRS Constitution (2001) Art 46(1); ORS Constitution (2001) Art 45; SNNPR 
Constitution (2001); Art 45(1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 45(1) 84.   
1123 See for instance SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 27(1); ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) 
Art 13(1). 
1124 MoWUD (2007) 2. 
1125 FDRE Population Census Commission (2007) 10. 
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industrial centre of eastern of Ethiopia. 1126 Dire Dawa is the most cosmopolitan 
city after Addis Ababa.   
 
On account of their unique position, the two cities are structured as autonomous 
federal cities. Each of the two cities is governed by a Charter issued by 
Parliament. 1127  The Charter provides for the structural organisation, powers, and 
functions of the cities’ government. Each of these cities has its own government 
which has a direct relation with the federal government.1128  
 
Addis Ababa is divided into 10 sub-cities. Previously Addis Ababa was also 
divided into 99 kebeles.1129  In 2009, however, the Addis Ababa city government 
elevated the kebeles to woreda status thereby abolishing the kebele system. 1130  
Dire Dawa still retains the kebele as its lowest administrative structure.1131    
6.5.  Governance and administrative structure of local government: An 
overview     
Each unit of both the Article 39 and Article 50(4) systems of local government 
has a representative council, an executive council, and several administrative 
organs.1132   
                                                 
1126 Dire Dawa City Administration official website http://www.dire-dawa.gov.et/site/index.php. 
1127 See FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) & FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004). 
1128 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 49 (3). 
1129 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 2(5). See also Addis Ababa City Proclamation 13 (2004). 
1130 See Addis Ababa City Proclamation 15 (2009). 
1131 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 2(6); Addis Ababa City Government Proclamation 13 
(2004) Art 2(3). 
1132 The discussions in § 6.5.1, § 6.5.2, & § 6.5.3 are based on an overview of 8 regional 
constitutions and several proclamations. Here a particular provision in a regional constitution or 
proclamation is cited only where there are differences among the regions. In the subsequent 
chapter the relevant provisions will be cited.  
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6.5.1. Representative councils  
Members of the representative councils of woredas, liyu woredas, cities, and 
kebeles are directly elected by the residents of the respective local unit for a five 
year term. Members of a nationality zone council are generally not directly 
elected by voters. A portion of members of a national zone council are elected by 
woredas councils within the nationality zone.  The remainder of the members of a 
nationality zone council are members of a regional council who are elected from 
woredas within the nationality zone. In SNNPR, members of a nationality zone 
council are directly elected by voters.   
6.5.2. Executive organs  
The executive council1133 of the woreda, the liyu woreda, and the nationality zone 
is composed of a chief administrator and the heads of the various executive 
organs of the respective local unit. The chief administrator, who is elected by and 
from among the members of the woreda, liyu woreda or nationality zone council, 
chairs the executive council of the relevant local unit.  
 
A city has a mayoral committee as its highest executive organ. The mayoral 
committee is composed of a mayor and the heads of the executive organs of the 
city. The mayor is elected by and from the members of a city council when the 
party which controls the majority of the seats of the city council nominates, from 
among the members of the city council, a person for the position. In Oromia, the 
mayor is appointed by the Regional President.1134 
                                                 
1133 This organ is referred to as ‘administrative council’, ‘executive council’, or ‘cabinet’ in the 
regional constitutions. In order to avoid confusion and for the sake of consistency, this organ will 
be referred to as ‘executive council’ throughout this study.   
1134 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 2 (6). 
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The woreda executive council is accountable to the woreda chief administrator, 
who is in turn answerable to the woreda council. The woreda chief administrator 
is also accountable to the chief administrator of the nationality zone (if the 
woreda is found within a nationality zone) and to the regional chief 
administrator.1135 Similarly, a mayor of a city is accountable to the city council, to 
the regional chief administrator and, where applicable, to the nationality zone’s 
chief administrator.1136 In Oromia, the mayor is not accountable to the city 
council but to the Regional President.1137  
6.5.3. Administrative organs  
The administration of woredas, liyu woredas and nationality zones is undertaken 
by sectoral offices. The administration of a city with regard to its state functions 
is also undertaken by sectoral offices.  The administration of a city with respect to 
its municipal functions is carried out by a city manager, a professional employee 
of the city, and other municipal organs which are organised by him or her.  
7. CONCLUSION 
Under Ethiopia’s dual federal system, local government is the competence of 
regional state. The regional states are, however, enjoined to establish one or both 
of two categories of local government viz. Article 39 and Article 50 (4) local 
governments. The two categories of local government are meant to serve two 
different purposes. Article 39 local government is meant to accommodate 
regional ethnic minority communities while Article 50 (4) local government is 
                                                 
1135 ARS Constitution (2001); Art 93(1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 94(2); SNNPR 
Constitution (2001) Art 100(2); GRS Constitution (2002) Art 97(1). 
1136 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 18(2); AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 13.  
1137 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 2 (6). 
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intended to be developmental. The Constitution envisages both categories of local 
government to be autonomous. 
 
Most of the local government units in the Article 39 category were established as 
part of the first phase of the decentralisation process in the country, which began 
during the transitional period and culminated with the establishment of the federal 
system.  The second phase of the decentralisation process which resulted in the 
establishment of Article 50 (4) local government began in 2001. It was driven by 
official and unofficial political motives. The official motive was to introduce 
local government as the locus of development. The unofficial motives were to 
reduce the powers of the regional states and to discourage ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ 
from demanding ethnic-based local units.   
 
In the Article 39 category, nationality zones and liyu woredas were established. In 
the Article 50 (4) category woredas, cities and municipalities are established.  
  
All local government units have representative councils, executive organs, and 
administrative organs.   
 
Against the backdrop of the institutional features that were formulated in chapter 
two and against the background outlined in this and the preceding chapter, the 
next three successive chapters will examine the institutional design of Ethiopia’s 
local government system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Decentralisation and development in Ethiopia: Local government’s political, 
financial, and administrative autonomy 
1. INTRODUCTION  
As the discussion in the preceding chapter reveals, the official motive 
underpinning the second phase of Ethiopia’s decentralisation programme is to 
achieve development. Development is articulated in terms of reducing the 
prevalence of poverty in the country.1138 Decentralisation is one of the four pillars 
on which Ethiopia’s poverty reduction programme rests. This thesis examines 
whether the institutional features that are considered to be critical for 
decentralised development are observed in the institutional design of Ethiopia’s 
local governance. In chapter two, the institutional features that are likely to 
positively impact on decentralised development were identified, based on a study 
of international literature on international practices.1139 These are political, 
financial, and administrative autonomy. Central supervision and inter-
                                                 
1138 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
1139 See chapter 2; § 3.5. 
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governmental co-operation were also identified as critical for decentralised 
development. In this and the next chapters, Ethiopia’s local governance system 
will be examined against the backdrop of these institutional features.   
 
As was discussed in chapters 3 and 4, Article 50 (4) local government (which 
includes woredas, cities, and municipalities) is intended and designed to be 
developmental.  Hence, the discussion in this chapter focuses on these local 
government units. Woredas, in this chapter, will also include liyu woredas unless 
indicated otherwise. Zonal administration and nationality zones will be mentioned 
only to the extent that they are relevant for the discussion.   
2. POLITICAL AUTONOMY  
2.1.Introduction  
Political autonomy was introduced as one of the central institutional features of 
decentralised development. Political autonomy has four elements: certainty of 
local government’s existence, local democracy, devolution of original, pertinent 
and suitable functions to local government, and political powers.1140 The 
following sections will evaluate Ethiopia’s local governance system against these 
elements.       
2.2.Certainty of existence  
The existence of local government on a permanent basis is a fundamental element 
of local political autonomy.1141 Certainty of existence, as was discussed in chapter 
two, has three elements: The first is the establishment of local government as a 
sphere/level of government on a permanent basis and with secured and 
uninterrupted existence. The second element is the establishment of local 
                                                 
1140 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1. 
1141 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
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government on a ‘wall-to-wall’ basis. The third element relates to ensuring the 
continued existence of individual local government units. 1142  The following 
section will examine how these elements are reflected in the federal and regional 
constitutions. 
 
 
 
2.2.1. Constitutional recognition  
2.2.1.1. Recognition in the federal Constitution  
As was stated in chapter two, the institutional mechanism to ensure the continued 
existence of local government as sphere/level is to provide it with constitutional 
recognition.1143 As was also argued in chapter four, the FDRE Constitution 
enjoins the regional states to establish what is called in this thesis Article 50 (4) 
local government.1144 The FDRE Constitution envisions this system of local 
government to be the locus of democratic participation.1145 Therefore, it can be 
inferred that the Constitution requires Article 50 (4) local government to exist. To 
this extent, it can be held that local government is indeed recognised in the 
federal Constitution.  
 
Nonetheless, the Constitution is vague and fails to explicitly recognise Article 
50(4) local government as an autonomous order of government. The Constitution 
is not as explicit as, for instance, the Nigerian Constitution which provides that 
                                                 
1142 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
1143 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
1144 See chapter 4; § 4.3. 
1145 See chapter 4; § 4.3. 
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‘[t]he system of local government by democratically elected local government 
councils is under this Constitution guaranteed’. 1146 Nor is it like the South 
African Constitution which devotes an entire chapter to regulate local government 
matters. 1147 Only one sub-article (Article 50(4)) in the FDRE Constitution, which 
principally deals with the structure of the regional states, makes a passing 
reference to local government. In fact, read on its own, this Article may appear to 
be an authorising provision rather than obligating one. In other words the Article 
conveys the impression that the regional states have the authority, if they so 
choose, to create their own administrative arms; not necessarily an autonomous 
level of government. The Constitution also fails to provide even the basic 
structure of local government that the regional states are supposed to establish. It 
becomes clear that the federal Constitution indeed envisages the establishment of 
autonomous local government only when Article 50(4) is read and interpreted 
together with other provisions in the Constitution and with the drafting history of 
the Constitution in mind. 1148 Therefore, the FDRE Constitution envisages Article 
50 (4) local government to be autonomous order of government but it does not 
provide it with an adequate recognition.    
2.2.1.2.Recognition in regional constitutions  
The prescription under Article 50 (4) of the FDRE Constitution was given effect 
to with the establishment of woredas and cities in every regional state.1149 
Woredas are created through regional constitutions. The regional constitutions 
                                                 
1146 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) S 7(1). 
1147 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) chapter 7. 
1148 See chapter 4; § 4.3. 
1149 See chapter 4; § 6.1. 
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provide a certain measure of recognition to the woreda. 1150  The regional 
constitutions are promulgated on the basis of the regional states’ power to ‘draft, 
adopt and amend’ their own constitutions.1151 They are the supreme regional laws 
that may be amended only through a stringent procedure. Moreover, the 
amendment of a regional constitution requires the assent of the woredas 
themselves. Any part of a regional constitution, save for the Bill of Rights, is 
amended only when half of (in most cases two-thirds) of the woreda councils in a 
region approve the amending Bill. 1152 Furthermore, at least two-thirds of the 
members of a regional council have to vote in favour of the amending Bill.1153 
The amendment of a regional constitution also requires the assent of the councils 
of nationality zones in the regions, such as Amhara and SNNPR which have 
them.1154 Constitutionally speaking, therefore, not only is the existence of 
woredas as a level of government ensured, they appear to be in a position where 
they can safeguard themselves from arbitrary abolition. In this sense it can be 
claimed that woredas are the creation of a constitution and their continued 
existence is guaranteed in the regional constitutions.   
 
                                                 
1150 ARS Constitution (2001) Arts 45 (1) & 83; BGRS Constitution (2002) Arts 45 (1) & 84; GRS 
Constitution 2002; Arts` 46(1) & 87; ORS Constitution (2001) Art 77; AfRS Constitution (2002) 
43; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 90; SRS Constitution (2001) Art 45 & 74; TRS Constitution 
(2001) Arts 45 (1) & 71. 
1151 FDRE Constitution 1995; Art 50(5). 
1152 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 118 (2); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 119(2); GRS 
Constitution (2002); Art 123(2) TRS Constitution (2001) Art 107 (2); ORS Constitution (2001) 
Art 112 (2); AfRS Constitution (2002) 110 (2); SNNPR Constitution (2001) 125; Art SRS 
Constitution (2001) (108). 
1153 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 118 (2); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 119 (2); GRS 
Constitution (2002) Art 123(2) TRS Constitution (2001) Art 107 (2); ORS Constitution (2001) 
Art 112 (2); AfRS Constitution (2002) 110 (2). 
1154 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 118 (2); SNNPR Constitution (2001) 123 (3) (b). 
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The situation is different regarding cities. It can be argued that the establishment 
of urban local government, like rural woredas, is impliedly prescribed by the 
federal Constitution. Moreover, the regional constitutions have also, either 
explicitly or impliedly, authorised the regional governments to establish urban 
local government wherever appropriate.1155 However, cities and municipalities 
are the creation of ordinary regional statutes, not of the regional constitutions as 
such. It is unclear why it was necessary to make a distinction between woredas 
and cities in providing constitutional recognition. It can however be assumed that 
this is related to the fact that the development policy of the EPRDF is centred on 
the rural areas.1156 Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) has 
been the mainstay of the EPRDF’s development policy.1157 Cities and 
municipalities are considered important in this policy only to the extent that they 
contribute to agricultural development. This might be the reason why woredas are 
recognised in regional constitutions while cities are not.  Whatever the reason 
may be, the non-recognition of cities in the regional constitutions has rendered 
them vulnerable to arbitrary elimination. This has happened, for instance, in 
Oromia where municipalities were eliminated and reduced to the status of 
kebeles.1158   
                                                 
1155 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 45 (4); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 45 (4); GRS Constitution 
(2002) Art 46 (3) TRS Constitution (2001) Art 45 (1); SRS Constitution                                         
(2001) 45; ORS Constitution (2001) Art 45; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 45 (3); TRS 
Constitution (2001) Art 45 (1). 
1156 Heymans & Mussa (2004).  
1157 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. For more discussion on ADLI see MoFED (2002) and MoFED (2006).  
1158 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 3. See also chapter 4; § 6.1.2.1.  
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2.2.2. Wall-to-wall local government  
The second element of the principle of certainty for the existence of local 
government is the establishment of local government in every part of the 
country.1159 This relates to equity as it impacts on whether everyone in the 
country has an easy access to basic services. 1160    
 
The federal Constitution clearly links the establishment of Article 50(4) local 
government with democracy and public participation.1161 It is evident that 
everyone in the country has a constitutional right to democratically participate in 
developmental activities of his/her community. This may be interpreted to 
necessitate the establishment of some form of local government system in every 
part of Ethiopia.  In addition, each of the regional constitutions provides that a 
regional state is organised at regional and woreda level, implying that woredas 
would be established on a wall-to-wall basis. 1162  The facts on the ground confirm 
that this is so. Every part of the country falls within one of the 670 or so woredas, 
106 cities, or the two federal cities. Liyu woredas, which principally are Article 
39 local government, discharge a woreda’s functions as they are like any other 
regular woreda in terms of population and territorial size except that they are 
ethnically structured. Thus, in Ethiopia, the establishment of wall-to-wall local 
government is both constitutionally implied and practically effected. 
                                                 
1159 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
1160 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1.  
1161 See chapter 4; § 4.3. 
1162 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 45 (1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 45 (1); GRS Constitution 
(2002) Art 46(1); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 45 (1); ORS Constitution (2001) Art 45; AfRS 
Constitution (2002) Art 43; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 45 (1); SRS Constitution (2001) Art 
45 (1); TRS Constitution (2001) 45 (1). 
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2.2.3. Formal protection for individual local government units 
The third element of the principle of certainty for the existence of local 
government which has a direct bearing on local political autonomy pertains to 
protecting each individual local government unit. As was said before, each 
individual unit of local government should be protected from random elimination, 
change, or diminution in status or size, through division or amalgamation.1163 
This entails a process of local boundaries demarcation that takes into 
consideration factors such as population size, administrative convenience, 
financial variability and the like. 1164  It also requires clear substantive and 
procedural criteria for adjusting local government boundaries. 1165  The objective 
for the creation of local government should determine the criteria for demarcating 
or adjusting local boundaries. Thus, where local government is intended to be 
developmental the factors that should be taken into account include territorial and 
population size, financial viability, developmental level, rural-urban differences. 
It should also provide for community engagement. 1166  
 
In Ethiopia the Article 50(4) local government is intended to be developmental. 
This begs the questions: what are the criteria for demarcating woreda and city 
boundaries? Who has the authority to decide on local government boundaries? 
How does the local community participate in the process of local government 
boundary demarcation? 
2.2.3.1.Demarcation of woreda boundaries  
                                                 
1163 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
1164 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
1165 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
1166 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
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As was stated in chapter three, the pre-1974 woreda boundaries were retained 
during the transitional period.1167 There were approximately 600 woredas at the 
time.1168 When the 2001 decentralisation programme was launched, it was 
indicated in the SPRDP that woreda boundaries might be re-demarcated with a 
view to creating ‘financially viable’ local jurisdictions.1169 It is unclear though 
whether any major local boundary re-demarcation has taken place in the country.  
What is clear, however, is that the number of existing woredas has increased 
since 1991. Now the number of woredas is estimated to be 670. 1170  
 
The increase in the number of woredas could only have resulted from the division 
of the existing ones. It is not clear however on what constitutional basis these 
changes were introduced. The trend is that the regional states are attempting to 
regulate this matter through ordinary legislation. This is the case, for instance, in 
Tigray and Benishangul, which have enacted proclamations which, among other 
things, deal with the issue of woreda boundaries.1171  The two proclamations 
provide formal recognition to hitherto existing woredas in the respective regional 
state. 1172 The proclamations also authorise the respective regional councils to 
create new woredas, and/or to divide, amalgamate, or eliminate any existing 
woreda within the jurisdiction of the respective regional state. 1173  Proclamation 
99 (2006) of the Tigray regional state authorises the regional executive council to 
                                                 
1167 See chapter 3; §  7.2.1.2 
1168 See chapter 3; § 7.2.1.2. 
1169 MoFED (2002) 40. 
1170 For instance, in 2007 the Afar Administrative Council partitioned three of the regions woredas 
and created three new woredas. Afar Pastoralist Association (2007) 5. 
1171 See TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) & BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010). 
1172 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 7 (1) & BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 9 (1). 
1173 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 6(4) & BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 10(4). 
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define, through executive regulation, the criteria for the creation of a new 
woreda. 1174  The proclamation also provides that the criteria, that are to be 
defined by the executive council, should include capacity to deliver services, 
administrative convenience, and the communities’ culture and preference. 1175  
Proclamation 86 (2010) of Benishangul-Gumuz provides certain criteria for the 
creation of a new woreda. These are population size,1176 capacity to cover 25 
percent of its expenses from own resources, population settlement structure and 
the history, culture and interest of the community. 1177 When deciding to create a 
new woreda, or to divide or amalgamate an existing one, a regional council has to 
take into consideration the studies and a proposal of a regional a bureau of 
finance and economic development as well as of administrative and security 
affairs bureau.1178     
2.2.3.2.Demarcation of city boundaries  
The city proclamations of Benishangul-Gumuz and Amahara provide that the 
criteria for the establishment of a city will be provided in an executive 
regulation.1179 It is not clear whether they have adopted such regulation as yet. 
The city proclamations of Oromia and SNNPR set certain preconditions and 
procedural guidelines for the creation of new cities and municipalities.1180 Among 
the preconditions are clearly defined boundaries, a minimum population size, 
                                                 
1174 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 6 (1). 
1175 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 6(3). 
1176 BGRS Proclamation 87 (2010) Art 11(1) (a). This Article provides 5000 as a minimum 
population size for the creating of a new woreda. This must be a typographic error as Article 
11(2) (a) of the same Proclamation provides 5000 as a minimum population size for creating a 
kebele. Moreover in general a woreda is expected to have approximately 100, 000 people.  
1177 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 11(1). 
1178 TRS Proclamation 15 (2006) Art 6 (4) & BGRS Proclamation 87 (2010) Art 10 (4). 
1179 BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 4 (2); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 4 (1) (ii) (2). 
1180 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 4 (1-2); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 8 (1). 
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commercial and industrial economic activities, financial self-reliance, and other 
objective criteria that may be stipulated by the regional executive council.1181  An 
urban community that wishes to have its locality incorporated as a city may 
petition the regional government (in particular the Bureau of Works and Urban 
Development) to that effect. The petition should be supported with documents 
that prove that the legal preconditions for the incorporation of an urban settlement 
are fulfilled.1182 The regional executive council has the final say on whether or 
not to grant the petition.1183      
2.2.4. Assessment  
From the foregoing discussion three points stand out. Local government is not 
given proper recognition under the federal Constitution.  Cities and municipalities 
are creations of ordinary regional statutes. Therefore, their lasting existence is 
continuously under threat. The individual local units are not provided with 
adequate constitutional protection.  
2.2.4.1.Constitutional recognition  
As was discussed in chapter four, the framers of the FDRE Constitution intended 
Article 50(4) local government to have ‘some level of autonomy’, and not to be a 
mere agent of the state governments.1184 The drafters, nonetheless, did not deal 
with the details of local government matters in the federal Constitution. They 
believed it would be appropriate to leave it to regional governments to define 
their own system of local government.1185 The decision of the framers of the 
                                                 
1181 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 4 (1-2); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 8 (1). 
1182 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 4 (1-2); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 8 (1). 
1183 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 4(4). 
1184 Assefa (2007a) 341. 
1185 See chapter 4; § 4.3.  
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Constitution not to encroach into the competence of the regional states is in 
keeping with the logic of the dual federal system of the country. Moreover, each 
regional state has diverse social and economic conditions.  
 
 ‘[The social and economic system in Ethiopia] ranges from settled upland teff cultures 
of the north to the enset-based farming system of the south to a range of agro 
pastoralists and nomadic system along the margins of the Rift Valley, each with their 
own particular socio-economic dynamics.’1186   
 
This diversity makes varied the developmental needs of those in different parts of 
the country.1187 Clearly, only the regional states can be assumed to be able to 
devise a local government system that caters for such diverse socio-economic 
conditions. 
 
However, the compromise that the framers of the federal Constitution made was 
so extensive that it has left local government without proper protection in the 
federal Constitution. This in turn has rendered the existence and status of local 
government to depend on the policy preferences and political interests of the 
party in power at federal and regional levels rather than on constitutional and 
legal principles.  As stated above, Article 50(4) of the FDRE Constitution is so 
vague that, if read by itself, may lead to the conclusion that it envisions the 
establishment of deconcentrated administrative structures rather than devolved 
local government units. This seems to be how the regional states understood 
Article 50 (4) prior to 2001. Thus, before the district level decentralisation 
                                                 
1186 World Bank (2001) 2. 
1187 World Bank (2001) 2. 
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(DLDP) was launched in 2001, woredas and municipalities were viewed as 
administrative arms of the regional governments without a modicum of 
autonomy. This was never viewed as incompatible with the Constitution. 
Moreover, the 2001 revision of the regional constitutions, which sought to 
provide woredas with some level of autonomy, was not the result of an effort to 
meet the prescriptions of the federal Constitution.  Rather, it was the outcome of a 
change in the policy of the EPRDF.1188  It was also, at least to some extent, a 
political manoeuvre that was directed at diminishing the power of the regional 
authorities following the political in-fighting within the ruling party. 1189 
 
It may be argued that woredas are recognised under the regional constitutions 
even though they are not explicitly recognised in the federal Constitution. Not 
only are the regional constitutions amended through stringent procedures, but the 
woredas themselves are involved in the amendment thereof.1190  Therefore, 
woredas have adequate protection under the regional constitutions. Such an 
argument, however, does not take into account the reality on the ground. The 
protection offered to local government by the regional constitutions is not as 
adequate as the protection that would have been offered by the federal 
Constitution. As was discussed in chapter four, the amendments of the regional 
constitutions are usually undertaken without strictly following the procedures that 
are provided in the regional constitutions. For instance, the amendment of the 
regional constitutions in 2001 did not follow the procedures which were 
prescribed in the regional constitutions themselves. In fact, the regional 
                                                 
1188  See chapter 4; § 5.3. 
1189  See chapter 4; § 5.3.7. 
1190 See above § 5.2.2.1.  
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constitutions were not amended by the regional states.1191 As was discussed in 
chapter four, the revision of the regional constitutions rather took place at the 
federal level, in the Prime Minister’s Office, without the knowledge of the 
regional states. 1192  As Solomon notes:- 
 
‘The process of constitutional revision has been criticised for its failure to emanate 
from within the states. The regional authorities were not aware of the reasons for 
this massive revision. It did not follow the amendment procedure set out in the 
states Constitutions, and, moreover it was an abrupt process under the command of 
the Prime Minister’s office.’1193  
 
It is submitted, therefore, that the FDRE Constitution should be more explicit in 
recognising the constitutional status of Article 50(4) local government. 
Recognising local government in a national Constitution is not atypical or 
repugnant to a federal system. Several federal and qusi-federal states, including 
Belgium, Nigeria, Russia, and South Africa have explicitly recognised local 
government in their Constitution.1194  
2.2.4.2.Constitutionally unprotected urban local government  
As the earlier discussion shows, cities and municipalities are not recognised even 
by regional constitutions, while woredas are in a relatively better position in this 
respect. The difference in the constitutional status of cities and woredas 
demonstrates the vulnerability of local government to central government policy 
preferences. This is caused by the ambiguity in the FDRE Constitution regarding 
                                                 
1191 Solomon (2006) 239. 
1192 See chapter 4 § 5.3.7.  
1193 Solomon (2006) 239. 
1194 Watts (2000) 947.  
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the status of Article 50(4) local government. The development policy of the 
EPRDF has centred on the rural areas ever since it assumed power.1195 Hence, 
rural woredas are recognised by and created in the regional constitutions. Cities 
and municipalities were, in contrast, considered important only to the extent that 
they complemented rural development.1196 They are, therefore, created through 
ordinary regional statutes. As was mentioned in chapter four, all cities and 
municipalities were initially within the administrative structure of rural woredas, 
like municipalities currently are. 1197  The separate restructuring of cities with the 
status of a woreda was rather an afterthought. 
 
In fact, the recognition of cities in regional constitutions does not adequately 
ensure their existence. Yet, the non-recognition of cities in the regional 
constitutions deprives them of that symbolic value that such recognition accords. 
It also renders cities vulnerable even to a swifter and unrestrained regional 
interference. The regional governments may, if they choose to, eliminate cities 
and municipalities as autonomous local government units by easily amending the 
regional statute that created them. This was the case, for instance, in Oromia 
where municipalities were reduced to the status of kebeles. 1198  
 
It is, therefore, submitted that as a minimum the regional constitutions should 
recognise cities as autonomous governments and guarantee their existence. There 
is no acceptable reason as to why only rural local government units should be 
                                                 
1195 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. See also Heymans & Mussa (2004). 
1196 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. See also Heymans & Mussa (2004). 
1197  See chapter 4; § 6.1.2. 
1198 See chapter 4; § 6.1.2. 
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constitutionally protected. Urban dwellers have equal need for development and 
efficient service delivery. This should entail the establishment of constitutionally 
protected urban local government system.  
2.2.4.3.Wall-to-wall local government  
As the discussion above shows the federal and regional constitutions explicitly or 
impliedly require Article 50 (4) local government units to be established in every 
parts of the country. Practice also shows that Article 50 (4) local government 
units are in fact established in every part of the country. There are two important 
points that needs to be highlighted here. First, the establishment of Article 50 (4) 
local government units on wall-to-wall basis meets the prescription of the federal 
and regional constitutions. Over and above that,  as it was indicated in chapter 
two,1199 it is important for ensuring that everyone, in every part of the country, 
participates in, and ‘reaps’  the ‘fruits’ of, local development. Second, as was 
stated in chapter two, while it is necessary to ensure that local government units 
are established in every part of a country, it does not however mean that all local 
units across a country should assume an identical structure. 1200 Localities with 
different social and economic realities may require different local structure 
structures. Accordingly, in Ethiopia, the manner in which each local government 
units are structured shows that the developmental preferences of communities in 
different parts of the country are taken into account. Rural communities and 
urban communities are expected to have varied developmental preferences. 
Hence, in rural areas, woredas are established while in urban areas municipalities 
and cities are established. Within the urban category the different status and 
capacity of each local unit seems also to have been taken into consideration. 
                                                 
1199 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1.   
1200 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1.   
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Hence, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are established as autonomous federal cities; 
outside the jurisdiction of a regional state. A distinction is also made in the 
manner in which cities and municipalities are structured; the former is established 
as autonomous unit of local government while the latter is established as 
administrative unit. In Ethiopia, therefore, the second element of ‘certainty of 
existence of local government’ is constitutionally prescribed and practically 
implemented 
2.2.4.4.Protection of individual local units  
As was explained above, in most of the regional states, the creation of new 
woredas, as well as the division and/or amalgamation of the existing ones, do not 
seem to be clearly regulated. The regional constitutions are completely silent on 
the issue. Even in Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz, where proclamations are 
enacted to regulate the matter, 1201  the criteria for establishing a new woreda and 
for dividing and amalgamating existing woredas remain vague.  In Tigray, the 
regional Executive Council is authorised to define these criteria in executive 
regulation, a legal instrument which the executive council can effortlessly 
amend.1202 The absence of a constitutional framework regulating the creation new 
woredas and the demarcation and adjustment of the boundaries of existing 
woredas is likely to render each individual woreda vulnerable to random division 
or amalgamation.  
 
It is also unclear how local communities participate in the demarcation and 
adjustment processes of woreda boundaries. There are certain instances in which 
                                                 
1201 See above § 2.3.3.1. 
1202 See above § 2.3.3.1. 
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the regional states established woredas in response to petitions that were lodged 
by local communities. There are also instances in the Somali, Oromia, and 
SNNPR regional states where some communities participated in referendums that 
had the effect of altering existing woreda boundaries.1203 These referenda were, 
however, conducted for the alterations of woreda boundaries which entailed 
changes to regional boundaries. Had this not been the case, the change with 
regard to woreda boundaries might not have involved referenda. Hence, no 
constitutional principle constrains the regional state governments, so it seems, 
from changing local government boundaries as and when they see fit.  
 
It is, therefore, submitted that local boundaries, as a rule, should be established 
on a permanent basis. Justifiable gradual changes and adjustments of woreda 
boundaries may be introduced. However these changes should not be arbitrary. 
The changes should rather be based on pre-determined substantive and procedural 
criteria. These substantive and procedural criteria must be clearly listed in the 
relevant regional constitution.   
2.3.Local democracy  
As was discussed in chapter two, competitive local democracy is a central 
element of local political autonomy.1204 It is also one of the key mechanisms for 
achieving development based on public participation.1205 Local democracy also 
serves as a mechanism of ensuring that local government is responsive to local 
preferences. Moreover, it is a critical means of ensuring downward accountability 
                                                 
1203 See Ye-Etypiya Biherawi Mircha Bord (1997 Ethiopia Calendar) (National Electoral Board of 
Ethiopia (NEBE) (2005) herein after cited as NEBE (2005). 
1204 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.2. 
1205 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.2. 
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which is vital to local government’s political autonomy. 1206 It was also indicated 
in chapter two, that local democracy entails the establishment of local councils 
and holding regular competitive elections. The following section will examine 
Ethiopia’s local democracy against the backdrop of these institutional features.  
2.3.1. Local elections  
FDRE Proclamation 532 (2007) provides that local elections are held on the basis 
of multi-party system and universal suffrage.1207 The Proclamation also provides 
that independent candidates may participate in elections. 1208      
2.3.1.1.Electoral system  
Proclamation 532 (2007) provides that the plurality system will be used in all 
elections which includes local elections.1209  The Block Vote (BV) system, a 
version of the plurality system which uses multi-member constituencies is used in 
local elections.1210 This system awards each voter as many votes as the number of 
councillors that can be elected from a constituency.1211 The kebele is used as a 
multi-member constituency for woreda and city council elections.1212  The 
                                                 
1206 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.2. 
1207 FDRE Proclamation 532 (2007) Preamble read with Art 29 & 26. 
1208 FDRE Proclamation 532 (2007) Preamble. 
1209 FDRE Proclamation 532 (2007) Art 45 (1) (d) 
1210 Pausewang et al (2002) 17. Proclamation 532 (2007) Article 29 (2) authorises the regional 
states to determine through a regional law the number of candidates that may be elected in local 
elections from a constituency, based on the size the population of the locality and the size of the 
local council.  
1211 Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis (2005) 44.  
1212  FDRE Proclamation 532 (2007) does not provide that the kebele will be used as a 
constituency for local elections. Article 20 (2) of this Proclamation rather provides that ‘[l]ocal 
elections at different levels shall be conducted by establishing proportional constituencies by 
taking into consideration the size and the number of deputies to be elected and the electors in 
accordance with the laws of State [sic] governments’. The regional constitutions provide that the 
kebele will be used as constituency in woreda elections.  ARS Constitution (2001) Art 85 (1); 
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number of councillors that are elected from each kebele varies depending on the 
size of the council which in turn depends on the territorial and population size of 
the woreda or city. Under the BV system, therefore, each voter in a kebele casts 
as many votes as the number of representatives that are elected from the kebele. 
Vote counting in the BV system is similar to the first-past-the-post (FPTP). 
Hence, two or more candidates, with the highest numbers of votes, even if 
without an absolute majority, become a winner. 1213    
2.3.1.2.Competiveness and representativeness in local elections  
Local elections have been held several times since the EPRDF took power. These 
elections were however far from competitive. The EPRDF and its affiliates 
claimed close to absolute victory in all the local elections thus far.  The EPRDF 
and its affiliates control all the seats in all woredas and cities. 1214  There is barely 
a single seat that is held by an opposition party save for a few seats that are held 
by independent candidates. In fact, the opposition parties hardly participated in 
local elections. Most of the opposition parties either boycotted or withdrew from 
all local elections held to date.1215  
 
Various reasons are given for this. Opposition parties blame the electoral system 
and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) for the non-competiveness 
of elections in the country. Merera, an opposition party leader, writes that the 
plurality electoral system was the ruling party’s ‘constitutional engineering’ to 
                                                                                                                                                        
AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 89 (1); SNNPR Constitution 
(2001) Art 92 (1); SRS Constitution (2001) Art 75 (2) (a); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 86 (1); 
ORS Constitution (2001) Art 77(2) (a); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 71(1). 
1213 See Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis (2005) 44.   
1214 NEBE (2008) 23-36.   
1215 NEBE (2008) 23-36.   
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ensure its continued dominance.1216 The actual impact of the electoral system on 
local elections is however difficult to appraise as the opposition parties hardly 
participated in local elections that were held to date. It can, however, be argued 
that the plurality electoral system might have discouraged the opposition parties 
from participating in local elections as they stand little chance of winning an 
electoral position with this electoral system in place. The chance that the 
opposition parties have to win local elections is further restricted particularly 
because BV is the version of the plurality system which is used for local 
elections. This is because, in general, all forms of plurality electoral systems are 
criticised for awarding to a party council seats that are disproportionate to the 
votes it receives.1217 The BV system further exaggerates this disproportionality 
and results ‘in an even greater distortion of seats to votes’ than other forms 
plurality system. 1218  Therefore, as Pauswang et al write, in Ethiopia, in a 
constituency which can send, for instance, six delegates to a local council, a party 
may win all the six seats with just six more votes than the other parties.1219  
 
The opposition parties also allege that NEBE thwarts their participation by 
preventing them from registering their candidates or dropping their candidates 
from the voting roll. Merera says the NEBE acts as ‘a player not a referee with 
handpicked EPRDF cadres serving in the electoral management and restricting 
opposition candidates from registering’.1220 Furthermore, the poor organisation 
and financial constraints of the opposition parties are claimed to have contributed 
                                                 
1216 Merera (undated) 9.   
1217 See Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis (2005) 35-52.   
1218 See Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis (2005) 44.   
1219 Pauswang et al (2002) 17.  
1220 Aalen & Tronvoll (2008) 115.  
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to this situation.  There are more than 3 million electoral positions at woreda, 
city, and kebele level. The opposition parties simply cannot compete for all these 
seats.1221  
 
The opposition parties seem to be either disinterested in local elections or to 
believe that it is meaningless to control local councils without controlling the 
federal and regional governments. This seems to be why that opposition parties 
participate in national elections while protesting against the electoral system and 
questioning the independence of the electoral commission. However they readily 
boycott local elections for the same reasons.. Moreover, it had been difficult for 
opposition parties to find suitable candidates for local elections. 1222  Many of 
their members view candidacy for a local council with disdain and prefer the 
more rewarding candidacy for Parliament and regional councils. Thus Lidetu 
Ayalew, an opposition party leader, states that when his party decided to 
participate in the 2001 woreda and kebele elections, most party members were 
not keen to stand as candidates. 1223  In order to encourage party members to stand 
for local election, Lidetu writes, he had to present himself as a candidate for a 
woreda council. 1224   
 
Additional point is that the international community does not appear to be 
interested in Ethiopia’s local elections which have its own impact on the 
                                                 
1221 Aalen & Tronvoll (2008) 115.  
1222 Lidetu (1998 Ethiopian Calendar) 32. 
1223 Lidetu (1998 Ethiopian Calendar) 32. 
1224 Lidetu (1998 Ethiopian Calendar) 32. 
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competitiveness and representativeness of local elections.1225  Since the fall of the 
Derg, international institutions and donors, such as the Carter Centre, European 
Union, and African Union have been involved as observers in Ethiopian national 
and regional elections. They have also assisted financially and logistically. Yet 
they have been dispassionate about local elections in Ethiopia. The last three local 
elections were, therefore, held without any international observers. 1226 
2.3.1.3.Assessment 
The significance of competitive and representative elections for development was 
highlighted in chapter two. 1227 As it is clear from the discussion above, local 
elections in Ethiopia are neither competitive nor representative, regardless of why 
this is so. All local councils are controlled by the EPRDF or its affiliates. The 
opposition parties are completely unrepresented in local councils. Only a few 
independent candidates managed to win a few seats in local elections. It would be 
absurd to assume that the dominance of the EPRDF and its affiliates of all local 
councils is due to the fact that these parties and their policies have a complete and 
unreserved support throughout the country. It should not be assumed that there is 
not a single section of the Ethiopian society that has a different preference of 
development to the one promoted by the EPRDF and its affiliates.  It is argued 
that the lack of competitiveness and representativeness in local elections has 
diminished the significance of the decentralisation programme as an institutional 
mechanism for bringing about development based on the democratic participation 
of the people.  
 
                                                 
1225 Abbink (2000) 169; Zemelak (2011) 20. 
1226 Aalen & Tronvoll (2009) 205; Abbink (2000) 169; Zemelak (2011) 20. 
1227 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.4. 
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Furthermore, as was discussed in chapter two, one of the most important benefits 
of decentralisation is the possibility to simultaneously respond to a variety of 
developmental preferences. However, in Ethiopia, the EPRDF, with its affiliates, 
controls all levels of government. This by itself reduces the potential of the 
decentralisation programme to simultaneously respond to varied developmental 
preferences of different localities.   Not only does the party with its affiliates 
control all local units, but it has also an extremely centralised structure and 
method of decision making. The decision making system of the party is based on 
the principle of ‘democratic centralism’. 1228  Under this system, the local 
structures of the party are only involved in the execution of decisions passed by 
the centre. Moreover, there is a little or no practical distinction between the 
government and the party. The policies and decisions of the party are executed as 
government policies and decisions. The lack of competitiveness and 
representativeness in local elections, and the domination of the entire political 
landscape of the country by a single party, coupled with the centralised decision 
making system of the party, is likely to have undercut the benefit that the 
decentralisation programme is expected to offer.  
 
It would, nonetheless, be unreasonable to claim that that the decentralisation 
process is an absolute fiasco in terms of bringing about electoral participation. 
For better or worse, several consecutive local elections have been conducted in 
the past years. This is not only a fundamental departure from the past, but it has 
also been a significant democratic exercise. Moreover, even in the absence of 
competitive elections, the decentralisation programme has registered some 
                                                 
1228 See Assefa (2007a) 391; Vaughn (2004) 17. 
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successes in terms of bringing about development. A 2010 UNDP report states 
that despite the lack of competitiveness and representativeness in Ethiopia’s local 
elections, the country has registered a significant improvement in providing 
primary health care and primary education. 1229    
2.4.Local government functions   
2.4.1. Introduction   
One of the central elements of local government autonomy, and which is a crucial 
institutional feature of decentralised development, is the devolution of original, 
relevant, suitable, and clearly defined functions. 1230  It was contended in chapter 
two that local government functions should be clear enough to prevent 
uncertainty about who does what. Yet, it should not be too detailed so as to afford 
local government a degree of discretion.1231 It was also stated that the devolution 
of functions to local government should be based on the principle of 
subsidiarity.1232  The following section will discuss local government functions in 
Ethiopia.   
2.4.2. The principle of subsidiarity  
2.4.2.1.Introduction  
In chapter two the principle of subsidiarity and its role in the allocation of 
functions to local government was discussed. 1233  The issue now is whether and 
what role the principle of subsidiarity plays in the allocation of powers and 
functions to local government in Ethiopia. The following section will discuss this 
matter.  
                                                 
1229 UNDP (2010) 51.  
1230 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.3. 
1231 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.3. 
1232 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.3 
1233 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.3 
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2.4.2.2.Subsidiarity under the FDRE Constitution  
With regard to the allocation of competences to local government the FDRE 
Constitutional provides: 
 
‘Adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the 
[p]eople to participate directly in the administration of such units’.1234  
 
It has been argued by some writers, and correctly so, that Article 50(4) is based 
the principle of subsidiarity.1235 If this provision is interpreted to embody the 
principle of subsidiarity, and it is submitted it does, clearly it is not based on an 
automatic ‘bias in favour of local government’. Nor is it based on the recognition 
of the sovereignty of the individual. The Ethiopian constitutional system 
recognises the sovereignty of ethnic communities, not of the individual.1236 The 
sovereignty of the individual is secondary under the Ethiopian constitutional 
system.  
 
 It is clear from Article 50 (4) that powers will be granted to local government. 
Clearly, it is the regional governments who will grant powers to local 
government. This implies that the regional states are the original custodians of the 
powers that are devolved to local government. Therefore, no assumption can be 
made in favour of local government in the allocation of functions. 1237  On the 
contrary, local government is expected to exercise those functions that are 
specifically granted to it by the regional states. The Constitution does not require 
                                                 
1234 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 50(4).  
1235 Solomon (2006) 79; Yilmaz (2008) 2. 
1236 See FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 8(1).  
1237 See also Solomon (2006) 80. 
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the regional states to justify their retention of certain functions on the basis of 
‘comparative efficiency’ or ‘necessity’. Rather, the Constitution implies a 
particular function should be allocated to local government if public participation 
is crucial for the implementation of the particular task.   
 
The other issue that arises is the meaning of ‘people’ in Article 50(4). As stated 
above, the allocation of powers to local government is meant to allow the 
‘people’ to participate in decision making directly affecting them. The question 
here is whether ‘people’ refer to ethnic communities or to a collection of 
individuals. The federal Constitution uses the term ‘peoples’ to refer to ethnic 
communities as well as to collections of individuals.1238 It is submitted that 
‘people’ does not mean ethnic communities here.  As the discussion in chapter 
four reveals, the Constitutions envisages the establishment of two categories of 
local government: 50(4) local government and Article 39 local government. The 
objective underpinning the establishment of Article 39 local government is 
specific: namely accommodation of intra-regional ethnic communities. 1239 On the 
other hand, the objectives underpinning the establishment of Article 50(4) local 
                                                 
1238 The Preamble of the FDRE Constitution begins with ‘we the nations, nationalities and, 
peoples’. Here the term ‘Peoples’ refers to ethnic communities. Article 39 is captioned as ‘the 
right of nations and nationalities and peoples’. Article 39 (5) uses the terms people and ‘nation 
and nationalities’ as if they refer to the same concept. The Constitution also uses the term people 
to refer to a mere collection of individuals. For instance Article 40 provides ‘the people of 
Ethiopia as a whole and each nation nationality and people’ has the right to development. Clearly, 
the ‘people of Ethiopia as a whole’ is considered to be a collection of individual citizens. Article 
10 provides that the human and democratic rights of the people will be respected. The term 
‘people’ seems to refer to a collection of individuals. Article 12 also provides that ‘the people’ 
may recall elected official if and when they lose confidence in him or her. Clearly the term people 
refer to a collection of individuals, as people vote in their individual capacity, not as members of 
an ethnic community.     
1239 See chapter 4; § 4.  
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government are not specific to accommodating ethnic communities. The 
objectives, which include democracy and public participation, have a universal 
relevance and application. 1240 Therefore, it is argued that ‘people’ under Article 
50 (4) does not refer to a certain ethnic community.  Rather, it refers to a 
collection of individuals who constitute a local community, regardless of their 
ethnic background.   
 
From the above it can be gathered that Article 50 (4) of the FDRE Constitution 
reflects the principle of subsidiarity. However, the principle of subsidiarity as 
implied in the Constitution is not based on the classical notion of subsidiarity 
with an automatic ‘bias’ or ‘preference’ in favour of local government. It is rather 
based on the democratic principle that those who have a direct interest in a public 
service should have the power to deliberate on it.  
2.4.2.3.Subsidiarity under the regional constitutions and regional laws  
The regional constitutions of Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, SNNPR, 
and Tigray provide that a woreda will have all powers that will ‘enable’ or 
‘allow’1241 it to prepare, determine, and implement social services and economic 
development within its jurisdiction.1242 The notion ‘enable’ or ‘allow’ is of 
critical import here in determining the functions that should be left to local 
government. It brings to the fore the condition of the ‘ability’ of local government 
to efficiently discharge a particular task. Hence, under the regional constitutions, 
                                                 
1240 See chapter 4; § 4.  
1241 The Amharic term which is used in these constitutions is ‘yemiyaschil’ which can be 
interpreted as ‘which enables’ or ‘allows’. 
1242 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 84(1); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 74(2); GRS Constitution 
(2001) Art 98(1); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 91(1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 85(1); 
TRS Constitution (2001) Art 72(1). 
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too, there is no assumption that all powers belong to local government unless 
explicitly stated provided to the regional governments. Rather, local government 
is expected to exercise functions that will enable it to prepare a plan for the 
provision of woreda social services and to implement its plan. Thus, the regional 
constitutions embody a conception of subsidiarity which seems to reflect the 
‘functionality’ approach to subsidiarity with regard to the devolution of 
competences to woredas.  
 
The city proclamations also contain what can be considered as the principle of 
functional subsidiarity.  The city proclamations of the Afar, Amhara, and SNNPR 
provide that cities and municipalities have the powers and functions that are 
‘necessary’ for the administration of their matters. ‘Necessity’ is, therefore, the 
functional criterion of subsidiarity for devolving functions to cities.1243   
 
The above discussion has identified the principle that is expected to guides the 
devolution of functions to local government. The next task is identifying the 
specific functions that are actually devolved to local government. The following 
section will deal with matter..          
2.4.3. Functional competences of woredas and cities/municipalities    
2.4.3.1.The woreda 
FDRE Constitution  
                                                 
1243 For instance the Afar proclamation 33 (2006) provides that the Semera city government has 
all powers which are ‘necessary’ to administer itself. The City proclamation of the SNNPR also 
states that a city has the power ‘necessary’ to administer city matters. The same principle is 
stipulated in the Amhara and Binishangul-Gumuz city proclamation. See AfRS Proclamation 33 
(2006) Art 5 (1); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art12 (1); ARS proclamation 91 (2003) Art 
8(1); BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 8 (1).  
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It was discussed in chapter two that local government should be provided with 
original functions which are enshrined in a national constitution. The discussion 
in chapter two also shows that the constitutions of several countries, including, 
South Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria, contain a list of local government functions 
or, as is the case in Nigeria, functions that the states can transfer to local 
government. 1244  
 
The FDRE Constitution, however, does not contain a list of local government 
competences. The constitutional division of functions under the FDRE 
Constitution is restricted to the federal and the regional states.1245 Hence, in 
Ethiopia, local government does not have original competences that can be traced 
to the federal Constitution.  
Regional constitutions  
The regional constitutions do not contain a list of local government functions. All 
of the regional constitutions provide that a woreda administration may plan and 
implement ‘economic development and social services’ within its territorial 
jurisdiction.1246 However, they fall short of providing a full list of woreda 
functions. The specific economic and social matters on which local government 
may exercise the power to plan remain undefined in the regional constitutions.    
 
                                                 
1244 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.3.   
1245 See FDRE Constitution (1995) Arts 51 & 52.   
1246 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 84(1) AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 74(2); GRS Constitution 
(2001) Art 98 (1); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 91(1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 85(1); 
TRS Constitution (2001) Art 72(1); ORS Constitution (2001) Art 79(2) (a); SRA Constitution 
(2002) Art 77(2) (a).  
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This calls for a perusal of the policy papers, sectoral proclamations and other 
documents in order to gain a better idea of a woreda’s competences. As discussed 
in chapter four, the Sustainable Poverty Reduction and Development Programme 
(SPRDP) and the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End 
Poverty (PASDEP) state that a woreda would exercise certain functions in the 
areas of primary education, primary health care, rural water supply, rural roads, 
and agriculture extension services.1247  It can be assumed therefore that woredas 
may exercise these functions. Some of the competences of the woreda can also be 
inferred from the powers and functions of woreda political organs as provided in 
the regional constitutions. For instance, a woreda council has the power to decide 
on matters relating to agriculture and natural resource conservation.1248 
Furthermore, a woreda chief administrator along with a woreda executive 
council, is charged with directing ‘woreda police’ and other security forces and 
protecting historical and cultural antiquities within the woreda.1249  It can be 
gathered from this that a woreda may exercise certain functions in the areas of 
agricultural development, natural resource conservation, and security. This does 
not, however, mean much as the matters relating to agriculture and natural 
resource conservation may include a wide spectrum of activities. The exact 
responsibility of a woreda regarding agricultural development and natural 
                                                 
1247 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
1248ARS Constitution (2001) Art 86 (2) (b); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 76 (2) (b); SRS 
Constitution (2001) Art 77 (2) (b); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (2) (b); ORS Constitution 
(2001) Art 79 (2) (b); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 93 (2) (b); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 
87 (2) (b); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74(2)(b).  
1249 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 93(2) (g) & 92 (1) (h); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 83 (1) (d) 
& (g); SRS Constitution (2001) 77 (2) (k); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 95 (1) (e) & (h); ORS 
Constitution (2001) Art 85 & 87; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 98 (1) (g) & 100(2) (f); BGRS 
Constitution (2002) Art 92 (1) (e) & (h); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 80 & 82. 
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resource conservation remains unclear particularly as these are regional 
competences under the federal Constitution. For example, does this include the 
provision of fertilisers? Is a woreda permitted to build agricultural colleges or 
irrigation schemes? In short, the manner in which the competences of woredas 
are provided for in the regional constitutions is full of ambiguity. In Amhara, 
SNNPR, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz the problem is compounded by the 
presence of another level of sub-regional government (nationality zones) above 
the woreda. The nationality zones also have similar competencies in the area of 
social services and economic development.1250   
Regional laws  
Regional laws are supposed to provide the details of the competences of the 
woredas as the latter are not listed in the regional constitutions. To this effect, 
former Ministry of Capacity Building (MoCB) prepared a draft legislative 
document on the basis of which regional governments were supposed to enact 
their own legislation defining local government competences. 1251   The draft 
legislative document proposed a list of functions that should be devolved to 
woredas. The functions that are listed in the draft Bill are reasonably similar to 
what woredas are exercising in practice.1252   
 
The document has not, however, been adopted, in any form, in most of the 
regions. Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz have each issued a proclamation; 
apparently based on this document, with the objective of defining the 
                                                 
1250 See chapter 7; § 2.2.3. 
1251 See MoCB (2007). 
1252 See below table 3. 
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competences of woredas.1253 However, these proclamations themselves lack 
clarity: They add little to what is in the constitutions of the two regions. The 
Oromia regional state has issued a regulation which seeks to define in detail 
woreda and kebele functional competences.1254 However, first an executive 
regulation is ranked below the regional constitution and the proclamation in the 
hierarchy of regional laws. 1255 It is a piece of legislation that the Regional 
President may alter at any given time. Secondly, this regulation does not define 
the functions of the woreda. It merely reiterates the regional constitution which, 
as stated above, is far from clear as far as functions of woredas are concerned.  In 
short the functional competences of woredas is not clearly defined either through 
regional constitutions or though ordinary regional laws.    
Woreda competences in practice  
Various studies show that, though unclear what a woreda’s exclusive functional 
competences are, in practice, a woreda exercises various functions in the areas of 
health, water and sanitation, education, agriculture, and roads. The following 
table summarises the functions that are exercised by a woreda and a kebele in 
practice.    
Table 3 Functions that woredas perform in practice  
Woreda Kebele  
 Providing primary and secondary education ( 
grades 1-10),  
 Adult education,  
 Printing and distributing primary school 
textbooks  
 Administering primary school  
 
 Administering primary schools 
                                                 
1253 See TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) & BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007). 
1254 See ORS Regulation 30 (2003). 
1255 See ORS Regulation 30 (2003). For a discussion on the status of ‘regulations’ see also 
Chapter 4; § 3.2.2 & 3.3.2. 
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 Implementing of health extension services 
 Constructing and administering of health 
stations and health posts  
 Administering clinics 
 Controlling and preventing HIV/AIDS and 
malaria 
 Undertaking immunisation programmes 
 Administering 
primary health 
posts  
 Preventing 
HIV/AIDS 
 Constructing wells 
 Supplying drinking water to municipalities  
 
 Administering community water 
schemes  
 Planning and implementing agricultural and 
pastoral development  
 Implementing agriculture extension packages 
 Constructing and administering small scale 
indigenous irrigation 
  
 Implementing agriculture extension 
packages  
 
 Co-ordinating farmers co-
operatives  
 Administering rural land use and other natural 
resources 
 Administering land use  
 Constructing  rural roads connecting kebeles  
 
 
 Implementing state functions in municipalities 
within a woreda  
 
Source:  Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) & Berhanu (2009)  
2.4.3.2.Functions of urban local government  
The functional competences of urban local government, including the federal 
cities, are categorised into state functions and municipal functions.1256  
State functions  
State functions are those functions that are exercised by a federal city in its status 
as a regional state and by a city in its status as a woreda. State functions are 
considered as ‘areas of intervention’ for poverty reduction in the SPRDP and 
                                                 
1256 The city proclamations do not classify cities’ functions into state and municipal functions. The 
proclamations contain a list of what they expressly refer to as municipal functions. The non-
municipal functions are referred to as ‘state functions’ in non-legislative policy documents. ARS 
Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8(2) (y & z) & (i-iii) also see Art 38(2); AfRS Proclamation 33 
(2006) Art 16(7-10); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 13(6); ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) 
Art 2(8). See Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 14; Berhanu (2009) 18; Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 21. 
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PASDEP and are also related to the MDGs. The functions include education, 
health care, drinking water, and agriculture.1257  
 
The federal cities and regional cities have the authority to exercise state functions. 
A municipality exercises only municipal functions. The state functions are carried 
out by woredas within whose jurisdiction the municipality is found. The state 
functions of the cities are not clearly defined in the city proclamations. As 
provided under the SNNPR, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Amhara city 
proclamations, the state functions of a city may include primary and secondary 
education, technical and vocational schools, 1258 and primary health care.1259 
Cities may also deal with local economic matters, such as, micro - and small scale 
enterprises, registration and supervision of commercial activities, issuing trade 
licenses, and expanding urban transport infrastructures.1260  
 
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are not within the jurisdiction of a regional state. 
These cities, therefore, can be assumed to have certain competences on the 
matters that are reserved as state functions under Article 52 of the Constitution. 
This does not, however, mean that the two cities can trace their competences 
directly from the Constitution. They rather drive their authority from the charters 
that established them. Ironically, the charters themselves do not contain clear lists 
of the functional competences of the two cities. Like the regional constitutions, 
the charters of the two federal cities contain a general provision which authorises 
                                                 
1257 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4; Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 14. 
1258 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8(2) (r); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 13(1); BGRS 
Proclamation 86 (2010) 8. 
1259 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8(2)(s);  
1260 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 13(4); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) 8(2) (o & p). 
 
 
 
 
264 
 
the cities to formulate policies and design plans on their own social and economic 
matters.1261 It is, therefore, necessary to examine other laws in order to obtain a 
clearer insight into the competences of the federal cities. 
 
The Addis Ababa City Proclamation, which establishes the various executive 
organs of the City, sheds some light on the state functions of the city.1262 Based 
on the functions each executive organ may exercise, it can be inferred that the 
Addis Ababa City may exercise the following state functions. 
 Education: primary, secondary, vocational, special  and technical schools, 
teachers training colleges; 
 Trade and industry: trade licences, business organisations, medium industries, 
market centres; 
 Urban agriculture: providing fertilisers, selected seeds, agricultural technology, 
veterinary services, animal breeding, reproductive centres, laboratories, genetic 
resources, quarantine services for animals and plants, veterinary drugs, forest; 
 Environment: standard setting, controlling pollution,  controlling of industrial 
residue, by-products, licencing and supervising underground water drilling, 
quarries 
 Health services:  
 Tourism: registering and protecting tourist sites, set standards for hotels; 
licensing tourist and travel agents; 
 Investment: licencing investment, providing financial and loan services, 
constructing infrastructure. 
Municipal functions  
                                                 
1261 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) 11(2) (a & b); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 9(2). 
1262 See Addis Ababa City Proclamation 15 (2009); Addis Ababa City Proclamation 2 (2003) 
Addis Ababa City Proclamation 20 (2004).  
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The federal and regional cities and municipalities exercise municipal functions. 
The municipal functions include the following: cultural centres; recreational 
centres; youth centres; museums; housing; sewerage; street; street lighting; land 
administration; solid wastes; fire fighting, nurseries, care centres (for the aged, 
disabled, orphaned and abandoned children); pollution control; abattoirs; parks; 
markets; sanitation; liquor licences;  and ambulance services.1263 
2.4.4. Assessment            
2.4.4.1. Devolution or delegation?  
It was stated in chapter two that the functional competences of local government 
should be original in a sense that they should be traced to a national 
constitution.1264 As the discussion above indicates, the functional competences of 
local government are not clearly defined. Whatever functions woredas and cities 
may exercise, those functions are not original since they do not emanate from the 
federal or the regional constitutions.  
 
Some of the regional states, for instance Oromia and Amhara, have attempted to 
use a legal instrument such as an executive regulation, the lowest in the hierarchy 
of laws, to define local government functions.1265 Benishangul-Gumuz and Tigray 
have issued proclamations to the same effect. Thus, a regional government may at 
any time decide to assume some or all of what would have been woreda and city 
functions by amending the relevant proclamations and regulations. From the 
above, it appears that Ethiopia’s decentralisation to be more of delegation than 
                                                 
1263ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8 (2) (y & z) & (i-iii) also see Art 38 (2); AfRS Proclamation 
33 (2006) Art 16 (7-10); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 13 (6); ORS Proclamation 65 
(2003) Art 2 (8). 
1264 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1 3. 
1265 About the hierarchies of regional laws see chapter 4; § 3.3. 
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devolution. As stated in chapter two, what characterises delegation is that the 
centre, as the principal holder of authority, is entitled to withdraw at any time the 
responsibilities it has transferred to local units. This is so despite the fact that the 
delegatee local unit enjoys a wide range of discretion regarding how it exercises 
the delegated powers and functions during the validity of the delegation.1266  
Similarly, in Ethiopia, the functions of woredas are not listed in the federal and 
regional constitutions. They are rather listed, if at all, in ordinary statutes. The 
regional state, therefore, by amending its statutes may take back the functions that 
it has transferred to local government at any time.    
2.4.4.2.Unclear functions 
The municipal functions of cities and municipalities have been reasonably clearly 
defined in the regional city proclamations. The state functions of cities are, 
however, unclear. The lack of clarity in the functional competences of local 
government is perhaps the most serious problem facing the entire decentralisation 
programme in Ethiopia. The regional constitutions have created a multi-tiered 
system of rural local government in which each tier is authorised to decide on its 
own ‘social and economic matters’. Yet they state nothing about the specific 
social and economic development matters with regard to which each tier of local 
government is authorised to take decisions. It is impossible to distinguish the 
exact responsibility of a woreda with respect to education, health, agricultural 
development by referring to the regional constitutions. In the regions, such as, 
SNNPR and Amhara, the problem is compounded by the presence of autonomous 
                                                 
1266 See chapter 2; § 2.2.2. 
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nationality zones, above woredas and cities, which are responsible for planning 
and implementing their own social services and economic development. 1267     
 
It is submitted that clearly defining local government functions should have been 
the first task in the decentralisation process. Establishing local government and 
transferring funds to it without transferring clear functions is ‘putting the cart 
before the horse’. Moreover, problems that are associated with a lack of clarity in 
the functional competences of different levels of government, 1268 such as 
wasteful redundancy and lack accountability, are likely to arise in Ethiopia. 
Furthermore, as a study by Garcia and Rajkumar shows, the political autonomy of 
woredas and cities is compromised due to the fact that their functional 
competences are not clearly defined.  The study shows that regional states and 
nationality zones have assumed certain functions that are in practice viewed as 
woreda functional competences.1269 It is, therefore, crucial to promptly define the 
functional competences of woredas and cities.    
2.4.4.3.Inaccessibility of legislative instruments  
Related to the above is that regional constitutions and other laws which, however 
scantly, deal with local government functions are inaccessible for the majority of 
the people. In fact, they are inaccessible even to woreda officials themselves. 1270  
Very few copies of the regional constitutions and laws are published. Those 
copies are distributed to the regional government offices. For instance, the 
Gambella region reported in 2009 that it had published and distributed 5000 
                                                 
1267 See below at § 2.5.3. 
1268 See chapter 2 § 3.5.1.3. 
1269 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 61. 
1270 Yemane (2010) 111. 
 
 
 
 
268 
 
copies of the regional constitution to regional government offices.1271  In a region 
with more than 200, 000 people, this was reported as a laudable achievement.   
 
Moreover, in most cases, the regional laws, which deal with local government, do 
not reach woreda officials, let alone the ordinary citizens. Hence, as some studies 
indicate, the basic functions of woredas are unknown to many woreda officials, 
let alone to the ordinary citizens.1272 Yemane, explaining the problems relating to 
the inaccessibility of legal instruments in Tigray Regional State writes: 
 
‘Once such laws are issued by the regional council that is the end of the process. 
They do not reach the woreda administration. If at all they reach the woreda 
administration, one cannot find them in government offices/shelves but in the 
hands/drawers of different individuals. When these individuals leave offices for 
whatever reasons, they take these important documents with them...This is the big 
challenge that woredas are facing today.’1273 
 
It is, therefore, submitted that the regional governments should make the 
necessary effort ensure that duly passed regional laws, specifically those that have 
impact on local development, are published in time. They should also ensure that 
these laws are easily accessible to members of the communities.  
2.4.4.4. Relevant for development? 
As stated in chapter four, the policy objective of the decentralisation programme 
is to reduce poverty in the country.1274  It was also envisioned in the policy paper 
                                                 
1271 Ministry of Information (MoI) (2010). 
1272 Yemane (2010) 111. 
1273 Yemane (2010) 111. 
1274 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
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dealing with urban local government that cities and municipalities will be 
engaged in tackling urban specific problems such as unemployment and lack of 
housing.1275 This is in addition to the role that cities are supposed to play in 
providing education, health care and other social services. It was also envisioned 
to make cities ‘attractive, healthy and sustainable living environments’. 1276  It is 
far from clear whether woredas and cities are legally empowered to exercise these 
functions. It is not, therefore, possible to judge the relevance of the functions of 
woredas for poverty reduction and development as the functions are not known. 
 
In practice, woredas are engaged in providing services relating to primary health 
care, primary education, agricultural extension services, water, and sanitation, 
regardless of their formal competences being unclear. It is self-evident that these 
activities are not only relevant but also are critical for poverty reduction as 
envisaged in the policy papers. It is also important to note that remarkable 
progress has been registered in the areas of primary education, primary health 
care, and agricultural extension services in Ethiopia since the launch of the 
second phase decentralisation. The 2010 UNDP report on human development 
ranks the progress made by Ethiopia in these areas first in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and 11th in the world.1277 Another report indicates that the prevalence of poverty, 
which was close to 50 percent at the beginning of the decentralisation process, 
has been reduced to 29.9 percent in 2009/2010.1278 In particular, the gross 
                                                 
1275 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
1276 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
1277 UNDP (2010) 28. 
1278 MoFED (2010) 5. 
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students’ enrolment for primary school, which was only 45.8 % in 1998/99, 1279  
has reached 95 percent in 2010. Reports indicate that the number of people 
suffering from lack of food has been reduced to 28 percent in 2009/2010. The 
UNDP report also indicates that local actions have contributed greatly to the 
progress that has been achieved in the past years.1280 This progress is recorded 
despite the lack of clarity in functional competences of woredas and cities. It can 
be assumed that had woredas’ competences been clearly defined, a better 
performance could have been registered in reducing the poverty prevailing in the 
country.  
 
The functions of cities and municipalities are clearer than those of woredas, in 
particular their municipal functions. Their functions are also relevant for, and are 
directed at, tackling urban specific problems. For instance, the functions of cities 
and municipalities relating to micro and small enterprises are pertinent for 
creating jobs and reducing unemployment as envisaged in the policy papers.1281  
Their municipal functions, such as, pollution control, sewerage, parks are relevant 
for creating attractive and healthy living environments in the cities. The 
competence of cities with regard to housing is critical for the people’s welfare 
and the improvement of their living standard. Several cities, therefore, have been 
engaged in building low-cost housing or condominiums. The Addis Ababa City 
Government, for instance, reports that it has built and distributed more than 
                                                 
1279 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
1280 UNDP (2010) 28. 
1281 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
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32,000 housing units since 2001.1282 To this extent it can argued that cities 
functions are indeed suitable and relevant for local development.     
2.5. Local government powers 
2.5.1. Introduction 
A local government power refers to what local government may do with respect 
to its functional competences.1283  Specifically, it referrers to political powers, 
such as, the power to formulate policies, adopt short term and long term plans, 
enact laws, and enforce laws. The following section will deal with this issue.  
2.5.2. Development policy making  
A policy is a broad and a ‘novel principle of action’ which guides decisions with 
the aim of achieving a certain outcome. 1284 A policy does not deal with the 
particular activities to be undertaken. The ‘detailed proposal for doing’ something 
or achieving a certain outcome is rather described in a plan.1285 The authority to 
formulate policies on local matters is a key political power. The significance of 
local government as discovery machine depends on the power of local 
government to formulate new policies.1286   
 
The power to adopt policies is all the more important in Ethiopia as policies, in 
particular those relating to social service and economic development matters that 
are adopted by various levels of government have a certain legal force. Their 
legal force emanates from the procedure through which they are adopted. The 
                                                 
1282Addis Ababa City Administration Housing Agency. www.addisababacity.gov.et/ (accessed on 
3 March 2011).  
1283 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.4. 
1284 Oxford Dictionary (2002) 902. 
1285 Oxford Dictionary (2002) 892. 
1286 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.4 
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federal Constitution provides that general policies relating to social and economic 
matters, which are prepared by the executive council, have to be approved by 
Parliament.1287 The executive council is also enjoined to ensure the 
implementation of the policies once approved by Parliament.1288 These 
procedures were followed to approve the SPRDP, PASDEP, and the Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) are adopted.1289 Likewise, regional policies on social 
services and economic development are formulated by a regional executive 
council and submitted to a regional council for approval.1290 Therefore, in 
Ethiopia the power to adopt policies is an important political power.  Now the 
question is whether woredas and cities have the power to formulate their own 
policies. 
 
2.5.2.1. Woredas 
The regional constitutions provide that a woreda has the ‘necessary’ power to 
‘plan’ and implement its own social services and economic development.1291 To 
this effect, a woreda executive council is authorised to draft ‘plans’ on woreda 
social and economic matters, while the relevant woreda council is authorised to 
approve the plans. 1292 The regional constitutions are silent as to whether woredas 
                                                 
1287 FDRE Constitution (1995) 77 (6) & 55(10). 
1288 FDRE Constitution (1995) 77 (6). 
1289 See MoFED (2010); MoFED (2006); MoFED (2002). What is still confusing is that even the 
general federal policy papers such as SPRDP, PASDEP, and GTP are titled as ‘plans’.  
1290 FDRE Constitution (1995) 52 (2) (c); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 49 (3) (10) AfRS 
Constitution (2001) Art 47 (3) (k); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 52 (3) (11); SNNPR Constitution 
(2001) Art 51 (3) (h); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 49 (3) (10); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 49 
(3) (k); ORS Constitution (2001) Art 49 (3) (i); SRA Constitution (2002) Art 49 (3) (h). 
1291 See above at § 2.4.3.1. 
1292 See below at § 2.5.3.1. 
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may formulate and adopt ‘policies’ on these matters.  It is necessary to note here 
that the policy making power of the federal and regional governments is 
mentioned in the federal and regional constitutions apart from and in addition to 
their power to approve and implement ‘plans’ on regional social and economic 
matters.1293 For instance, Article 51(2) provides the following:  
‘[The federal government] shall formulate and implement the country’s policies, 
strategies and plans in respect of overall economic, social and development matters.’ 
 
Article 52(2) (c) also provides: 
 
‘[States have the power to] formulate and execute economic, social and development 
policies, strategies and plans of the State.’ 
 
Therefore, both in the federal as well as the regional constitutions, ‘policies’ are 
distinguished from ‘plans’. The regional constitutions are, however, silent 
regarding a woreda’s power to adopt its own development policies. Moreover, 
several government documents and manuals refer to woredas as policy 
implementers rather than policy makers.1294 Does this mean that woredas may not 
formulate policies on woreda matters?  
 
One argument may be that the explicit reference to a woreda’s power to approve 
its own development plans, and not to a woreda’s power to formulate policies, 
implies that it cannot do the latter. The counter argument may be that there is no 
                                                 
1293 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 51(2) & 52(2) (c). See also AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 45 
(2) (2); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 47(2)(1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 47 (2) (1); GRS 
Constitution (2001) Art 50 (2) (1); ORS Constitution (2001) Art 47 (2) (a); SNNPR Constitution 
(2001) Art 47(2) (a); SRA Constitution (2002) 47(2) (a); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 47 (2) (a).  
1294 MoCB (2007) & MoFED (2002). 
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legal or constitutional provision that explicitly disqualifies woredas from 
adopting policies on woreda matters. The silence of the regional constitutions on 
the matter should not, therefore, be construed as prohibition. Moreover, there is 
no discernible reason why woredas may not be allowed to adopt their own 
policies while, as will be discussed in the next section, a city, whose status is 
equivalent to a woreda, has such a power. What becomes clear from the above 
however is the fact that it is not at all certain whether woredas have policy 
making power.  
2.5.2.2. Urban local government  
It is explicitly stated in the city proclamations and charters that cities and the 
federal cities may formulate policies on local matters. FDRE Proclamation 416 
(2004) and FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) provide that the Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa city governments, respectively, may formulate and implement policies 
concerning the development of the cities.1295 It may be argued that the policy 
making power of these two cities emanates from their status as federal cities 
which is similar to the status of the regional states, despite their accountability to 
the federal government.  
 
The regional city proclamations also provide that cities may formulate policies on 
local matters.1296 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) does not state whether a city 
may formulate its own policy. Yet, Article 12 (1) provides that a city may 
exercise all powers ‘necessary’ to administer local matters. It is evident that the 
                                                 
1295 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 9 (1) & FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 11 (2) (a). 
1296 See ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8 (1); BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 8 (1); ORS 
Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 9 (1) & 9 (2) (a); AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 5 (2) (a); SNNPR 
Proclamation 103 (2006).   
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power to formulate policies on local developmental matters is a power which is 
‘necessary’ for local development. Hence, it can be argued that cities in the 
SNNPR also have the power to formulate and implement their own 
developmental policies.      
2.5.3. The power to plan              
2.5.3.1. Woreda planning 
 
The regional constitutions explicitly state that a woreda may prepare plans with 
respect to its own social and economic matters.1297 The woreda executive council 
is responsible for preparing draft woreda plans, and the woreda council has the 
ultimate power to approve the plans.1298 The regional constitutions do not, 
however, define ‘planning’ and the sorts of activities it entails.  In practice, 
woreda planning is guided by manuals which are prepared by the MoCB and 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), which define woreda 
planning and describe the process for adopting woreda plans. Some of the 
regional states, such as, the Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states, also 
have regulated woreda planning and the procedures for adopting a woreda 
plan.1299 According to the proclamations and manuals, planning involves 
                                                 
1297 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 84 (1) AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2); GRS Constitution 
(2001) Art 98 (1); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 91(1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 
85(1).TRS Constitution (2001) Art 72 (1); ORS Constitution (2001) Art 79 (2) (a); SRA 
Constitution (2002) 77 (2) (a); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 72 (1). 
1298AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 76 (2) (a); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 86 (2) (a); BGRS 
Constitution (2002) Art 87 (1) (a); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (2) (a); ORS Constitution 
(2001) Art 79 (2) (a); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 93 (2) (a); SRA Constitution 77 (2) (a); 
TRS Constitution (2001) Art 72 (1). 
1299 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) & BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010). 
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identifying resources and developmental priorities, and utilising resources to 
achieve these priorities.1300    
Types of woreda plans 
There are three types of woreda development plans:  short term development 
plans (for 1 year), medium term or strategic development plans (for 3-5 years) 
and long term development plans (for 10-20 years).1301 The woreda is authorised 
to adopt a short term and medium term strategic plan. 1302  In practice, however, 
woredas limit themselves to preparing a short term development plan since they 
do not have the necessary capacity for preparing medium term and long term 
plans. In the short term plans, therefore, woredas strive to respond for the 
preferences of local communities using the resources under their disposal.1303  
Planning processes and public participation 
The process of woreda planning is described in various manuals of MoFED and 
MoCB. A woreda development planning begins with public consultation at 
village level.1304 The main purpose of the consultation is to identify community 
problems and prioritise them.1305 The consultations are facilitated by employees 
of the kebele. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are also invited to 
participate.1306  The community needs that are identified at village level are 
consolidated at kebele level and become a ‘single kebele priority list’. The 
aggregated priorities at kebele level are also discussed at a kebele general 
                                                 
1300 MoCB (1997 Ethiopian Calendar) 51. 
1301 MoFED (2010). 
1302 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 30 (1) & BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 72 (6). 
1303 MoFED (2010). 
1304 MoFED (2010) 7. 
1305 MoFED (2010) 7. 
1306 MoFED (2010) 7. 
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community meeting of the kebele’s residents.1307 The kebele priority lists are then 
sent to a woreda where the priority lists of the various kebeles are consolidated by 
the woreda development planning committee. The aggregate woreda priorities are 
then re-organised on a sectoral basis and passed on to the sectoral office 
concerned. 1308 
  
Based on the priority list, each sectoral office decides on the ‘intervention areas’ 
and produces a plan. The plan of each sector is then aggregated and ‘linked to a 
budget’.1309  The plans which are prepared at sectoral level are discussed and 
negotiated among the various offices with the facilitation of the woreda Planning 
and Budgeting Desk. The end result of this negotiation becomes a single woreda 
plan which identifies woreda priorities and links them to budgets. The woreda 
plan is finally submitted to a woreda council for approval. 1310  
 
It is, however, alleged that the planning process in practice distorts the local 
communities’ priorities: The priorities are distorted specially during the process 
of aggregation, disaggregation, and negotiation.1311 In addition, public 
participation is used only as a means to ‘extract information’ rather than to 
involve the public in decision making.1312  It is also unclear whether the 
information that is gathered through public participation is the ‘articulated 
                                                 
1307 MoFED (2010) 7. 
1308 MoFED (2010) 16. About sectoral offices see below at § 4.2.2. 
1309 MoFED (2010) 16. 
1310 MoFED (2010) 16. 
1311 Hadingham (2003) 21. 
1312 Hadingham (2003) 21-22. 
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interests of local elites’ or the actual needs of local communities.1313  Moreover, 
the interests of heads of sectoral offices play a critical role in determining the 
areas of intervention.   
 
‘[T]he mechanism for prioritising between sectors and between interventions is not 
clear even among woreda staff. It is likely that in the absence of clear guidelines, 
prioritisation is done on an ad hoc basis with choices of intervention being heavily 
influenced by the interests of the office head.’1314 
 
Another concern is that in practice the woreda council plays a limited role in 
woreda planning.1315 The executive and administrative organs of the woreda play 
a dominant role in this respect. According to Yilmaz and Venugopal the woreda 
council hardly ever rejects plans prepared by sectoral offices.1316 The lack of 
knowledge and capacity to adequately understand ‘planning, budgeting and 
service delivery processes’ prevents woreda councillors from playing a more 
active role in the planning process. Thus, a woreda council plays a role which is 
‘little more than a rubber stamp’ of the planning process.1317    
2.5.3.2. Development planning in urban local government  
Urban planning is generally understood to have two components: The first is 
planning state and municipal service delivery.1318 The second is town planning 
                                                 
1313 Hadingham (2003) 22. 
1314 Hadingham (2003) 20 
1315 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 11. 
1316 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 11. 
1317 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 11. 
1318 What is referred to here as ‘town planning’ is referred in the regional and federal proclamation 
as ‘development planning’. For the sake of clarity the term ‘town planning’ is used here.   
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which pertains to planning the physical and structural development of an urban 
centre.  1319   
Planning state and municipal services delivery 
Cities, including the two federal cities, have both the power and the duty to 
prepare short term, medium term, and long term state and municipal services 
delivery plans.1320 Municipalities also have the power to prepare and implement 
plans for municipal services delivery. The woreda within which a municipality is 
found is in charge of the preparation and implementation of the plans regarding 
state matters, such as, education and health care.1321 However, there is not a 
single regional law that deals with the details of the planning of state and 
municipal delivery in cities. The manuals which deal with woreda planning 
provide some guidelines for the planning and implementation of state and 
municipal services delivery in urban areas. In practice, it seems that cities plan 
the delivery of social services by using procedures that are similar to the one 
described above in relation to woreda development planning.  
Town planning 
The federal cities and the regional cities also have the power to prepare and 
approve their own town plans.1322 However, neither the regional city 
                                                 
1319 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 9 (1) & 12 (1) (c); FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 
11(2) (b) & 14 (1) (c); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Arts 8 (2) (a) &  8 (2) (c) & 60; ORT 
Proclamation 65 (2006) Art 8 (2) (b) & 9 (1) (d) & 49; BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Arts 8 (2) 
(a) & 53; AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 17 (2) (9) & (10) 
& 49. 
1320 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 9 (1); FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 11(2) (b); ARS 
Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8 (2) (a) & (c); ORT Proclamation 65 (2006) Art 8 (2) (b); AfRS 
Proclamation 33 (2006); SNNPR Proclamation 17 (2) (9) (10). 
1321 See above Table 3. 
1322 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 12 (1) (c); FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 14(1) (c); 
AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art5 (2) (e); ARS Proclamation 99 (2003) Art 8(2) (c) see also Art 
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proclamations nor the charters of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa define what town 
planning constitutes. This is rather dealt with in a federal law: FDRE 
Proclamation 574 (2008). This Proclamation is enacted by the federal government 
on the basis of its constitutional power to enact laws regulating the utilisation and 
conservation of land.1323 The Proclamation provides three levels of town 
planning: national, regional, and urban.1324 Cities are authorised to have their 
‘urban physical and structural plan’ prepared either by private or public 
institutions.1325  
 
The Proclamation mentions to two types of town plans: A ‘city wide structural 
plan’ which covers the entire urban area and a ‘local structural plan’ which 
focuses on a particular section of a city.1326 The first, which is prepared by a city 
for a ten year period, determines the direction and extent of the physical growth 
of a city or a municipality. 1327 A city wide structural plan is also used to 
determine the principal land use classes, housing development, lay-out of major 
social and physical infrastructures, environmental matters, and industrial 
zones.1328 A local structural plan is prepared based on and with a view to 
implementing a city wide structural plan.1329 It also focuses on the strategic areas 
                                                                                                                                                        
60; ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 14 (2) (k) see also Art 49; BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) 
Arts 53; AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Arts 17  (9) & see also 
Art 49. 
1323 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 51 (5). Also see the FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Preamble. 
1324 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 7. 
1325 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 7. 
1326 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 8. 
1327 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 10. 
1328 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 9 (2). 
1329 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 11 (1). 
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of an urban centre.1330 A local structural plan is used to determine different zones. 
It is also used to determine building heights, plan local streets and transport 
systems, determine types of housing and neighbourhood organisations. Moreover 
it is used to identify green areas, water bodies, and the like.1331 A city has the 
authority to revise/modify urban plans, authorise development1332 (or demolition), 
to redevelop an urban area, to undertake urban renewal, to expropriate or re-
allocate land.1333   
2.5.4. Local government legislative powers  
The power to pass laws on local matters is critical for local autonomy.1334 As De 
Visser notes, ‘the ability’ of local government to ‘translate locally generated 
policies into law’ is a vital element of local autonomy.1335 The next section 
discusses the legislative powers of woredas and cities have legislative power. 
2.5.4.1. Woredas 
The regional constitutions provide that a woreda may issue directives on security 
related matters. 1336 The constitutions also provide that a woreda may adopt its 
own internal procedures.1337 The regional constitutions provide nothing more than 
                                                 
1330 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 11 (1). 
1331 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 11 (3). 
1332 ‘Development’ is defined as ‘the carrying out of building, engineering works, mining or other 
operations on or below ground, or the making of any substantial change in the life of any 
structures or neighbourhoods’. FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 24. 
1333 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 24-54. 
1334 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1 4. 
1335 De Visser (2005) 272. 
1336 AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 76 (2) (h); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 86(2) (h); BGRS 
Constitution (2002) Art 87 (2 (h); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (2) (h); ORS Constitution 
(2001) 79 (2) (f); SNNPR Constitution (2001); Art 93 (2) (h); SRS Constitution (2002) 77 (2) (k).  
1337 AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 76 (2) (e); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 86(2) (e); BGRS 
Constitution (2002) Art 87(2 (e); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (2) (e); ORS Constitution 
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this so far as the legislative power of woredas is concerned. The regional 
constitutions are silent on whether woredas may legislate on economic and social 
matters within their competences. Zerihun, referring to Article 79 (2) (f) of the 
Oromia Constitution, asserts that a woreda (in the Oromia region) has legislative 
power.1338 He seems to suggest that the legislative power of the woreda is 
explicitly stated in the Oromia Constitution. However, Article 79(2) (f) thereof 
refers to the power of the woreda to approve its own internal rules and 
procedures. Whilst this may be considered as a legislative act, it is restricted to 
the internal operations of a woreda council. It does not mean that a woreda may 
enact laws on developmental issues, such as, primary health care, and primary 
education.  
 
The Tigray Constitution, on the other hand, provides that a woreda may issue 
directives on matters relating to social and economic matters that are within its 
competence.1339 This provision was specifically inserted into the Tigray 
Constitution in 2006. Prior to that, the legislative power of a woreda council in 
Tigray was limited to adopting internal procedures and issuing directives on 
security matters. 1340  
 
This brings us back to the initial question: are woredas, other than those in the 
Tigray region, permitted to legislate on the provision of social and economic 
services?  Proclamation 86 (2010) of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2001) 79 (2) (f); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 93 (2) (e); SRS Constitution (2002) 77 (2) (e); 
TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2) (e).  
1338 Zerihun (2010) 132. 
1339 Proclamation 98 (2006) Art 4 (i). 
1340 TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2) (i). 
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provides that a woreda may issue directives on matters within its competence. It 
is, therefore, clear that in Benishangul-Gumuz the woreda has legislative power. 
It is unclear, however, whether this power is based on the regional constitution or 
whether it is a mere statutory power.  As stated previously, the principle of 
subsidiarity which is implied in the regional constitutions allows a woreda to 
exercise any power which ‘enables’ it to prepare and implement social and 
economic development plans. 1341  Based on this principle, it may be argued that a 
woreda may indeed enact local laws for doing so will certainly ‘enable’ it to 
prepare and implement plans on a woreda’s social and economic matters.  
2.5.4.2. Urban local government  
Regional cities 
It is plainly stated in the city proclamations that cities and municipalities may 
issue directives on matters that are within their competence.1342 Both cities and 
municipalities have a wide range of legislative powers with respect to municipal 
matters. Cities also have the power to legislate with respect to their state functions 
and in their capacity as a woreda. In addition, SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) 
provides that a city may legislate on matters that are not covered by regional and 
federal laws.1343 This Proclamation also enjoins the Regional President to ensure 
that the legislation of city councils are published in the Debub Negarit Gazette1344 
when, after being adopted by a city council, it is signed and sent to him by the 
                                                 
1341 See above at § 2.4.3. 
1342 AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 10 (2); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8 (1); ORS 
Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 14 (2) (a); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 17 (2) (1).   
1343 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 16 (1) (2) (2). 
1344 This is a gazette in which the regional government’s laws are published. 
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speaker of the city council.1345 As was discussed in chapter four, the FDRE 
Constitution divides legislative powers between the federal and regional 
governments. Given this fact, it is doubtful whether a regional government may 
authorise a city council to legislate on matters that are not covered by federal 
laws. It is clear that a regional council may delegate to a city within its 
jurisdiction some of its own legislative powers. However, it may not do so with 
respect to federal matters which are not covered by federal laws. In any case, it 
seems that a piece of legislation which is issued by a city to regulate a matter 
which is not covered by regional legislation will lapse as soon as the regional 
government legislates on the matter.   
Federal cities  
The city councils of the federal cities have the power to enact proclamations on a 
wide range of state and municipal matters.1346 Proclamation 416 (2004) provides 
that the Dire Dawa city may issue proclamations on matters relating to the city’s 
development.1347 Similarly, Proclamation 361(2003) and Proclamation 416 
(2004) provide that the Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa cities may enact 
proclamations to constitute the executive organs of the cities, to approve the 
budgets, to issue the master plans of the cities, to establish the cities’ judicial 
organs, and to levy taxes and services fees.1348 Moreover the two cities may enact 
regulations to implement federal laws when they are so authorised.1349 As 
mentioned in chapter four, the proclamation is the highest statutory law that the 
                                                 
1345 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 16 (1) (2) (2). 
1346 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 14 (1); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 12 (1). 
1347 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 9 (1). 
1348 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 14 (1); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 12 (1). 
1349 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 14 (2) (b); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 12 (2) (b). 
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highest federal or regional legislative organ may enact.1350 In principle, a 
proclamation enacted by either of the two cities may not be superseded by a 
contrary federal law so long the city enacted the proclamation on matters that are 
within its competences.1351 The power of the two federal cities to issue 
proclamations seems to emanate from fact that they have a status similar to the 
regional states. 
2.5.5. Local government executive power  
Executive power is important political power. Local executive power implies the 
establishment of executive organs which are run by locally elected or appointed 
officials who are also accountable to local representative councils. It also implies 
the power of these executive organs to enforce locally adopted laws and policies 
within the relevant local unit. It may also include the power to enforce regionally 
and nationally adopted laws and policies. The following sections will examine 
whether woredas and cities have executive powers.  
2.5.5.1. Woreda  
Woredas have executive powers under the regional constitutions. As indicated in 
chapter four, the executive power of a woreda is vested in its executive council 
and a woreda chief administrator who chairs the woreda executive council.1352 
The woreda chief administrator is elected by and from among members of the 
woreda council. 1353   
 
                                                 
1350 See chapter 4; § 3.2.1. & 3.3.1. 
1351 Fasil (1997) 82. See also the discussion in chapter 4; § 3.3. 
1352 See chapter 4; § 6.5.2. 
1353 See chapter 4; § 6.5.2. 
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The woreda executive council, along with the woreda chief administrator, is 
charged with preparing a woreda development plan. The executive council is also 
tasked with ensuring the implementation of the development plan after it is 
approved by the woreda council. The woreda executive council is also 
responsible for executing regional and federal laws, regulations, and policies at 
woreda level.1354  
 
The regional constitutions provide that the woreda executive council is 
accountable to the woreda chief administrator and the woreda council. 1355  A 
woreda chief administrator in turn is accountable to the woreda council and the 
regional chief administrator. 1356  
2.5.5.2. Urban local government 
As indicated in chapter four, the city has a mayor and a mayoral committee as its 
executive organs.1357  The mayor, who is generally elected from and among the 
                                                 
1354 See chapter 4; § 6.5.2. 
1355 AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 82 (1); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (1); BGRS Constitution 
(2002) Art 91 (1); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 94 (1); ORS Constitution (2001) Art 87 (1); 
SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 97 (1); SRS Constitution 82 (2); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 79 
(1).  
1356 AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 85(1); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 93 (1); BGRS Constitution 
(2002) Art 94 (2); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 97 (1); ORS Constitution (2001) Art 84 (1); 
SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 100 (2); SRS Constitution 85 (1); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 
82 (1).  
1357 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 10 (2) (b) & (c); FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 10 
(1) (b) & (c); AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 10 (2); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 9 (1) & 
(3); BGRS Proclamation 9 (2 & 3);ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 12 (2) &  (3; SNNPR 
Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 15 (2) (1) & (3).  
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members of the city council, chairs the mayoral committee. 1358 In Oromia, the 
mayor is appointed by the Regional President, not elected by a city council. 1359  It 
is unclear whether the Regional President is required to appoint the mayor from 
among members of a city council. The mayoral committee is accountable to the 
mayor while the mayor is in turn accountable to the city council and the regional 
chief administrator or, in case of federal cities, to the federal government. 1360 In 
Oromia, a mayor is accountable to the regional president, not to a city council. In 
this region, a mayor is required only to present his plans and reports to the 
relevant city council. 1361 
 
Both the federal cities as well as the regional cities have executive powers on city 
matters. The mayor and the mayoral committee are charged with the execution of 
a city council’s policies and decisions.1362 The federal cities have residual 
executive power on federal laws; in addition to their original executive powers 
                                                 
1358 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 19, & 20 (1) & (2); FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 
21 (1) & (2); AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 10 (2); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 18 (1); 
SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 21 (1) (1); BGRS Proclamation 19.  
1359 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 7.  
1360 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 21 (1); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 20 (1); AfRS 
Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 10 (2); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 18 (2) & 21(5); BGRS 
Proclamation 18 (2) & 21 (5); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 21 (2) & 24 (9).  
1361 Previously, like in the other regions, in Oromia, the mayor was elected by the relevant city 
council. He or she was also accountable to the city council as well as to the Regional President 
(see ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 18 (1). The above change was introduced in 2006 through 
the amendment of the city proclamation of the region. It seems that the success of opposition 
parties in the 2005 elections in many cities of Oromia prompted the regional government to seek 
to control the executive organs of the cities in the region. ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 7.  
1362 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 20 (1 & 2) & (22); FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 
21 (1 & 2) & 23; AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 10 (2); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 19 & 
22; BGRS Proclamation 19 & 22; ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) 18 & (21); SNNPR Proclamation 
103 (2006) Art 22 & 24. 
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over matters within their competences.1363 Thus, they may assume the 
responsibility of executing a federal law, within their jurisdictions, where the 
execution of the law does not clearly fall in the mandate of anyone of the federal 
ministries.1364  
2.5.6. Assessment  
As discussed in chapter two full political powers are crucial for local autonomy. 
Political powers include the power to formulate policies on local matters, to plan 
the implementation of those policies, and to translate the policies into laws. 
However, it submitted that the policy making and legislative powers woredas are 
vague. Moreover, the development planning process distorts a local community’s 
preferences. In addition, woredas and cities have compromised executive power.  
2.5.6.1. Unclear policy making powers 
The preceding discussion shows, the regional constitutions are ambiguous as to 
whether woredas may adopt their own policies on local matters. The silence of 
the regional constitutions on the policy making power of a woreda is a grave 
diminution of the political autonomy of the latter. The political power of a 
woreda will not be full without the power to formulate policies on local matters. 
Furthermore, woredas become able to create novel ideas and new methods of 
tackling communal developmental problems only when they may adopt original 
policies on matters within their competence. The absence of explicitly stated 
policy making power will reduce woredas into regional and national policy 
implementing agents, as opposed to autonomous levels of government. Moreover, 
                                                 
1363 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 14 (1); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 12(1). 
1364 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 11 (1); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 9. 
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without the power to adopt policies, the significance of woredas as ‘laboratories’ 
of new ideas will be diminished.  
 
One may argue that even if woredas had the constitutional power to formulate 
their own policies, it would make no significant practical difference.  As was 
discussed earlier, the functional areas on which woredas may adopt policies are 
themselves unclear. Moreover, as will be discussed below, woredas do not have 
the necessary competent personnel to formulate policies.1365 In addition, it was 
indicated in chapter four that, in practice, the federal government takes it upon 
itself to formulate all policies; even policies concerning local matters.1366 The 
regional governments are rarely involved in policy formulation despite their 
constitutional power to do so; and let alone woredas.  
 
It is submitted that woredas’ lack of capacity should not be used as an excuse to 
formally deprive them of the power to formulate woreda-specific policies. 
Regional governments should rather take measures to build the capacity of 
woredas so that they may formulate their own polices.   
2.5.6.2. Vague legislative power 
As was discussed above the regional constitutions are silent on whether a woreda 
may legislate on its social and economic matters. It may be argued that a woreda 
legislative power may be inferred from the omnibus provision which allows a 
woreda to exercise all powers to plan its economic development and social 
service provision and implement the same. However, a legislative power is such 
                                                 
1365 See below at § 2.7.4.  
1366 Chapter 6; § 2.2.1.1.  
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an important political power that it should not be merely inferred from general 
constitutional principles, but explicitly stated. Furthermore, the absence of an 
explicit allusion to a woreda’s legislative power on matters relating to 
development is problematic. It may be understood that a woreda council’s 
legislative power is limited to regulating its own internal procedure of operation. 
Regional states, such as, Benishangul-Gumuz, have provided in regional 
proclamations that woredas may issue directives on matters within their 
competences.  However, it is submitted that given the importance of legislative 
power as a political power, it should not be mere statutory power. It should rather 
be clearly stated in the regional constitutions.  
 
The Tigray regional government seems to have appreciated the potential 
confusion that was likely to arise from the silence of the region’s Constitution 
regarding the legislative power of woredas. That must be why the regional 
government amended the regional Constitution to specifically indicate that 
woreda council may enact directives on woreda matters; even if the matters are 
not clearly defined. It is submitted that the other regional states should follow 
suit.     
2.5.6.3. Compromised executive powers  
Executive power is a critical manifestation of political autonomy. As indicated 
above, woredas and cities have executive organs that exercise certain executive 
powers. Nevertheless, it is argued that the autonomy of woredas and cities is 
vulnerable to regional and even zonal interference.  
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One of the manifestations of local government executive autonomy is the 
accountability of its executive branch to local government representative 
councils. Under the regional constitutions a woreda chief administrator is 
accountable not only to a woreda council but also to the regional president/chief 
administrator.1367  The woreda chief administrator is also accountable to the zonal 
chief administrator if the woreda is found within a nationality zone. Similarly, the 
mayor of a city is accountable to the city council, to the regional chief 
administrator and, where applicable, to the nationality zone’s chief administrator. 
In Oromia, the mayor is not even accountable to the city council but to the 
regional government. The mayor is required under that region’s law only to 
submit to the city council the plan on social and municipal services for 
approval.1368   
 
The dual, in some cases triple, accountability of woreda chief administrators and 
mayors allows senior governments to interfere in the execution of the decisions 
and laws of a woreda council or a city council. It even allows regional and zonal 
governments to replace local decisions with their own.  It also undermines the 
role of the local councils as the overseers of the performance of the local 
executive bodies.  The situation is further compounded by the fact that all 
government structures in the country are controlled by either EPRDF or its 
affiliates. In most cases the regional chief administrators are the ‘party bosses’ of 
woreda chief administrators and mayors of cities. Thus, woreda chief 
administrators and mayors will naturally tend to give a more serious attention to 
                                                 
1367 See chapter 4; § 6.5.2.  
1368 See chapter 4; § 6.5.2.  
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their accountability to their party bosses rather than to that of the local 
councils.1369   
 
Moreover, as was stated above, in Oromia, a city council is no longer authorised 
to elect a mayor. This power has been shifted to the regional president. Moreover, 
the mayor is rendered accountable to the Regional President. The decision to 
transfer the power to appoint a mayor of a city from a city council to the Regional 
President is a grave diminution to the autonomy of the cities in the region.1370 It 
turns them into an administrative arm of the region.   
3. FINANCIAL AUTONOMY  
3.1.Introduction  
The importance of local financial autonomy for decentralised development cannot 
be exaggerated. As Steytler notes, financial autonomy ‘defines whether local 
government [is] an order of government’.1371 The financial autonomy of local 
government can be guaranteed, primarily, by enabling it to raise its own 
revenue.1372  Where local government cannot raise sufficient internal revenue, and 
that is oftentimes the case, central transfers are used to finance local 
government’s activities. 1373  This section will deal with the issue of financial 
autonomy of local government in Ethiopia.  
                                                 
1369 See Yilamz & Venugopal (2008). 
1370 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006). 
1371 Steytler (2009) 419. 
1372 See chapter 2; § 3.5.3.1. 
1373 See chapter 2; § 3.5.3.3. 
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3.2.Local finances under FDRE Constitution  
The FDRE Constitution does not contain a list of local government taxes, nor 
does it mention how local government activities are financed. Yet, it prescribes 
that adequate powers must be transferred to local government. This constitutional 
prescription may be considered to impliedly require the transfer of adequate 
revenue to local government. The Constitution could not have required the 
devolution of ‘adequate’ powers to local government without sufficient revenue: 
The effective exercise of political powers cannot be possible without 
commensurate revenue. It may be, therefore, assumed that the FDRE Constitution 
implicitly requires the regional states to transfer adequate financial powers to 
local government. 1374   
3.3.Local finances under regional constitutions and laws  
The regional constitutions, city proclamations, and other laws speak about various 
sources of local government revenue. The sources of woredas are different from 
cities and municipalities. The sources of revenue of local government also vary 
from one region to another. In general, local government revenue in Ethiopia may 
be classified into taxes and fees, regional grants, and other sources.  
3.3.1. Taxes and fees 
3.3.1.1. Woreda taxes and fees 
The regional constitutions are silent regarding woreda’s taxes except that they 
authorise woredas to collect (not to decide on the rate of) certain taxes. As was 
discussed in chapter three, land use fees and agricultural income tax including 
royalties on the use of forests are designated as regional taxes under the federal 
                                                 
1374 See Solomon (2006). 
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Constitution.1375 The regions have retained for themselves the power to determine 
the rate of these taxes under the regional constitutions. However, they have 
transferred to woredas the responsibility to assess and collect these taxes and 
fees.1376 To that effect, the regional states have enacted rural land use fee and 
agricultural income tax proclamations in which they have determined the rates of 
these taxes.1377 The involvement of the woredas in connection with land use fees 
and agricultural income tax is limited to assessing and collecting the taxes and 
fees.1378 Woredas collect these taxes on the regional states’ behalf. As rule, 
woredas are required to transfer a certain percentage of the revenue that they 
collect from these taxes to the regional government.1379 However, in practice, the 
regional states allow woredas to retain the revenue. Instead, as will be discussed 
below, the regional states deduct an amount equivalent to the revenue the woreda 
collected from these taxes from what would accrue to it in form of regional 
grants. 1380 
 
                                                 
1375 See chapter 4; § 3.5. 
1376 As was discussed in chapter 3 rural and urban lands were nationalised by the Derg in 1970s. 
Since then, land remains under the ownership of the state. Under the FDRE Constitution  it is 
clearly stated that the 'right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural 
resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia’. Thus, one pays a land 
use fee as a possessor of a piece of land not as an owner. See chapter 3; § 6.2. See also FDRE 
Constitution (1995) Art 40 (3).  
1377 ARS Proclamation 30 (1998) Art 15; ARS Proclamation 30 (1998) Art 19; SNNPR 
Proclamations 122 (2008) Art 15 (4); See ORS Proclamation 8 (1992) and ORS Proclamation 64 
(2002) Art 18; TRS Proclamation 136 (2008). 
1378 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 86 (2) (f); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 77 (2) (f); SRS 
Constitution (2001) Art 77 (2) (h); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (2) (f); ORS Constitution 
(2001) Art 79 (2) (g); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 93 (2) (f); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 
87 (2) (f); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2) (f). 
1379 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 66. 
1380 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 66. 
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In addition, the regional constitutions provide that a woreda may identify and 
utilise a source of revenue that is not being utilised by a regional government.1381 
However, it is unclear what this means. It may mean that a woreda may impose 
and collect a state tax where the regional state has not begun to utilise the 
particular tax. If this is what the regional constitutions mean, it is of no use as 
there is no state tax that the regional states have not begun utilising.1382 The above 
provision may also be interpreted to mean that a woreda may create a new tax 
which does not fall under the authority of the federal or the regional governments 
and collect revenue therefrom. However, this would be an incorrect interpretation 
because a woreda may not assume the authority to impose and collect 
undesignated taxes as there is a constitutional procedure in accordance with 
which an undesignated tax is designated as either a federal, state, or concurrent 
tax.1383  Therefore, the regional constitutional provision which allows woredas to 
impose and collect taxes that are not utilised by regional governments seems to be 
meaningless.     
 
Certain regional proclamations authorise the woreda to collect income taxes from 
its employees and employees of enterprises that it owns and administers. Under 
these proclamations, a woreda is also authorised to collect income tax from 
                                                 
1381 ORS Constitution (2001) Art 79 (2) (h); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (2) (g); SNNPR 
Constitution (2001) Art 93 (2) (g);` BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 87 (2) (g); ARS Constitution 
(2001) Art 86 (2) (g); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 77 (2) (g); SRS Constitution (2002) Art 77(2) 
(i); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2) (g). 
1382 Solomon (2008) 145. 
1383 See chapter 4; § 3.5.1. 
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employees of enterprises which are licensed by the woreda  and to collect certain 
taxes from small traders, and traditional minors.1384  
 
 The woreda is also authorised to collect user fees from libraries, clinics, and 
community halls. It is also entitled to collect license fees, from irrigation 
schemes, water-wells, and fees for registration of birth, death, marriage, and 
divorce. 1385 Some regional states have also introduced a scheme of tax-sharing 
between themselves and woredas within their jurisdiction. For instance, in Tigray 
and Benishangul-Gumuz, a woreda is entitled to take a certain percentage of the 
income collected from land leased for and income tax collected from commercial 
agriculture within a woreda.1386 Incomes collected from tourists visiting certain 
sites in a woreda are also shared between the woreda and the regional state. The 
share of each level of government in these incomes is determined by the regional 
state.1387 
3.3.1.2.Urban local government taxes and fees 
The most important taxes and fees that cities and municipalities may collect are 
urban land lease fees, land use fees, municipal user charges, and payment for 
municipal services.1388 The municipal user charges and payment for municipal 
                                                 
1384 See BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 88; TGR Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 39. 
1385 See BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 89; TGR Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 39. See also 
Yilmaz (2008).  
1386 See BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 91; TGR Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 43. See also 
Yilmaz (2008).  
1387 See BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 91; TGR Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 43. See also 
Yilmaz (2008).  
1388 AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 20 (1); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 49 (1); BGRS 
Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 42; ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 37; SNNPR Proclamation 103 
(2006) Art 43 (1). 
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services include: ‘market fee, sanitary service, slaughter houses, fire brigade 
services, mortuary and burial services, registration of birth and marriage, building 
plan approval, property registration and surveying, and use of municipal 
equipment, transport or employees’.1389 The city also has the authority to collect 
rentals from government-owned houses.  
 
In theory, cities and municipalities have full authority to assess and impose the 
fees mentioned above and to retain and use the revenue collected therefrom. 
However, in practice cities and municipalities do not seem to exercise full 
authority over these taxes. For instance, the Tigray government has issued an 
extremely detailed regulation in which it has determined the rates for municipal 
service fees.1390 
 
Revenue collected from municipal service charges is reserved to finance the 
municipal functions of an urban local government; not state functions.1391   
However, cities are often required to re-direct revenue which is generated from 
municipal service to finance their state functions which are generally 
underfunded.1392   
3.3.1.3.Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa 
The charters of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa contain long lists of taxes that the 
two cities may impose and collect.  In terms of revenue, the two cities, especially 
Addis Ababa, are in a by far better position compared to other cities.  
                                                 
1389 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 21. 
1390 See TRS Regulation 6 (1998).  
1391 Werner and Nguyen-Thanh (2007) 17. 
1392 Werner and Nguyen-Thanh (2007) 17. 
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Table 4. Revenue collected by Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city governments 
in Birr (in millions (in Birr) 
Year Addis Ababa Dire Dawa 
2005/06 2770.876 34.288 
2006/07 2349.42 58.60 
2007/08 2976.00 72.68 
2008/09 4202.54 102.24 
2009/10 4690.78 140.21 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2011) 
Addis Ababa covers close to 97 percent of its expenditure from its internal 
revenue and it receives no block grant from the federal government.1393 
Moreover, as the above Table shows, the internal revenue of the two cities has 
increased significantly over the past years. For instance, Addis Ababa’s internal 
revenue has risen by 70 percent between the year 2005 and 2010.  
 
 The internal revenue sources of the two cities include the following:1394 
 Income tax from government employees working in the cities.1395  
 Tax on income earned from urban agricultural activities.  
 Profit, excise and turnover taxes on individual traders (as opposed to companies) 
operating in the city and public enterprises which are owned by the city 
government.  
                                                 
1393 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008). 
1394 See FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 52 & FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 43. 
1395 Addis Ababa is territorially found with the Oromia regional state. The Oromia regional 
government uses the City as its seat. Many regional government offices of the Oromia region 
including the office of the regional president are found in the City.  The City ,may not collect 
income tax from those who work in the offices of Oromia.     
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 VAT which is collected by the federal government from individual traders in the 
cities, and from enterprises that are owned by the city government. 
 Urban land lease and use fees  
 Property rates. 
 Capital gains tax on properties in the city. 
 Tax on income earned from rented houses and buildings. 
 Stamp duties on contracts, agreements, as well as title deed executions. 
 User charges from vehicles in the city. 
  Royalties on the use of forest resources in the city. 
  Services charges on municipal services. 
  Tax on income earned from patent rights.  
3.4.Inter-governmental fiscal transfers to rural local government 
Local government receives revenue directly from the regional states or nationality 
zones or indirectly from the federal government. The revenue that comes to local 
government in the form of inter-governmental revenue transfers may take the 
form of either unconditional block grants or specific purpose grants (SPG).   
3.4.1. Block grants  
3.4.1.1. Woreda 
Block grants are the most vital source of revenue for woredas.1396 They cover the 
lion’s share of a woreda’s budget. As mentioned above a woreda receives block 
grants directly from a regional government where the woreda is outside the 
jurisdiction of a nationality zone. Where the woreda is found within a nationality 
zone the block grants are channeled to the woreda via that nationality zones.  
 
                                                 
1396 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 18. 
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The policy to transfer unconditional block grants to woredas was adopted in 2001 
when the DLDP was launched. 1397 The four highland regions first introduced a 
scheme of block grants and the other regions followed suit.1398 The constitutional 
foundation of woreda block grants is unclear. Given the federal system, the 
federal government does not seem to have the authority or the duty to directly 
finance local government. It is, therefore, up to the regional states to finance local 
government through inter-governmental transfers. The regional constitutions, 
however, are silent on whether local government is entitled to regional revenue 
transfers. The regional constitutions vaguely hint that the regional governments 
may allocate a certain amount to woredas. 1399  Certain regional proclamations 
also provide that the regional states may extend financial assistance to 
woredas.1400 However, it is not clear what form this ‘financial assistance’ takes 
and whether the regional states are legally obligated to provide such assistance.  
Put differently, it does not seem that woredas are constitutionally entitled to 
regional block grants.  
 
Block grants are, in principle, unconditional grants. Therefore, woredas are free 
to use these grants for any purpose they deem necessary.1401 In particular, block 
grants are intended to cover the woreda’s recurrent and capital expenditure for 
                                                 
1397 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4.  
1398 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 22-23. 
1399 ORS Constitution (2001) Art 79 (2) (h); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (2) (g); SNNPR 
Constitution (2001) Art 93 (2) (g); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 87 (2) (g); ARS Constitution 
(2001) Art 86 (2) (g); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 77 (2) (g); SRS Constitution (2002) Art 77 
(2) (i); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2) (g). 
1400 See for instance BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 93 (1); TGR Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 
56 (1). 
1401 MoFED (2002) 138. 
 
 
 
 
301 
 
education, health care, agricultural extension services, rural roads, and the 
like.1402  
 
As was mentioned above block grants cover a significant portion of woredas’s 
annual budget. As the table below shows, in Tigray more than 60 percent of 
woreda budget is covered by regional block grants. In Oromia the regions block 
grants cover up to 81 percent of woredas’ budget. 
             Table 5. Percentages of woreda budget covered by block grants 
Year Amhara SNNPR Oromia Tigray 
2006/07   86%    
 
  
        -               
 
     - 
2008/09  78.4% 
 
 77.7%  76.1%  61.8% 
2009/10 
 
 78.2%  73.3%  81%  57.6% 
             Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2010) 
 
Similarly in SNNPR up to 77 percent of same is covered by block grants while in 
Amhara up to 86 percent of woreda budget is covered by regional block grants.  
Table 6. Block grant transferred to woredas (in millions (in Birr) 
 
Year Amhara SNNPR Oromia Tigray 
2005/06        - 852.106 
 
 
1819.24 
 
493.74 
 
                                                 
1402 Yilmaze & Venugopal (2010) 22. 
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2006/07   2497.171 
  
  
        -   2,688.20          
 
     - 
2008/09 2936.29  
 
2121.33 
 
3,133.63  
 
769.44 
 
2009/10 
 
2714.2 
 
2529.4 
 
3619.3 
 
839.48 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2010) 
 
Moreover, as can be gathered from the table above, the revenue that woredas 
receive in form of block grants has increased significantly over years. In SNNPR 
the block grants to woredas shows a 196 percent increase in the years between 
2005 and 2010.  In Tigray the regional block grants increased by more than 70 
percent during the same years. Likewise, in Oromia the block grant that woredas 
receive has risen by more than 98 percent.  
Vertical division of block grants  
As stated above there is no clear constitutional instruction for the regional states 
to transfer revenue to woredas. Therefore it is unclear what percentage of its 
budget a regional state is expected to transfer as block grants to woredas within 
its jurisdiction.  In practice a regional state sets aside not less than 50 percent of 
its annual revenue as block grants to woredas.1403 Up to 66 percent of the total 
budget of Amhara regional state is set aside as woreda block grant. In Tigray and 
Oromia, the share of woreda block grants in the regional budget is up to 60.5 and 
52 percents, respectively.1404 The SNNPR regional government reserves up to 80 
                                                 
1403 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 24. 
1404 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 24. 
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percent of its annual budget (which is the highest compared to the other regions) 
as woreda block grants.1405  
 
As a study by Garcia and Rajkumar shows, woredas may even take the lion’s 
share of some sectors’ budgets. For instance, in the four highland regions 
woredas administer from 80 to 65 percent of the regional recurrent spending for 
education and health, respectively.1406  
Horizontal division of block grants 
The amount that each woreda is entitled to receive in the form of a block grant 
(horizontal division) is determined on the basis of a preset formula. Each region is 
entitled to use any formula it deems fit to allocate block grants to the woredas.1407 
In practice, the regional states use the ‘three parameters formula’, the ‘unit cost 
formula’ or the ‘fiscal equalisation formula’ to allocate block grant to each 
woreda within their jurisdiction.1408  
 
The ‘three parameter formula’ uses population size, level of development and 
own revenue of a woreda to calculate the share of the woreda in the block 
grant.1409  This formula was criticised as unfair and unresponsive to service 
delivery needs of woredas.  The ‘unit cost formula’, on the other hand, takes the 
cost of providing a given service for a given individual in a woreda and multiplies 
it by the number of individuals who receive the service in the woreda. This 
formula is criticised for incorrectly assuming that the cost of providing a given 
                                                 
1405 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 24. 
1406 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 35. 
1407 MoFED (2006) 61. 
1408 For detailed discussion on the formulas see Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 91-95. 
1409 For a detailed discussion on see Garcia and Rajkumar (2008). 
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service is equal in all woredas in a particular region. To correct this, the ‘fiscal 
equalisation formula’ was introduced in a number of regional states. The fiscal 
equalisation formula, while principally similar to the unit cost formula, attempts 
to take into account the actual unit cost of providing a particular service in a 
particular woreda.It should be borne in mind that these are mere formulae for 
determining the amount a woreda is entitled to receive. Regardless of the formula 
used, the revenue is a block grant and a woreda is at liberty to spend the revenue 
as it sees fit.  
 
Once the amount due to a woreda is determined by using one of these three 
formulae, an amount equivalent to what a woreda has collected in the form of 
land use and agricultural income taxes is deducted. 1410  The remaining amount is 
transferred directly to the woreda. The block grants are directly transferred to a 
nationality zone when a woreda is found within a nationality zone. The 
nationality zone then transfers the revenue to the woredas within its jurisdiction 
after making the necessary adjustment. 1411  
3.4.1.2.Grants for cities  
Transferring regional grants to cities is a relatively new development.1412 The 
regional states began transferring grants to cities after the restructuring of some of 
the municipalities as cities with the status of a woreda. The city proclamations of 
Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz provide that cities will receive block grants 
                                                 
1410 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008). 
1411 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 91-95. 
1412 Werner and Nguyen-Thanh (2007) 16. 
 
 
 
 
305 
 
from the regional government. 1413 The Oromia and SNNPR proclamation provide 
that cities will receive subsidies, not necessarily block grants, from the regional 
government.1414 The practice, however, is that cities are not treated in the same 
manner as the rural woredas despite having the same status. In most cases, the 
grants for a city are not formula-based, nor do they take the form of a block 
grant.1415 Rather, the grants are determined on an ‘ad hoc’ basis with a view to 
financing the recurrent costs of the state functions of the cities.1416 The exception 
is SNNPR, where cities receive formula based block grants.1417  
 
Moreover, the municipal functions of cities and municipalities are expected to be 
fully covered by the city’s or the municipality’s internal revenue. 1418 Therefore, 
cities do not receive grants for their municipal functions. They are required to 
keep the accounting record of and to administer their municipal revenue 
separately from their revenue for state functions.1419 
3.4.2. Specific-purpose grants (SPGs) 
Special-purpose grants (SPG) are further sources of revenue for woredas.1420 The 
federal government or donors finance specific projects of woredas through SPGs. 
Programmes that are designed by the federal government, including food security 
                                                 
1413 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 49 (1) (b); BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 42 (b); ORS 
Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 37 (4); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 43 (1) (2).  
1414 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 49 (1) (b); BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 42 (b); ORS 
Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 37 (4); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 43 (1) (2).  
1415 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 24. 
1416 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 24. 
1417 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 24. 
1418 Werner and Nguyen-Thanh (2007) 16; Tegene & Kassahun (2007) 32. 
1419 Werner and Nguyen-Thanh (2007) 16. 
1420 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 38. 
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programme, productive safety net programme, public service capacity building 
programme (PSCAB), road fund, and HIV/AIDS programme, are budgeted for 
and funded by the federal government.1421 These programmes are executed by the 
regional governments together with local government. For the purpose of 
executing these programmes, the federal government transfers SPGs to the 
regional governments. The regional governments in turn transfer the SPGs to 
local government. More than half of what woredas receive in the form of SPGs is 
allocated for food security related programmes including agricultural extension 
and resettlement programmes.1422  
 
The federal government also finances specific projects which are undertaken in 
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa and which have national relevance.1423 The federal 
government may also financially assist the two federal cities in order to enable 
them to discharge their responsibilities.1424     
3.4.3. Other sources of revenue  
3.4.3.1. Sales of assets  
In some regions woredas are allowed to collect revenue from the sale of assets. 
The assets that may be sold may include movable and immovable properties 
(other than land) under the ownership of a woreda, building materials such as 
sand, stones, and woods.1425       
3.4.3.2.Revenue from business activities   
                                                 
1421 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 38. 
1422 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008); 38. 
1423 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) 46 (1) & FDRE Proclamation 321 (2003) Art 55 (1). 
1424 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 55 (1) & FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 46 (1). 
1425 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) 90; TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 41. 
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Cities are authorised to receive income from certain business activities, including 
public enterprises under their ownership. They are also legally authorised to 
engage in other income generating activities by entering into contracts and, for 
instance, by engaging in investment activities.1426   
3.4.3.3.Borrowing 
The regional constitutions are completely silent on whether a woreda may 
borrow. The regional proclamations of the Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz 
regions provide that a woredas may borrow if so authorised by the regional 
governments.1427  The city proclamations also allow cities to borrow from various 
sources. According to SNNPR Proclamation No 103 (2006), an urban 
administration may borrow.1428  In the Oromia also, cities are allowed to borrow 
from the federal and regional governments’, a city fund or other financial 
institution to finance their capital expenditure.1429 In the Amhara region, a city 
may borrow from internal sources with the permission of the regional 
government.1430 Proclamation 69 (2007) of the Benishangul-Gumuz region also 
provides that a city may borrow. 1431 The two federal cities are also authorised to 
take short term and long term loans from domestic sources with the authorisation 
of the federal government. 1432  They may do so provided that their primary 
function of services delivery will not be endangered.1433 The two cities may 
                                                 
1426 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 53 & FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 45. 
1427 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 94 & TGRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 42. 
1428 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 43 (1) (3).                                                                                                                  
1429 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 37 (6 & 7). 
1430 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8 (2) (m).  
1431 BGRS Proclamation 69 (2003) Art 42 (2).  
1432 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 54 (1) & FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 45 (1)  
1433 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 54 & FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 45. 
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borrow directly or by selling bonds.1434 Furthermore, the Addis Ababa city 
government may request the federal government to borrow money from 
international sources on its behalf.1435 
 
Despite the above, there is still some confusion regarding the power of local 
government to borrow. As was discussed in chapter four, the FDRE Constitution 
provides that the regional states may borrow money from ‘domestic sources’ 
under the conditions stipulated by the federal government.1436 It is, therefore, 
unclear whether the regional states may authorise local government to borrow, 
considering the fact that their own power to borrow is curtailed. Even if the 
regional states could authorise local government to borrow it is also unclear 
whether the authorisation of the regional governments would suffice. There is a 
legal uncertainty in this respect. As some studies indicate, the legal uncertainty 
pertaining to borrowing by urban local government has discouraged financial 
institutions from extending loans to it. 1437    
 
An additional point is that, in Ethiopia all financial institutions require security in 
the form of a ‘disposable asset’ or a guarantee for any lending they make.1438 
Nonetheless, neither the federal government nor the regional governments are 
legally required to provide guarantees for the loans that an urban local 
government may take. Thus, it is for the lender to assess the creditworthiness of 
the cities. Most financial institutions however do not view cities as creditworthy. 
                                                 
1434 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 54 (1) & FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 45 (1)  
1435 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 54 (3). 
1436 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 51 (7). 
1437 Werner and Nguyen-Thanh (2007) 29. 
1438 Werner and Nguyen-Thanh (2007) 30. 
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Therefore they do not extend loans to cities unless either the federal or regional 
governments guarantee the loans.1439 As a consequence, cities and municipalities 
are unable to finance certain capital expenditure by borrowing from financial 
institutions.  
 
It is submitted that there should be a clear legal framework regulating when, from 
whom, and how much cities may borrow. It is, however, a prudent decision from 
the part of the regional and federal government not to guarantee local 
government’s loan. As was discussed in chapter two, the expectation that regional 
or federal government would guarantee such loans will encourage financial 
institutions to extend unwarranted loans to city, resulting in what Shah calls 
‘financial perversity’. 1440   
3.4.3.4.Donors funds 
Donors provide financial assistance to woredas through direct budget support or 
by financing specific projects. After the dispute relating to the 2005 national 
elections, many donors ceased to assist the federal government with direct budget 
support. However, with a view to ensuring the continuation of basic service 
delivery, more than 12 donors1441, along with the World Bank designed a 
Protection of Basic Services (PBS) project.1442 The aim of the project was to 
provide direct budgetary assistance to regional and local government (as opposed 
                                                 
1439 Werner & Nguyen-Thanh (2007) 30. 
1440 See chapter 2; § 3.5.3.2. 
1441 These include African Development Bank (AfDB), Austria, Canada International 
Development Agency, (CIDA), DFID, European Commission (EC), Irish Aid, Italy, Netherlands, 
Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW(German Development Bank)) Spain, and the World Bank. 
World Bank (2006) 3. 
1442 Spielman et al (2008) 7.  
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to the federal government) to ensure ‘basic services’ delivery, and that the 
country meets the MDGs.1443 In addition, donors finance various projects in 
different regions. 1444  For instance, some 18 cities in the Amhara, Oromia, 
SNNPR, and Tigray regional states have donor’s funded Municipal Infrastructure 
Investment Plans which cover infrastructure such as, water, roads, drainage, 
sanitation, and solid waste management.  
3.4.3.5.Public Contribution  
It is widely reported that woredas and kebeles often take contributions in kind, in 
cash, or in labour from local residents for building schools, roads, markets, health 
posts, and the like.1445 Kebele and sub-kebele level institutions play an important 
role in mobilising the local community for development related activities. 
However, the collection of public contributions does not seem to be well 
regulated. Moreover the public contributions are not well ‘quantified’ or 
documented. 1446  It is not possible to adequately assess the community 
contribution for local developmental purposes. In addition, some reports show 
that local communities are often pressurised to contribute.1447  
3.5. Budgeting and expenditure authority  
3.5.1.  Introduction  
As was discussed in chapter two, financial autonomy includes expenditure 
autonomy. Expenditure autonomy finds practical expression in the budgeting 
                                                 
1443 World Bank (2006) 3. 
1444 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008). 
1445 World Bank (2004) 10; Yilmaz & Venugopal (2010) 17. 
1446 Yiltmaz & Venugopal (2010) 18. 
1447 Yiltmaz & Venugopal (2010) 18. 
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power of local government. The following sections will examine whether 
woredas and cities have budgeting and expenditure power.   
3.5.2. Budgeting power of woredas and cities  
Until 2001 woredas did not have the authority to approve their own budgets. 
Their budgets were rather decided by the regional governments.1448  With the 
launch of the second phase decentralisation, woredas and cities were authorised 
to prepare and implement their own social and economic development plans 
consistent with the national and regional development policies and plans.  
Concomitant with this power, woredas and cities were empowered to decide on 
their expenditure preferences which find expression in their budget. To this 
effect, all regional government constitutions and city proclamations as well as the 
charters of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, provide that woredas and cities have the 
power to prepare and adopt their budgets.1449  
3.5.3. Budget preparation  
There is no clear legal procedure for the preparation and adoption of a budget at 
woreda and city level.1450 According to manuals prepared by MoFED, the budget 
preparation forms part of the planning process.1451 Hence it begins with 
identifying expenditure priorities.1452 This is conducted based on the budget needs 
                                                 
1448 Solomon (2008) 145. 
1449 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 86 (2) (g); AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 76 (2) (g); SRS 
Constitution (2001) Art 77 (2) (i); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 90 (2) (a); ORS Constitution 
(2001) Art 79(2) (h); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 93(2) (a); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 
87(2) (a); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2) (g); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 17 (2) 
(10); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8(2) (y); AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 10 (6); BGRS 
Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 41 (1); ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 8 (2) (b). 
1450 Yiltmaz & Venugopal (2010) 22. 
1451 For the discussion on planning see above at § 2.5.3.1. 
1452 MoFED (2010) 6. 
 
 
 
 
312 
 
of each sectoral and sub-sectoral office. Each sectoral and sub-sectoral office of a 
woreda or a city prepares a budget request in which it describes its plans, the 
activities it is going to undertake and the amount of revenue that it needs for 
undertaking the planned activities.1453 This budget request is submitted to a 
woreda developmental committee. This committee consolidates and makes the 
necessary adjustments and submits it to the woreda council for approval.1454 The 
woreda council or city council has the final say on the budgets of the woreda and 
the city respectively.1455  
3.5.4. The legal status of an approved budget  
The other related issue to budgeting and expenditure is the legal status that an 
approved woreda or city budget assumes. The issue is whether a woreda or a city 
budget is approved as a policy, a by-law, or a directive. The regional constitutions 
are silent on this matter. Practice at federal and regional level shows that a budget 
is approved as a proclamation which is the highest statutory law next to the 
federal and regional constitutions.1456  A federal or regional budget is also 
published in a gazette on which a federal or a regional law is published. 
Accordingly, a federal budget is published as a proclamation in the Federal 
Negari Gazette. 1457 If the same procedure is followed at local level, it can be 
assumed that is the case, a woreda or a city budget may be approved as a 
proclamation, regulation, directive, or by-law depending on the designation that 
the legislation of the council of a particular local unit takes. Hence, the Addis 
                                                 
1453 MoFED (2010) 6. 
1454 MoFED (2010) 6. 
1455 MoFED (2010) 6. 
1456 See chapter 4; § 3.2.1.1 & 3.3.1. 
1457 See for instance FDRE Proclamation 578 (2008). 
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Ababa and Dire Dawa city governments adopt their budget as a proclamation 
since the two cities have the power to enact proclamations. 1458  The regional 
cities may approve their budget as directive. 1459 
3.6.Assessment  
The financial powers of local government are assessed as follows. 
3.6.1. No adequate woreda taxes and fees 
In chapter two, it was emphasised that internal revenue is critical for a local 
government which aims to achieve development. The transfer of revenue from 
central government should be used only to minimise fiscal imbalances and for the 
purpose of redistribution. This helps shield the political autonomy of local 
government and ensure downward accountability of local authorities. 1460 
 
However, in Ethiopia woredas have no clear taxing power. Land use fees, 
agricultural income taxes, and income taxes from employees of woredas are 
generally considered as the main sources of own revenue for woredas. There are a 
number of concerns regarding these taxes and fees.  First, these taxes cannot be 
considered as internal sources of revenue for a woreda as the woreda does not 
have full authority on these taxes. As discussed in chapter two, full authority over 
a tax includes controlling the tax rates and collecting and spending the revenues 
for purposes that a local government unit deems necessary.1461  As the foregoing 
discussion reveals, the woreda does not determine the tax rate. Moreover, the 
                                                 
1458 See above at § 2.5.4.2. 
1459 See above at § 2.5.4.2. 
1460 See chapter 2; 3.5.3.1. 
1461 See chapter 2; 3.5.3.1 
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revenue a woreda collects from land use fees and agricultural income tax is 
‘offset’ against its share in the regional block grants.1462 Land use fees and 
agricultural income taxes cannot thus be considered as internal sources of revenue 
for woredas.   
 
According to Solomon, the lack of skilled manpower at the woreda level is what 
is keeping the regional states from assigning taxes to woredas. 1463  The other and 
the more important concern is the wide inequality that exists among woredas.1464 
Some are affluent while others are poor. The regional states are concerned that 
assigning taxes to woredas will perpetuate this inequality. This concern is a 
legitimate one. The regional states have the responsibility to ensure equitable 
development among the woredas. While maintaining equity is necessary, the 
regional states cannot, however, expect a complete equality among all woredas 
and cities. A certain level inequality should be tolerated. Moreover, the regional 
states should use other means to maintain equity. The block grant can be used to 
maintain a level equity among local government units. Moreover, equalisation 
grants may serve the same purpose.  It is not prudent to deny all woredas taxing 
power in the name of equity.     
 
As was indicated above woredas are authorised to collect fees from users of 
woreda libraries, clinics, community halls, irrigation schemes, water-wells, and 
fees for registration of birth, death, marriage, and divorce.  The woreda is a rural 
local government unit. Not most cities, let alone rural woredas, keep a record of 
                                                 
1462 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 92. 
1463 Solomon (2008) 145. 
1464 Solomon (2008) 145. 
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births, deaths, marriages and divorces. Moreover, in general, rural communities 
do not have births, deaths, marriages, and divorces recorded. It will be also hard 
to find even a single library in most woredas. It is, therefore, questionable 
whether a woreda can collect a significant amount of revenue from these sources. 
 
In addition, records show that the revenue that woredas collect from agricultural 
income taxes, land use fee, and the like is negligible. In Amhara, Oromia, and 
SNNPR, the three biggest highland regions, woredas collect less than 30 percent 
of their total revenue from internal sources (land use fees and agricultural income 
taxes included).1465 Moreover, woredas do not have the incentive to vigorously 
collect revenue from these taxes. This is because the regional states deduct from 
the regional grants an amount equivalent to what a woreda has collected from 
these taxes. 1466  
3.6.2. Inadequate block grants 
There are two important points regarding woreda block grants. First, woreda 
block grants make up a significant proportion of each region’s annual budget. As 
indicated earlier, the four highland regions set aside not less than 60 percent of 
their annual budgets as woreda block grants. The SNNPR reserves up to 80 
percent of its annual budget for woreda block grants.1467  Secondly, the block 
grants which are transferred to the woredas have increased considerably over the 
years. Thirdly, the regions have tested and are testing several grant formulae with 
a view to ensuring a more equitable distribution of revenue among the woredas. 
This effort to discover a more efficient and equitable formula is commendable.  
                                                 
1465 See table 5 above. 
1466 Garcia and Rajkumar (2008) 67. 
1467 See table 5 above. 
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Despite the above, the fact remains that woredas do not have a constitutionally 
entrenched claim to block grants. The policy decision to transfer regional block 
grants to woredas was made by the federal government in the SPRDP and 
PASDEP. Thus it was a mere policy preference of the EPRDF. This preference 
may change depending on the party in power.  
 
In addition, due to the fact that the entitlement of a woreda to block grants is not 
constitutionally entrenched, a regional government might refuse to transfer block 
grants to a woreda that is under the control of a party other than the one that 
controls the regional government. This was, for instance, precisely the case in the 
Sheko-Mejenger woreda of SNNPR. In the 2000 local elections an ethnic-based 
opposition party called Shako-Mejenger Democratic Unity Party (SMDUP) 
managed to win the majority seats in this particular woreda. However, the 
Southern Ethiopia Democratic Movement (SEPDM), the ruling party at the 
regional level, punished residents of this woreda for electing the ‘wrong 
party’.1468 It did so by depriving this woreda of regional grants so that the woreda 
would face ‘extreme budget allocation problems’ while under the control of 
SMDUP. 1469      
 
Furthermore, there is enormous imbalance between the expenditure needs and the 
revenue of woredas in spite of the increase in the amount which is transferred to 
them in the form of block grants. The block grants are too small to allow woredas 
to engage in developmental activity. More than 90 percent of the revenue that 
                                                 
1468 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 8. 
1469 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 8. 
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comes to woredas in the form of block grants is used for paying the salaries of 
woreda employees.1470 According to some studies, the woreda ‘wage bill’ is 
growing at an alarming rate and woredas are facing difficulties in meeting these 
commitments.1471 Too little is left for capital investment, such as, building 
schools, health stations, etc. 
3.6.3. Public contribution: voluntary?  
The insufficiency of own revenue and block grants to finance capital projects has 
forced local communities to shoulder the responsibility of contributing to such 
projects. A study by Yilamaz and Venugopal shows that there are many cases in 
which communities are left to meet, from their own resources, the costs of 
building schools, roads and water tanks.1472 Public contributions are not 
necessarily detrimental: they may be seen as active participation by the 
communities in their own affairs. 1473 Yet, such a heavy reliance on public 
contributions is also unhealthy and may be viewed as a failure by the government 
to deliver basic services.1474 Moreover, the contributions are not always offered 
voluntarily; often communities are forced to make these contributions. For 
instance, in some Tigray woredas communities are required to provide 20 days 
free labour. In Afar a woreda directive requires the communities to contribute to 
the maintenance of some forests.1475    
 
 
                                                 
1470 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 36. 
1471 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 36. 
1472 Yilamz & Venugopal (2010) 17-18. 
1473 Yilamz & Venugopal (2010) 17-18. 
1474 Yilamz & Venugopal (2010) 17-18. 
1475 Yilamz & Venugopal (2010) 18. 
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3.6.4. Neglected municipal services 
Cities and municipalities have the responsibility to provide municipal services. It 
is evident that the municipal services relating to pollution control, parks, 
sanitation and hygiene are decisive for the urban dwellers. There are also certain 
municipal functions, such as housing, which are clearly related to enhancing 
human welfare and poverty reduction. Yet, cities and municipalities are left to 
fend for themselves to cover the costs of these municipal services. The block 
grants do not cover any of the municipal services they provide. In short, 
municipal services are totally neglected by the regional governments. This is a 
manifestation of the ruling party’s emphasis on rural development.    
 
The fact that cities and municipalities are left to shoulder the full financial burden 
of providing municipal services raises the issue of equity. It is evident that some 
cities and municipalities are more affluent than others. The cities and 
municipalities that are well-off will provide better municipal service than the poor 
ones.  This creates an inequitable distribution of municipal services. Thus, it is 
submitted that the regions should consider some mechanism of financing the 
municipal services of poor municipalities and cities. 
4. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY  
4.1.Introduction  
The importance of administrative autonomy for local development was discussed 
in chapter two. Administrative autonomy allows local government to implement 
local policies and decisions on its own. Thus, administrative autonomy makes 
local government ‘flexible’ and ‘responsive’ to local preferences.1476 Local 
                                                 
1476 See chapter 2; § 3.5.2. 
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administrative autonomy also has a bearing on the political autonomy for local 
government as a lack of administrative autonomy allows undue central 
interference to take place.1477 Administrative autonomy, as defined in chapter 
two, includes local government’s discretion to determine its internal adminis-
trative structures as well as to hire and fire personnel.  
4.2. Determining the internal administrative structure of local 
government  
4.2.1. Woreda 
The administrative autonomy of local government is implied in the federal and 
regional constitutions. As discussed elsewhere, the federal Constitution provides 
that local government should be afforded ‘adequate’ power. This provision, based 
on the principle of subsidiarity, may be interpreted to envisage providing woredas 
and cities with ‘adequate’ administrative power which also includes the power to 
determine their own administrative structure. The power of a woreda to determine 
its administrative structure can also be inferred from the omnibus provisions in the 
regional constitutions that provide woredas with the ‘necessary’ power, or a power 
which ‘enables’ them to prepare, determine and implement plans for social services 
and economic development.1478 Evidently the power to determine the 
administrative structure of a woreda is a necessary power that would enable a 
woreda to prepare and implement its own social services and economic 
development plans.  
 
                                                 
1477 See chapter 2; § 3.5.2. 
1478 See above at § 2.4.2.2. 
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The regional constitutions provide that a woreda may determine its internal 
affairs.1479 It is clearly an internal matter of a woreda to determine its own 
administrative structure. Furthermore, a woreda council is charged with the power 
to approve the ‘administrative plan’ of the woreda when submitted to it by the 
woreda chief administrator.1480 An ‘administrative’ plan may include a plan on the 
administrative structure of the woreda. From the above it can be concluded that the 
woreda has the constitutional power to determine its administrative structure. In 
addition Proclamation 86 (2010) of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state and 
Proclamation 99 (2006) of the Tigray regional state provide that woreda may 
decide on its administrative structure. 1481    
4.2.2. Administrative organs of a woreda 
Each woreda has various sectoral offices which serve as its administrative 
structure. The sectoral offices of a woreda are almost always the counterparts of 
the sectoral offices of a regional government. There appears to be an unwritten 
rule which requires a woreda to align its administrative structure to that of the 
regional government.1482        
                                                 
1479 AfRS Constitution (2002) Art 75 (2); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 84 (2); BGRS Constitution 
(2002) 85 (2); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 91 (2); GRS Constitution (2002) Art 88 (2); TRS 
Constitution (2001) 72 (2). 
1480 AfRS Constitution (2002) Art 76 (2) (a); ARS Constitution (2001) Art 86 (2) (a); ORS 
Constitution (2001) Art 79 (2) (a); BGRS Constitution (2002) 87 (2) (a); SRS Constitution (2001) 
Art 85 (1);SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 93 (2) (a);GRS Constitution (2002) Art 90 (2) (a); 
TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (2) (a). 
1481 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 108 (1); TGR Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 52. 
1482 In general, sectoral offices that exist at the woreda level may include some or all of the 
following. Agriculture & rural development bureau;  Pastoralist affairs (in SNNPR, Oromia, 
Somali and Afar regions);   Finance and economic development bureau ; Capacity building bureau 
(which includes  Health office, public health desk, health service training desk,   HIV/AIDS 
office);  Education office; Public organisation and public participation labour and social affairs 
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4.2.3. Urban local government  
Like woredas, the power of cities to determine their internal administrative 
structure can be inferred from the general constitutional principle discussed 
above.1483 Moreover, the regional city proclamations provide cities and 
municipalities with the necessary power (‘full power’ as provided under the 
Oromia city proclamation) to administer local matters.1484 This can be interpreted 
to include the power to decide on the internal administrative structure of a city or 
a municipality. Furthermore, the power of cities and municipalities to determine 
their administrative structure is clearly stipulated in the city charters and regional 
city proclamations. The Dire Dawa Charter provides that the city government has 
the power to establish municipal and non-municipal bodies.1485 The Addis Ababa 
Charter also provides that the city government may determine the organisational 
structure of its sectoral offices.1486 Furthermore, the Charter provides that, on the 
recommendation of the city manager and with the approval of the city council, the 
mayor may establish municipal organs.1487   
 
The regional city proclamations also authorise cities and municipalities to 
determine their administrative structure and to establish departments and support 
                                                                                                                                                        
office bureau (which includes women’s affairs office and youth and sport); water resources 
development office; Justice administration office;   Rural roads, mining and energy desk; Trade, 
industry and transport; Public organisation, labour and social affairs office; Youth and sports 
desk; Culture information and tourism desk. MoCB (2007) (a); 39ff; MoCB 2007 (b).  
1483 See above § 4.2.2. 
1484 BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 8 (1); ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 8 (1); SNNPR 
Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 12 (1); ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 8(1). 
1485 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 9 (2) (a). 
1486 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 23 (1) (e). 
1487 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 23(1) (e); Art 24 (2) (a). 
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services and other administrative offices.1488 However, the organisational 
structure of a city is explicitly required to be in line with the administrative 
structure of a regional government. For instance, Regulation 53(2005) of the 
Oromia region, which was issued to give effect to the regional city proclamation, 
requires the organisational structure of a city to be aligned to the organisational 
structure of the regional government.1489 The same is provided in SNNPR 
Proclamation 103(2006).1490 This seems also to require the administrative 
structure of a city to be aligned to the administrative structure of the regional 
government. 
Administrative organs of urban local government  
Cities have two types of administrative organs; namely sectoral offices and 
municipal service organs.  
Sectoral offices  
As has been discussed elsewhere, urban local governments including the two 
federal cities (with the exception of the municipalities) discharge both state 
functions and municipal functions. Thus, the cities, and the federal cities have 
sectoral offices which directly deal with the administrative aspects of their state 
functions. The number and types of sectoral offices of a city vary depending on 
the kind and number of state functions that it discharges. Addis Ababa and Dire 
Dawa exercise extensive state functions in their capacity as regional states. Thus, 
                                                 
1488 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 14 (2) (e); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 17(2) (2) 
(5). 
1489 ORS Regulation 53 (2005) Art 7 (1). 
1490 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art17 (2) (2) (5). 
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the two federal cities have numerous sectoral offices which deal with the 
administrative aspects of their state functions.1491  
Municipal service organs  
The administrative aspects of the municipal services of a city and a municipality 
are undertaken by a manager of municipal services (MMS) and other municipal 
service organs which are established under his office.1492 In general, a MMS is 
directly accountable to the mayor of an urban local government.1493 Each of the 
various municipal service organs is charged with a particular municipal 
function.1494                                                                                                                         
4.2.4. Civil service and employment    
Local administrative autonomy also relates to the power of local government to 
recruit, hire and fire, and determine the salaries and benefits of, its personnel. As 
stated in chapter two, local personnel who are locally recruited and hired are 
expected to be accountable to local political organs.1495 Local personnel who have 
                                                 
1491 For instance, Addis Ababa city has the following sectoral offices Tourism commission; Urban 
agriculture office;  Co-operative organisation and promotion offices;  Investment authority;  
Micro - and small scale business enterprises development agency;  Environmental protection 
authority;  Policy studies and plan commission; Social and non-governmental organisation affairs 
office; Labour affairs office; Youth and sports commission; Women affairs office; Public 
prosecution office; Addis Ababa city penitentiary administration; Mass media agency. Addis 
Ababa City Proclamation 14 (2004) Art 2.  
1492 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 24 (1); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 23(1); 
SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 25 (3); AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 16. 
1493 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003); Art 24(1); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 23(1); 
SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 25(3). 
1494 For instance, in Addis Ababa the municipal service organs include: Infrastructure and 
construction authority; Transport authority; Land development authority; Housing agency; 
Cleaning and beautification and park development; Civil status document services; Fire and 
emergency services; Code enforcement services 
Addis Ababa City Proclamation 2 (2003) Art 37(1) (a-i). 
1495 See chapter 2; § 3.5.2. 
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vertical accountability to the central government have the potential to endanger 
the political autonomy of local government and therefore stifle the success of 
decentralised development.  
4.2.4.1.Woreda  
The power of a woreda to recruit, hire, deploy, and fire its personnel is not plainly 
stated in the regional constitutions. Nevertheless, this power can be considered as 
a ‘necessary’ power to prepare and implement a woreda’s socio-economic 
development plans. It can also be considered to have been implied in the power of 
a woreda to determine its administrative structures, as establishing the 
administrative organs, without the power to staff them, is meaningless. In any 
case, regional states, such as the Tigray regional state, have issued proclamations 
which deal with the power of a woreda in relation to civil service and 
employment matters. Proclamation 99 (2006) of the Tigray regional state 
provides that a woreda has the power to recruit, promote, deploy, inspect, 
internally transfer and adjudicate the grievances of woreda employees.1496 
Various government documents and studies recognise that a woreda has the 
power to hire and fire its administrative staff, support staff and ‘frontline’ 
professionals, including, teachers, doctors, nurses, health officers, agricultural 
experts, within the framework of regional civil service law.1497 
4.2.4.2.Urban local government 
Urban local government has certain explicitly stated powers pertaining to its 
administrative personnel. These powers include the power to hire, deploy, and 
                                                 
1496 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006); BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 109 also provides to the 
effect.  
1497 See for instance MoCB (2007) 3.  
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determine the salaries and other benefits of, administer, promote, and/or terminate 
the employment of, its personnel in accordance with regional civil service 
laws.1498 The mayors of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have the authority to hire 
city managers to head the administration of municipal services.1499 The city 
manager in turn has the authority to hire sub-city managers (in Addis Ababa) and 
kebele managers and other employees in accordance with the city’s civil service 
law.1500  
4.2.5. Assessment 
The foregoing discussion shows that woredas and cities have the power to decide 
on the structure of their administrative organisations. Accordingly, they have 
established several administrative organs in the form of sectoral offices and 
organs of municipal services. It can be gathered from the discussion in the 
preceding sections that the administrative offices are organised in a manner that 
takes into account the need to have a differentiated approach to rural woredas and 
cities. The organs are also structured to deal with the administrative aspects of the 
specific functions of a woreda or a city. The particular circumstances of woredas 
in different regions also seem to have been taken into account in the structuring of 
the woreda administrative organs. For instance, there are sectoral offices that deal 
with pastoral matters in the lowland regions which have pastoral communities, 
while no such office exists in the highland regions which have no pastoral 
                                                 
1498AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006); Art 24; Addis Ababa City proclamation 2 (2003) Art 6(4); 
SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006); Art 47(1); ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 43(1).  
1499 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003); Art 21 (2) (g); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 20 (2) 
(g). 
1500 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 24 (2) (c); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 23 (2) (c); 
SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) 25 (5) (5) (6). 
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communities.1501 The establishment of municipal organs in urban areas also 
shows the effort taken to provide urban specific services through suitable 
administrative structures. Woredas and cities also have a constitutional and 
statutory power to hire and fire their own personnel which is a central element of, 
and critical for, administrative autonomy. 
 
Despite the above, woredas do not enjoy their administrative autonomy. There 
are various reasons for this. First, as a report by MoCB indicates, the 
administrative organs of woredas suffer from an acute lack of skilled 
manpower.1502  Many approved woreda positions are either vacant or occupied by 
employees who do not fulfill the minimum educational and work experience 
requirements. A study conducted by the MoCB in the lowland regions indicates 
that up to 33 percent of woreda approved positions remain vacant.1503 According 
to this study, the educational background of the existing woreda personnel is 
extremely low.  Less than two percent of the woreda personnel have a first 
degree, while only 20 percent have a diploma. The great majority of the woreda 
employees have not even completed their high school education.1504 More than 18 
percent of the woreda positions are occupied by employees who do not even meet 
the minimum requirements relating to work experience and education.1505 
Moreover, the field of specialisation of 65 up to 75 percent of woreda employees 
does not match their job descriptions.1506 In particular, the rural woreda 
                                                 
1501 See above § 4.2.1. 
1502 MoCB (2007) 50. 
1503 MoCB (2007) 55 
1504 MoCB (2007) 50 
1505 MoCB (2007) 51 
1506 MoCB (2007) 41 
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employees in the lowland regions are drawn ‘from a narrow educational pool’ 
even though the new developmental role that woredas are expected to play 
requires ‘higher education and wider fields of specialisation’.1507  
 
Various factors contribute to the prevailing shortage of trained man power at the 
woreda level. The work environment at woreda level generally viewed as 
unattractive: Most woredas are found in remote rural areas where there are little 
or no facilities and services. 1508  Moreover not only tworeda personnel are paid 
poor salaries, they also receive no fringe benefits.1509   
 
Secondly, regional states and (in SNNPR) the nationality zones often interfere in 
the administration of woredas. There have been instances where the decisions of 
woredas in relation to civil service and employment were ‘overruled’ by zones 
and regions.1510 For instance, in SNNPR a woreda’s decision to cut back on the 
number administrative workers was overruled by a nationality zone.1511 There 
also have been several instances where woredas, despite their refusal, were forced 
to employ workers that were transferred from zones. 1512  
 
Thirdly, ‘frontline’ professionals, such as, nurses, teachers, health workers, and 
development agents are trained by regional institutions. For instance teachers of 
primary schools are trained in teachers training colleges which are run by regional 
                                                 
1507 MoCB (2007) 41 
1508 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 72. 
1509 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 72. 
1510 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 15. 
1511 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 16. 
1512 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 16. 
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states. Nurses, development agents, health workers are all trained in institutions 
that are run by regional states. 1513 They are deployed by the relevant regional 
bureau to woredas after they have completed their training. The deployment is in 
principle carried out based on woredas’ requests.  However, woredas rarely 
receive what they request. For instance, a woreda may request a certain number 
of, for example, mathematic teachers. But it may wind up receiving several 
English teachers. 1514 
5. CONCLUSION  
The discussion in this chapter reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the 
institutional design of Ethiopia’s decentralisation programme as it relates to 
development. To start with the positive aspect of the decentralisation programme 
there is a policy framework which aims to use woredas and cities as tools of 
development. Significant and commendable measures have been taken to this 
effect. Regional states have revised their constitutions with the intention of 
creating autonomous woredas. They have also enacted proclamations with the 
object of restructuring their urban local government. In every part of the country 
either a woreda or a city is established whose main purpose is achieving 
development. An attempt has been made to respond to the varied developmental 
preferences of urban and rural communities by creating different kinds of local 
                                                 
1513 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 16. 
1514 It should, however, also be noted here that in the past years a number of public and private 
universities and colleges have been opened in Ethiopia. These academic institutions are producing 
thousands of graduates every year and supplying, even saturating, the labour market with trained 
professionals. As finding jobs in the urban areas is becoming more and more difficult, many 
university graduates have no other option but to take up employments in rural woredas. Therefore, 
shortage of trained man power may not be a problem for a long time, unless, the financial 
constraints under which woredas operate constrains them from effecting the necessary 
employment. Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 68-72. 
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government structure. Therefore, woredas are established in rural areas while 
cities and municipalities are established in urban centres. Elected local councils 
are established and elections are held more or less regularly. It is constitutionally 
recognised that woreda and cities have the power to plan and implement their 
own social services and economic development Woredas and cities are afforded 
the power to design their own administrative structure and effect employment. A 
block grant system has been introduced with a view to ensuring the financial 
autonomy of woredas and cities. 
 
However, the constitutional and legal framework, governing woredas and cities, 
has numerous deficiencies that has real or potential negative impacts on local 
government’s effectiveness to achieve development. The following standout in 
particular: 
 The federal Constitution is far from explicit in recognising Article 50(4) local 
government as an autonomous level of government. The Constitution does not 
clearly provide that local government will be a democratically constituted 
order of government. It merely makes a transitory reference to local 
government. This creates uncertainty about the very existence of local 
government.  The recognition of woredas in regional constitutions does not 
seem to guarantee the continued existence of local government. As past 
experience shows, if it is in the interest of the ruling party, the regional 
constitutions may be easily amended, even through procedures other than 
those that are provided for their amendment.  
 Cities are not accorded appropriate recognition in the regional constitutions.  
This is because the ruling party’s development policies are centred on the 
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rural areas. This is an example of how the existence of local government is 
dependent on party policy rather than constitutional principle which may be 
linked to the lack of explicit recognition of local government in the federal 
Constitution.    
 There is no clear principle that guides the creation of new woredas, or the 
amalgamation, or division of existing ones. Not even the basic principles that 
are supposed to guide the alteration of woredas’s boundaries are provided for 
in the regional constitutions. This opens the door for arbitrary alteration of 
woread boundaries which has potentially harmful impacts on local democracy 
and development.  
 The functional competences of woredas and the state functions of cities are 
not clearly defined. This is one of the most critical deficiencies in the 
institutional design of Ethiopia’s local governance system.  
 Woredas do not have full political power since the regional constitutions, 
save for that of the Tigray, do not explicitly provide woredas with policy 
making and legislative powers.  
 Woreda chief administrators and mayors are not exclusively, even primarily 
accountable to local representative councils. They are equally, if not more, 
accountable to zonal and/ or regional chief administrators. This dual and 
sometimes triple accountability of mayors and woreda chief administrators 
compromises the political autonomy of local government.   
 Local government has no adequate sources of revenue. Woredas do not have 
full taxing power. They collect certain taxes, but on behalf of the regional 
government. Their entitlement to regional block grants is not 
constitutionally guaranteed. Moreover, the block grants, despite the fact that 
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they are increasing from year to year, are not adequate enough to cover the 
expenditure needs of woredas. 
 
This chapter has dealt with woredas, cities and municipalities political, financial 
and administrative autonomy.  As was discussed in chapter two, local autonomy 
needs to be complemented with central supervision and inter-governmental co-
operation in order to optimise the potential of a decentralisation programme to 
achieve development. The following chapter will examine whether and how 
central supervision and inter-governmental co-operation are undertaken in 
Ethiopia.    
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Chapter 6  
Decentralisation and development in Ethiopia: Central supervision and 
inter-governmental co-operation  
1. INTRODUCTION  
The preceding chapter dealt with matters pertaining to local government’s 
political, fiscal, and administrative autonomy. As was discussed in chapter two, 
experience in the implementation of decentralisation programmes shows that 
local government autonomy is important, but not sufficient to ensure 
decentralised development.1515  Central supervision of local government’s 
activities is equally critical for attaining the optimum developmental benefit of a 
decentralisation programme.  Central supervision is particularly important to 
ensure equitable development among localities, to prevent corruption and capture 
by local elites of powers and resources. 1516  Moreover, co-operation between 
local government and central government is also crucial as there always be 
overlaps and gray areas in functional division between local and central 
government. This chapter, therefore, deals with the issue of central supervision 
and inter-governmental co-operation in Ethiopia.  
 
Thus,§ 2 will deal with the central supervision of local government activities in 
Ethiopia. It describes the role of the federal and regional governments in 
supervising the activities of local government. § 3 will deal with inter-
governmental co-operation between local, regional, and federal governments. 
                                                 
1515 See chapter 2; § 3.5.4. 
1516 See chapter 2; § 3.5.4. 
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2. CENTRAL SUPERVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ETHIOPIA  
2.1. Introduction  
Central supervision, which is essentially hierarchical, is used to enforce national 
or regional objectives. 1517 Supervision is critical for ensuring equitable 
development which is a central element of development. As was indicated in 
chapter two, supervision has four elements: regulation/standard setting, oversight, 
support, and intervention.1518 The following sections will discuss the role that the 
federal and regional governments play in regulating the activities of local 
government as well as the instruments that they use to do so. The sections will 
also discuss the role of the federal and regional government in monitoring and 
supporting local government. The substantive criteria for and methods of 
intervention by federal and regional government will also be discussed.     
2.2. Regulation  
As stated before, local government in Ethiopia operates within a dual federal 
system.  In this dual federal system, local government is primarily the competence 
of the regional states. 1519 Hence the regional states can be presumed to have the 
primary responsibility to regulate its activities. As will be explained below, this 
does not mean that local government is exempt from the regulatory power of the 
federal government. Both the federal and regional governments regulate the 
works of local government. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1517 See chapter 2; § 3.5.4.1. 
1518 See chapter 2 § 3.5.4.1. 
1519 See chapter 4; § 4. 
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2.2.1. Federal government  
The federal government may set standards for local government in two ways: by 
using its power to formulate general policies on national, social, and economic 
matters and by enacting proclamations.  
2.2.1.1. Federal government policy papers  
The federal government has an extensive policy making power under the federal 
Constitution which allows it to influence local government activities.  It has the 
power to ‘formulate and implement the country’s policies, strategies, and plans in 
respect of the overall economic, social and development matters’.1520 
Furthermore, it has the power to ‘establish and implement national standards and 
basic policy criteria for public health, education, science and technology as well 
as for the protection and preservation of cultural and historical legacies’.1521 In 
addition, the federal government has the power to ‘formulate and execute the 
country’s financial, monetary and foreign investment policies and strategies’.1522 
The federal government uses these constitutional powers to set national political 
visions and standards which have the effect of regulating local government’s 
actions.   
 
As the discussion in the preceding chapter shows, local government is directly 
engaged in providing economic and social services, including, primary education, 
healthcare, agricultural extension services, and the like. 1523 The federal 
government has the constitutional power to set national policy standards 
                                                 
1520 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 51 (2). 
1521 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 51 3). 
1522 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 51 (4). 
1523 See chapter 5; § 2.4.6. 
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regarding the provision of these social services. Hence, the federal policies, 
strategies and plans on social services and development also set general policy 
framework for local government.  
 
There are several federal policy papers that regulate local government. As was 
discussed in chapter four, the decentralisation programme itself was articulated in 
various federal policy papers. The three policy papers on poverty reduction and 
development outlined the role that local government was expected to play within 
the overall poverty reduction and development programme.1524 In particular these 
policy papers articulated the role that local government was expected to play in 
providing social services, such as, primary education, primary health care, rural 
water supply, rural roads, and agricultural extension services.1525  There are also 
several other federal policy papers which were prepared on a sectoral basis: The 
policy papers on urban development, education, agriculture, to mention a few. 1526  
These papers provide further details pertaining to the role of local government 
role in each sector.    
 
It should be noted that the policy papers of the federal government do not purport, 
nor are they expected, to specifically and comprehensively deal with 
decentralisation or local government. In other words there is no federal policy 
paper on local government since local government is the competence of the 
regional government.  The federal government is constitutionally prohibited from 
                                                 
1524 See chapter 4 § 5.3.4.  
1525 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4.  
1526 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4.  
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directly regulating it.1527Decentralisation and local government, therefore, feature 
in federal policy papers within the context of and, as a strategy for, poverty 
reduction.  
 
Nonetheless, each of the sectoral policies deals with every aspect of local 
government activities in that particular sector. The policy papers provide the 
minimum number of schools, health stations that are to be established not only in 
a woreda but also in a kebele.1528 Thus, local government activities are in practice 
regulated more by federal policy frameworks than by regional ones. This is 
despite the dual federal arrangement. 
2.1.1.2. Federal framework legislation 
The federal government has important legislative powers which allow it to set 
general legislative frameworks. This allows it to regulate local government 
activities. For instance, it has the constitutional power to enact laws which are 
necessary for establishing and sustaining ‘one economic community’.1529 It also 
has the power to enact laws which regulate ‘the utilisation and conservation of 
land and other natural resources’.1530 The federal government makes use of these 
and other legislative powers to regulate local government actions. What is visible 
here is that some of the federal proclamations are specifically intended and 
drafted to directly address local government, despite the dual federal system. 1531   
  
                                                 
1527 Heymans & Mussa (2004) 6 
1528 See MoCB (2007) 104. 
1529 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 55 (6).  
1530 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 51 (5).  
1531 FDRE Proclamation 272 (2002) & FDRE Proclamation 513 (2007). 
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There are several proclamations as well as executive regulations, issued by the 
federal government that lay down standards for local government. It is not within 
the scope of this study to analyse all federal laws which directly or otherwise 
regulate local government. Therefore, only some of the federal proclamations that 
regulate local government are briefly discussed below to illustrate how the federal 
government regulates local government through framework legislation.   
Proclamation 272 (2002) 
Proclamation 272 (2002) is issued by the federal government based on its power 
to enact laws to regulate the use of urban land.1532 The Proclamation regulates 
how cities and municipalities may allocate urban land on lease for various 
‘developmental activities’. It broadly defines ‘developmental activities’ and sets 
the maximum lease period for a specific ‘developmental activity’.1533 The 
Proclamation authorises a city/municipality to set the maximum lease period for 
developmental activities that are not defined in the Proclamation.1534 The 
Proclamation also deals with the manner of determining the land lease rate, 
expropriation, eviction of illegal land holders, and the like.1535 It should be noted 
that this Proclamation directly addresses not only federal cities but also regional 
cities.  
Proclamation 513 (2007) 
Proclamation 513 (2007) regulates solide waste management. The Proclamation 
regulates how cities and municipalities should manage solid waste in an 
                                                 
1532 FDRE Proclamation 272 (2002) Preamble 6th paragraph.  
1533 The developmental activities include housing, urban agriculture, education, industry, 
commerce, and any other activity which may be defined by the regional government, a city or a 
municipality. FDRE Proclamation 272 (2002) Art 6. 
1534 FDRE Proclamation 272 (2002) Art 6 (2). 
1535 FDRE Proclamation 272 (2002) Art 7-25.  
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economically useful manner.1536 It thus regulates what cities and municipalities 
should do so as to create an enabling environment to attract investment in waste 
management. It enjoins cities and municipalities to prepare and implement waste 
management plans.1537 The Proclamation goes as far as prescribing to cities and 
municipalities to put marked waste bins in the streets, ensure frequent collection 
of waste, and create public awareness.1538  . 
Proclamation 574 (2008) and Proclamation 455 (2005) 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, Proclamation 574 (2008) regulates 
urban planning.1539 Proclamation 455 (2005) regulates matters relating to rural 
and urban land expropriation. The Proclamation authorises woreda or 
city/municipal administrations to expropriate land for a ‘public purpose' where it 
is believed that a plot of land may be used for a more appropriate development 
project.1540 It further provides how a woreda, acity, and a municipal 
administration can effect the expropriation. In particular, it provides a general 
framework with regard to the provision of an expropriation order and 
determination of compensation.1541      
 
                                                 
1536 FDRE Proclamation 513 (2007) Art 4. 
1537 FDRE Proclamation 513 (2007) Art 5 (1). 
1538 FDRE Proclamation 513 (2007) Art (4). It is constitutionally suspect whether the federal 
government has the power to legislate on solid waste management. It is indicated in the 
Proclamation that its enactment was based on Article 55 (1) of the Constitution which authorises 
Parliament to legislate on those matters that are designated as federal functions in the 
Constitution. However ‘solid waste’ management is designated neither as a federal nor as a state 
competence. Thus, it is a residual power, which, by default, is within the competence of the 
regional states. 
1539 For more discussion see chapter 5; § 2.5.3.2. 
1540 FDRE Proclamation No 455 (2005) Art 3. 
1541 FDRE Proclamation No 455 (2005) Arts 4-15. 
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2.2.2. Regulation by regional and nationality zones governments  
2.2.2.1. Regional policy papers 
Regional states have the power to formulate regional policies and strategies on 
social and economic development matters.1542 The regional states also have the 
authority to set minimum targets that need to be fulfilled in every sector by local 
government units.1543 They may do so through their policies and plans. The 
regional policies are expected to be consistent with the national poverty reduction 
and economic development policies and strategies. Hence, the planning and 
implementation of social services and economic development by a woreda, city, 
or municipality are expected to be undertaken within the national as well as the 
regional policy frameworks. 
 
In Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and SNNPR some woredas and 
cities are found within a nationality zone. Nationality zones are established as 
autonomous local units for regional minority ethnic communities.1544 As is stated 
in the regional constitutions, the government of a nationality zone is the highest 
political organ of the ethnic community for whom the nationality zone is 
established. It may, therefore, exercise all political power within the nationality 
zone.1545 It is also clearly provided that a nationality zone may prepare and 
implement its own strategic development plan.1546 A woreda within a nationality 
zone is, therefore, expected to take into consideration the strategic plan of the 
                                                 
1542 See chapter 4; § 3.3. 
1543 See chapter 4; § 3.3. 
1544 See chapter 4; § 6.2. See also chapter 7 § 2.2.1 for more discussion on this. 
1545 See chapter 7; § 2.2.3. 
1546 See for instance ARS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (3) (d); GRS Constitution (2002) Art 78(3) 
(d). 
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nationality zone while preparing its own strategic and annual plans.  It is unclear 
whether a nationality zone may formulate its own policies on social services and 
economic development, as this is not explicitly stated in any of the regional 
constitutions. If nationality zones may in fact formulate zone-specific policies, it 
will mean that the woredas within the nationality zone’s territorial jurisdiction 
will be further regulated by these policy frameworks. In effect, it will mean that 
woredas within a nationality zone will be regulated by three levels of 
government, namely federal, regional, and zonal governments. However, practice 
shows that the federal government plays a dominant role in policy making, and 
woredas are seldom affected by a regional policy framework let alone by that of a 
nationality zone. 1547  
2.2.2.2. Regional framework legislation  
As has been indicated earlier, local government is a regional government 
competence. Hence, the regional governments have a constitutional power to 
regulate the activities of local government through regional laws. The regional 
states have issued a number of proclamations that have the effect of regulating 
local government. Most of these proclamation feature in the discussion in chapter 
five. The regional constitutions which created woredas are enacted by the 
regional governments. The regional proclamations which have created cities and 
municipalities and which have defined their powers can also be considered as 
regional legislative regulatory frameworks.  
 
Nationality zones may also regulate woredas by enacting laws. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, a government of a nationality zone has the power to 
                                                 
1547 Assefa (2006). 
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choose the official language of the nationality zone.1548 It also has the power to 
enact laws on matters that are not covered by regional laws.1549 It can be assumed 
that the laws of the nationality zones will also serve as regulatory frameworks for 
woredas and cities.  
2.2.3. Assessment   
The foregoing discussion has described the role of the federal, regional, and, in 
some cases, zonal governments in regulating the activities of local government. 
As the discussion shows, the federal and regional governments have the authority 
to set standards for local government through their policies and framework 
legislative instruments.  
 
The federal government plays a dominant role in terms of regulating local 
government through policy making. The regional governments play a minor role 
in this respect. This is despite the fact that, given the dual federal system, the 
latter are supposed to play a more dominant role in regulating local government’s 
activities. The rather marginal role of the regional states in regulating local 
governments may be due to two reasons. Firstly, the policy making power of the 
federal government, in the areas of social services and economic matters, 
including health and education, is widely cast in the Article 51 (2) of the federal 
Constitution. The Constitution does not put a limit on the policy making power of 
the federal government on these matters. Assefa and Mohammed, referring to the 
clause in Article 51 (2) of the federal Constitution, write:-  
‘This is perhaps more than necessary and proper clause because it grants the federal 
government wide powers over economic, social, health, and education matters. It places 
                                                 
1548 See for instance ARS Constitution (2001) 74 (3) (a). 
1549 See chapter 7; § 2.2.3.1. 
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primary responsibility on the federal government to determine major policy directions and 
standards. However, if one follows the terms closely, the powers of the federal government 
even in these vital areas do not seem [to have a limit].’ 1550     
This vaguely and widely phrased clause on the policy making power of the 
federal government seems to have allowed the latter to cover all areas through its 
policies. This in turn seems to have limited the opportunities that the regional 
states have to regulate local government though their policies.  
 
The second reason may relate to the fact that all levels of government are 
controlled by a single party, the EPRDF. As stated in the preceding chapter,1551  
the policies of the country are drafted by the central structure of the party. The 
regional states, therefore, barely add to the content of the federal policies in their 
policy papers.   
 
A related matter is that the federal government uses its power to legislate on 
certain matters including urban and rural land to bypass the regional states to 
regulate the activities of local government. As the above discussion indicates, 
some of the federal proclamations directly address cities, municipalities, and 
woredas.   
 
The other visible matter is that, within a region, the degree of a woreda’s 
authority with respect to a particular function seems to vary depending on 
whether the woreda is within or outside the borders of a nationality zone. The 
area of authority of woredas within a nationality zone, with respect to a particular 
                                                 
1550 Assefa & Mohammed 2010 144..   
1551 See chapter 4; § 3.2.1. and chapter 5; § 2.3.1.2.   
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woreda function, is likely to be more limited than the woredas outside a 
nationality zone. This is because the activities of woredas outside a nationality 
zone are regulated only by the federal and regional policy and legislative 
frameworks. Woredas within the borders of a nationality zone may also be 
regulated by the laws of the nationality zones’ government. The policies and laws 
of a nationality zone, which are likely to be more detailed and specific than 
regional and federal policies and laws, will have the effect of narrowing the field 
of authority of the woredas within a nationality zone’s boundaries compared to 
the woredas outside the jurisdiction of a nationality zone. This is a consequence 
of the compromise to balance the need to accommodate regional ethnic minorities 
and the need to ensure the autonomy of the woreda and cities.   
2.3. Monitoring      
The second element of central supervision is oversight or monitoring the 
activities of local government. Monitoring is a mechanism by which senior levels 
of government gather information as to whether local government is acting within 
its constitutional and legal authority. It is also the mechanism to ensure whether 
local development projects meet regional and national standards.  
2.3.1. Federal monitoring  
2.3.1.1. Monitoring woredas and regional cities  
The federal government or its organs are not expected to directly monitor the 
activities of local government as local government is a regional matter. There is 
no a federal law that authorises any federal organ to exercise direct oversight over 
either woredas or cities. This begs the question of how the federal government 
can ensure that the standards it sets are respected by woredas and cities. 
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It seems that the mechanism for the federal government to ensure that federal 
standards are met by local government is indirect: through the regional states. 
Each federal ministry may exercise indirect monitoring through their regional 
counterparts to ensure federal standards are met. For instance, Proclamation 574 
(2008) provides that the Ministry of Urban Development and Construction 
(MoUDC) has the power to watch over and follow up the conformity of urban 
structural plans to the national standard.1552 In addition, the Proclamation 
authorises the regional government to ‘follow up, evaluate and ensure the proper 
implementation of urban plans’.1553 This cannot mean that MoUDC may directly 
monitor the activities of regional cities. Such an interpretation will render the 
above provision of the proclamation unconstitutional. Hence the provision must 
be read to mean that the relevant regional bureau of urban development will 
monitor cities and municipalities. MoUDC monitors urban local government 
indirectly through the regional bureaus. Other ministries may also engage in 
similar indirect monitoring of woreda and city activities. 
2.3.1.2. Monitoring the federal cities  
The two federal cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, are accountable directly to 
the federal government.1554 Hence, their activities are monitored directly by the 
federal government and its organs. There are two federal organs with a particular 
responsibility of monitoring the two federal cities: these are MoUDC and the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA).  The former is in charge of overseeing the 
activities of the two federal cities with respect to their municipal functions.1555 
                                                 
1552 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 55 (2). 
1553 FDRE Proclamation 574 (2008) Art 56 (2).  
1554 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 51 (1); FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 61(1&2). 
1555 FDRE Proclamation 471 (2005) Art 18 (1) (m).  
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The latter is charged with monitoring the overall activities of the federal cities.1556 
Furthermore, each line ministry presumably oversees the activities of these two 
cities that are related to the particular sector for which the ministry is responsible. 
2.3.2. Monitoring by regional and zonal governments  
2.3.2.1. Monitoring woredas  
As was stated in chapter four, in Oromia, Somali, Tigray, Afar, and most parts of 
Amhara regional states, woredas and cities are the second level of sub-national 
government, with no intermediary between them and the regional 
governments.1557 In fact, the constitutions and proclamation of Oromia and Afar 
provide for the establishment of zone administrations, between the regional states 
and woredas. Zone administrations (as opposed to nationality zones) are 
‘deconcentrated arms' of the regional government, not autonomous sub-regional 
governments.1558  In every part of the SNNPR, Gamabella, and some parts of 
Amhara regional states, nationality zones are established as self-governments of 
minority ethnic communities between the woredas and the regional 
government.1559 The level of government that has a direct monitoring 
responsibility over a woreda or a city, therefore, seems to vary depending on 
whether a woreda is found within or outside a nationality zone. As provided in 
the regional constitutions, a woreda which is found within a nationality zone is 
responsible to the government of the nationality zone as well as the regional 
government.1560 Therefore, both the nationality zone and the regional state may 
                                                 
1556 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 61 (5). 
1557 See chapter 4; § 6.1. 
1558 See chapter 4; § 6.1. 
1559 See chapter 4; § 6.2. 
1560 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 86 (1); SNNPR Constitution (2001) 91(2) & 100 (2) (g); GRS 
Constitution (2001) 90 (1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 87 (1). 
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monitor its activities. A woreda which is outside a nationality zone is answerable 
only to the regional government. Therefore, only the regional government may 
directly monitor the woreda’s activities. Furthermore, as is the case in Oromia 
and Afar, a regional state may monitor woredas through zonal administration, 
where the latter is established. 1561  
 
A related issue is whether there is a particular regional or zonal organ that has a 
principal or exclusive responsibility of monitoring woredas. In some regions, 
such as Tigray and Beinishangul-Gumuz, the primary responsibility to monitor 
woredas is entrusted to a regional ‘administrative and security affairs bureau’. 1562  
This bureau is required to monitor woredas directly or through its zonal 
counterparts. It is unclear whether the other regions also allocate to a particular 
bureau the principal responsibility of monitoring woredas. Even if this is the case, 
it does not mean that such a bureau has an exclusive mandate of monitoring 
woredas.  Rather, various regional and/or nationality zone sectoral offices are 
authorised to exercise oversight over the various activities of the woredas. For 
instance, the regional finance and economic development bureau has the ‘primary 
responsibility’ to monitor woredas with respect to their financial management.1563  
Other sectoral offices, including, education bureaus, health bureaus, and the like, 
monitor the activities of woreda that relate to their respective sector.1564  
 
 
                                                 
1561 ORS Constitution (2001) Art 71 (3). 
1562 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) 102; TRS proclamation 99 (2006) Art 55. 
1563 Heymans & Mussa (2004) 9. 
1564 Heymans & Mussa (2004) 9. 
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2.3.2.2. Monitoring urban local government  
As stated in the preceding chapter, cities have state functions and municipal 
functions. 1565  It is not clearly regulated in the city proclamations which organ of 
a regional state monitors the activities of cities with regard to their state functions. 
However, it seems that, as is the case with respect to a woreda, no regional or 
zonal sectoral office has exclusive power to monitor cities with respect to their 
state functions. It seems that each regional sectoral office may monitor cities with 
respect to the cities’ state function which is pertinent to it. Thus, for instance, a 
regional education bureau may monitor cities with respect to their activity in the 
area of education. As far as their municipal functions are concerned, the regional 
bureau of urban development has the primary responsibility to monitor cities and 
municipalities.1566     
2.3.2.3. Methods of monitoring  
The principal method of regional monitoring is self-reporting. For instance, the 
federal cities are required to submit annual reports to the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs.1567 Likewise, a woreda chief administrator is required to submit 
periodical reports to the regional states, or nationality zones, or, as is the case in 
Oromia, to the zonal administration.1568 The mayor of a city has a similar 
                                                 
1565 See chapter 5; § 2.4.3.2. 
1566 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 62; ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 53; AfRS 
Proclamation 33 (2005) Art 19; BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 55; SNNPR Proclamation 103 
(2006) Art 53. 
1567 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 61(6); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 51(3). 
1568 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 93(2) (h); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 94(2) (h); GRS 
Constitution (2002) Art 97 (2) (h); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 100 (2) (g); ORS Constitution 
(2001) Art 87 (2) (f); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 82 (2) (g).  
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responsibility. 1569 The reports of the woreda chief administrator or the mayor of a 
city deal the overall activities of the woreda and city respectively. In addition, 
each woreda or city sectoral office submits periodical reports on its activities to 
its zonal or regional counterpart.1570 The report regarding the municipal functions 
of a city or a municipality, so it seems, goes to the regional bureau of urban 
development1571  or in case of federal cities to the MoFA and MoUDC. 1572       
 
The other method of monitoring is on-site inspection. In some regions, regional 
officials are required to undertake periodical on-site inspections. For instance in 
Benishangul-Gumuz, regional officials are enjoined to visit woredas once a 
year.1573  It is also reported that some regional bureaus conduct periodical on-site 
inspections of the performance of woredas. Most notably, a regional bureau of 
finance and economic development periodically sends auditing and inspection 
units to woredas.1574    
                                                 
1569 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 21 (2) (k); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 20 (2) (k); 
BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 19 (2) (g); ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 7; ARS 
Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 19 (2) (g); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006). 
1570 Heymans & Mussa (2004).  
1571In Oromia it is called Bureau of Industry and Urban Development. 
1572 The MoF and MoUC are authorised to follow up the activities of the federal cities in particular 
those that are related to the municipal functions of the cities. Likewise, regional bureaus of works 
and urban development are authorised to follow up the activities of cities in relation to their 
municipal functions.  It can be inferred from this that the reports of cities regarding their 
municipal functions should be submitted to these federal and regional organs. FDRE Proclamation 
361 (2003) Art 61; FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 51; BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 55; 
ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 53 & 54; ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Arts 62 & 63; SNNPR 
Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 53. 
1573 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 104 (1) (c). 
1574 Yilmaz & Venugopal (2008) 23. 
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2.4. Support 
2.4.1. Introduction  
As maintained in chapter two, one component of supervision is that senior levels 
of government should support local government in undertaking its developmental 
activities. Support may take the form of a general assistance. It may also be used 
to resolve specific problems that are identified through monitoring.  The 
following section will examine whether and how the federal and regional 
governments provide support to local government.  
2.4.2. Federal support  
The federal Constitution is silent on the issue of whether and how the federal 
government may support local government. The question is whether the federal 
government is required to support local government. One argument in this respect 
may be that, local government is a regional competence. Hence, the federal 
government has no obligation to provide support to local government, save for 
the two federal cities which are within its jurisdiction. The counter-argument is 
that the constitutional responsibility of the federal government to directly or 
indirectly support local government is implied in its duty to formulate and ensure 
the implementation of policies on social services and economic matter.   It is 
submitted that the second is the more plausible argument. As stated before, 
important social services, such as, health care and education, whose policies are 
formulated by the federal government, are implemented by local government. It 
may be, therefore, argued that in order to ensure the implementation of the 
policies of the federal government on social services, the federal government 
may, if not should, directly or indirectly, support local government.      
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In addition, certain federal laws require federal ministries to support local 
government. For instance, Proclamation 691 (2010) requires MoUDC to ‘provide 
all-round and co-ordinated support to urban centres to make them development 
centres capable of influencing their surroundings’. 1575 The Proclamation further 
provides that the Ministry has the duty to ‘provide capacity building support to  
urban centres for improving their service delivery; and where necessary, organise 
training and research centres in the field of urban development’. 1576  
 
Practice confirms the above. The federal government provides technical support 
to woredas either directly or through regional sectoral offices.  The MoFED and, 
previously the MoCB, are principally involved in providing support to woredas. 
As the discussion in chapter four shows, MoCB had the mandate, among other 
things, to implement the DLDP. 1577  Accordingly, the MoCB, with its counterpart 
at regional level, took various measures to implement the DLDP and to build the 
capacity of woredas including preparing manuals, general guidelines and the 
like.1578   
 
 
 
                                                 
1575 FDRE Proclamation 691 (2010) Art 25 (1) (b). 
1576 FDRE Proclamation 691 (2010) Art 25 (1) (c). 
1577 See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
1578 See for instance Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development: planning guideline for woredas and kebeles in Ethiopia June 2010; Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Local 
government development planning guide April 2010; Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: 
Ministry of Capacity Building: Public Sector Capacity Building Program: District level 
decentralization sub – program Woreda planning and budgeting manual July 2007. 
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2.4.3. Support by regional government  
2.4.3.1.Supporting woredas  
The regional constitutions are silent on the responsibility of regional governments 
to support woredas. Some regional proclamations, however, impose an obligation 
on regional governments to support woredas. In Benishangul-Gumuz, for 
instance, the regional Administrative and Security Affairs Bureau has the 
responsibility to support woredas to build their capacity. 1579  To this effect, the 
Bureau is required to provide comments on woreda sectoral reports.1580  It is also 
required to support woredas to prepare and implement annual and strategic plans 
that are consistent with regional and federal annual and strategic plans. 1581  
Moreover, other regional sectoral bureaus are required to provide technical 
assistance to woredas. In Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, for instance, experts 
in each regional sectoral office are required to go to woredas twice a year to 
provide technical assistance.1582   
2.4.3.2.Urban local government  
In all regions, the primary responsibility of supporting cities is given to the 
regional bureau of works and urban development.1583 The bureau is required to 
provide technical support to cities and generally to build the capacity of cities. It 
is also expected to co-ordinate the technical support that other sectoral bureaus 
provide to cities. 1584   
                                                 
1579 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 104 (1). 
1580 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 104 (1) (a). 
1581 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 104 (1) (b). 
1582 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 104 (1) (c). 
1583 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 104; ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 62; ORS 
Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 54 (2); BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 55. 
1584 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 104. 
 
 
 
 
352 
 
 
The federal cities receive support from the federal government. The MoF has the 
main responsibility of supporting the federal cities.1585 MoUDC also has the duty 
to provide technical support to the federal cities.1586   
2.5.  Intervention   
The fourth element for central supervision is intervention. 1587 It was indicated in 
chapter two that it was critical to clearly define in a constitution the grounds for, 
and the methods of, intervention. Therefore, the following sections will examine 
the grounds and the methods for federal and/or regional intervention in local 
government. 
2.5.1. Federal intervention  
2.5.1.1. Intervention in woreda and regional cities 
There is no explicitly stated constitutional ground for direct federal government 
intervention in local government. What is clearly known is that the federal 
government has the power to intervene in a regional state when the ‘constitutional 
order is endangered’ in the region1588 or the regional state fails to maintain 
security, or to prevent human rights violations.1589 It may be argued that a federal 
intervention in a regional state may not necessarily have state-wide implications. 
The problem that triggers a federal intervention in a regional state may be 
                                                 
1585 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 61 (5); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 51 (2). 
1586 FDRE Proclamation 691 (2010) Art 25 (1) (c). 
1587 See chapter 2; § 3.5.4.1. 
1588 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 62 (9). FDRE Proclamation 359 (2003) a proclamation which 
is issued to regulate federal intervention, provides that the constitutional order is said to be 
endangered when there is an armed uprising, attempt to resolve a conflict between ethnic groups 
of different regions in ‘non-peaceful means’, and when the peace and security of the federal 
government is disturbed. 
1589 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 55 (16). 
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geographically limited to a specific woreda or city. In such circumstances, the 
federal intervention may in effect amount to a federal intervention into a local 
government unit. It will be, however, implausible to consider such an intervention 
as federal intervention in local government unit. Moreover, even if it was to be so 
argued, the grounds for a federal intervention, in particular the first two, are 
limited to security-related matters. They are not related to a breakdown in service 
delivery which is the principal responsibility of an Article 50(4) local government 
unit. Thus, the question still remains: what will happen if a woreda fails to 
provide basic services despite the fact that the constitutional order is not 
endangered and that there is stability and security in the woreda? What will 
happen if a regional state, within whose jurisdiction the malfunctioning woreda is 
found, is unwilling or unable to take appropriate measures to rectify the 
problems?  
 
One argument may be that Ethiopia has a dual federal system in which local 
government is an exclusive regional matter. Therefore, the federal government 
may not intervene in local government even if there is a breakdown in service 
delivery in a particular woreda and the regional state within whose jurisdiction 
the woreda is found fails to intervene.  
 
The counter-argument may be that the federal government has a constitutional 
responsibility not only to formulate, but also to ensure the implementation of, 
policies with respect to social services, such as, public health, education, and the 
like. Evidently, it is the primary responsibility of a regional state to intervene and 
rectify a breakdown in service delivery in a particular woreda. However, this 
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cannot preclude the possibility of a federal intervention when a regional state 
completely fails to correct the problem.  
 
In addition, FDRE Proclamation 359 (2003) (issued to regulate federal 
intervention in regional states) defines a human rights violation, for the purpose 
of federal intervention, as a ‘violation of the provision of the human rights 
stipulated in the Constitution and laws promulgated pursuant to the 
Constitution’.1590 The Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution provides that 
‘[e]very Ethiopian national has the right to equal access to publicly funded social 
services’.1591 The Constitution adds that ‘[t]he State has the obligation to allocate 
ever increasing resources to provide to the public health, education, and other 
social services’. 1592 A failure to ensure the delivery of basic services, such as, 
health care and education, may, therefore, constitute a human rights violation as 
per Article 55(16) of the FDRE Constitution. Accordingly, the federal 
government may (if not must) intervene if a woreda or city fails to provide basic 
services and if a regional state does not intervene in time to correct the situation.  
 
It may still be argued that such a federal intervention cannot be considered as an 
intervention in local government but as an intervention in a regional government. 
This is because what triggers the federal intervention is not the failure of a 
woreda or a city to discharge its constitutional duty. It is rather the failure of the 
regional state to correct the problem which emanates from the failure of a local 
government unit to discharge its constitutional duty.  
                                                 
1590 FDRE Proclamation 359 (2003) Art 7.  
1591 FDRE Proclamation (1995) Art 41 (3).  
1592 FDRE Proclamation (1995) Art 41 (3).  
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It is submitted here that it is of little consequence whether such an intervention is 
called federal intervention in local government or federal intervention in a 
regional government. What matters most here is that the federal government is 
not precluded from intervening to correct a break down in service delivery by a 
local government unit.   
2.5.1.2. Federal intervention in federal cities  
As indicated above, the federal government has the power to exercise direct 
oversight over the two federal cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. There are 
three grounds for federal intervention in the federal cities. It may intervene in 
either of these cities if the city government endangers ‘the constitutional order’, if 
there is a breakdown of security in the city,1593 and if a coalition of political 
parties breaks up which forms the executive of the city.1594  
 
When the first two are the grounds for federal intervention, Parliament may 
decide to immediately dissolve the councils of the two cities and establish a 
transitional government for the cities.1595 Parliament may also determine the 
duration that the city will be under a transitional government. The Prime Minister 
(PM) will be in charge of ensuring the implementation of the decision of 
Parliament in this respect.1596 In the case of a break-up of a coalition of parties 
forming the executive of one of the federal cities, the MoFA is required to 
approach the political parties and invite them to form a new coalition or revitalise 
                                                 
1593 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 61(3); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004). 
1594 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 17 (2) (b); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 15(4) (b).  
1595 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 61(4); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 15(3) (a). 
1596 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 61(4); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 15(3) (b). 
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the previous one.1597 Parliament may, however, decide to dissolve the city 
councils and hold new elections within six months if the parties fail to agree to 
create a coalition.1598  
 
Regardless of the ground of intervention the body which will be in charge may 
not make new laws or amend the existing law of the cities. 1599  The only 
legislative power it may exercise is to adopt a budget. The body may also issue 
regulations, as part of its executive power, where a proclamation issued by the 
city council so authorises the executive organ so to do. Otherwise, the power of 
the body is limited to exercising executive powers only.  
 
After the 2005 electoral dispute the federal government had intervened in Addis 
Ababa. A provisional care taker government was established which governed the 
city until 2008. 1600 
2.5.2. Regional intervention  
2.5.2.1. Intervention in a woreda  
Grounds for intervention  
The regional constitutions, other than that of the Tigray, provide no substantive 
ground for regional intervention in a woreda. The Tigray regional Constitution 
provides three broadly defined grounds for a regional intervention in a 
                                                 
1597 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 17(2) (b); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 15(4) (b). 
1598 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 17(2) (c); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 15(4) (c). 
1599 FDRE Proclamation 361 (2003) Art 17 (2) (e); FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 15(4) (e). 
1600 See Assefa (2009) 89. 
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woreda.1601  It provides that the regional government may intervene (1) when a 
woreda endangers the constitutional order, (2) when it fails to maintain peace and 
security, or (3) when it fails to effectively exercise its legal and constitutional 
functions and powers.1602  
 
Proclamation 99 (2010) of Tigray and Proclamation 86 (2010) of Benishangul-
Gumuz provide three additional grounds of intervention over and above the above 
two. These are misappropriation of funds or properties, a failure of a woreda 
executive council to convene a meeting for more than 6 months, and infringement 
of obligating provisions of regional laws. 1603  
 
The aforementioned regional constitution and proclamations do not define what 
‘endangering the constitutional order’ or a failure to maintain peace constitutes. It 
may be, therefore, appropriate to use the elements that are used in Proclamation 
359 (2003) to define ‘endangering the constitutional order' for the purpose of 
federal intervention.1604 A constitutional order, thus, may be considered to have 
been endangered when there is an armed uprising in a woreda or when ethnic 
                                                 
1601The intervention clause was inserted in the Tigray Regional Constitution by means of a 
constitutional amendment that was introduced in 2006. The amendment was promulgated in the 
TRS Proclamation 98 (2006). 
1602 TRS Constitution (2001) 73 (4).  
1603 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 58 (1); BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 103(1).  
1604 FDRE Proclamation 359 (2003) defines endangering the constitutional order as ‘an activity or 
act carried out by the participation or consent of a Regional Government in violation of the 
Constitution or the constitutional order and in particular (1) armed uprising (2) resolving conflicts 
between another Region or Nation, Nationality or People of another Region by resorting to non-
peaceful means(3) disturbance of peace and security of the Federal Government or (4) violation of 
directives given pursuant to Article 11of this Proclamation; shall be deemed to have been an 
activity or act that has endangered the constitutional order. 
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groups within a woreda clash and no peaceful means are used to resolve the 
problem. A woreda can also be said to have failed to maintain peace when it is 
unsuccessful in ensuring public safety through the normal operation of the 
law.1605 These substantive grounds for intervention are security related.  
 
The third substantive criterion under the Tigray Constitution and the additional 
three grounds for intervention in the aforementioned proclamations may be linked 
to a breakdown in basic service delivery. In Tigray, for instance, a woreda can be 
considered to have failed to exercise its legal or constitutional functions 
warranting intervention if it fails, for instance, to approve its annual plan and 
budget to deliver basic services. It goes without saying that a woreda’s 
development will be negatively affected if a woreda executive council fails to 
meet for six months. This should entail intervention in a woreda by a regional 
government. However, a failure to exercise a ‘constitutional function’, and 
infringement of regional laws by a woreda as grounds for intervention, are too 
ambiguous and widely formulated. The lack of specificity in this respect is likely 
to endanger a woreda’s autonomy.  
Methods of intervention  
Only two methods of intervention are considered in the Tigray Constitution and 
in the regional proclamations that regulate regional intervention. These are 
suspension and dissolution of a malfunctioning woreda council.1606 The two 
methods of intervention are employed regardless of the ground for intervention. 
Hence, in Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz, for instance, the regional council, 
which has the last say on the matter, may suspend a woreda council pending an 
                                                 
1605 See FDRE Proclamation 359 (2003).   
1606 TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (4) (b).  
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investigation into the problem which caused the regional state to intervene.1607  If 
the investigation so warrants, the regional council may dissolve the woreda 
council. During the suspension of a woreda council or after the council is 
dissolved, the regional council may order the regional executive council or chief 
administrator to establish a transitional woreda administration and appoint 
provisional heads of executive bureaus of the woreda.1608 The transitional woreda 
administration will administer the woreda for a maximum of one year or, as is the 
case in Tigray, one and a half years.1609 During that period of transition a woreda 
administration will assume only the executive powers of the woreda executive 
council as provided under Articles 80 and 82 of the Tigray Constitution. The only 
legislative power the provisional administration may exercise is approving the 
woreda’s annual plan and budget.1610  Thus, it may not carry out other legislative 
functions of the woreda. This is in keeping with local democracy and political 
autonomy to preclude the provisional local administration from assuming the 
legislative functions of a woreda or a city. As De Visser states, local legislative 
power is the most important expression of local autonomy which should not be 
easily tampered with. 1611 
2.5.2.2. Regional intervention in urban local government 
The regional city proclamations regulate intervention by the regional 
governments into cities. 
 
 
                                                 
1607 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 103; TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (4) (b).  
1608 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 103; TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (4) (b). 
1609 TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (6). 
1610 TRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (5) (a).  
1611 De Visser (2005) 277.  
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Grounds for intervention   
The grounds for regional intervention in cities are (1) causing harm to the public 
interest, (2) failing to maintain peace and security, and (3) endangering ‘the 
constitutional order’.1612 When any one of these substantive criteria is met, the 
regional government is authorised to intervene. Each of the above substantive 
criteria is ambiguous and requires clarification. However, no definition is 
provided in the regional city proclamations as to what constitutes ‘causing harm 
to the public interest’, or what ‘the public interest’ is for that matter. 
‘Endangering the constitutional order’ is also not clearly defined.   
Methods of intervention  
In some of the regions, for instance in Oromia, the regional government is 
allowed to automatically dissolve a city council when any one of the grounds for 
intervention is present.1613  In the Amhara, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, and SNNP 
regional states, the regional governments are authorised to suspend a city council 
in similar cases.1614 The suspension is undertaken temporarily and is meant to buy 
time to investigate the matter. In the meantime, the regional government will 
establish a provisional city government which will take care of the city’s affairs 
pending investigation. A new election will be conducted within six months if 
after investigation the regional council decides that the city council be 
dissolved.1615 
                                                 
1612 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 13 (2); AfRS Proclamation 33 (2006) Art 17 (2); BGRS 
Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 13 (2); ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 304 (1) `SNNPR 
Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 19 (2).  
1613 ORS Proclamation 65/2003; Art 30 (2). 
1614 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 13 (2); BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 13 (2); SNNPR 
Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 19 (2).  
1615 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 13(4); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 19(4). 
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2.5.3. Procedural safeguards against undue intervention  
The above discussion shows whether, when, and how the federal and regional 
governments may intervene in woredas and cities. The question that follows is 
whether a woreda or a city may defend itself from illegal regional or federal 
intervention. As was discussed above, the regional constitutions, except that of 
the Tigray, are silent on the issue of intervention, including on the issue of 
whether a woreda may challenge a regional intervention. The Tigray 
Constitution, even though has an intervention clause, is silent on whether and 
how a woreda may challenge an illegal regional intervention. Moreover each of 
the city proclamations of the SNNPR, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Oromia 
as well as the charters of the federal cities has an intervention clause. Yet, none of 
these proclamations provide whether or how a city may challenge an undue 
regional intervention. Only Proclamation 99 (2006) of Tigray and Proclamation 
86 (2010) of Benishangul-Gumuz provide that a woreda may provide a written 
explanation as to why the regional intervention should not take place. 1616 Even in 
this case, the final decision on whether the intervention should take place 
however remains with the regional council.  
   
The next related issue is whether a woreda or a city may approach a regional or a 
federal court challenging the legality of a regional or (in case of the federal cities) 
a federal intervention. There appears to be no constitutional or legal provision 
that hinders a woreda or a city from doing so. However, disputes relating to 
regional or federal intervention are likely to involve the interpretation of either 
the federal or a regional constitution. As was mentioned in chapter four, it is an 
                                                 
1616 TRS Proclamation 99 (2006) Art 58 (1) (d); BGRS Proclamation 86 (2010) Art 103 (1) (2). 
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unsettled matter whether a regional court may interpret a regional constitution in 
resolving disputes. It is also contestable whether a federal court may interpret the 
federal Constitution in similar cases. 1617 It is clear though that disputes involving 
the interpretation of regional constitution may be resolved by a Constitutional 
Interpretation Commission (CIC) or, in case of SNNPR, by the Council of 
Nationalities (CoN). 1618 The HoF has a final say on disputes involving the 
interpretation of the federal Constitution. 1619 Therefore, it may be argued that a 
woreda or regional city, other than those that are in SNNPR, may challenge the 
constitutionality of regional intervention by taking the matter to a regional CIC. A 
woreda or city in SNNPR may approach the CoN challenging the 
constitutionality of a regional intervention.  The federal cities may approach the 
HoF challenging the constitutionality of a federal intervention.    
2.6. Assessment  
The above section has dealt with the question as to whether, when, and how 
federal and regional governments may intervene in local government. There are 
some critical issues relating to intervention. First, none of the regional 
constitutions, except that of the Tigray, provides substantive criteria or 
mechanisms of intervention in ailing woredas and city administrations. Thus, it is 
not clear whether and how a regional government may intervene when a woreda 
fails to live up to its developmental mandate. In regional states such as Amhara 
and SNNPR where there are autonomous nationality zones above woredas, it is 
also unclear who has the constitutional mandate to intervene in a malfunctioning 
woredas that is located in a nationality zone. 
                                                 
1617 See chapter 4 § 3.2.3 & 3.3.3. 
1618 See chapter 7; § 2.3.2.2. 
1619 See chapter 4 ; § 3.2.1.2. 
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The failure of the regional constitutions to adequately regulate regional 
intervention is dangerous as regional governments may interpret the silence of the 
regional constitutions on the matter to mean that they have neither the authority 
nor the duty to intervene in underperforming woredas. This is however unlikely. 
What is likely and equally dangerous is that the regional states may interpret the 
silence of the regional constitutions to mean that there is no limit to their power 
of intervention. The regions may, therefore, resort to intervention in response to 
minor problems in otherwise a well-functioning woreda thereby excessively 
eroding its autonomy. The regional states may also resort to intervention to 
achieve selfish political ends. For instance, the regional governments may use 
intervention to undermine the authority of a woreda that is under the control of an 
opposition party. As was discussed above, some of the regional states, such as 
Benishangul-Gumuz, have attempted to define the grounds for and methods of 
intervention in their proclamations. However this has two flaws. First regional 
intervention has critical consequence on woreda autonomy. Therefore, it should 
not be regulated through ordinary legislation. It should be clearly provided in 
regional constitutions. 
 
Secondly, as the above discussion shows, the grounds for intervention are defined 
in the regional proclamation vaguely and broadly. As was discussed above, the 
grounds for intervention include endangering the constitutional order, failing to 
maintain peace and security, and causing harm to the public interest. Neither the 
Tigray Constitution nor the regional proclamations define what constitutes 
endangering the constitutional order. ‘Public interest’ is also not defined, nor 
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what constitutes ‘causing harm’ to it. In a scenario where a woreda or a city is 
controlled by a party other than the ruling party of a regional state, every little 
deviation of a woreda council, which is controlled by such a party, from the 
decision of a regional government may be interpreted as ‘endangering the 
constitutional order’ warranting intervention. Moreover, the substantive criteria 
are not only ill-defined, but also almost exclusively focused on security issues. A 
failure by a city to fulfill its state and municipal functions in a peaceful situation 
is not considered as a ground for intervention.  
 
Thirdly, the only mechanism for intervention that is provided in the Tigray 
Constitution and other regional proclamations is the dissolution of a woreda or 
city council and the establishment of a provisional administration. It is 
questionable whether it is appropriate to dissolve a woreda or city council for 
every allegation of failure to exercise its constitutional function. If ‘failure to 
exercise a constitutional function’ is generously interpreted, a woreda council 
may be dissolved just because one of its sectors, for instance education, is 
malfunctioning.  It may be argued that dissolving a woreda council is appropriate 
for a woreda political autonomy as it takes the matter back to the local 
community. However, the time and resources that will be wasted every time a 
woreda council is dissolved and new elections are held should also be considered. 
It is submitted that other methods of intervention should be used before resorting 
to the dissolution of a woreda council. One such method of intervention is the 
assumption of a woreda’s function by the regional government. Thus, for 
instance, the regional government may be allowed to take over the responsibility 
of providing primary education if a woreda education bureau fails to effect its 
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responsibility without the need to dissolve the woreda council. For instance, in 
South Africa the assumption of some of local government’s executive powers by 
a senior level of government, without a need to dissolve municipal councils, has 
been used as a method of intervention. This method ensured an uninterrupted 
service delivery in ailing municipalities.1620 This approach should be considered 
in Ethiopia, too.   
3. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN ETHIOPIA   
3.1. Introduction  
As stated in chapter two, co-operation between local government and senior 
levels government is as important as central supervision.1621 Co-operation aspires 
to harmonise activities, prevent disputes, and fill legislative gaps.1622 As stated 
previously, co-operation is expected to be based on equality among the various 
levels of government.1623 This requires a normative principle of co-operation 
which recognises the ‘institutional integrity’ of local government. Moreover, co-
operation should be conducted both horizontally (among local government units) 
and vertically (between local government and senior levels of government).  
 
In Ethiopia’s context, it is submitted, it is critical to create institutional systems 
for both horizontal and vertical co-operation.  There are many areas which require 
co-operation between two or more woredas and between woredas and cities. In 
many cases schools and clinics which are situated in one woreda serve residents 
                                                 
1620 Steytler & De Visser (2007).  
1621 See chapter 2; § 3.5.4.2. 
1622 See chapter 2; § 3.5.4.2. 
1623 See chapter 2; § 3.5.4.2. 
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of other woredas.1624 Financing and administering these facilities requires co-
operation between or among woredas. Moreover, cities and municipalities serve 
as political seats and economic and political centres of several woredas. This also 
requires clearly institutionalised city-woreda co-operation.  
 
In addition, as was discussed above, the federal and regional governments adopt 
policies on social and economic matters that are meant to be implemented by 
woredas and cities. Moreover, there are two, in some cases three, levels of sub-
national governments. As was discussed previously, the functional competences 
of each of the sub-regional governments are left undefined. It is, therefore, critical 
to create institutional arrangements for both horizontal and vertical co-operation.   
 
The following sections will examine the institutional framework for co-operation 
among the various levels of government in Ethiopia.   
3.2. Normative principles of co-operation in Ethiopia  
3.2.1. Under the FDRE Constitution 
The federal Constitution articulates a normative framework which recognises the 
regional states and the federal government as two autonomous orders of 
government. This normative framework enjoins the two orders of government to 
respect each other’s institutional integrity.1625 The Constitution is, however, 
completely silent on the institutional status of local government. Article 50(4) of 
the federal Constitution is too ambiguous and does not explicitly recognise local 
                                                 
1624 Solomon (2008). 
1625 The FDRE Constitution Article 50 (8) provides that ‘Federal and State powers are defined by 
this Constitution. The States shall respect the powers of the Federal Government. The Federal 
Government shall likewise respect the powers of the States’. 
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government as an equal partner of the regional and federal governments. It does 
not also explicitly articulate the normative principle that should guide the 
relationship between the Article 50(4) local government and the regional states. 
3.2.2. Under the regional constitutions  
All the regional constitutions explicitly state that the woreda remains a body 
hierarchically subordinate to the regional government despite having the power to 
decide on its internal affairs.1626 The regional constitutions of SNNPR and 
Gambella provide that the woreda is subordinate not only to the regional 
government but also to the nationality zone within which it is found.1627 The 
Constitution of the Benishangul-Gumuz region specifically states that a woreda is 
subordinate to the executive branch of the regional government.1628  
 
Cities and municipalities are not the creation of the regional constitutions even 
though their establishment has been implicitly required by the federal and 
regional constitutions.1629  They are the creatures of regional statutes. Therefore, 
their institutional status as an order of government is not explicitly recognised and 
their basic structure is not defined in the regional constitutions. Furthermore, the 
regional statutes which created cities plainly affirm the institutional subordination 
of the cities to the regional governments. Proclamation 65 (2003) of the Oromia 
region, for example, provides that the relationship between the regional 
government and the cities in the region will be ‘guided by [a] spirit of co-
                                                 
1626 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 84 (2); AfRS Constitution (2002) 74 (2); BGRS Constitution 
(2002) Art 85 (2); TRS Constitution (2001) Art 72 (2); AfRS Constitution (2002) 110 (2). 
1627 GRS Constitution (2002) Art 88 (2); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 91(2) 
1628 BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 85 (2). 
1629 See chapter 5; § 2.2.1.2. 
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operation, partnership, support’.1630 The Proclamation further states that this 
relationship (which is guided by a spirit of co-operation, partnership, support) is 
founded on the recognition of the accountability of cities to the regional 
government.1631 Likewise, the provision of the Amhara Proclamation which 
provides for the principle which governs the relationship between cities and the 
regional government, also asserts that cities are answerable to the regional 
government. 1632   
 
In brief, neither the FDRE Constitution nor the regional constitutions nor the city 
proclamations contain a normative principle that recognises the institutional 
status of a woreda or a city as an equal partner with the regional governments. On 
the contrary, the regional constitutions as well as the regional proclamations 
ascetically draw attention to the hierarchical subordination of local government.  
3.3. Horizontal co-operation 
As stated earlier, horizontal co-operation among local government units is crucial 
for addressing developmental issues that impact on more than one local unit. 1633  
In the Ethiopian context, this requires an institutionalised woreda-to-woreda, city-
to-city, and woreda-to-city, co-operation. The following section discusses how 
horizontal co-operation takes place.  
3.3.1. Co-operation between woredas 
The regional constitutions are silent on the issue of whether there can or should 
be a woreda-to-woreda co-operation and the institutional instruments for such co-
                                                 
1630 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 24(1). 
1631 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 24(1). 
1632 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003). 
1633 See chapter 2; § 3.5.4.2. 
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operation. Yet, there is no a legal impediment for such co-operation to take place. 
Moreover, some of the regional states have provided in their proclamations that 
woredas within a regional state may co-operate with each other. For instance, 
Proclamation 86 (2010) of the Benishangul-Gumuz provide that woredas with 
these regions may co-operate with each other.1634 The proclamation provides, the 
woredas within the regional state may establish an association to this effect. It 
also provides that neighbouring woredas in the region may create a joint 
committee to deal with common issues. 1635  
3.3.2. Co-operation among cities  
The principles for co-operation among the cities within a region as well as among 
cities of different regions are provided for in city proclamations. For instance, the 
Amhara Proclamation 91 (2003) provides that one of the municipalities in a 
woreda, where there are a number of municipalities, becomes ‘a leading 
municipality’.1636 The leading municipality will be responsible for co-ordinating 
the activities of, providing technical and engineering assistance to, and building 
the capacity of, the other municipalities in the woreda. It also has the 
responsibility to co-ordinate their human resource management and financial 
administration.1637  
 
The Amhara regional city Proclamation also provides for the establishment of 
‘amalgamated cities’ and ‘metropolitan cities’ which are expected to serve as 
                                                 
1634 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2006) Art 106. 
1635 BGRS Proclamation 86 (2006) Art 106. 
1636 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 37(1). 
1637 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 37(2) (a-g). 
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institutions of co-operation among cities.1638  An ‘amalgamated city’ is a 
gathering of small towns within a given radius that do not have their own city or 
municipal administrations.1639 According to the regional Proclamation, these 
small towns which are in close proximity to each other may come together to 
create a city.1640 However, the details of how the system of amalgamated cities 
operates are not clearly stated in the Proclamation. There is no also evidence 
demonstrating that amalgamated cities exist in fact; and not only in law.   
 
A ‘metropolitan city' is a city which is, supposedly, created through the coming 
together of several cities which have their own city or municipal 
administration.1641 It can be assumed that the cities which constitute a 
metropolitan city need to be situated in close geographical proximity to each 
other. Therefore, through co-operation, cities and municipalities in the Amhara 
region can create a larger urban government structure. Nevertheless, there is no 
evidence about whether there are in fact metropolitan cities in the region. 
 
A further institutional arrangement for co-operation among the cities within a 
region is the establishment of zonal1642 and regional associations of cities and 
municipalities. This is provided for in the city proclamations of some of the 
regional states including Amhara, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and SNNPR.1643 
                                                 
1638 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 2(4). 
1639 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 2(4). 
1640 ARS Proclamation 91(2003) Art 2(4). 
1641 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 2(4). 
1642 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 64 (2). 
1643 As stated previously very few urban settlements exist in the low land regions. Moreover, only 
the capitals of these regions have the status of a city or a municipality. Thus nothing is provided 
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The regional association of cities and municipalities is expected to promote co-
operation among them.1644 A cities’ association is expected to assist the cities in a 
region to build their capacity.  It is not clear whether there is an existing city 
association in any of these regions. It is unlikely that any city associations have 
been established in the lowland regions as at present the capital of each of these 
regions is the only existing viable city in those regions.  
 
The above formal arrangements are designed to facilitate co-operation among 
cities and municipalities of a specific regional state. This begs the question 
whether there may be co-operation among cities of different regions. It is 
provided in the regional city proclamations that each city may establish co-
operation with cities in a different region.1645 Thus, the cities of the different 
regions may come together to form a national cities’ association. However there 
is no a national legal framework that regulates co-operation among cities unless 
FDRE Proclamation 621 (2009), which regulates the establishment and operation 
of non-government organisations, may be considered as a national law governing 
the establishment of a national cities’ association. Therefore a city association 
may be established at national level as non-governmental organisation, not as 
public organs. Nonetheless, there is no institutional system that allows such an 
                                                                                                                                                        
about the possibility of establishing cities’ association in these regions. ARS Proclamation 91 
(2003) Art 64 (1); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 51(1); ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 
51(1).  
1644ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 66 (1); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 52 (1); ORS 
Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 52 (1). 
1645ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 66 (1); SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 52 (1); ORS 
Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 52 (1) 
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association to play a significant role at the federal government level other than, 
perhaps, acting as a lobbying group. 
3.3.3. ‘Rural-urban linkages’  
As discussed in chapter four, the need for the ‘rural-urban linkage’ was stressed 
in the federal policy papers. 1646 In particular it was envisioned by the federal 
government that urban areas would complement rural development by serving as 
market, service, and industrial centres.1647 This policy rationale is translated into 
law in the city proclamations and charters. The regional city proclamations state 
that, one of the objectives for the creation of cities and municipalities is to ‘help, 
guide, and accelerate’ rural development.1648 Three mechanisms for the 
integration of rural and urban local government are provided for in the city 
proclamations. The first one is the creation of municipalities within a larger rural 
woreda structure.1649  The municipalities are allowed to carry out municipal 
functions. Simultaneously, they serve as political, administrative, and economic 
centres of the woreda within which they are found.   
 
The second mechanism for integration is the representation of surrounding rural 
kebeles in a city council. For instance, the Proclamation 16 (2006) of Oromia 
provides that at least 20 percent of the seats in a city should be reserved for the 
surrounding rural kebeles.1650 Proclamation 103 (2006) of SNNPR also envisages 
elections for a city council in the rural kebeles surrounding a city. Despite the fact 
                                                 
1646 See chapter 4; §.5.3.4. 
1647 See chapter 4; §.5.3.4. 
1648 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Preamble; SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Preamble; ORS 
Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 7(8). 
1649 See chapter 4; § 6.1.2.1. 
1650 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 2 (5). 
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that this arrangement may have other, less benign, objectives,1651 it still serves the 
purpose of integrating cities and rural areas. The boundary of the city of Dire 
Dawa is also demarcated in such a manner that certain rural kebeles are included 
within the city so that that may be represented in its City Council.1652 It could be 
argued that the representation of rural kebeles in city councils is not a mechanism 
for co-operation between two distinct units of local government as those who are 
elected in the rural kebeles become full members of the city council. However, it 
cannot be gainsaid that the representatives who are elected from rural kebele may 
create a link between rural kebeles and cities thereby serving as means of co-
operation.  
 
The creation of a joint committee is the third mechanism of integration or co-
operation between rural and urban local government. The Oromia, SNNPR, 
Amhara, Afar, and Benishangul-Gumuz city proclamations provide that a joint 
committee may be established between a rural woreda and a city.1653 The joint 
committee is expected to identify social and economic matters affecting both the 
rural and urban populations, seek solutions for common problems, and make 
                                                 
1651 As will be argued in chapter 7, the real motive behind this arrangement is to ensure that 
members of an indigenous ethnic group of the area hold the majority seats in the city council and 
to exclude non-indigenous communities.  
1652 FDRE Proclamation 416 (2004) Art 4.  
1653 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) 46; BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 39; AfRS Constitution 
33 (2005) Art 21; SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) 36 (1); ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 28. 
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recommendations to the political organs of the local government.1654  The 
committee is also mandated to resolve border disputes. 1655    
3.4. Vertical co-operation: Forums for inter-governmental relations  
As argued above there are many areas which require co-operation between 
woredas or cities and nationality zones, regional states and the federal 
government. However, the regional constitutions provide no clear direction as to 
how the various levels of sub-national governments may come together to solve 
the problems that arise from the unclear division of functional competences. 
There is no deliberately designed institutional forum for interaction between 
woredas or cities and regional states and/or nationality zones. A careful perusal of 
the regional constitutions and city and sectoral proclamations however points to 
some mediums which are or may be used as forums for inter-governmental 
relations. These are: nationality zone councils, associations of cities and 
municipalities, and sectoral offices. Practice also suggests the existence of certain 
informal forums of IGR. 
3.4.1. Nationality zone council as forum for IGR 
As discussed in chapter four, in Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella a 
portion of the seats in a nationality zone council are occupied by representatives 
of woreda councils. Members of a regional council who are elected from the 
constituencies within the nationality zone occupy the rest of the seats.1656 Thus, in 
these three regions, woreda and the regional government representatives meet in 
the nationality zone councils.  In some sense, therefore, a nationality council can 
                                                 
1654 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 46; ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 28; SNNPR 
Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 36 (1). 
1655 ARS Proclamation 91 (2003) Art 46; ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 28; SNNPR 
Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 36 (1). 
1656 See chapter 4; § 6.5.1.   
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be considered as a forum of IGR for the three orders of government, viz., 
regional, zonal and woreda. However, it should be noted that nationality zone 
councils are not designed to serve as forums for IGR. It is also unclear whether 
members of a nationality zone council who are selected from constituencies 
within the zone act in their individual capacity or in their capacity as the 
representatives of the woreda from whose council they are selected.  It is also 
unclear in what capacity those who are also members of the regional council act 
in the nationality zone. Yet, it can be assumedthat in this council the interests of 
the woredas as well as those of the regional state are or can be raised and debated.  
3.4.2. Local government associations  
As stated above, certain regional proclamations provide that regional associations 
of woredas and cities and municipalities may be established. The Proclamation 65 
(2003) of Oromia provides that such an association will represent cities 
collectively and express their views on matters of common interest’.1657 However, 
the Proclamation does not indicate the forum wherein the association may express 
these views. Proclamation 103 (2006) of SNNPR also provides that a city 
association may represent ‘cities collectively, express their views on matters of 
their common interest [and] lobby [the regional] government for revision of 
laws’.1658 The association of cities in the Amhara regional state, as provided for 
Proclamation 91 (2003), is intended to exercise function similar to those of in the 
other regions.1659   
 
                                                 
1657 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 52 (2). 
1658 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) Art 52. 
1659 ARS Proclamation  91 (2003) Art 66. 
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There is no evidence showing whether a regional association of woredas or cities 
and municipalities has been established in any of the regional states. It should be 
noted that even if such an association is in fact established, it is not expected to be 
a ‘negotiating partner’ that represents the interests of cities at regional level. A 
regional government is not, for instance, required to consult such an association 
before passing a certain decision affecting the cities within the jurisdiction of the 
relevant regional state. Therefore, it seems that such an association of woredas or 
cities is meant to be merely an informal lobbying group.   
 
There is no federal law that specifically provides for the establishment of a 
national association of woredas, cities, and municipalities which promotes the 
interest of cities at federal level.  There is no also evidence as to whether such an 
organisation exists in the country.  
3.4.3. Communication through sectoral offices  
There is no institution of co-operation that brings together regional executive 
organs and their counterparts at woreda and city levels. However, frequent 
communication takes place between woredas, cities, and senior level 
governments (nationality zone and regional governments) through sectoral 
offices.1660 Regional or zonal bureaus of education and health, for instance, 
interact with their woreda counterparts. There are also regional bureaus with 
crosscutting functions. For instance, regional and woreda or city bureaus of 
capacity building and urban development communicate with a number of other 
sectoral offices. The most important communication on a sectoral basis, however, 
is the one between regional or nationality zone bureaus of finance and economic 
                                                 
1660 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008); Heymans & Mussa (2004). 
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development and their woreda equivalents.1661 Regional bureaus of finance and 
economic development are in constant communication with woreda bureaus with 
respect to financial and developmental matters. Block grants and other financial 
assistance are transferred to woreda through these regional bureaus of finance and 
economic development and received and administered by its woreda 
counterparts.1662 
 
 As stated previously, a woreda in a nationality zone is not expected to have 
direct communication with regional sectoral offices. Rather, the nationality 
zone’s sectoral offices deal directly with their regional counterpart. For instance, 
in SNNPR, the regional government does not transfer block grants directly to the 
woredas but to the zonal bureau of finance and economic development.1663 In 
some regions, such as the Oromia region, there are zonal administrations which 
are ‘deconcentrated arms’ of the regional governments. The zonal administrations 
‘serve as immediate points of referral for local governments’ dealings with 
regional or federal government on service delivery matters related to health, 
education, roads, and other sectors.1664 
 
It should be underscored that co-operation through sectoral offices is not 
statutorily institutionalised. Hence it is up to each regional and woreda sectoral 
office to decide when, where, and how often to meet and to determine the agenda 
to be discussed. Little is known about the extent to which these sectoral 
                                                 
1661 Heymans & Mussa (2004) 9 
1662 Heymans & Mussa (2004) 9-10. 
1663 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 24. 
1664 Heymans & Mussa (2004) 9. 
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interactions serve as mediums for communicating local government interests to 
the senior levels of government. 
3.5. Assessment  
3.5.1. Co-operation between unequal  
As stated before, co-operation between local government and a senior level of 
government presupposes equality between the two levels of government. This, in 
turn, presupposes the recognition of the institutional integrity of the two levels of 
government. The regional constitutions and city proclamations, however, have 
not elevated the status of local government to that of being an equal partner of the 
regional states. Nor do they protect the institutional integrity of local government. 
Rather, the regional constitutions and city proclamations underscore the 
subordinate status of woredas and cities to the regional governments. In so doing, 
the regional constitutions and city proclamations maintain the old hierarchical 
local administrative structure. Consequently, any interaction that takes place 
between a nationality zone or a regional state and a woreda or a city is in 
principle founded on the inferior status of the latter.  
 
According to the World Bank it is a ‘universal lesson’ of the past several decades 
that any endeavour to promote development through decentralisation needs to 
replace the ‘hierarchical system of governance characteristic of centrali[s]ed 
systems’.1665 It is submitted that this lesson is also applicable to Ethiopia. 
Therefore, if woredas and city are to play a significant developmental role, the 
hierarchical relations between them and regional government should be 
reconsidered. This may require replacing the provisions in the regional 
                                                 
1665  World Bank (1998) 112. 
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constitutions which cause local government to be a subordinate structure with 
provisions that recognise and protect the institutional integrity of woredas and 
cities.  
3.5.2. Horizontal co-operation  
As was discussed earlier, the federal policy papers recognised the importance of 
the ‘rural-urban linkage’ for development. 1666 Moreover, these interactions are 
more or less clearly institutionalised in the city proclamations. The provisions for 
the creation of municipalities in woredas, the representation of rural kebeles in 
cities, and the establishment of joint committees between rural woredas and cities 
are commendable and innovative institutional arrangements in this regard. 
However, it is unclear to what extent these institutions of horizontal co-operation, 
which are envisioned in the regional constitutions and proclamations, are 
established and have become operational.   
3.5.3. Vertical co-operation  
As was discussed above, the manner in which nationality zone councils are 
composed makes them forums for co-operation for three levels of government.  
Yet nationality zone councils have not been deliberately designed to serve as 
forums for co-operation. It is also not clear whether in fact nationality zones serve 
as forums of co-operation. Even if they do, they do not exist in all regions. Nor 
are they found in every part of the regional state where they are established.   
 
Local government interacts with regional government through the latter’s sectoral 
offices. The interactions between the regional sectoral offices and their 
counterparts at woreda and city level are not institutionalised or regulated. 
                                                 
1666  See chapter 4; § 5.3.4. 
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Moreover, woreda and city associations are not formally represented either at 
regional levels or nationality zone level. There is also no an institutional 
mechanism that allows the voices of woredas and cities to be heard at federal 
level even though the policies and laws of the federal government have an 
important impact on local government. 1667   
 
Ethiopia is not the only federal country that does not have an institutional 
arrangement for the representation of local government at national level. Inter-
governmental co-operation in federal systems is generally limited to the central 
government and the states. Local government may then participate in a system of 
inter-governmental co-operation between itself and the state governments. It, 
however, seldom makes direct contact with the national government.1668  In many 
federal states there are no formal inter-governmental forums for local-federal 
interaction. Only informal interactions take place where ‘organized local 
governments act as lobby groups rather than negotiation partners’.1669 In fact, the 
states do not welcome direct contact between local government and national 
government.1670 Lacking constitutionally entrenched representation at federal 
level, for instance, the German local government lobbies its interests through 
local government associations, such as, the German Association of Cities and the 
                                                 
1667 See above at § 2.2.1. 
1668 Steytler (2005) 7. 
1669 Steytler (2009) 428. 
1670 Lazar and Seal wrote that in Canada the states of Quebec and Ontario opposed any direct 
relation between the municipalities and the national government. They preferred any deal between 
the municipalities and the national government to be made through their mediation. Lazar & Seal 
(2005) 41. 
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German Association of Towns and Municipalities.1671  In Canada, the relations 
between local government and national government are mostly limited to 
deciding whether local government qualifies for federal spending 
programmes.1672 The local - provincial and local - federal relationships are top-
down, in which local government is a mere ‘policy taker’ not a ‘full partner’.1673 
In Australia, too, the Constitution does not provide for direct interaction between 
local government and the national government.1674   
 
This does not, however, mean that local government associations may not be 
allowed to represent local government in the national government and serve more 
important purposes. In Austria, for instance, local government has a constitutional 
consultative position which it exercises through the Austrian Association of Cities 
and Towns and the Austrian Association of Municipalities.1675  The South African 
Constitution provides that organised local government should be consulted by 
national and provincial governments and be represented in the National Council 
of Provinces (NCOP), the second chamber of the South African Parliament.1676 
Accordingly, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) 
represents local government in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), the 
upper chamber of the South African Parliament. Moreover it plays a central role 
in facilitating co-operation among municipalities. 1677   
                                                 
1671 Burgi (2009) 155. 
1672 Young (2009) 120. 
1673 Young (2009) 120. 
1674 Sansom (2009) 22; Steytler (2009) 427. 
1675 Kiefer & Schausberger (2009) 47. 
1676 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) S 163 (b). 
1677 Steytler & De Visser (2007) 16-11. 
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Clearly, no mechanism exists in Ethiopia which allows the voice of local 
government to be heard at national level. The EPRDF party structure, therefore,  
seems to play the most significant role as the medium of communication between 
local government and senior levels of government. 1678  This is perhaps the most 
important reason that jurisdictional disputes among the various tiers of 
government almost never occur.1679    
3. CONCLUSION  
The discussion in this chapter shows that both the federal and regional 
governments are authorised, explicitly or implicitly, to co-ordinate the activities 
of woredas and cities. The regional governments are expected to play a leading 
role in terms of regulating the activities of local government, the latter being 
within the former’s competence. The regional states also play the leading role in 
monitoring woredas and cities. In practice, however, the federal government 
plays a dominant role in regulating local government activities.    
   
There is a general normative principle for co-operation between regional 
governments and local government.   However, co-operation between the orders 
of government takes place with the subordinate status of local government in 
mind. Even if there is a principle in various regional laws requiring linkages 
between woredas and cities, the institutional mechanisms that are provided are 
limited to linking cities and neighbouring woredas. No institutional arrangement 
is provided for region-wide and nation-wide co-operation between cities and 
woredas.    
                                                 
1678  This is true for for federal-regional relations. See Assefa (2007a) 383 ff. 
1679  Assefa (2007a) 383 ff. 
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The previous two chapters have dealt with the issue of decentralised development 
in Ethiopia. The second main issue that this thesis seeks to discuss is whether and 
how local government serves as institutional mechanism for accommodating 
ethnic minorities-more specifically intra-regional ethnic minorities. The following 
chapter will deal with this matter.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7  
Decentralisation and accommodation of intra-regional ethnic minorities in 
Ethiopia 
1. INTRODUCTION  
One of the two principal objectives of this study is to inquire whether Ethiopia’s 
local government system demonstrates the institutional features that are necessary 
for accommodating ethnic minorities in each of Ethiopia’s regional states. This 
chapter deals with this particular issue. In chapter two, it has been shown, on the 
basis of international literature, that ethnic minorities may exercise self-rule at 
local level. The institutional features of territorial autonomy also were identified. 
These include: a constitutional norm permitting ethnic minorities to exercise self-
rule, ethnically organised local territorial units, political and administrative 
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structures, and relevant competences and powers. It was also shown that ethnic 
minorities may be represented in central government institutions that have the 
power to make decision directly affecting their autonomy at local level. This 
chapter examines how these institutional principles are given effect in Ethiopia’s 
constitutional system.  
 
To this end, § 2 will briefly discuss the normative principle under the FDRE 
Constitution allowing intra-regional minority ethnic communities to enjoy 
territorial autonomy at local level and to be represented in federal and regional 
governments. Next, § 3 will discuss territorial autonomy and self-rule as a 
mechanism for accommodating intra-regional ethnic minorities. § 4 will deal with 
the principle of shared rule, followed by a discussion in § 5 on the institutional 
arrangements for accommodating territorially dispersed ethnic communities.  
   
2. TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AT LOCAL  
2.1. Normative principle for self-rule under FDRE Constitution  
Even before the promulgation of the FDRE Constitution in 1995, the Transitional 
Period Charter (TPC) contained a principle of ‘self-rule'.1680 This principle 
empowered each ethnic community in the country, intra-regional minority ethnic 
communities included, to exercise territorial autonomy in the territory it 
inhabited. In this respect the Charter explicitly recognised the right to self-
determination of each ethnic community as one of the political principles that 
would govern the country.1681 It also recognised the right of each ethnic 
                                                 
1680 See chapter 3; § 7.2.1.1. 
1681 See chapter 3; § 7.2.1.1. See also the Transitional Period Charter (TPC) 1991; Preamble. 
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community to administer its own affairs within the territory it inhabited.1682 The 
TPC also provided for the creation of ethnically structured regional and local 
territorial entities. With a view to implementing this principle, the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia (TGE) enacted Proclamation 7 (1992) which identified 
63 territorially concentrated ethnic communities.1683 Out of the 63 ethnic 
communities, 47 were declared able to establish their own self-government 
starting from the woreda. 1684  
 
The TPC was not limited to providing the principle of self-rule. It also contained 
the principle of ‘shared rule’ which entitled each ethnic community of the country 
to be represented in regional and national government organs.1685 
 
The principle of the right to self-determination of each ethnic community of 
Ethiopia became constitutionally entrenched when the 1995 Constitution was 
promulgated. Under the FDRE Constitution, a group of people is considered to be 
an ethnic community when, among other things, the group is found in contiguous 
territorial areas.1686 An ethnic community, which by definition occupies clearly 
defined territory, is constitutionally entitled to exercise self-rule in the territory it 
occupies either through the establishment of a regional state or ethnically 
organised local government unit. 1687  
 
                                                 
1682 TPC (1991) Art 2 (b). 
1683 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 3 (1). 
1684 See chapter 3; § 7.2.1.1. 
1685 TPC (1991) Art 2 (b).  
1686 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (5). 
1687 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3). 
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The FDRE Constitution, like the TPC, also contains the principle of ‘shared rule’. 
The specific provision of the FDRE Constitution that recognises the right to self-
government of ethnic communities also entitles them to an ‘equitable 
representation in regional and federal government’.1688 This provision of 
Constitution is interpreted to require the representation of all ethnic communities 
in all branches of regional and federal governments including the representative 
assemblies, the executive branches, and the civil service.1689  
 
The following sections will examine how the elements of self-rule and shared rule 
are given effect to at local level in the regional constitutions and in political 
practice.   
2.2. Self-rule at local level  
As stated in chapter two, self-rule promotes political autonomy.1690  It, therefore, 
first and foremost entails the establishment of local territorial units whose 
boundaries are delimited along the geographical settlement structure of a minority 
ethnic community which seeks to exercise territorial autonomy.1691 Secondly, it 
calls for the establishment of government institutions in the territorial area so 
demarcated. The government institutions must include political organs, such as, a 
representative council, executive organs, and administrative organs. Thirdly, self-
rule involves transferring clearly defined competences to the local unit. The 
competences must also be relevant for promoting and protecting the identity of 
the particular minority ethnic community. Fourthly, self-rule entails transferring 
                                                 
1688 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3). 
1689 Yonatan (2010) 232. 
1690 See chapter 2; 4.4.2.1. 
1691 See chapter 2; 4.4.2.1. 
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internal financial sources to the ethnic-based local territorial units. The following 
sections will examine whether these elements of self-rule are found in the 
regional constitutions.  
2.2.1. Ethnically organised local territorial units  
As was indicated earlier, Proclamation 7 (1992) identifies 63 territorially 
concentrated intra-regional ethnic minority communities in six regional states, 
namely Amhara, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, SNNPR, and Tigray.1692 
The Proclamation also provides that 47 of the 63 ethnic communities can 
establish self-government starting from woreda level.1693 Accordingly, the 
aforementioned regional states, with the exception of the Tigray Regional 
State,1694 have provided in their constitutions for the creation of ethnic-based 
local territorial units. The territorial units are meant to provide territorial 
autonomy to the intra-regional minority ethnic communities which are found 
within the boundaries of these five regional states.  
 
The ethnic-based local territorial units are established either at zonal level as 
nationality zones (special zones) or at woreda level as liyu woredas (special 
districts).1695  As described in chapter four, a nationality zone covers two or more 
woredas while a liyu woreda is equivalent to a regular woreda in terms of 
                                                 
1692 See chapter 3; § 7.2.1.1.This is excluding the Amhara, Oromo, Tigrawi, Somali, Hareri, and 
Afar, which have their own regional states. 
1693 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 3(1) & (2). 
1694 The Irob and Kunama ethnic communities, the two intra-regional minority ethnic communities 
in the Tigray region, are among the ethnic communities that are declared incompetent to establish 
self-government. See Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 3 (2) (a).  
1695 See chapter 4 § 6.2. 
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territorial and population sizes.1696 There are 29 ethnic-based local territorial units 
in Ethiopia. Most of these territorial units (14 nationality zones and four liyu 
woredas) are found in the SNNPR. Afar has one liyu woreda, Amhara has three 
nationality zones and one liyu woreda, Gambella has three nationality zones and 
one liyu woreda  and Benishangul has two liyu woredas. 
 
The Afar, Amhara, and Gambella regional Constitutions specifically indicate the 
ethnic community for which a nationality zone or a liyu woreda is established. 1697 
The regional constitutions of SNNPR and Benishangul-Gumuz simply provide 
for the establishment of a nationality zone and/or a liyu woreda without 
specifying the ethnic community/communities for whom these territorial units are 
to be established. 1698 
  
The Afar regional Constitution explicitly provides for the establishment of a liyu 
woreda for the Argoba ethnic community.1699 The Amhara regional Constitution 
also explicitly provides that a nationality zone will be established for each of the 
Himra, Awi, and Oromo ethnic communities.1700  Accordingly, two nationality 
zones called Waag-Himra and Awi have been created for the Himra and Awi 
ethnic communities, respectively.  The Oromo nationality zone is established for 
the Oromo ethnic communities in the Amhara regional state, since the Oromos in 
                                                 
1696 See chapter 4 § 6.2. 
1697 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 73 (1); AfRS Constitution (2001); GRS Constitution (2001) Art 
77 (1). 
1698 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 80 (1); BGRS Constitution (2001) Art 74(1). 
1699 The Argoba ethnic community was not mentioned in Proclamation 7/1992 even as an ethnic 
community, let alone as capable of establishing self-government. AfRC (2002) Art 43 (2). 
1700 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 73 (1). 
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the particular area are among original inhabitants of the region.1701 Moreover, a 
part of the Argoba ethnic community, which is original inhabitant of the Amhara 
region as well as to Afar, is given its own liyu woreda in the regional state. 
However, neither the Argoba ethnic community nor the Argoba liyu woreda is 
mentioned in the regional Constitution. The liyu woreda is, therefore, created in a 
regional proclamation.1702   
 
The Gambella regional Constitution specifically provides that the Anywaa (or 
Anuak), Nuer and Mejenger ethnic communities will have their own nationality 
zones.1703 Accordingly, three nationality zones and one liyu woreda are 
established in Gambella; Anywaa zone, Nuer Zone, Majenger Zone and Itang liyu 
woreda. 1704  The Anywaa zone is, as the name itself indicates, established for the 
Anywaa ethnic community, the Nuer Nationality Zone belongs to the Nuer ethnic 
community and the Majang Zone for the Majenger ethnic community. In this 
region, Article 39 local government units are created on a wall-to-wall basis. 
Hence, every part of the regional state falls under either one of the two nationality 
zones or the Godere liyu woreda. No territorial regime is established in the 
Gambella region for the Opo and Komo ethnic communities. The regional 
Constitution, however, enjoins the existing nationality zones to allow these intra-
                                                 
1701 As mentioned before, Oromia is reserved as a mother state of the Oromo ethnic group; the 
largest ethnic group of the country. Yet there are Oromo enclaves in the Amhara region. Thus, the 
Oromo nationality zone was established by bringing together five woredas whose inhabitants 
were predominantly Oromos. Mohammed (2010) 147. 
1702 See ARS Proclamation 130 (2006). 
1703 GRS Constitution (2002) Art 77 (1). 
1704 FDRE Population Census Commission (2008) 81 . 
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zonal ethnic minorities to administer themselves at kebele level.1705 The 
Constitution also requires the nationality zones to ensure the representation of 
these ethnic communities in the zones’ councils.1706     
 
As indicated above, the SNNPR and the Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
Constitutions provide for the establishment of nationality zones and liyu woredas 
as the second orders of government within the regions.1707 Neither of these 
Constitutions, however, mentions the specific ethnic community for whom a 
nationality zone or a liyu woreda is to be established.  
 
The Constitution of the SNNPR provides a general principle that each liyu 
woreda or nationality zone will be delimited on the basis of the settlement 
pattern, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned.1708 The regional 
Constitution also authorises the Council of Nationalities (CoN) - the second 
chamber of the regional government – to decide on matters relating to the 
establishment of nationality zones and liyu woredas.1709 It should be noted none 
of the Amhara, Gambella, Afar, and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states have 
more than five territorially concentrated intra-regional minority ethnic 
communities. It was, therefore, fairly easy for these regional states to territorially 
accommodate the minority communities within their boundaries. Establishing 
ethnic-based territorial units was not, however, an easy task in SNNPR where 
                                                 
1705 GRS Constitution (2002) Art 47(1). 
1706 GRS Constitution (2002) 47(3).   
1707 BGRS Constitution (2002) 74 (1); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 81(1). 
1708 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 45 (2). 
1709 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 59 (2). For more discussion on the CoN see below at § 
2.3.2.1. 
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more than 45 ethnic communities are found. It was also not practical to list in the 
regional Constitution all the nationality zones and liyu woredas in the region, or 
the ethnic communities for which such territorial units were to be established. 
That seems to be the reason why the regional Constitution of SNNPR provides 
only the procedure by which an ethnic community can petition for a nationally 
zone or a liyu woreda, and the organ that has the power to decide on such 
petitions.  
 
As indicated above, there are 14 nationality zones and four liyu woredas in 
SNNPR.1710  The nationality zones are: Hadiya, Gurage, Keffa, Sheka, Sidama, 
Silte, Wolayita, Dawro, Gedeo, Bench-Maji, South Omo, Gamo-Gofa, and 
Kemabat-Tembaro. 1711 There is a dominant ethnic community in each of the first 
                                                 
1710 Official website of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional Government 
website http://www.snnprs.gov.et (last visited on 27 February 2012) 
As was discussed in chapter 3, five regions were created during the transitional period in the area 
which is now known as the SNNPR. The regions were Gurage-Hadiya, Kemabata, Wolayita, 
Omo, and Sidamo. Each of these regions held between 5 to 10 distinct ethnic communities most 
of which were, according to Proclamation 7 (1992) capable of establishing their own self-
government starting from woreda. In the 1990s the five regions arguably agreed to merge together 
and form what is now called the SNNPR. The agreement was based on Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 
3 (2) (b) which allowed the regional states to come together to form a larger region by agreement. 
The former five regions were, therefore, reduced to the status of nationality zones after the 
amalgamation. Some of the former regions became multiethnic nationality zones. The nationality 
zones and liyu woredas which were established within the former regions were restructured 
separately.  
1711 The official website of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples 
http://www.snnprs.gov.et (last accessed on 27 February 2012). The number of nationality zones 
and liyu woredas in the SNNPR has changed over the past years. In some cases new nationality 
zones were created and in other instances existing nationality zones were amalgamated. Their 
boundaries were redrawn. In few cases separate nationality zones which were amalgamated were 
again divided into their former constituents. For instance, initially Wolayita, Gamo-Gofa, and 
Dawro were lumped together in one multi-ethnic nationality zone known as North Omo 
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seven nationality zones, even though none of the nationality zones are ethnically 
homogenous.1712  The Kembata-Temabaro and Gamo-Goafa nationality zones 
have two large yet non-dominant ethnic communities; the Kembata and Tembaro 
and the Gamo and Gofa respectively. Moreover, there are other ethnic minorities 
and ethnic migrants amidst these ethnic communities. The Bench-Maji and South 
Omo nationality zones are multi-ethnic nationality zones. For instance in the 
South Omo nationality zone more than 16 distinct ethnic communities live.1713  
 
The liyu woredas in SNNPR are the Alaba, Basketo, Konta, and Yem. 1714  Each 
of these liyu woredas has a dominant ethnic community. Moreover, each liyu 
woreda bears the name of the dominant ethnic community for whom it is 
established. This does not, however, mean that these liyu woredas are ethnically 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nationality Zone. Later, the North Omo nationality zone was divided into three nationality zones 
(Daro, Gamo-Gofa and Wolayita) and two liyu woredas (Basketo and Konta).  The Keffa and 
Sheka nationality zones were merged together to form the Keffa-Shecka Nationality Zone before 
the latter was once again divided into its constituting units. The Bench-Maji zone is also a result 
of the union of two pre-existing nationality zones: the Bench and the Maji. The Silte Nationality 
Zone is the other nationality zone which was established as a result of the division of the Gurage 
Nationality Zone.  Previously, the woredas in the present day Silte Nationality Zone formed part 
of the Gurge Nationality Zone. It was only in a referendum held in April 2000 that Silte was 
recognised as an ethnic community which is distinct from the Gurage. After the referendum the 
woredas which are predominantly Silte were brought together to form a new nationality zone. See 
Vaughn (2003).  
1712 Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia: SNNPR (2007) 154 ff. 
1713 Van der Beken (2007) 136. 
1714 Intially there were eight liyu woredas which inlcuded Amaro, Burji, Derashe, and  Konso liyu 
woredas. These four liyu woredas were however merged together in 2011 into one zone called 
Segen zone. Official website of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State 
http://www.snnprs.gov.et (last visited on 27 February 2012). 
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homogenous.  For instance, there are three very small ethnic communities in the 
Derashe liyu woreda, not to mention the ethnic migrants in the liyu woreda.1715  
 
It is important to note that in SNNPR, Article 39 local government is established 
on a wall-to-wall basis. Hence, every part of SNNPR falls into one of the 22 
nationality zones and liyu woredas. Consequently all of the Article 50 (4) local 
government units (woredas and cities) are found within the territorial jurisdiction 
of an Article 39 local government unit in this regional state. This makes the 
region, as Assefa and Mohammed observe, something akin to an ethnic federation 
within a larger ethnic federation. 1716    
 
The Benishangul-Gumuz regional Constitution provides for the creation of ethnic 
territorial units. 1717  However, the regional Constitution does not indicate which 
of the five ethnic communities of the region would have its own nationality zone 
or liyu woreda. The regional government has issued a Proclamation 
(Proclamation 73 (2008)) which specifically provides that each of the five ethnic 
communities of the region can establish a ‘Nationality Council’.1718   The ethnic 
communities are the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, and Kono. 1719 It is unclear 
from the Proclamation whether these ethnic communities may have their own 
nationality zone or liyu woreda.   
 
                                                 
1715 Van der Beken (2007) 136. 
1716 Assefa & Mohammed (2010) 155.  
1717 BGRS Constitution (2002) 74 (1).  
1718 BGRS Proclamation 73 (2008) Art 3 (2).  
1719 BGRS Proclamation 73 (2008) Art 3 (2).  
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In any case, nationality zones are yet to be established in the Benishangul-
Gumuz. Instead three administrative zones are established in the region: Assossa, 
Kemashi, and Metekel. 1720 The Assossa administrative zone is viewed as the 
domain of the Berta ethnic community.1721 The Kemashi and Metekel 
administrative zones are regarded the ‘domains’ of the Gumuz ethnic 
community.1722 An administrative zone – in contrast to a nationality zone - is not 
an autonomous level of government; but a deconcentrated unit of the regional 
government.1723  
 
Two liyu woredas, Pawe, 1724 and Mao-Komo, have been established in the 
Binshangul-Gumuz region.1725 The Mao-Komo liyu woreda is a bi-ethnic liyu 
woreda which is established, as the name indicates, for the Mao and Komo ethnic 
communities.1726 The Pawe liyu woreda1727 is the only local unit that established 
as an autonomous territorial unit for ethnic migrants. 1728    
                                                 
1720 Berhanu (2007) 160. 
1721 Berhanu (2007) 160. 
1722 Berhanu (2007) 160 
1723 See chapter 4; § 6.1.  
1724 Proclamation 86 (2010) of Benishangul-Gumuz region refers to Pawe as regular woreda, not 
as liyu woreda.  
1725 Berhanu (2007) 160. 
1726 Berhanu (2007) 160. 
1727 Pawe, which is found within the Metekel administrative zone, was established as a settlement 
area by the Derg during the implementation of its Beles-Vally villagisation programme. In 1980s 
tens of thousands of people were moved from the former Gojjam and Wollo provinces as well as 
Kembata and Wolayita areas of the present SNNPR to be settled in Pawe area. These settlers have 
formed a distinct community in the past 30 or so years. However, after the formation of the 
Benishangul-Gumz region in the 1990s, these communities were excluded from the regional and 
local politics despite their sheer numbers and the fact that they occupy largely contiguous 
territorial areas. They were excluded for the mere reason that they were non-indigenous to the 
region. Angered by their political exclusion, the settlers were engaged in incessant conflict with 
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2.2.1.1. Assessment  
Self-rule at local level, first and foremost, necessitates the demarcation of a local 
territorial unit wherein an intra-regional ethnic minority community becomes the 
dominant group. As the preceding discussion clearly indicates, the FDRE 
Constitution provides a general normative principle which permits intra-regional 
ethnic communities to exercise self-rule at local level. The discussion also 
demonstrates that five multi-ethnic regional states have created ethnically defined 
local territorial units to provide territorial autonomy for the ethnic minorities 
within their boundaries. The other four regions do not have created Article 39 
local government unit.  The reasons seems to be that, as per Proclamation 7 
(1992), only these five regional states and the Tigray regional state have 
territorially structured intra-regional ethnic minority communities.1729 Indeed the 
Irob and Kunama ethnic communities, which are found in the Tigray regional 
states, are territorially structured. However, they are among the ethnic 
communities that are declared in Proclamation 7 (1992) to be too small to 
exercise territorial autonomy even at woreda level.1730 Proclamation 7 (1992) 
does not indicate the existence of any territorially organised intra-regional 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Gumuz which are found in the surrounding areas. In 1993, the EPRDF pressurised the 
regional government to establish Pawe as a liyu woreda for the settlers. Pawe’s status as liyu 
woreda not only has relieved it of its accountability to the Metekel administrative zone but also 
allowed the settlers to be represented in the regional legislative and executive organs. Pawe is the 
only known autonomous sub-regional territorial unit which is established for a non-indigenous 
ethnic community. The establishment of a liyu woreda in Pawe apparently became possible due to 
the relatively identifiable geographical settlement pattern of the settlers in the region. Wolde 
Selassie (1997) 63; Asnake (2009) 169. 
1728 It is alleged that the Amhara settlers in the Wollega Administrative Zone of the Oromia 
Regional States had petitioned for their own Nationality Zone which apparently has not 
materialised. See Tesfaye (2011) 51. 
1729 See chapter 3 § 7.2.1.1. 
1730 See chapter 3 § 7.2.1.1. 
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minority ethnic community in the Oromia and Somali regional states.1731 Hareri is 
so small a city state that it does not even have a woreda which is recognised in 
the region’s Constitution. Therefore, it is not surprising that these four regions did 
not create ethnically organised local territorial unit. The establishment of 
territorial regimes in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa is simply out of the question. 
These are cosmopolitan cities and melting pots for all ethnic communities of the 
country.  Now, what remains is to evaluate the merits and demerits of this 
arrangement. The advantages and disadvantages of establishment the ethnic-
based local territorial units are assessed as below.   
The benefit of local territorial autonomy  
The establishment of ethnic-based local territorial units has two principal 
benefits. First, it empowers intra-regional minority ethnic communities. Secondly, 
it prevents potentially deadly ethnic conflicts.     
Empowering intra-regional ethnic minorities  
A plethora of ethnic communities in Ethiopia had endured political, economic, 
and cultural domination and marginalisation for more than a century. The pre-
1991 centralisation process, in particular, had aggravated the marginalisation of 
the various ethnic communities.1732 Evidently, almost all ethnic communities of 
the country were under harsh economic and cultural domination; especially those 
in the southern Ethiopian regions. However, it will be safe to say that the 
discrimination against most of the ethnic communities that have now become 
                                                 
1731 However, it is to be noted that millions of territorially dispersed non-indigenous ethnic 
communities live in these two regions. This calls for non-territorial accommodation. It will be 
examined below whether any non-territorial mechanisms have been used to accommodate the 
ethnic minorities in these two regions. Whether and how the territorially dispersed endogenous 
and exogenous ethnic minorities are accommodated will be dealt with below. 
1732 See chapter 3. 
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intra-regional ethnic minorities was particularly harsh. Due to their small size, 
their very existence was barely noticed, save for the purpose of tax collection, 
military service, and/or labour. The ethnic federal system has provided the larger 
ethnic groups with a territorial and political space wherein they can enjoy some 
level of political and cultural autonomy. Had it not been for the constitutional 
principle that entitles them, among other things, to exercise self-rule at local level 
the intra-regional minority ethnic communities would have remained under 
similar domination, though from a different group,.  
 
The establishment of the local territorial units, therefore, has allowed these ethnic 
communities to decide on their own affairs without the fear of being 
‘outvoted’1733 by the regionally dominant ethnic communities. The establishment 
of the ethnic-based local territorial units has enabled the intra-regional minority 
communities to become local majorities.1734 This, in turn, has provided such 
ethnic community with a territorial space wherein it can protect and promote its 
unique identity. It has also prevented regionally dominant ethnic communities 
from imposing their values on the intra-regional minority ethnic communities.1735 
 
The territorial arrangement also has the effect of restoring the dignity and pride of 
the intra-regional ethnic minority groups which were hitherto marginalised. These 
ethnic communities have now begun to feel empowered. They have regained 
‘importance and integrity'.1736 Watson, explaining how the establishment of the 
                                                 
1733 Yonatan (2010) 203. 
1734 Yonatan (2010) 203. 
1735  Yonatan (2010) 203. 
1736 Watson (2000) 199. 
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Konso liyu woredas has made the Konso ethnic community feel empowered, 
writes:   
‘The implication of the designing as a special woreda were immediately evident: the 
main junction town of Bekawale, which had grown up earlier this century, first as a 
garrison town and administrative outpost of the northern empire and more recently as 
the Derg headquarter, was renamed Karate, after the Konso name for the area in which 
it is situated. The administrative offices, which earlier had largely been staffed by 
officials from other regions of Ethiopia, were locked up and deserted. These had been 
situated in one part of Bekawale known by the Amharic term for the old garrison, 
Aroge Ketema. New offices were opened in another part of the town and staffed by as 
many educated Konso as could be found. Through this renaming and relocation, the 
new local administration reclaimed Konso linguistically and spatially, at the same time 
distancing itself from [historical domination].’1737 
 
Preventing or resolving conflicts  
As several studies indicate, the creation of ethnic-based local territorial units has 
helped quell potentially devastating inter-ethnic conflicts and ease inter-ethnic 
tensions.1738 This is particularly true for SNNPR which is the most ethnically 
diverse region. It is appropriate to discuss two important instances where the 
creation of sub-regional territories has helped bring some calm in SNNPR. The 
first is inter-ethnic conflicts in the former North Omo nationality zone. The 
second is the Silte-Gurage ethnic tension.   
 The North Omo case 
                                                 
1737 Watson (2000) 200.  
1738 Assefa (2007a); Vaughn (2003). 
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As was discussed in chapter three, SNNPR is a result of the amalgamation of four 
pre-existing regions which were created during the transitional period.1739 One of 
the four regions was a multi-ethnic region, called the Wolayita region. Within the 
territorial area of the former Wolayita region were found several ethnic 
communities including Wolayita, Gamo, Gofa, Dawro Basketo and Konta. The 
Wolayita region became a multi-ethnic nationality zone after the establishment of 
SNNPR and was renamed the North Omo nationality zone.1740 Members of the 
Wolayita elite found it to be below their expectation, yet tolerable, that they were 
put together in one regional state with other ethnic communities whom they 
considered to be ‘backward population'.1741 Their despondency, however, began 
to re-surface after the Wolyita region was relegated to the status of a nationality 
zone when SNNPR was established.1742  Soon they began to demand their own 
separate nationality zone. Their demand was rebuffed by the regional 
                                                 
1739 See chapter 3 § 7.2.1.1. 
1740 According to Vaughn, the Wolayita region or later Semeien Omo nationality zone was 
established along the boundaries of the Gamo-Gofa province; a province which was created by the 
Derg. Vaughn says the Derg created the Gamo-Gofa province (kifle-hager) by taking some 
territorial areas from the former Sidamo, Kafa, Gamo-Gofa tekaly-ghizats. The creation of the 
province was effected with a declared purpose of bringing together one linguistic community in 
one administrative unit. This was based on a study conducted in 1980s by the Institute for the 
Study of Ethiopian Nationalities which suggested that the languages that are spoken by the Dorze, 
Gamu-Gofa, Kulo-Konta [Daro], Malo, Oyda, Welamo [Welaiyta] ethnic communities were 
different dialects of one language called ‘wolamo-cluster’. The study showed that the languages 
which are spoken in the area share up to 90% of terms. Vaughn (2003) 251. 
1741 Vaughn explains that the Wolayita pride emanates from the fact that they were better educated 
than the rest of ethnic communities in the area. The fact that Ka’o Tonna, the former King of the 
Wolayita resisted Emperor Menilik’s conquest until he was at last defeated given them a sense of 
pride. Also a number of Wolyitas were in the Derg government. These factors have made the 
Wolyitas to view themselves as better than the rest of the ethnic communities in the North Omo 
nationality. However this attitude of the Wolayita was regarded by others including the EPRDF as 
‘chauvinistic’. Vaughn (2003) 253. 
1742 Vaughn (2003) 253.  
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government. The refusal created tension and sporadic conflicts between the 
Wolayitas and the other ethnic groups in the Zone. The tension reached a boiling 
point when politicians at the regional level decided to coalesce the Wolayita, 
Daro, Gamo and Goffa languages to create what Smith calls an ‘Esperanto-style 
language’, wogagoda, which was meant to be used as a language of instruction in 
primary schools.1743 The Wolayitas were infuriated by this arrangement and a 
conflict broke out in the North Omo Zone which caused the deaths of dozens of 
people. The regional government then decided to partition the North Omo 
Nationality Zone into three nationality zones (Daro, Gamo-Gofa and Wolayita) 
and two liyu woredas (Basketo and Konta). 1744  The conflict was resolved only 
after the Wolayitas acquired their own nationality zone.    
The Silte case 
The Silte ethnic communities were not considered to be a distinct ethnic 
community until April 2000. They were rather considered to be Muslim members 
of the Gurage ethnic community.1745 After the ethnic federal system was 
introduced, some urban elite, organised in two political parties,1746 began to 
agitate for the recognition of the Silte as a distinct ethnic community.1747  In 1997, 
the SNNPR government organised what is now known as the Butajira Conference 
in Butajira Town to determine the identity of the Siltes. The Conference, 
however, decided that the Siltes were not a distinct ethnic community, but a part 
                                                 
1743 Smith (2008) 208. The language was named by taking the Amharic letter initials of the four 
languages mixed together. See also Getachew & Derib (2006) 57. 
1744 Cohen (2006) 174. 
1745 Many writers agree that the Gurages and Siltes speak two distinct languages which are 
mutually unintelligible. See Bahru (2008). 
1746Silte Gogot Democratic Party and Silte People’s Democratic Unity Party. 
1747 For detailed discussion on the process of the recognition of Silte as an ethnic community and 
the establishement of Silte nationality zone see Vaughn (2003) 261 ff.  
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of the Gurage ethnic group. This decision created tension in the area.1748 In the 
meantime, the two Silte parties continued to agitate for the recognition of the 
Siltes as a distinct ethnic group. The parties alleged that the Gurage nationality 
zone was discriminating against the Silte woredas in terms of investing in social 
and economic development projects.1749 They, therefore, demanded territorial 
autonomy for the Silte ethnic community. Eventually, the House of Federation 
(HoF), which under the FDRE Constitution has the power to decide on issue of 
ethnic identity, determined that a referendum be held in the Silte woredas to 
determine the identity of the Siltes.1750 In the referendum that was held in April 
2000, the Siltes overwhelmingly voted in favour of their recognition as a distinct 
ethnic group. Subsequently, the Silte inhabited woredas were brought together to 
form the Silte Nationality Zone.  
 
Studies indicate that SNNPR has enjoyed relative peace since the establishment 
of the Wolayita and Silte nationality zones.1751 
The disadvantages of local territorial autonomy  
While the establishment of ethnic-based local territorial units has the above 
mentioned advantages, it also has numerous disadvantages. There are six points 
which should be stressed in this regard. First, as was discussed in chapter two, 
many scholars agree that creating ethnically defined territorial units is not the 
‘ideal’ method to tackle the challenges of ethnic diversity.1752 It may rather 
constitute a ‘counter ideal’ as it locks into territorial places ‘the historical 
                                                 
1748 Vaughn (2003) 261. 
1749 Vaughn (2003) 261. 
1750Vaughn (2003) 265.  
1751 See Assefa & Mohammed (2010) 156; Vaughn (2003) 261ff. 
1752 Steiner (1991) 1554. 
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differences’ among ethnic groups.1753 It also perpetuates ethnic divides by 
institutionally ‘freezing’ them.1754 By so doing, it enfeebles any sense of 
commonality.1755 Instead, it accentuates differences and separateness.1756 
Therefore, the territorial option of accommodating minorities should be a last 
resort. However in Ethiopia the territorial option seems to be viewed as the ideal 
method of accommodating ethnic minorities.  
 
Secondly, as was indicated in chapter four, Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system fails 
to resolve majority-minority tensions as it does not and, in fact, cannot create 
ethnically homogenous regional states.1757 This criticism can also be directed 
against the scheme which attempts to accommodate intra-regional ethnic minority 
communities through the establishment of local territorial units. The creation of 
28 local territorial units has not removed majority-minority tensions.  Not all 
intra-regional ethnic minority communities are able to exercise territorial 
autonomy at local level. Several ethnic communities still remain minorities within 
an intra-regional minority ethnic community. There are still other minorities in 
the mono-ethnic nationality zones which are vulnerable to discrimination from 
locally empowered ethnic communities. There are also others which are lumped 
together in bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic nationality zones, such as, Gamo-Gofa, 
Bench-Maji, and South Omo. Hence, majority-minority tensions also re-emerge 
at local level.   
 
                                                 
1753 Steiner (1991) 1552. 
1754 Erk & Anderson (2010) 2. 
1755 Steiner (1991) 1554. 
1756 Steiner (1991) 1552. 
1757 See chapter 4 § 2.2. 
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Thirdly, the creation, division, and amalgamation of nationality zones and liyu 
woredas, especially in SNNPR, are not undertaken on the basis of constitutional 
principle, but on the basis of the political preferences of the ruling party. In the 
early 1990s, the ruling party encouraged all ethnic communities to establish their 
own self-government. Latter, the party decided that establishing ethnic-based 
local units was bad for efficiency. 1758 Now the right to self-rule has become 
secondary to efficiency. Therefore, some legal demands for a nationality zone or 
liyu woreda are denied in the name of efficiency. As Aalen writes: 
 
‘[The Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM)] made a 
principled decision to separate “identity issue” from “administrative issues”, stating 
that the request for new zone or special woreda administrations should from now on be 
considered from a purely administrative perspective, which was clearly separated from 
the right of nationalities to self-determination. It was decided that groups which before 
could argue that recognition of a separate ethnic identity should automatically give 
them the right to a separate administration would not be heard anymore.’ 1759 
  
Moreover, the creation of nationality zones and liyu woredas is carried out 
arbitrarily and seldom follows the procedures laid down in the regional 
constitutions. 1760  For instance, as Vaughn states, the authorities of the Keffa and 
Sheka zones were summoned to Awassa, the capital of SNNPR, and simply told 
that the two zones would be amalgamated.1761 No public consultation or 
referendum took place.1762 Besides, nationality zones and liyu woredas are often 
                                                 
1758 Aalen (2008) 128. 
1759 Aalen (2008) 128. 
1760 See above at 7.4.1. 
1761 Vaughn (2003) 260. 
1762 Vaughn (2003) 260. 
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created only following violent conflicts; rarely has a peaceful petition for a 
nationality zone or liyu woreda resulted in the establishment of one. The Keffa-
Sheka nationality zone, for instance, was divided after a deadly conflict broke out 
in the area. As explained earlier, the division of the former North Omo zone into 
three nationality zones and a number of liyu woredas was also precipitated by the 
conflict between the Wolayitas and the other ethnic communities in the Zone. 1763     
 
Fourthly, in many cases, projects to create ethnic local territorial units are hardly 
ever initiated by the people: The establishment of nationality zones and liyu 
woredas is rather driven by urban elites.1764 The urban elites lobby for the 
creation of an ethnic-based local unit motivated by their own desire to take a 
piece of the increased national and regional budgets that the creation of such 
territorial units brings or is assumed to bring.1765 Often, the urban elites put the 
majority of the population, whose interests they claim to champion, in economic 
and politically disadvantageous positions while pursuing their own economic 
interest. A typical example is the creation of the Wolayita nationality zone. The 
establishment of the Wolayita nationality zone was clearly in the interest of the 
urban elite who took control of the budget of the zone. 1766 However, by no means 
could it be in the interest of the bulk of the rural population.  Land scarcity is ‘the 
defining socio-economic constraint’ of Wolyitas.  The area is also known for food 
insecurity and famine. As Vaughn maintains:-  
 
                                                 
1763 See above at 7.4.1. 
1764 See Vaughn (2003). 
1765 See Vaughn (2003). 
1766 Vaughn (2003) 259. 
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‘One would not normally expect a population concerned to maximise its opportunities 
for outward migration to support the drawing of administrative boundaries likely to 
have the effect of confining it more closely within its own ‘homeland’.1767 
 
Fifthly, in several instances the creation of nationality zones and liyu woredas has 
been the cause of ethnic conflicts, even though in some cases it has helped 
resolve such conflicts. It politicised competition for resources among ethnic 
communities. The conflict between the Anywaa and the Nuer ethnic communities 
of Gambella is an example. As a study by Medhane indicates, the very creation of 
the Anywaa and Nuer nationality zones has aggravated the historical rivalry 
between the two communities.1768  
 
The Anywaa have a sedentary agrarian socio-economic tradition and established 
settlements and villages.1769 The Nuers, on the other hand, are predominantly 
pastoralists who move seasonally from one place to the other in search of pasture 
for their cattle within certain ‘natural’ (as opposed to administrative), boundaries. 
In fact, they are not restrained by the international borders between Ethiopia and 
Sudan, let alone by sub-regional boundaries. Therefore, the establishment of 
nationality zones is at odds with the economic tradition of the Nuers as it puts 
limitations on the territorial range within which they can move in search of 
pasture. 
‘Pastoralists in Ethiopia have their respective ‘natural homeland’ within which they 
used to move freely. Confinement of intra-regional mobility increases distress among 
local population intensifying intra-ethnic competition for resource and/or territories. It 
                                                 
1767 Vaughn (2003) 259. 
1768 See Medhane (2007). 
1769 Kelkelachew & Falge (2006). 
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further increases inter-ethnic conflicts as it denies pastoralists to use their mobility in 
order to avoid conflictuous confrontations.’1770  
 
On the other hand, the establishment of nationality zones has given the Anywaa a 
constitutional claim over a certain part of the Gambella region which they never 
had previously.  There were traditionally known Anywaa settlement areas even 
before the establishment of the nationality zones.1771 Often conflict arose when 
the Nuers moved to this area in search of grazing, and whenever their cattle 
destroyed the farms of the Anywaa. However, the conflicts were seen as conflicts 
between individuals, and were settled through traditional dispute settlement 
mechanisms.1772 The disputes were hardly politicised. The creation of an ethnic 
local regime has failed to solve the problems which used to occur as a result of 
the difference in the manner of creating a livelihood of the two ethnic 
communities. On the contrary, it has given it a political dimension, and made it 
even more rigid, intense and broad. As Medhane writes: 
‘Unlike the past, when conflicts were mainly over control or use of grazing areas and 
riverbanks, control over territory is now important to the extent that it helps to 
legitimise power at zonal and regional levels, where the new resources are found. Thus 
the controversy over territory and citizenship and the conflict between the Anuak and 
Nuer elites over who controls the administrative centres may not be because the 
agricultural value of the land in the weredas gives direct economic benefits, but 
because political control of these weredas leads to direct access to the resources of the 
state. The focus is not on the traditional ecological zones, but on new choke points of 
financial resources, that is, the wereda and regional power structures, which largely 
depend on numbers and on how many weredas are controlled by each group. Violent 
                                                 
1770 Kelkelachew & Falge (2006) 98. 
1771 Medhane (2007) 12ff. 
1772 Kelkelachew & Falge (2006). 
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conflicts have broken out between the two ethnic communities in which education and 
jobs have usually been the points at issue. Which language is taught in which district 
has come to signal political ownership of the district under contestation and the region 
in general.’1773 
 
As a consequence, Gambella has been plagued by inter-ethnic conflict between 
the Nuer and Anywaa ethnic groups making the region the most volatile one in 
the country.1774 The conflict between the two ethnic communities was so serious 
that the federal government was forced to intervene in the regional state on more 
than one occasion. It is clear that the conflict between the two ethnic groups has 
other historical, political, and even international,  dimensions. Moreover, the 
competition between the two ethnic groups is not limited to guarding their 
respective sub-regional territory. Being the largest ethnic communities in the 
region, both the Anywaa and the Nuer vie to control the regional government.  
However, it cannot be gainsaid that the establishment of the ethnic-based local 
territorial units has ‘politicised’, ‘intensified’ and given a new dimension to the 
historical rivalry that existed between the two ethnic groups. 
 
Sixthly, the creation of territorial entities for sub-regional ethnic minorities has a 
negative impact on the developmental mission of Article 50(4) local government 
units which are found within each ethnic-based local unit. In SNNPR all woredas 
and cities are found within one of the 14 autonomous nationality zones. The same 
goes for Gambella where each woreda is within one of the two nationality zones. 
There are also several woredas in the three nationality zones of the Amhara 
                                                 
1773 Medhane (2007) 12-13. 
1774 Equally bloody conflicts have also arisen between the ethnic migrants on the one hand and the 
endogenous ethnic group and on the other which also led to federal intervention in the region. 
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regional state. The constitutions of the Amhara, SNNPR and Gambella regional 
states do not provide any significant protection to the institutional integrity of the 
regular woredas in the nationality zones. As a result, nationality zones exercise 
tight control over the woredas. In a sense, it can be said that woredas are the 
competences of nationality zones wherever the latter are established. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, allocated regional block grants reach woredas 
after passing through nationality zones.1775 This creates an additional and 
unnecessary hurdle which has unacceptable consequences for the developmental 
activities of woredas. Moreover, liyu woredas have the power and the duty to 
discharge development related functions in accordance with their status as 
woredas. 1776 As was discussed in chapter two, when creating a local unit which is 
meant to serve as an agent of development, important factors, including, 
territorial and population sizes, ethnic diversity, resources, the level of 
development, and rural-urban differences should be taken into account.1777 Liyu 
woredas, however, are created primarily, if not purely, based on the ethnic 
criterion. Economic and administrative capacity and other social factors are 
seldom considered in the process of creating liyu woredas. Hence, the capacity of 
liyu woredas to effectively deliver basic services to their residents is debatable. 
The above problems are compounded by the lack of clarity in the functional areas 
of the various levels of sub-regional government. 1778     
2.2.2.2. Secession  
Introduction  
                                                 
1775 See chapter 5; § 2.6.3.1. 
1776 See chapter 5; § 2.6.3.1. 
1777 See chapter 2; § 3.5.1.1. 
1778 See chapter 5; § 2.4.4.2. 
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Under the Ethiopian constitutional dispensation, the right to territorial autonomy 
of an intra-regional ethnic group extends to secession. Secession has two aspects 
as far as intra-regional ethnic minority communities are concerned: secession 
from a regional state and secession from the Ethiopian federation. An intra-
regional minority ethnic community has the right to secede from a regional state 
wherein it is found to form a separate regional state. 1779 It also has the right to 
secede from the Ethiopian federation to form an independent state. 1780 As will be 
argued below, only an intra-regional minority ethnic community which enjoys 
territorial autonomy at local level may exercise both aspects of the right to 
secession. Put differently, only nationality zones and liyu woredas may secede to 
be a separate regional state or independent state. 
Secession from a regional state 
The procedure for secession from a regional state is provided under Article 47(3) 
of the FDRE Constitution. A demand for a regional state must be approved by the 
legislative council of the intra-regional minority ethnic community concerned.  It 
has to be passed by a two-thirds majority.1781 It should be noted that it is not the 
approval of the regional council of the region wherein the intra-regional ethnic 
community is found which is required here. Rather the approval of the council of 
the particular ethnic community is required. Clearly, the council of an Article 
50(4) local government unit (i.e. a woreda or a city council) is not considered to 
be a council of an ethnic community. Therefore, it may not exercise the power to 
approve a demand for secession. As will be discussed below, the council of a liyu 
woreda or nationality zone is considered to be the highest political organ of the 
                                                 
1779 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47 (2). 
1780 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (1). 
1781 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47 (3) (a). 
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ethnic community for whom it is established.1782 It is, therefore, this organ that 
the Constitution envisages to approve a demand of an ethnic community for 
secession from a regional state. This implies that an ethnic community should 
have a nationality zone or a liyu woreda in order to demand its own regional state. 
It is unclear whether the council of a multi-ethnic nationality zone can validly 
approve a demand for a regional state by one of the ethnic communities 
constituting the nationality zone. It seems that the particular intra-zonal minority 
ethnic community must first secede from the nationality zone wherein it is found, 
in a similar procedure, and establish its own liyu woreda or nationality zone 
before it can demand its own regional state. 
 
The regional council of the region within which the intra-regional ethnic group is 
found is expected to organise a referendum within a year after the demand for a 
regional state is approved by the council of the ethnic community i.e. a 
nationality zone or a liyu woreda council of the ethnic community.1783According 
to the FDRE Constitution, the referendum is organised ‘in the nation, nationality 
or people’ which desires to secede.1784 This clearly indicates that the referendum 
is held in the nationality zone or liyu woreda which seeks to become a regional 
state.  The demand for a regional state needs to be supported by a majority of the 
population of the particular intra-regional ethnic group.1785 Article 47 (3) (b) of 
the Constitution suggests that only members of the relevant ethnic community 
concerned can vote in the referendum. This excludes ethnic migrants who reside 
                                                 
1782 See below at § 2.2.1.2. 
1783 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47 (3) (b). 
1784 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47(3) (b). 
1785 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47 (3) (c) 
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in the particular nationality zone or liyu woreda which seeks to become a regional 
state. If the demand to secede from a regional state is approved by a referendum, 
the regional council will have to transfer the power to the council of the ethnic 
community concerned. The nationality zone or liyu woreda then becomes a 
regional state and a member of the Ethiopian federation.1786   
Secession from the federation  
A further aspect of secession refers to the right of every ethnic community of the 
country, including an intra-regional minority ethnic group, to secede from the 
federation to form an independent state. This right is enshrined in Article 39 (1) 
of the FDRE Constitution. Article 39 (4) of the FDRE Constitution provides the 
procedural requirements for secession from the federation.  The move towards 
forming an independent state begins with the approval of a demand for secession 
by the council of the relevant ethnic community.1787 Fasil argues that only a 
regional council has the power to approve a demand for secession from the 
federation.1788  Thus, an intra-regional ethnic minority group must have its own 
regional state in order to demand secession from the federation. Yonatan Fessha, 
on the other hand, maintains that the right to secession belongs not to a regional 
state but to the ethnic communities of the country.1789 Therefore, he adds, an 
ethnic community is not required to have its own regional state in order to secede 
from the federation and form an independent state. 1790  It is submitted that 
Yonatan’s interpretation of the constitutional provision is the correct one. The 
Constitution provides that a demand for secession from the federation should be 
                                                 
1786 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 47 (3) (e).  
1787 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (4) (a). 
1788 Fasil (1997) 159. 
1789 Yonatan (2010) 208. 
1790 Yonatan (2010) 208. 
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approved by the council of the ethnic community, which is not necessarily a 
regional council. This implies that the legislative council of the ethnic community 
which is established at nationality zone or liyu woreda level may validly approve 
the ethnic community’s demand for secession. Therefore, an intra-regional ethnic 
minority community may secede to form its own independent state without the 
need to establish a regional state. However, the ethnic community may not secede 
from the federation unless it enjoys territorial autonomy at least at local level by 
establishing a nationality zone or liyu woreda.     
 
Once the nationality zone or liyu woreda council approves, by a two-thirds 
majority, the demand of the ethnic community for secession from the federation, 
the federal government will organise a referendum in the particular nationality 
zone or liyu woreda.1791 If, in the referendum, the demand for an independent 
state is supported by the majority of the members of the ethnic community in 
question, the federal government will transfer powers to the council of the newly 
independent state.1792    
 
A further question is whether an intra-regional ethnic minority group must show a 
good cause to validly demand secession. FDRE Proclamation 251 (2001) 
provides that an ethnic community may petition for secession when it believes its 
identity is denied, its right to self-administration infringed, its history and culture 
are not promoted, or its rights under the FDRE Constitution are not respected. It 
appears from the Proclamation that the right to secession is not entirely 
unconditional. On the other hand, the FDRE Constitution, under Article 39 (1), 
                                                 
1791 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (4) (b).  
1792 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (d). 
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makes it clear that the right to secession is ‘unconditional’. Clearly, the 
Constitution supersedes Proclamation 251(2001). Hence, an intra-regional ethnic 
group may exercise both secessions without any condition.1793 
Assessment   
It was discussed in chapter two that territorial autonomy, as a rule, does not 
include the right to secede.1794 However, in Ethiopia, as the above discussion 
shows, the territorial approach to accommodate intra-regional ethnic minorities 
goes as far as allowing the ethnic communities to secede from the regional state 
wherein they are found. Furthermore, an intra-regional minority ethnic 
community is even permitted to secede from the federation to establish a separate 
state. What needs to be stressed is that only a council of a unit of local 
government which belongs to Article 39 local government category may approve 
a demand for secession.  An ethnic community may not exercise the right to 
secession unless it has a nationality zone or a liyu woreda. Local territorial 
autonomy is, therefore, a precondition for secession.  
 
However, the significance of the secession clause for intra-regional ethnic 
communities, in particular the clause for secession from the federation, is 
debatable. The right to secede from a regional state may be appealing to some of 
the major intra-regional minority ethnic communities, such as, the Sidama, the 
Wolayita, the Gumuz, and the Berta, who have for a long time entertained an 
aspiration for their own regional state. However, it seems to have little more than 
symbolic value to most of the small ethnic communities that dot SNNPR and the 
other regional states. Small ethnic communities, which are found in multi-ethnic 
                                                 
1793 See also Yonatan (2010) 208. 
1794 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2. 
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nationality zones, such as, Bench-Maji- and South Omo, and others such as, Opo 
and Komo, are not expected to aspire to have their own liyu woreda or nationality 
zone; let alone a regional state. 
  
With respect to secession from the federation, it is clear that the clause was 
incorporated first into the TPC and later into the federal Constitution principally 
to appease the nationality movements which claimed to represent the Oromo and 
Somali ethnic groups.1795 In fact, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the 
parties that claimed to be representatives of the Somali and Afar ethnic 
communities had made it clear from the outset that they would not even take part 
in the TGE unless the clause for secession from the federation was incorporated 
in the TPC.1796 Several writers agree that the EPRDF had no choice but to 
incorporate the secession clause at the time, or risk a reversion back to a civil war 
even if the party was not in favour of the inclusion of the clause.1797    
 
Intra-regional ethnic minorities, on the other hand, ardently opposed the 
incorporation of the clause on secession from the federation. Especially, those 
pro-Ethiopian ethnic minority communities from the south fervently argued at the 
drafting stage against the incorporation into the Constitution of the secession 
clause.1798 Apparently they could not prevent the incorporation of the clause in 
the Constitution. The concern of the intra-regional ethnic communities is obvious. 
Most of them do not aspire to secede and create their own state; nor are they 
                                                 
1795 Alem (2005) 323. 
1796 Alem (2005) 323.  
1797 Alem (2005) 323; Yonatan (2010) 208-209; Assefa (2007a). 
1798 Alem (2005) 326. 
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capable of doing so. They rather seek to ensure that their rights are respected 
within the Ethiopian state. The intra-regional ethnic minority communities view 
all of the regionally dominant ethnic communities, including, the Oromo, Amhara 
and Tigrawi, as potential oppressors.1799 It is unclear whether the intra-regional 
minority ethnic community will be part of the newly created state if a regionally 
dominant ethnic community secedes from the federation.1800 If that is the case, 
and it is difficult to imagine otherwise, the intra-regional ethnic minorities will 
have no choice but to put their fate in the hands of the dominant group of the new 
state.  
 
Thus far, only political parties, such as, OLF and Ogaden National Liberation 
Front (ONLF) have expressed their aspiration for secession from the federation. 
None of the intra-regional ethnic minority groups seem to aspire to secede from 
the federation. Most of the ethnic communities in SNNPR have rather shown a 
strong desire to stay within the federation.1801 With regard to secession from a 
regional state, the Sidama and the Wolayita have demonstrated an interest to 
establish their separate regional state. In fact the Sidama Nationality Zone 
Council had gone as far as approving a demand for a separate regional state.1802 
The request had also received support from the CoN. 1803  However, the EPRDF 
keen to allow the creation of new regional states.  Therefore, it intervened and 
stopped the implementation of this decision.1804 As was also explained earlier, it 
                                                 
1799 Alem (2005) 326. 
1800 Yonatan (2010) 209.  
1801 Alem (2005). 
1802 Aalen (2008) 164.  
1803 For a discussion on the CoN see below at § 2.3.2.1.  
1804 Aalen (2008) 164.  
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was because the EPRDF wished to reduce the number of regional states that the 
four former regional states were lumped together to create SNNPR.1805 The Berta 
elite, disillusioned by their failure to dominate the Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
government, had also agitated for secession from a region and the establishment 
of a separate state.1806 The EPRDF was nevertheless unsympathetic to their plea 
and dismissed their petition ‘as an unpopular wish of the Berta political elite, not 
a genuine demand of the people’.1807 
2.2.2. Governance institutions and their powers  
2.2.1.1. Introduction  
The second feature of the self-rule element is the establishment of government 
institutions in the autonomous areas. Government institutions include political 
organs, such as, representative councils and executive as well as administrative 
organs.1808  As was discussed previously, having institution of government is vital 
for a minority ethnic community to exercise self-rule.1809  
 
As was mentioned earlier, the FDRE Constitution explicitly recognises the right 
of every ethnic community to exercise ‘a full measure of self-government’.1810 To 
that effect, the Constitution authorises the establishment of government 
institutions in the territorial area that each ethnic community inhabits.1811 Without 
doubt, ‘a full measure of self-government’ includes the power to exercise both 
                                                 
1805 Vaughn (2003) 248ff. 
1806 Asnake (2009) 164 
1807 Asnake (2009) 164.  
1808 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2.2. 
1809 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2.2. 
1810 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3). 
1811 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3).  
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political and administrative powers. Furthermore, ‘government institutions’ 
include both political and administrative organs. As was argued earlier, the FDRE 
Constitution envisions that neither the exercise of self-governance nor the 
establishment of government institutions is to be limited at regional level.1812 The 
Constitution envisages that self-governance may be exercised at local level. It 
also requires the establishment of government institutions at local level. There is 
thus a clear constitutional normative principle that empowers intra-regional ethnic 
minority groups to exercise self-rule by establishing government institutions in 
the territorial areas they inhabit. The following section will examine how this 
principle is given effect through regional constitutions. 
   2.2.1.2. Political organs   
In each liyu woreda and nationality zone a representative council and various 
executive organs are established.  
Representative councils  
The members of the representative council of a liyu woreda, like any woreda, are 
directly elected by the people for a five year term.1813  As was discussed in 
chapter five, a plurality electoral system is used in all elections, including the 
elections of liyu woreda councils. 1814 As is the case with any woreda elections, a 
kebele is used as an electoral district in liyu woreda elections.1815 Therefore, two 
or more representatives are elected to a liyu woreda council from each kebele in 
the liyu woreda.  
 
                                                 
1812 See chapter 4; § 4.2. 
1813 See chapter 4; § 4.2.   
1814 See chapter 5; § 2.3.1.2. 
1815 See chapter 5; § 2.3.1.2.   
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In Gambella and Amhara, the nationality zone council is not directly elected. 
Some of the members of a nationality zone council are rather selected in a 
‘special procedure’ by and from among members of the woreda councils that are 
found within a nationality zone.1816 Members of a regional council who are 
elected from the woredas within the nationality zone automatically become 
members of the nationality zone council.1817 The Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
Constitution also provides a similar procedure for the election of members of the 
nationality zone councils (even though no nationality zone council is yet 
established in this region).1818 In SNNPR, members of a nationality zone council 
are directly elected by the people.1819 It is not clear though whether the woreda or 
the kebele is used as the electoral district in elections for nationality zone councils 
in this region.  According to the regional Constitution, members of the regional 
council, who are elected from constituencies within a nationality zone, also 
become members of the nationality zone council.1820 
 
As was discussed in chapter four, there are 79 political parties in the country, 
most of which are ethnic-based political parties. These parties operate either alone 
or in coalition with each other.1821 Some of the ethnic-based parties are members 
or affiliates of the EPRDF while the rest are opposition parties. As indicated 
before, all regional and local councils in the country are controlled by ethnic-
                                                 
1816 ARC (2001) Art 74 (1); BGRC (2002) Art 75 (1); GRC (2002) Art 78 (1). 
1817 ARC (2001) Art 74 (1); BGRC (2002) Art 75(1); GRC (2002) Art 78 (1). 
1818 BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 75 (1). 
1819 The SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 81 (1)  
1820 The SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 81 (1)  
1821 See chapter 4; § 3.2.1.1. 
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based political parties which are either members or affiliates of the EPRDF.1822   
None of the opposition parties are represented in any woreda council because, 
among other things, all opposition parties either boycotted or withdrew from all 
local elections that have been held thus far.1823  The consequence is that 
opposition parties are also not represented in any nationality zone council, as 
members of a nationality zone council are elected from among the members of 
the woreda councils within the nationality zone.  
Powers of representative councils  
A council of a nationality zone or a liyu woreda has the power to legislate on 
local matters.1824 The legislation of the council may not, however, be repugnant to 
a regional, national or regional law. Moreover, a nationality zone or liyu woreda 
council is authorised to approve the budget and the social and economic 
development plan of the nationality zone or the liyu woreda. 1825  The council also 
has the power to approve the appointment various executive office holders 
including, as is shown below, the appointment of the nationality zone/liyu woreda 
chief administrator.  
Executive organs  
Each liyu woreda and nationality zone has an executive organ, called, the 
executive council.1826 The executive council is composed of a chief administrator, 
a deputy chief administrator, and heads of the various executive organs of the 
                                                 
1822 See chapter 5; § 2.3.1.3.  
1823 See chapter 5; § 2.3.1.2.  
1824 ARC (2001) Art 74 (3) (c); BGRC (2002) Art 75 (3); GRC (2002) Arts 81 (3); SNNPR 
Constitution (2001) Art 81 (3). 
1825 See ARS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (3); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 75 (3); GRS 
Constitution (2002) Arts 78 (3); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 81 (3). 
1826 See ARS Constitution (2001) Art 77 BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 79; GRS Constitution 
(2002) Arts 78; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 84. 
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nationality zone or liyu woreda.1827 Nationality zones and liyu woredas have a 
parliamentary executive. Hence, the representative council of a liyu woreda or a 
nationality zone elects a chief administrator from among its members after the 
party that controls the majority seats nominates the person.1828 The representative 
council also approves the appointment of the heads of the various executive 
organs. The terms of the office of the executive council and chief administrator 
runs concurrently with that of the representative council.1829  
Powers of executive organs  
A chief administrator of a nationality zone or a liyu woreda is responsible, with 
the other heads of executive organs, for implementing the legislation and 
decisions of the nationality zone or liyu woreda council as well as that of the 
federal and regional governments. 1830 He or she is also responsible for the 
preparation of the budget and social and economic development plans of the 
nationality zone/liyu woreda. Furthermore, he or she is in charge of ensuring the 
implementation of the budget and the plans once they are approved by the 
representative council of the nationality zone or the liyu woreda. 1831    
Assessment 
As was discussed above, nationality zones and liyu woredas have representative 
councils and executive organs, the political organs which are critical for self-rule. 
                                                 
1827 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 77 (3); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 78 (3); GRS Constitution 
(2002) Arts 81(3); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 84 (2). 
1828 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 79 (1); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 80 (1); GRS Constitution 
(2002) Arts 83 (1); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 86(1).  
1829 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 79 (2); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 80 (2); GRS Constitution 
(2002) Arts 83 (2); SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 86 (2). 
1830 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 78; BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 79; GRS Constitution (2002) 
Arts 82; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 85. 
1831 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 78; BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 79; GRS Constitution (2002) 
Arts 82; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 85. 
 
 
 
 
421 
 
Therefore, the second feature of self-rule is clearly institutionalised. The critical 
question is whether and to what extent members of an ethnic community may in 
fact control and run the political organs of its nationality zone or liyu woreda. 
 
As the discussion above indicates, the plurality electoral system is used in all 
elections in Ethiopia, including local elections. It is submitted that in spite of the 
plurality electoral system, in most cases members of the ethnic communities, for 
whom a liyu woreda is established, are likely to have control over the liyu woreda 
councils.  As was discussed earlier, most of the liyu woredas have one dominant 
ethnic community. Only a few liyu woredas are bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic. 
Besides, members of the dominant ethnic community of a liyu woreda are to be 
found in the majority in most of the kebeles which serve as constituencies in liyu 
woreda elections.  As was discussed earlier, each woreda or liyu woreda was 
carved out by bringing together several kebeles the majority of whose residents 
belong to a particular ethnic community.1832 A liyu woreda is, therefore, a 
collection of kebeles where members of an ethnic community are in the 
majority.1833 Even now inter-zonal or inter-regional boundary disputes are 
resolved by taking into consideration the ethnic composition of the residents of 
each kebele in the border areas.1834  Kebeles in disputed border areas are 
transferred to one or other woreda, liyu woreda, zone, or region based on their 
                                                 
1832 See chapter 3; § 7.2.1.1. 
1833 For instance the Argoba nationality zone of the Amhara regional states is composed of 7 
kebeles where members of the ethnic community are found in majority. The kebeles are 
Fetekoma, Arranechero, Chomye, Emeyeserte, Killkillo, Yaseneager and Gobera. ARS 
Proclamation 130 (2006) Art 6.   
1834 FDRE Proclamation 251 (2001) Article 29 (3) provides that refrendums to resolve border 
disputes take place at kebele level. 
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ethnic composition.1835 Therefore, it can safely be assumed that the 
representatives that are elected to a liyu woreda council from most of the kebeles 
in the liyu woreda are likely to belong to the ethnic community for which the liyu 
woreda has been established.  
 
The same can be said with respect to nationality zones. A nationality zone is an 
amalgam of two or more woredas where members of a particular ethnic 
community are found to be in the majority.1836 As indicated above, in Amhara 
and Gambella regional state, the woredas within a nationality zone send specially 
selected individuals to nationality zone councils to occupy a portion of the 
nationality zone council seats. Members of the regional council, who are elected 
from the woredas within the nationality zone, automatically become members of 
the nationality zone council and occupy the remaining seats. Clearly the woredas 
within the nationality zone are likely to send to the nationality zone council 
individuals belonging to the ethnic community for whom the nationality zone was 
established. Furthermore, members of the regional council who are elected from 
the woredas within the nationality zone are likely to belong to the ethnic 
community for whom the nationality zone was established. 1837   
 
                                                 
1835 For instance in resolving the boundary disputes between Oromia and Somali regional states as 
well as between SNNPR and Oromia regional states certain kebeles were transferred from Oromia 
to the SNNPR or Somali regional states or vice versa through a referenda which was conducted at 
a kebele level.  NEBE (1997 Ethiopian Calendar) 
1836 See above at § 2.2.1. 
1837 Yonatan makes similar argument about the representation of ethnic communities in the 
HoPRs. See Yonatan (2009) 336. 
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In SNNPR, a certain number of the members of a nationality zone council are 
directly elected by the people.  It is not clear whether the woreda or the kebele is 
used as the electoral district in elections for nationality zone councils in this 
region. In any case, it makes no difference. Still, in line with the above reasoning, 
it can be assumed that the dominant ethnic community in the mono-ethnic 
nationality zones controls the majority of the seats in the nationality zone 
councils. Even members of the various ethnic communities in the multi-ethnic 
nationality zones are likely to be more or less proportionately represented in the 
nationality zone councils as each of them controls one or more woredas. In short, 
the direct and indirect electoral process is likely to result in a liyu woreda or 
nationality zone council that is controlled by the ethnic community for whom the 
nationality zone or the liyu woreda was established.  
 
However, the electoral process is far from perfect. Certain deficiencies can still be 
detected in the electoral processes which are likely to undermine the right to a 
‘full measure’ of self-rule of the ethnic communities. As was indicated above, 
members of a nationality zone council are not directly elected by the people in 
Gambella and Amhara regional states. The ‘special procedure’, whatever it might 
entail, deprives members of the ethnic community of the opportunity to directly 
elect their own representatives. This belies the notion of self-rule. As has been 
maintained in chapter two, representative democracy is essential for territorial 
autonomy.  It is also inherent to the notion of the right to self-determination.1838  
 
                                                 
1838 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2.1.  
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Nationality zone and liyu woreda councils are intended to be institutions of self-
determination of a particular ethnic community. As provided in the regional 
constitutions, the councils are the highest political organs of the ethnic 
community for which they are established.1839 The self-determination of the 
ethnic community is expected to be expressed in the ability of members of the 
ethnic community to directly elect their political leaders. This is what the FDRE 
Constitution envisages. That is why the FDRE Constitution provides that a 
sovereign power resides in each ethnic community and finds expression, among 
other things, in the ability of members of the ethnic community to elect their 
representatives.1840 It seems also based on this assumption that the FDRE entrusts 
these councils with the power to decide on so critical a matter as secession. The 
indirect arrangement, on the other hand, counters the very notion of autonomy, 
self-determination, and self-government of the ethnic community for which a 
nationality zone is established. Moreover, the arrangement opens a door for the 
federal and regional politicians to undermine the autonomous entity by ensuring 
the selection of ‘loyalists’.   
 
Furthermore, the electoral practice, but not necessarily the electoral system, 1841 
fails to allow the representation in the nationality zone and liyu woreda councils 
                                                 
1839 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 74; BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 75; GRS Constitution (2002) 
Arts 81; SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 81. 
1840 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 8(3). 
1841 Opposition parties blame, among other things, the plurality electoral system for their 
exclusion from all representative councils in the country. They even argue that the plurality 
electoral system was deliberately introduced by the EPRDF to manipulate electoral outcomes so 
as to deny them representation in any representative council (Mennasemay (2003)).  The 
distortive effect of the electoral system can be seen in the results of regional and national 
elections. However, the effect of the electoral system on the electoral outcomes of local elections 
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of diverse political views which exist within an ethnic community. As was 
indicated previously, all nationality zones and liyu woredas are controlled by 
ethnic-based political parties which are either members or affiliates of the 
EPRDF. There is no a single party with a different political view that is 
represented in a nationality zone or a liyu woreda council.1842  
 
The non-representation of diverse political views is exacerbated by the fact that 
many of the political parties that control nationality zones and liyu woredas have 
disputable legitimacy.1843 It is often alleged that the EPRDF is involved in the 
creation of the affiliate parties.1844 The relationship between the EPRDF and 
affiliate parties is alleged to be ‘characterised by [the latter’s] complete 
subordination’ to the former.1845 Members of the affiliate parties who reject the 
EPRDF’s ‘ideological line’ are expelled through a process of gim-gema. In 
particular, the so called ‘Peace and Development Conferences’ which are 
                                                                                                                                                        
is unclear. This is simply because the opposition parties have never participated in local elections. 
They either boycotted or withdrew from local elections. Thus, there is no factual evidence that 
directly links the electoral system with the lack of representation of the opposition parties in 
nationality zone and liyu woreda councils. 
1842As will be discussed below, there are evidences which indicate that electoral system has 
exclusionary effect in national and regional election. 
1843 Young (1998) 197.  
1844 The genesis of the establishment of the affiliate parties (also referred to as Peoples Democratic 
Parties (PDOs)) is that after the fall of the Derg and during the transitional period the EPRDF 
fighters ‘marched’ to the present day SNNPR. In the area, they mobilised the various ethnic 
groups into small ethnic-based political parties. The teachers in the area were particular targets of 
recruitment. Each of these parties now bear the name of the ethnic group they claim to represent 
followed by ‘people democratic organisation’ (PDO).  Now these parties are commonly called as 
PDOs.  Vaughan (2006) 186. 
1845 Asnake (2009) 247. 
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convened and chaired by EPRDF cadres, are used to dispose of those who refuse 
to obey.1846  
 
In addition, the ethnic-based political parties which are members of the EPRDF 
and which control self-governing local territories are not politically autonomous. 
It has become the policy of the EPRDF to merge ethnic-based parties (both 
EPRDF’s members and affiliate parties) under one umbrella regional party.1847 
The regional umbrella party is expected to operate on the basis of the principle of 
democratic centralism.1848 For instance, the SEPDM is a coalition of 20 small 
ethnic-based political parties and is a member of the EPRDF.1849 Based on the 
principle of democratic centralism the constituent units of the SEPDM do not 
have political autonomy from the SEPDM. Similarly, the SEPDM does not have 
a political existence separate from the EPRDF. Thus, the policies are formulated 
at the centre and the local echelons of the party are enjoined to implement these 
policies and decisions. Thus, the governments of the 18 liyu woredas and 
nationality zones in SNNPR, which are ruled by more than 20 ethnic-based 
political parties, cannot independently exercise political power. A similar kind of 
centralisation of the political party structure has taken place in the Gambella and 
                                                 
1846 Asnake describing the gimgema process in Benishangul-Gumuz states: ‘After the end of the 
conference, the six political parties underwent a gruelling gimgema session under the stewardship 
of EPRDF cadres. In these evaluation sessions, the members of the parties had to undergo a 
humiliating process of self-criticism. Those who sufficiently criticised themselves and accepted 
their ‘weakness’ and were thought to have submitted themselves to the objectives of the EPRDF 
were allowed to become members of the new ethnic parties. On the other hand, many regional 
officials accused of having links with ‘anti-peace’ forces, tendencies of ‘narrow-nationalism’ and 
‘dictatorship’ were excluded’. Asnake (2009) 247. See also Samatar (2004) 1146. 
1847See Wondwosen (2009). 
1848 See The Statute of EPRDF (undated). 
1849 See chapter 4; § 3.2.1.1. 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
Benishangul-Gumuz regions at the behest of the EPRDF.1850 This, in effect means 
that, the territorial autonomy which came about as a result of the decentralisation 
process, is undercut by the centralisation of the regional party structures. The 
establishment of nationality zones and liyu woredas has, therefore, become 
enfeebled in terms of allowing the ethnic minorities to fully enjoy self-rule. 
2.2.3. Competences of liyu woredas and nationality zones 
The third critical feature of self-rule is the devolution of clearly defined 
competences which are relevant for the protection of the identity and culture of an 
ethnic community. As indicated in chapter two, language, education, radio, 
television, public libraries, cultural centres, museums and the like are considered 
appropriate functions for the promotion and protection of an ethnic community’s 
culture and identity.1851  
 
The federal Constitution does not contain a list of competences that are to be 
exercised by ethnic-based sub-regional units. Article 39(2) of the Constitution, 
however, provides that an ethnic community ‘has the right to speak, to write and 
to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; 
and to preserve its history’. This implies that nationality zones and liyu woredas 
may exercise those powers and function that are necessary for expressing, 
developing, and promoting the language and culture of the ethnic community for 
which they are established. However, the specific competences that they may 
exercise are not clearly identified.  
 
                                                 
1850 Asnake (2009); Medhane (2007). 
1851 See chapter 2 § 4.4.2.1. 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
The regional constitutions do not also clearly indicate whether a nationality zone 
or a liyu woreda may exercise these functions. Like the federal Constitution, the 
regional constitutions impose a duty on the governments of nationality zones and 
liyu woredas to promote and protect the language, culture, and history of the 
intra-regional minority ethnic communities for whom they were established.  It is 
unclear what these local units may do to perform this duty. What is clearly 
provided, though, is that nationality zones and liyu woredas may choose their 
own working language as well as the language of instruction for primary 
education within their territorial jurisdiction.1852 It is not at all clear whether they 
may exercise any of the functions that are mentioned above. Furthermore, a 
nationality zone and a liyu woreda have a constitutional power to decide on their 
own social services and economic development matters.1853 It is, however, left 
undefined what ‘social services and economic development matters’ include. 
 
In practice, nationality zones and liyu woredas exercise certain functions in the 
area of education. For instance, they are responsible for translating teaching 
materials into local languages.1854 They are also responsible for distributing 
teaching material to primary schools. Nationality zones, along with the regional 
state, are engaged in establishing and administering secondary schools, technical 
and vocational schools, special schools, teacher training institutes, and medium-
                                                 
1852 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (3); BGRS Constitution (2002) 75 (3); GRS Constitution 
(2002) Art 78(3); SNNPR Constitution (2001) 81 (3).  
1853 See ARS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (3); BGRC (2002) Art 75 (3); GRC (2002) Arts 78 (3); 
SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 81(3). 
1854 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 16 
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level colleges.1855 The practice is not, however, based on a clear legislative 
division of functions among the various levels of government.  
         2.2.3.1. Competences relating to language  
Choosing a working language 
The federal Constitution authorises each regional state to choose its working 
language.1856 The regional constitutions in turn allow each nationality zone and 
liyu woreda to adopt its own working language.1857 Accordingly, several mono-
ethnic nationality zones have adopted the language of the dominant ethnic 
community of the zone as their working language. For instance, afaa-oromo has 
become the working language of the Oromo Nationality Zone in Amhara regional 
state.1858  In SNNPR, several mono-ethnic nationality zones, including the 
Sidama, Silte, and Hadiya nationality zones, have begun to use local languages 
for official purposes.1859 
 
In principle, the working language of a regional state becomes the working 
language of all woredas and cities in the region. This is the case, for instance, in 
Oromia, Tigray, and Somali. However, a woreda or a city, which is within the 
territorial jurisdiction of a nationality zone, is expected to use the working 
language of the latter. This is because only Article 39 local government units may 
decide to adopt their own working language. Article 50(4) local government units 
do not have this competence. Hence, intra-regional ethnic minority communities 
                                                 
1855 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 17. 
1856 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 5 (3). 
1857See ARS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (3) (a); GRS Constitution (2002) Arts 78 (3) (a); SNNPR 
Constitution (2001) Art 81(3) (a).  
1858 Mohammed (2010) 147. 
1859 Cohen (2000); Smith (2008). 
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that are found within the nationality zones and that have decided to use a local 
language for official purposes may access public services in their own language 
from all local public offices, including, kebeles, woredas, and cities.1860 
Therefore, they may use their own language to submit applications to public 
offices. They may also receive documents, such as identification cards, which are 
prepared in their own languages.  
 
Multi-ethnic nationality zones, such as, the Bench-Maji and South Omo zones 
rather resort to using Amharic as their working language. This is not, however, as 
a result of a constitutional restriction preventing them from adopting two or more 
local languages as their working languages. The decision to use Amharic rather 
seems to have been prompted by the ethnic and linguistic diversity of these 
nationality zones. A decision to do otherwise might have driven the nationality 
zones into administrative difficulties. Moreover, it might have led to a dispute 
among the ethnic communities as each ethnic community would have attempted 
to have its language used as the working language.            
Choosing language of instruction for primary education   
The FDRE Constitution recognises the right of each ethnic community ‘to speak, 
write and develop its language’. 1861  Accordingly, the regional constitutions have 
recognised the right of the intra-regional ethnic communities to receive education 
in their own working language.1862  Moreover, it is the policy of the federal 
                                                 
1860 That is, for instance the case in the Oromo nationality zone in Amhara regional state. See 
Mohammed (2010). 
1861 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (2). 
1862 The Gambella Constitution, for instance, expressly provides that each of the ethnic 
communities of the region has the right to learn in their own language. Likewise, the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional Constitution recognises the right of the ethnic communities of the region to 
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government to ensure that primary education is offered to each ethnic community 
either in its own language or in the language that the ethnic community 
chooses.1863 Amharic is only a subject in primary schools of various nationality 
zones as it is ‘a language of countrywide communication'.1864   
 
The councils of nationality zones and liyu woredas are authorised to decide 
whether or not a local language should be used for the purpose of primary 
education.1865 Moreover, practice shows nationality zones are engaged in 
translating primary school textbooks into a local language.1866 Nationality zones 
(along with the woredas within their territorial jurisdictions) and liyu woredas are 
expected to establish schools or separate classes which provide primary education 
in the language of an ethnic community.  
 
Practice is also largely in line with the above. Several mono-ethnic nationality 
zones and liyu woredas have adopted local languages for primary education. For 
instance, the Oromo and Awi nationality zones of the Amhara regional states 
have begun to use Afaan-oromo and Awgini, respectively.1867 Most of the mono-
ethnic nationality zones and liyu woredas in SNNPR have adopted local 
                                                                                                                                                        
receive education either in their own language or in the language of their choice. GRS 
Constitution (2002) Art 6 (3); BGRS Constitution (2002) 6 (3). 
1863 FDRE Ministry of Education (1994) 23. 
1864 FDRE Ministry of Education (1994) 23. 
1865 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 74; GRS Constitution (2002) Arts 78; SNNPR Constitution 
(2001) Art 81. 
1866 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008) 15. 
1867 Cohen (2006) 166; Mohammed (2010); Yonatan (2011). 
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languages as medium of instruction. Some ethnic communities in multi-ethnic 
nationality zones have also begun to use local languages for education.1868  
 2.2.3.2. Assessment  
Evidently, there is a lack of clarity as regards the functional areas that are within 
the exclusive competences of nationality zones and liyu woredas. The federal 
Constitution implies that ethnically organised territorial and administrative units 
may exercise functions that are relevant for preserving and promoting the culture 
and language of the ethnic community for which they are established. The 
regional constitutions also impose on nationality zones and liyu woredas the duty 
to promote the language, culture, and history of the ethnic communities. 
Furthermore, the nationality zones and liyu woredas are authorised to formulate 
the social services and economic development plans of a nationality zone.  
 
The federal Constitution does not, however, specify the functions that an ethnic-
based territorial and administrative unit may exercise for achieving the stated 
purposes. The regional constitutions also fail to clearly define the specific 
competences that nationality zones and liyu woredas may use to the above effect.  
Furthermore, the specific areas of social and economic matters that are within the 
competences of a nationality zone are undefined. In particular, the distinction 
between the social and economic matters that are within the competences of a 
nationality zone and the woredas or/and cities that are found within it are left 
unspecified. Interestingly, the draft legislative framework that was prepared by 
the Ministry of Capacity Building to clarify the competences of woredas, 
deliberately avoids defining the competences of the woredas that are found within 
                                                 
1868 Cohen (2000) 124.  
 
 
 
 
433 
 
the territorial jurisdiction of nationality zones.1869  As was discussed in chapter 
five, the lack of specificity in the competences of the various tiers of sub-regional 
governments is one of the major deficiencies of the decentralisation project in 
Ethiopia.1870   
 
It is clear that nationality zones or liyu woredas have the competence to use a 
local language for work and/or primary education. The decentralisation of 
language choice to nationality zones and liyu woredas is viewed as an important 
measure for protecting the identity of the intra-regional ethnic minority 
communities. Several writers claim that the use of local languages in schools and 
administrative offices has resulted in a ‘cultural renaissance’ for many ethnic 
communities that were marginalised in the past.1871 This arrangement has re-
instated the pride and dignity of these ethnic communities by preventing the need 
to ‘face the indignity of having to speak [Amharic] and appear before members of 
Amhara elites at the local level’.1872 As Cohen maintains, ‘local pride and self-
identity are clearly increasing in response to the reform’ that allowed nationality 
zones and liyu woredas to use local languages for work and education.1873 Boothe 
and Walker also state that:- 
 
‘[D]ecentralisation, use of the mother tongue, and curricular revision have all helped to 
bolster community support for primary education … Across the board, parent, student 
and teacher attitudes about using the nationality languages were positive. Children 
                                                 
1869 See chapter 5; § 2.4.4.2. 
1870 See chapter 5; § 2.4.4.2. 
1871 Young (1998) 199; Cohen (2000) 122; Boothe & Walker (1997). 
1872 Young (1998) 199. 
1873 Cohen (2000) 122.  
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were excited that for the first time they could legally use their mother tongue in 
schools. Parents were pleased that they could talk to school officials in the mother 
tongue rather than through an interpreter. Teachers were encouraged by the students’ 
willingness to engage in class discussions now that they could express themselves in 
the language in which they were most confident.’1874 
 
The use of local languages for official purposes also brings significant economic 
benefits for members of ethnic minority communities as it provides them with 
enhanced employment opportunities. Previously, many were discouraged, if not 
excluded, from seeking employment in the administrative organs of the country, 
among other things, due to their lack of proficiency in the Amharic language.1875 
Now, the establishment of nationality zones and liyu woredas, coupled with the 
decentralisation of language choices, has enhanced the opportunity for most 
hitherto ‘unemployable’ members of the ethnic minorities to find employment in 
the administrative structures of the local units. Presently, most of the 
administrative organs of the nationality zones and liyu woredas are occupied by 
members of the ethnic minorities for whom the autonomous areas were 
established. 
 
The implementation of a decentralised language choice is not, however, without 
problems. The decisions to adopt a local language for work and education are 
often top-down in which members of the community hardly participated.1876  In 
some cases this top-down approach has caused serious conflicts. The wogagoda 
                                                 
1874 Boothe & Walker (1997). 
1875 See chapter 3; § 5.1.5. 
1876 Getachew & Derib (2006) 56-57. 
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case is an example.1877 The decision to adopt a local language for work seldom 
takes into account the ethnic heterogeneity of the nationality zones and liyu 
woredas. In particular, the urban areas are always multi-ethnic even in nationality 
zones and liyu woreda where there is a dominant ethnic community. The 
decentralisation of language choices does not formally cater for the ethnic 
communities which do not belong to the dominant ethnic group.1878 This renders 
the decentralisation of language choices problematic.  
 
The implementation of the use of local languages for education has also become 
an immensely complex task for the nationality zones and liyu woredas.  For 
instance, it has been difficult to find trained teachers who speak local languages. 
Therefore, almost all nationality zones and liyu woredas suffer from a chronic 
shortage of trained administrative workers and teachers who speak the local 
language.1879        
2.2.4. Revenue  
As was stated in chapter two, financial autonomy is a critical element of self-rule. 
Financial autonomy impacts on the effectiveness of local self-government in 
promoting and developing the culture and languages of the ethnic group for 
which it is established. 1880 Building schools, publishing books in the language of 
the ethnic minority, hiring teachers, and establishing other cultural centres clearly 
require revenue. Transferring adequate revenue to ethnically organised local units 
                                                 
1877 See above chapter 7; § 2.2.1.1. 
1878 In SNNPR there is a policy to use Amharic in primary schools in the zonal capitals. See the 
discussion below at § 3.3.2.2.  
1879See MoCB (2007) 50-51.   
1880 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2.1.   
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is also important for preventing conflicts and maintaining peace as ethnic-based 
conflicts are often caused or exacerbated by unjust resource distributions.1881 
  
The FDRE Constitution is silent on how ethnic-based sub-regional units are to be 
financed even though it envisages their establishment. As indicated elsewhere, the 
federal Constitution allocates taxing powers only between the federal and 
regional governments.1882 The regional constitutions provide no taxing power for 
nationality zones and liyu woredas. This is despite the power of nationality zones 
and liyu woredas to approve their own budgets.1883 It seems, therefore, that a 
nationality zone may only decide on how to spend revenue allocated to it by a 
regional state; it may not raise its own revenue.  
 
In practice, nationality zones receive a significant amount of funds from the 
regional governments in the form of block grants.1884 As has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, the block grant that is earmarked for woredas within a 
nationality zone is transferred directly to the nationality zone.1885 The nationality 
zone then deducts a certain amount for itself and adjusts the remaining amount to 
transfer it to the woredas within its jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
1881 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2.1.  
1882 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2.1.  
1883 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (3); BGRS Constitution (2002) 75 (3); GRS Constitution 
(2002) Art 78 (3); SNNPR Constitution (2001) 81 (3). 
1884 Garcia & Rajkumar (2008). 
1885 See chapter 5; § 2.6.3.1. 
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A liyu woreda, like any other woreda, may collect agriculture income taxes and 
land use fees.1886 However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, a liyu 
woreda, like a regular woreda, collects these taxes on behalf of the regional 
states.1887 It is not allowed to retain the proceeds from these taxes for itself. That 
is why an amount equivalent to what it has collected from these taxes is deducted 
from the block grants it receives from the regional government. Moreover, it is 
not clear whether the status of a liyu woreda entitles it to extra revenue over and 
above what other ordinary woredas with similar developmental needs receive 
from a regional government. 
 
In short, both nationality zones and liyu woredas have no constitutionally defined 
internal revenue raising power. Moreover, liyu woredas, like any other woreda 
outside the jurisdiction of a nationality zone, directly access block grants from the 
regional government.     
        2.2.4.1. Assessment  
As can be gathered from the above discussion, territorial autonomy at sub-
regional level is not accompanied with full financial autonomy. Nationality zones 
are completely dependent on regional grants to finance their activities.  Liyu 
woredas raise some revenue in the form of agricultural income taxes and land use 
fees. However, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, an amount that is 
equivalent to what a liyu woreda raises from these taxes is deducted from its 
share of the regional block grant.1888  
 
                                                 
1886 See Chapter 5:§ 2.6.2.1. 
1887 See chapter 5; § 2.6.2.1.  
1888 See chapter 5; § 2.6.2.1. 
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Even if nationality zones and liyu woredas do not have constitutionally defined 
sources of revenue, some studies indicate that they have had access to increased 
funding from the regional and, even, from the national government, which is 
meant to cover their capital and recurrent expenditures.1889  In fact, it was the 
desire to access this revenue that motivated the elites of certain ethnic 
communities to demand the creation of nationality zones or liyu woredas. As has 
been discussed in chapter four, 1890 one of the unofficial rationales for the second 
phase decentralisation was to discourage the demand for nationality zones and a 
liyu woredas. This is why nationality zones are required to transfer to the woredas 
within their jurisdiction the bulk of the regional block grant that they receive.1891 
The block grant is transferred directly to a nationality zone merely to signify its 
special status. 
 
The total dependence of the nationality zone on regional block grants is likely to 
weaken their relevance as institutions of self-rule for a particular ethnic 
community for whom it was established. The financial dependency does away 
with the accountability of local officials to the local people. The fact that 
members of nationality zone councils are not even directly elected by the people - 
despite the fact that members of a nationality zone council are expected to 
exercise the highest political powers in their respective nationality zones - makes 
the problem even more aggravated.  
                                                 
1889 Vaughn (2003). 
1890 See chapter 4; § 5.3.7.2. 
1891 See chapter 5; § 2.6.3.1. 
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2.2.5. Concluding remarks  
The foregoing discussion depicts the institutional design of ‘self-rule' at local 
level which is meant to accommodate intra-regional ethnic communities. As the 
discussion reveals, ethnic-based sub-regional territorial units are established. The 
establishment of ethnic-based local territorial units is clearly the fundamental 
element of territorial autonomy. Political and administrative institutions are 
established in the territorial units which are also critical for self-rule. Even though 
their competences are generally unclear, the political organs have the authority to 
decide on certain culture and language related matters.  
 
As the discussion in chapter two shows, territorial autonomy clearly allows ethnic 
minorities to exercise self-rule at local level. However, unlike federalism which 
provides both for self-rule and shared-rule, territorial autonomy does not in 
general necessitate the representation of the local units in the central government. 
The FDRE Constitution, however, contains the principle of ‘shared-rule’ which 
entitles intra-regional minority ethnic communities to be represented in the 
central government. The following section will examine how the ‘shared-rule' 
element is institutionalised.   
2.3. Shared-rule 
2.3.1. Introduction  
As was stated in chapter two,1892 local autonomy is critical, but not sufficient. 
Self-rule must be complemented with shared-rule. Shared rule entails the 
representation of ethnic-based local units or intra-regional ethnic minority groups 
in sub-national and national government political, administrative, and judicial 
                                                 
1892 See chapter 2§ 4.4.2.2. 
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organs.1893 As maintained previously, the representation of intra-regional minority 
ethnic communities in regional and national governments signifies regional 
integration. It also puts intra-regional minority communities in a position where 
they can influence decisions directly affecting their interests. 
 
According to the FDRE Constitution, intra-regional minority ethnic communities 
not only are allowed to exercise self-rule, they are also entitled to ‘equitable 
representation in state and Federal governments’.1894 This is clearly a normative 
principle for shared-rule.1895 Several studies indicate that this principle allows the 
equitable representation of every ethnic community in every regional and national 
government organs including the legislative and executive organs, the army, the 
police, and the civil service.1896 Obviously, not all federal and state organs make 
decisions that directly affect ethnic-based local units. Moreover, even if members 
of a given intra-regional ethnic community are elected or appointed to a particular 
regional or federal government, it does not mean that he or she will act as a 
representative of the ethnic-based local unit. Therefore, it is unnecessary to 
discuss whether and how each ethnic community is represented in every regional 
and federal government organ.  
 
There are, however, certain regional and federal organs in which the ethnic-based 
local units are either directly or indirectly represented and whose decisions 
directly impact on the ethnic-based local units. At regional level, nationality 
                                                 
1893 See chapter 2§ 4.4.2.2. 
1894 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3). 
1895 See above § 2.1. 
1896 See above § 2.1. 
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zones and liyu woredas are represented in the CoN (in SNNPR) and certain 
judicial organs. At federal level, the HoF has the power to make decisions 
directly affecting the ethnic-based local units. The following section, therefore, 
will discuss how these organs are composed and how their decisions impact on 
the ethnic-based local units.       
2.3.2. Shared-rule at regional level  
2.3.2.1. The Council of Nationalities of SNNPR 
As mentioned before,1897 SNNPR is a collection of 21 ethnic-based autonomous 
sub-regional territorial units. Every part of the territory of SNNPR falls within a 
nationality zone or a liyu woreda, making the region appear to be an ethnic-based 
federation within a larger ethnic federation. Moreover, SNNPR has another 
distinctive feature of a federal system: a bi-cameral legislative house. Unlike any 
other regional states in Ethiopia, SNNPR has an upper house which is known as 
the Council of Nationalities (the CoN).1898  
 
Each of the members of the CoN is viewed as a representative of a particular 
ethnic community, not as representative of a particular nationality zone or liyu 
woreda.1899 Yet, members of the CoN are elected by the councils of the 
nationality zone and liyu woredas from among their members.1900 The 
                                                 
1897 See above § 2.2.1. 
1898 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 58. 
1899 Each ethnic community is represented by at least one representative. If an ethnic community 
has more than a million people it may have additional representative in this CoN. SNNPR 
Constitution (2001) Art 58 (1). 
1900 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 58 (3). 
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representatives of the ethnic communities which are not represented in a 
nationality zone council, if there are any, are elected by woreda councils.1901  
 
The CoN has three critical powers that directly impact on nationality zones and 
liyu woredas. First, it has the power to decide on a petition of a particular ethnic 
community for a separate nationality zone or liyu woreda.1902 Evidently, the 
power of the CoN to decide on this matter directly affects the existing nationality 
zones and liyu woredas. As stated before, the entire territorial area of SNNPR 
falls within one of the 21 nationality zones and liyu woredas. The establishment 
of a new nationality zone or liyu woreda in this region cannot take place without 
causing a reduction in the territorial and population sizes of one of the existing 
nationality zones, if not its total disintegration as was the case in the North Omo 
nationality zone. The power of the nationality zones and liyu woredas to elect the 
members of the CoN, therefore, allows them to be involved in and to influence 
such decisions.  
 
Secondly, the CoN is responsible for settling disputes between the various levels 
of government of the regional state.1903 It has a final say when the dispute 
between two levels of government entails the interpretation of the regional 
Constitution.1904 The power of the CoN to settle disputes between two levels of 
                                                 
1901 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 58 (3). 
1902 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 59 (3).   
1903 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 59 (5) 
1904 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 59 (1). There is a constitutionally established organ in 
SNNPR, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) which is composed of judges and lawyers. 
The CoN itself is in charge of establishing the CCI. The CCI presents to the CoN its opinion with 
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government and to interpret the regional Constitution has the potential to affect 
the existing nationality zones and liyu woredas.  
 
Thirdly, the CoN is involved in the amendment of the regional Constitution.1905 
The provisions of the regional Constitution, other than the Bill of Rights, are 
amended when a Bill of Amendment is approved by a joint session of the 
Regional Council and the CoN and when the Bill is approved by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the joint secession.1906  
2.3.2.2. Judicial organs  
Under the FDRE Constitution judicial power is entrusted to the federal and state 
courts. 1907 The regional constitutions also structure the state courts as regional 
first instance courts (often referred to as woreda courts), regional high courts 
(also known as zonal court) and regional supreme courts.1908 Woreda and zonal 
courts fall under one hierarchical structure at the top of which is a regional 
supreme court.1909 They do not form parts of a woreda, a liyu woreda or 
nationality zone government structure. The regional government is responsible 
for establishing the various tiers of regional courts, for appointing the judges 
thereof, and for financing them.1910 
                                                                                                                                                        
respect to a particular issue related to the interpretation of the regional Constitution. The CoN 
delivers a final decision on the matter. SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 59 (2), 78 & 79.  
1905 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 125 (3). 
1906 SNNPR Constitution (2001) Art 125 (1) (b). 
1907 See chapter 4; § 3.2.3. & 3.3.3.  
1908  ARS Constitution (2001) Art 67; BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 68; GRS Constitution (2001) 
Art 71; SNNPR Constitution (2001) 75. 
1909 There are various specialised tribunals at state level which deal with particular issue such as 
taxes, labour, urban land expropriation  
1910 ARS Constitution (2001) Art 67; BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 68; GRS Constitution (2001) 
Art 71; SNNPR Constitution (2001) 75. 
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However, there is an element of shared-rule in the procedure in terms of which 
the judges of the above mentioned branches of a regional court are appointed. The 
regional government is enjoined to consult with the relevant nationality zone or 
liyu woreda government about the appointment of a particular judge to administer 
justice in a regional first instance or high court which is established within its 
territory.1911 The final decision with respect to the appointment of judges belongs 
to a regional council. It is important to note, however, that no such consultation 
takes place to appoint a judge in a woreda which is found outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of a nationality zone.  
 
In Gambella and Amhara regional states, nationality zones and liyu woredas are 
also represented in a quasi-judicial organ known as the ‘Constitutional 
Interpretation Commission (CIC)’. A CIC is an organ which has the power to 
interpret a regional constitution. The establishment of this organ is provided for in 
all regional constitutions except that of SNNPR. 1912 A CIC is composed of the 
representatives of each woreda.1913 In Amhara and Gambella regional states, the 
nationality zones, in addition to the woredas, are also represented in the CIC.1914 
A CIC decides on matters involving the interpretation of a regional 
                                                 
1911 ARS Constitution (2001) 74 (3) (g); BGRS Constitution (2002) Art 75 (3) (g); GRS 
Constitution (2001) Art 78 (3) (g); SNNPR Constitution (2001) 76 (3). 
1912 As mentioned above, in the SNNPR, the power to interpret the regional constitution belongs 
to the Council of Nationalities. The ARS Constitution (2001) Art 70 (1); the AfRS Constitution 
(2001) Art 76; the SRS Constitution (2001) Art 71(1); the GRS Constitution (2001) Art 74 (1); the 
ORS Constitution (2001) Art 67 (1).  As was stated above in the SNNPR the power to interpret 
the regional Constitution is entrusted in the Council of Nationalities. 
1913 The ARS Constitution (2001) Art 70 (1); the AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 76; the SRS 
Constitution (2001) 71(2); the ORS Constitution (2001) Art 67 (1).  
1914 The GRS Constitution (2001) 74 (1). 
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constitution1915 based on the opinion of a regional ‘Constitutional Inquiry 
Commission’.1916   
2.3.2.3. Assessments  
The CoN is intended to play the role that a second chamber in a federal system 
plays.1917 The drafters of the regional constitutions were in fact inspired by the 
composition and powers of the HoF when they created the CoN.  
 
‘There was need for an institution which can resolve conflicts democratically and 
amicably, thereby contributing to the consolidation of the democratic unity among the 
diverse peoples of the south. So from the exercises of the federal House of the 
Federation we came to learn the need to establish a similar institution in our region. 
The House of Nationalities or the Council of Nationalities is the result of that 
realization.’ 1918 
As several writers argue, the rationale for the establishment of a second chamber 
in a federal system is to create a check on the ‘tyranny’ of the majority.1919 
Therefore, the principle that underlies the manner in which such a house is 
organised is directed at mitigating the influence of the majority. To that effect the 
second chambers of many federal states, including, the USA, Canada, and 
                                                 
1915 The ARS Constitution (2001) Art 70 (1); the AfRS Constitution (2001) Art 76; the SRS 
Constitution (2001) 72 (2); the GRS Constitution (2001) 75 (2); the ORS Constitution (2001) Art 
68 (2). 
1916 The Constitutional Inquiry Commission is composed of a president and a vice-president of a 
regional supreme court, six lawyers who are appointed by a regional council after being 
nominated by a regional chief administrator, and three members of a regional council who are 
selected by the speaker. The ARS Constitution (2001) Art 70 (2); the AfRS Constitution (2001) 
Art 76; the SRS Constitution (2001) 71 (2); the GRS Constitution (2001) 74 (3); the ORS 
Constitution (2001) Art 67 (2). 
1917 Van der Beken (2007) 114. 
1918 Haile Mariam Dessalegn, a former chief administrator of the SNNPR, quoted in Van der 
Beken (2007) 114.  
1919 Erk & Swenden (2010) 192; Assefa (2007a) 140. 
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Switzerland, are composed of the representatives of the sub-national units.1920 
Moreover, the sub-national units are represented, though not always, on the basis 
of equality, despite differences in territorial and population sizes.1921 Hence, each 
unit of a federation, regardless of its population and territorial sizes, sends an 
equal number of representatives to the second chamber. 1922   
 
Considering the fact that the CoN is meant to play the role of a second chamber, 
this organ should have been composed of representatives of the nationality zones 
and liyu woredas. 1923 Moreover, each nationality zone and liyu woreda in the 
region should have been represented by an equal number of representatives. 
However, as was stated above, in terms of the regional Constitution, members of 
the CoN are not viewed as representatives of the nationality zones and liyu 
woredas even though the councils of the nationality zone and the liyu woredas 
elect them. They are rather viewed as representatives of the ethnic communities 
which are found within each nationality zone and liyu woreda. Moreover, under 
the regional Constitution, members of the CoN are not required to act as agents of 
the nationality zone from whose council they are elected. Rather, they are 
expected to act as agents of the ethnic community that they are meant to 
represent. Furthermore, the CoN is composed on the basis of a majoritarian 
principle. Therefore, the number of representative that may represent an ethnic 
community in the CoN is determined by the size of the population of the ethnic 
community. It is logical, therefore, to expect ethnic communities with larger 
                                                 
1920 See Watts (2010); Norton (2007) 7.  
1921 Watts (2010) 2. 
1922 Watts (2010) 2. 
1923 Van der Beken (2007) 136. 
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populations to have more representation than those with smaller populations 
allowing the former to have stronger influence in the CoN. 
 
However, first, despite the fact that the nationality zones and liyu woredas are not 
represented in the CoN, members of the CoN are elected by the nationality zones 
and liyu woredas from among the members of their councils. It can be assumed 
that nationality zones and liyu woredas would ensure that their interests are 
promoted in the CoN by sending members who are likely to do so. Secondly, the 
fact that the CoN is organised based on a majoritarian principle will not have 
much impact on its composition and on its decisions. This is because even the 
largest ethnic communities of SNNPR, such as, the Sidamas and Gurages have 
populations of little more than two million each.1924 Therefore, even the largest 
ethnic communities can send only one or a few more representatives.1925 The 
Sidama ethnic community, for instance, sends three representatives which is the 
largest number of representatives that an ethnic community sends.1926 The 
Gurage, Gedeo, Hadiya, Wolayita, and Gamo send 2 representatives each.1927 The 
rest of the ethnic communities, including the smallest ones, send one 
representative each.  
 
The ethnic diversity of the population of a nationality zone or a liyu woreda, 
therefore, determines the number of representatives that it may send to the 
                                                 
1924 See FDRE Population Census Commission (2007). 
1925 Van der Beken (2007) 136. 
1926 Van der Beken (2007) 136. 
1927 Van der Beken (2007)136. 
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CoN.1928 Mono-ethnic nationality zones, such as, Sidama, Hadiya, and Gedeo, 
send fewer representatives than the multi-ethnic nationality zones, such as, 
Bench-Maji and South Omo.  For instance, the South Omo nationality zone sends 
16 representatives, one for the each of the16 ethnic communities that are found in 
the nationality zone. 1929 Even the Derashe liyu woreda sends two more 
representatives to the CoN than the Sidama nationality zone.1930 This provides the 
multi-ethnic nationality zones more weight in the CoN than the mono-ethnic 
nationality zones even if the latter have a larger population size.  
 
The involvement of nationality zones and liyu woredas in the appointment of the 
judges who preside in the courts that are established within their territorial 
jurisdiction is an expression of shared-rule. It is particularly important to ensure 
that the courts deliver judgements in the working language of the nationality 
zones and liyu woredas. 1931 Moreover, as was stated above, nationality zones and 
liyu woredas are represented in the quasi-judicial organ which has the ultimate 
power to decide on disputes involving the application and interpretation of 
regional constitutions. The involvement of nationality zones and liyu woredas in 
the appointment of the judges of a state court is likely to help them ensure the 
appointment of a judge who can deliver judgements in their working language. 
Also, their representation in the CIC is of important symbolic value. Moreover, it 
might help protect their interests.   
                                                 
1928 Van der Beken (2007) 136 
1929 Van der Beken (2007) 136 
1930 Van der Beken (2007) 136 
1931 In SNNPR, Sidama, Wolayita, Gamo, Gofa, Dawro, Hadiya, Kamabata, Kafa, Silte languages 
are used by the state courts for the purpose of administering justice in the relevant nationality zone 
and liyu woreda.Getachew & Derib (2006) 55.  
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However, it should be noted here that the regional constitutions are meant to give 
effect to the normative principles that are enshrined in the FDRE Constitution. 
Therefore, any dispute based on a regional constitution may not find a final 
solution at regional level. It may still be taken to the House of Federation (HoF) 
for final resolution. However, as clearly provided in Proclamation 251(2001), 
parties to a dispute are required to exhaust regional remedies before taking their 
cases to the HoF.1932 The CIC and the CoN (in SNNPR) can be viewed as an 
important regional remedy for resolving disputes. It may, therefore, be assumed 
that the nationality zones and liyu woredas will gain some advantages from their 
involvement in the interpretation of the regional constitutions to protect their 
autonomy where they are involved in constitutional dispute. This is so despite the 
fact that it is open to question whether it was wise to entrust a political organ with 
the power to interpret a regional constitution. 
 
It is necessary to note that the above assessment is based on what is formally 
stated in the regional constitutions. The practice is that disputes between different 
levels of government are hardly coached in such a way that they require the 
interpretation of a regional constitution. There is no reported case where a 
regional CIC was ever approached to interpret a regional constitution in any of 
the regional states. Disputes between various levels of government are rather 
dealt with within the party system. This renders the constitutionally established 
dispute settlement structures obsolete and the representation of liyu woredas and 
nationality zones in these formal structures meaningless.   
                                                 
1932 FDRE Proclamation 251 (2001) 
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2.3.3. Shared-rule at federal level  
2.3.3.1. Introduction  
As was stated in chapter two, the representation of intra-regional minority ethnic 
communities in regional government is important, but not sufficient. The shared-
rule element of the federal model requires the representation of ethnic minority 
communities in national government. A perusal of the FDRE Constitution reveals 
that intra-regional ethnic minority communities have the right to be represented in 
important federal government organs. These organs include the House of Peoples 
Representatives (HoPR), the House of Federation (HoF), and various executive 
and administrative organs. Decisions of all these federal organs may have a direct 
or indirect impact on the autonomy of the ethnic-based local units.  However, the 
discussion in the following section will focus only on the HoF, the second 
chamber the federal government.   
2.3.3.2.The House of Federation (HoF)  
Compostion of the HoF 
As has been discussed before,1933 the HoF, which is the upper house of the federal 
government, is composed of the representatives of the ethnic communities of the 
country.1934  Therefore, every ethnic group, regardless of its population size, 
sends at least one representative to the HoF.1935 An ethnic community with more 
than a million people sends one extra representative for each additional 1 million 
people belonging to that ethnic community.1936  
 
                                                 
1933 See chapter 4; § 3.2.1.  
1934 FDRE Constitution (1995) 61(1).  
1935 FDRE Constitution (1995) 61(2) 
1936 FDRE Constitution (1995) 61 (2) 
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It is debatable whether the Constitution warrants separate representation in the 
HoF of an ethnic community whose members are found in more than one regional 
state as original inhabitants. Alem seems to argue that the Constitution warrants 
separate representation of members of an ethnic community who live in different 
regional states. 1937  On the basis of this assumption he views as anomalous the 
non-representation of the Amharas and other ethnic migrants who are found in 
Oromia and other regional states.1938  
Table 7. Ethnic communities as represented in the HoF 
Region                                         Ethnic groups 
Amhara    Amhara (13), Awi (2) Agew-Himra (1),  Oromo (1)  
Oromia  Oromo (19),  
Tigray Tigre (4) , Kunama (1 ) Irob/Saho (1) 
 
SNNPR 
Dawro (1), Bumi (1), Dime (1), Tembaro (1), 
Shekicho, (1), Kafficho (1) Gacho (1); Nao (1), 
Tsemay (1) Alaba (1),  Qebena (1),  Gamo (1), 
Derashe (1)  Bench (1),    Yem (1),   Konta (1)   Konso 
(1)    Me’enite (1)  Mareko (1)   Oida (1), Ari (1), 
Gedeo (1), Gofa (1), Silte (1), Desenech (1), Surma (1) 
Wolaita (2), Hadyia (2), Sidama (2), Surma (1), Zeyise 
(1), Gidecho (1),  Arbore (1),  Geleb (1),  Kore (1),  
Gideo (1),  Guraghe (1),  Hamer (1),  Gewada (1), 
Basketo (1),  Burji (1) Alaba (1) ,  Bena  (1), Kambata 
(1), Shinasha (1) 
Afar Afar (2) 
Gambella  Anywaa (1) Nuer (1), Opa (1), Mejenger (1)  
Benishangul-Gumuz Berta (1), Gumuz (1), Shinasha (1), Mao (1), Koma (1)          
 
Hareri Hareri (1) 
Somali  Somali (4) 
Source:  House of Federation (2011) 
 
Yonatan, on the other, hand argues that each member of the HoF is assumed to 
represent a particular ethnic community. This is so regardless of where the 
                                                 
1937 Alem (2005) 330. 
1938 Alem (2005) 330. 
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members of the particular ethnic community live. Therefore, he maintains, there 
is no reason why the Oromos who are also found in the Amhara regional state 
should be separately represented in the HoF, let alone the Amharas in the Oromia 
regional state who are anyway ethnic migrants in that region.1939 Separate 
representation may be acceptable, according to Yonatan, only if there is a 
persuasive reason to consider an ethnic community ‘that [is] demarcated outside 
[its] homeland’ as a ‘distinct’ ethnic community in its own right.1940   
 
In any case, the practice is that an ethnic community which is considered original 
inhabitant of more than one regional state is represented in HoF separately. 1941 
For instance, the Oromia region, as the homeland of the Oromos, sends the largest 
‘contingent’ to the HoF.  Moreover, the Oromo nationality zone of the Amhara 
regional state also sends one representative to the HoF.1942  On the other hand, the 
Amharas in Benishangul-Gumuz, even though they have their own liyu woreda, 
are not separately represented in the HoF. This is apparently so because the 
Oromos are considered to be an original inhabitant of the Amhara regional state, 
whereas the Amharas in Pawe liyu woreda are still regarded as ethnic migrants in 
the region despite the territorial autonomy that they enjoy. 
 
The Constitution provides that members of the HoF may be elected by the 
regional councils. It also provides that they may be directly elected by the people 
                                                 
1939 Yonatan (2010) 220. 
1940 Yonatan (2010) 220. 
1941 Yonatan (2010) 220. 
1942 Yonatan (2010) 220. 
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if a regional government decides to do so.1943 Therefore, it is the prerogative of 
each regional state to determine the manner in which those who would represent 
the various ethnic groups of the region in the HoF are selected. Proclamation 251 
(2001) provides that if an ethnic community has its own nationality zone or liyu 
woreda, the council of the relevant nationality zone or liyu woreda will fully 
participate in the selection of those who will represent the relevant ethnic 
community in the HoF. 1944   
Powers of the HoF impacting on nationality zones and liyu woredas 
As indicated before, the HoF does not have legislative power.  It has, however, 
the power to decide on matters related to self-determination.1945 It also has the 
authority and the duty to settle constitutional disputes.1946  The decisions of the 
HoF on these matters may impact on intra-regional minority ethnic communities 
as well as on the autonomy of the ethnic-based local territorial units that are 
established for them. 
 
First, as was stated before, matters relating to the right to self-determination of a 
particular ethnic community are settled with the involvement of the HoF.1947 This 
may involve the determination of fundamental issues, including whether a group 
of people can be considered to be as an ethnic community. 1948   This was, for 
instance, precisely the issue in the Silte Case. 1949   
                                                 
1943 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 61 (3).  
1944 FDRE Proclamation 251 (2001) Art 47 (6).  
1945 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 62 (3). 
1946 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 62 (2). 
1947 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 62 (3). 
1948 FDRE Proclamation 251 (2001) Art 19 (1).  
1949 See above § 2.2.1.1. 
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Secondly, the issue of self-determination may involve a demand by a particular 
ethnic community for territorial autonomy through the establishment of a liyu 
woreda or a nationality zone. It should be noted that such a demand is in principle 
a regional matter which must be decided by a regional government. However, the 
normative constitutional principle that entitles intra-regional ethnic minority 
groups to their own liyu woreda or nationality zone emanates from the FDRE 
Constitution.1950 As stated before, the HoF has a final say on all constitutional 
disputes. Hence, a demand by a particular intra-regional ethnic group for a liyu 
woreda or nationality zone, if denied by a regional government, may find its way 
to the HoF as a constitutional dispute. In effect, the HoF may be called upon to 
decide on the very creation of a particular liyu woreda or nationality zone.  
 
Thirdly, the HoF may also be involved in the determination of matters relating to 
secession from a region. This is particularly relevant to intra-regional ethnic 
communities that have their own liyu woredas or nationality zones. In principle a 
demand by an intra-regional ethnic group for a regional state is decided by a 
representative council of the ethnic community which desires to establish its own 
regional state. This means that a liyu woreda or a nationality zone council decides 
whether or not to secede from the regional state wherein it is found.1951 The 
regional government has the responsibility to facilitate the implementation of the 
decision of the nationality zone or liyu woreda council. It does so by organising a 
referendum and by transferring power to the new regional government when the 
demand for a regional state is supported in the referendum by the majority of the 
                                                 
1950 See FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3).  
1951 See the discussion above at 2.2.2.2. 
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ethnic community. In short, secession from a region is a regional matter that can 
be settled in accordance with the procedure laid down under Article 47(3) of the 
FDRE Constitution. Moreover, as indicated in Proclamation 251 (2001), an ethnic 
community must exhaust its remedies at regional level as far as secession from a 
region is concerned.1952 A nationality zone or a liyu woreda council may, 
however, approach the HoF for a final decision, if a regional government refuses 
to positively respond to the demand of the ethnic community for a regional state 
after the latter has exhausted its regional remedies.1953  
 
Fourthly, as was discussed above, under the FDRE Constitution the right to self-
determination of the ethnic communities of the country is extended to include the 
right to secede from the federation to form an independent state. The referendum 
for secession is organised by the HoF.1954 The HoF is also the federal government 
organ which actually transfers powers to the newly established states.1955    
 
Fifthly, the federal government has the power to intervene in regional states when 
it believes that the constitutional order is endangered, when human rights are 
violated, or the regional government fails to maintain peace and security using the 
regular peacekeeping mechanisms.1956 Any intervention by the federal 
government in a regional government must receive the approval of the HoF. The 
HoF also decides when a federal intervention should come to an end. 1957 It is 
                                                 
1952 Proclamation 251 (2001) Art 20. 
1953 FDRE Proclamation 251 (2001) 19(3) (2-4). 
1954 FDRE Proclamation 251 (2001) 19 (2) (a). 
1955 FDRE Proclamation 251 (2001) 19 (2) (b). 
1956 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 55 (16) & 62 (9).  
1957 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 55 (16) & 62 (9).  
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important to note the problem that causes federal intervention may be limited in 
its scope within a particular nationality zone or liyu woreda. Hence, a federal 
intervention in a regional state may equally, if not more so, impact on the 
autonomy of a nationality zone or a liyu woreda.      
2.3.4. Assessment  
The foregoing discussion clearly shows that all intra-regional minority ethnic 
communities are represented in the HoF. Their representation in this House is 
crucial as the HoF has the power to decide on matters that directly impact on the 
local territorial autonomy of the ethnic communities. Their representation, 
therefore, allows them to have their voices heard at the federal level. The 
involvement of the council of nationality zones and liyu woredas in the selection 
of the representative of the relevant ethnic community is an expression of shared-
rule. Moreover, as stated above, members of the HoF are not formally required to 
act as representatives of a region even if they are primarily selected and sent by a 
regional council. They are not, for instance, enjoined to vote in a block.1958  The 
absence of a legal requirement that enjoins members of the HoF to promote 
regional interests provides the representatives the opportunity to promote in the 
HoF the particular interests of their ethnic community. In effect, even if not 
necessarily, they may promote the interest of the nationality zone or liyu woreda 
of the particular ethnic community to which they belong.   
 
The above advantage is, however, mitigated by the fact that the composition of 
HoF is based on a majoritarian principle. 1959  As was discussed before,1960  there 
                                                 
1958 Yonatan (2010) 218. 
1959 Yonatan (2010) 222; See also Assefa (2007a).  
1960 See § Table 4.1. 
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are substantial differences in population size between the various ethnic 
communities of the country. Ethnic communities, such as, the Oromos and 
Amharas, which have large populations, can easily ‘outvote’ intra-regional ethnic 
communities.1961 Moreover, in practice, members of the HoF act more as 
representatives of the regional states rather than of the ethnic communities that 
they are supposed to represent. 1962 
2.4. Concluding Remarks  
The above discussion shows that intra-regional ethnic communities are 
represented in regional and federal government organs. These federal and 
regional government organs into which intra-regional ethnic communities are 
represented have the power to decide on matters that have a direct and an indirect 
impact on the territorial autonomy of the intra-regional ethnic communities. The 
representation of the ethnic communities in these organs is, therefore, likely to 
allow them to influence decisions which have an impact on their interests. 
3. ACCOMMODATING TERRITORIALLY DISPERSED ETHNIC 
COMMUNITIES  
3.1. Introduction 
It may be gathered from an earlier discussion that territorial autonomy becomes a 
workable mechanism for accommodating ethnic minorities only where the ethnic 
communities are found territorially concentrated.1963  Territorial autonomy is not 
an appropriate option when members of an ethnic community are dispersed all 
over a region or a country.  It is also not an ideal choice where an ethnic 
community, though territorially concentrated, is too small to effectively exercise 
                                                 
1961 Yonatan (2010) 222.  
1962 Assefa (2007a); Yonatan (2010) 218. 
1963 See chapter 2; § 4.4.2. 
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territory-based self-governance. Non-territorial options should be explored in 
such cases. It was stated in chapter two that the equitable representation of ethnic 
minorities in the political and administrative apparatuses of local government, 
and providing recognition to the culture and language of members of a 
territorially dispersed ethnic community were necessary. The following sections 
will examine whether a non-territorial institutional arrangements have been used 
in Ethiopia to accommodate these communities. The sections will also examine 
how local government - both Article 39 and Article 50(4) local government units 
- plays a role in this respect. The discussion will begin by arguing that there is a 
need to seriously consider non-territorial options to accommodate certain intra-
regional minority ethnic communities. 
3.2. A case for non-territorial options in Ethiopia 
As previously discussed, there are a number of small indigenous ethnic 
communities in some of the regional states that are too small, both in terms of 
population size and in terms of the territorial area that they occupy, to effectively 
exercise territorial autonomy even at local level. Proclamation 7 (1992) identifies 
more than 17 such ethnic communities. Most of these intra-regional ethnic 
minority groups are found in SNNPR. As was shown above, these small ethnic 
groups are lumped together in multi-ethnic nationality zones, such as, Bench-
Maji, South Omo, Kembata-Tembaro, and Gamo-Gofa. Besides, there are those 
that are found in other nationality zones amidst a locally dominant ethnic 
community. Such small ethnic communities are also found in the Tigray region 
(the Kunamas and Irobs) and in Benishangul-Gumuz (Komo, Mao and 
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Shinasha).1964 The Opo and Komo ethnic communities of the Gambella regional 
state are also among those that are too small to exercise territorial autonomy 
 
Moreover, millions of ethnic migrants are found in every regional state, 
nationality zones, and liyu woreda. More than three million non-Oromo people 
reside in the Oromia region, including close to two million Amharas.1965 
Similarly, in the Somali region, in particular in Jijiga town, a significant number 
of non-Somali residents are found.1966 Furthermore, in SNNPR half a million 
Amharas are found, mostly in the urban areas of SNNPR; a population greater by 
far than, for example, the entire population of the Gambella region. 1967  There are 
also quarter of a million Oromos in this region. 1968   Tens of thousands of 
Amharas, Oromos, and other ethnic communities live in Gambella region.1969  
Besides, more than quarter of a million Amharas and Oromos live in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region besides small proportion of other communities.1970  
 
Clearly, territorial autonomy is not a viable option to accommodate the ethnic 
migrants, save in exceptional cases, like Pawe liyu woreda, where they are found 
territorially concentrated. 1971  Therefore, the need to accommodate these ethnic 
communities and ethnic migrants requires a serious consideration of non-
                                                 
1964 In Benishangul a bi-ethnic liyu woreda is established for Mao and Komo ethnic groups. 
However, the Shinasha ethnic group has no territorial autonomy.  . 
1965 FDRE Population Census Commission (2007) 92-94. 
1966 FDRE Population Census Commission (2007) 94-96. 
1967 FDRE Population Census Commission (2007) 98. 
1968 FDRE Population Census Commission (2007) 99. 
1969 FDRE Population Census Commission (2007) 100-102.  
1970 FDRE Population Census Commission (2007) 100-102. 
1971 See above at § 2.2.1. 
 
 
 
 
460 
 
territorial solutions. The following sections examine how the regional states have 
attempted to accommodate these communities.  
3.3. Political representation  
3.3.1. Autochthonous ethnic communities  
3.3.1.1. Representation in woredas  
The FDRE Constitution guarantees the right of every ethnic community to be 
represented in the national and state governments.1972 To that effect it reserves 20 
seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPRS) for 20 ethnic 
communities that cannot be represented through the normal electoral process. 
Undoubtedly, the express reference to the right of an ethnic community to be 
represented in state and federal governments does not exclude a claim for similar 
representation in local government. Rather, it is clearly provided in Proclamation 
7 (1992) that an ethnic community has a right to be represented in a woreda 
council if it does not have a woreda of its own.1973  
 
Small ethnic communities not only are represented in woreda councils but many 
of them also have their own woredas. As a rule a woreda is required to have a 
population of approximately 100 000. However, often this requirement is ignored.  
Woredas are created for several ethnic communities even if they do not fulfil the 
minimum population requirement. Therefore, even in multi-ethnic nationality 
zones, such as, Bench-Maji and South Omo, small ethnic communities, such as, 
Suri, Me’en and Dizi have their own woredas.1974 This is even the case in the 
regions that have not created any ethnic-based local government units. In Tigary, 
                                                 
1972 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 39 (3). 
1973 Proclamation 7 (1992) Art 5 (3). 
1974 Abbink (2000) 533. 
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for instance, the Irob ethnic community has a woreda of its own which in fact 
bears the name of the ethnic community.  
 
This kind of arrangement allows the ethnic communities to decide on some of 
their own social and economic matters. It should be noted that a woreda is an 
Article 50 (4) local government unit. Therefore, these ethnic communities do not 
enjoy the same degree of constitutional protection and autonomy as the ethnic 
communities that have their own liyu woredas or nationality zones.  
 
There are several territorially concentrated small ethnic communities that do not 
have their own woredas. These ethnic communities are often found to be in the 
majority in one or more kebeles within a particular woreda.  This is the case, for 
instance, in Gambella where ethnic communities of a few thousands, such, as 
Opo and Komo, are found concentrated in certain kebele/s. That is why the 
Gambella regional Constitution provides that the Opos and Komos can exercise 
self-rule at kebele level.1975 As was discussed above, a kebele is used in woreda 
elections as a multimember constituency.1976 Each kebele sends a certain number 
of representatives to the woreda councils. Therefore, the electoral process which 
uses a kebele as a constituency for woreda elections is likely to result in the 
representation in a woreda council of most of the ethnic communities. 
Furthermore, special procedure, such as reserving a certain number of seats in a 
woreda council, may be used to ensure the representation of the ethnic 
communities where the electoral process does not guarantee their representation.  
                                                 
1975 See above at 2.2.1. 
1976 See chapter 5; § 2.3.4.2. 
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3.3.1.2. Representation in city councils  
The political representation through the normal electoral process of ethnic 
communities of a given region in city councils including those communities that 
constitute the majority in a particular region, nationality zone, or liyu woreda, 
cannot be guaranteed. The cities are often multiethnic. Oftentimes autochthonous 
ethnic communities of a given region are even found to be in the minority in 
many urban areas. 1977  
 
Some of the regional states, such as Oromia and SNNPR, have introduced a 
special procedure designed to ensure the representation of the autochthonous 
ethnic communities in city councils. However, as can be gathered from the 
discussion below, the procedure goes beyond ensuring the representation of the 
ethnic communities. Rather it seems to be directed at excluding ethnic migrants 
from being represented in local political organs.        
Reserving city council seats  
Proclamation 65 (2003) of the Oromia regional state provided that up to 30 
percent of the seats in a city council may be reserved for the Oromos in the cities 
where they are found to be in the minority.1978 In addition, the Proclamation 
provided that five percent of the seats in a city council will be reserved for the 
                                                 
1977 The Oromos, for instance, constitute only 46 percent of the total population of the Nazret 
(Adama) City which is found in Oromia regional state. The Amhara population exceeds that of the 
Oromos in Debre-Zeit (Bishoftu) which is also in Oromia regional state. In Somali regions, in 
particular in Jijiga town, there are a significant number of Amharas and Oromos. The same can be 
said in relation to most of the cities in SNNPR, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz. FDRE 
Population Census Commission (2007).  
1978 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 13 (3).  
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rural kebeles which are found in the vicinity of a city.1979 The above provisions 
were amended in 2006 by Proclamation 116 (2006). Proclamation 116 (2006) 
increased the seats in a city council that are reserved for the Oromos from 30 
percent to 50 percent.1980 The Proclamation further stated that this arrangement 
may also be implemented at the kebele level within a city.1981 This means that 50 
percent of a kebele council is reserved for Oromos if they are found to be in the 
minority in a particular kebele of a city. Moreover, the Proclamation increased 
from five percent to 20 percent the seats in a city council that are reserved for the 
rural kebeles which are found in the surrounding area of a city.1982 It is evident 
that almost always the rural kebeles in the Oromia region that are found in the 
vicinity of cities are dominated by the Oromos. Hence, the above scheme alone 
reserves approximately 70 percent of the seats in a city council for the Oromos. 
As will be discussed below, this, coupled with a language requirement,1983 
completely disenfranchises the ethnic migrants in many urban areas.  
 
Similarly, Benishangul-Gumuz City Proclamation 69 (2007) provides that 55 
percent of a city council in the region is reserved for the ethnic communities.1984  
The Proclamation authorises the regional council to increase the percentage of a 
city council’s seats that can be reserved for the ethnic communities. 1985   
 
                                                 
1979 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 13 (4). 
1980 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 2 (4). 
1981 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 2 (4). 
1982 ORS Proclamation 116 (2006) Art 2 (5). 
1983 See below at § 3.2.2.1.  
1984 BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 10 (5). 
1985 BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 10 (6). 
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Likewise, Proclamation 103 (2006) of SNNPR provides that up to 30 percent of 
the seats in a city council may be reserved for members of the ethnic communities 
of a particular nationality zone or liyu woreda within whose jurisdiction the city 
is situated. 1986 This happens in particular when members of the ethnic community 
of a nationality zone or liyu woreda are in a minority in the city.1987 The 
Proclamation further provides that in order to fill the seats that are reserved for 
the groups, elections may be conducted in the rural kebeles which are adjacent to 
the city.1988 The above quota scheme would be used unless the particular ethnic 
community is in the majority in a particular city, or the regional executive council 
decides otherwise.  
A mayor from an indigenous community  
The reservation of political positions for ethnic communities in cities also extends 
to the executive branch of a city. SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) provides that 
the mayor of a city will be elected from among the members of the city council 
who belong to the ethnic community within whose nationality zone or liyu 
woreda the city is found.1989 This is especially so when members of the ethnic 
group/s are in a minority in the particular city. According to this provision, the 
mayor cities, such as, Wolkité and Butajira, cities that are found in Guraghe 
nationality zone, must be from Gurage ethnic community. Likewise, Hosanna, a 
city which is found in Hadiya nationality zone, may have only a Hadiya mayor. 
The same applies to the other mono-ethnic nationality zones.  
 
                                                 
1986 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) 16(3) (1).  
1987 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) 16 (3) (1).  
1988 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) 16 (3) (1). 
1989 SNNPR Proclamation 103 (2006) 21(1) (2). 
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However, it is unclear what happens when a city is found in a multi-ethnic 
nationality zone, such as South Omo or Bench-Maji. There appear to be two 
options. The first option is that the office of the mayor would rotate among the 
ethnic communities constituting that particular nationality zone. This might be the 
case especially where the city is a capital of a multiethnic nationality zone. The 
other option is that the mayor may be elected from among the ethnic community 
within whose woreda the city is found. 
 
Proclamation 116 (2006) of the Oromia region provides that the mayor and 
deputy-mayor of city will be appointed by the Regional President, as opposed to 
by a city council. Previously, the cities in Oromia had a parliamentary form of 
executive. A city council, therefore, had the authority to elect the mayor from 
among the members of the city council.1990 The above change was introduced in 
Proclamation 116 (2006). As the preamble of Proclamation 116 (2006) indicates, 
the above change was introduced to eliminate all legislative hurdles that limited 
‘the role of the Oromo people’ in the cities. In another words, this arrangement is 
meant to ensure that all political organs of the cities, including the offices of the 
mayor and the deputy-mayor, are occupied by Oromos, to exclusion of others. 
3.3.2. Ethnic migrants 
As was indicated before, there millions of ethnic migrants in many urban areas of 
almost every region. 1991 In particular, millions of internal immigrants, mostly 
belonging to the Amhara ethnic community, are found in Oromia, SNNPR, 
Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, and Afar. There are also certain ethnic 
                                                 
1990 ORS Proclamation 65 (2003) Art 18 (1). 
1991 See chapter 4 § 2.1. 
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communities of southern origin who have a history of migration within the 
country which include ethnic Wolayita and Guraghe who are found in various 
urban areas outside their respective regions, nationality zones, or liyu 
woredas.1992  
3.3.2.1. Political representation of ethnic migrants 
The regional constitutions and proclamations are almost completely silent on the 
issue of the political representation of ethnic migrants. None of the regional 
constitutions or city proclamations provide for any special schemes aimed at 
ensuring the representation of ethnic migrants. It also does not seem possible to 
provide for such a scheme, as individuals belonging to various ethnic 
communities are found in every urban area; even if most of the ethnic migrants 
are of Amhara origin.   
 
The question, therefore, is whether the normal electoral process provides an 
opportunity to everyone in all cities to be elected to the city councils. The answer 
is simply no. On the contrary, there are various legislative and non-legislative 
barriers which have the effect of disenfranchising those who belong to ethnic 
migrants in a number of regional states.  As was seen above, the reservation of 
the largest portion of a city council’s seats for members of ethnic communities 
greatly reduces the opportunity that the ethnic migrants have for representation in 
city councils. The language requirement is the other legislative barrier hampering 
the political representation of ethnic migrants.    
 
 
                                                 
1992 Smith (2008). 
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Language requirement, local elections, & ethnic migrants  
Proclamation 532 (2007), which regulates all elections in the country, provides 
that anyone who wishes to stand for election must be conversant with the working 
language of ‘the regional state or the area of his intended candidature’.1993 As an 
earlier discussion shows, each regional state, nationality zone, or liyu woreda may 
adopt its own working language. The working language of a regional government 
may not be the same as the working language of a nationality zone or a liyu 
woreda. In general, woredas and cities are expected to use the working language 
of the regional government within whose jurisdiction they are found. For 
instance, all woredas and cities in Oromia and Tigray use afaan-oromo and 
Tigrigna, respectively. However, woredas and cities that are found in nationality 
zone or liyu woreda are expected to use the working language of the latter for 
official purposes. In the context of local elections, therefore, it is not sufficient for 
a candidate to be conversant with the working language of the regional 
government. The electoral proclamation requires the person to be able to speak 
the working language of the woreda or city wherein he or she intends to run for 
election. 
The constitutionality of the language requirement  
The constitutionality of the language requirement was disputed in 2000 in 
connection with regional elections. 1994 The issue arose in relation to regional 
elections when individuals belonging to ethnic migrants were prevented from 
running in regional elections by officials of the Benishangul-Gumuz Region. The 
regional officials argued that the individuals should not be allowed to run for 
election in the region as they did not speak any of the local languages of the 
                                                 
1993 Proclamation 532 (2007) Art 45 (1) (b). Emphasis added. 
1994 This is as narrated by Assefa (2007 a). 
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region. This argument was based on a provision of the election law which, before 
it was amended, provided that a person must be ‘versed in the vernacular’ of a 
regional state in order to stand for election. Yet, Amharic, which is not 
‘vernacular’ of the region, was the working language of the region in which the 
individuals, who sought to run for elections, were well versed. The matter was 
taken to the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). The NEBE interpreted 
the term ‘vernacular’ to mean a language which is indigenous to a particular 
region. Then it decided that the individuals who sought to run for election could 
not do so since none them was able to speak any of the local languages of the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region.  
 
The individuals challenged the constitutionality of the provision of the law along 
with the decision of the NEBE by invoking Article 38 of the Constitution which 
provides: 
‘Every Ethiopian national, without any discrimination based on colour, race, nation, 
nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion or other status, has the 
following rights: ...(c) To vote and to be elected at periodic elections to any office at 
any level of government; elections shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors’1995 
 
The matter was referred to the HoF as it involved constitutional interpretation. 
The HoF, in turn, referred it to the Constitutional Inquiry Commission (CCI) 
seeking the Commission’s opinion. The majority of the CCI were of the opinion 
that the provision as well as the interpretation of the NEBE had infringed the 
Constitution. On the other hand, the minority of the CCI held that the language 
                                                 
1995 FDRE Constitution (1995) Art 38 (1) (c). Emphasis added. 
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requirement was neither discriminatory nor unconstitutional if it was seen in light 
of the ‘letter and spirit’ of the Constitution as well as the country’s ethnic-based 
federalism.  
 
The HoF declared that the decision of the NEBE was unconstitutional to the 
extent that it required knowledge of a local language in order to run for elections. 
The HoF, however, decided that a person should be able to speak the working 
language of a regional state to participate in regional elections. 
The impact of the language requirement on ethnic migrants 
As a consequence of the language requirement, ethnic migrants that are found in a 
number of urban areas, are effectively disenfranchised. They are in particular 
disenfranchised in local elections. For instance, a large number of non-Oromo 
people are found concentrated in many cities of the Oromia regional state. As was 
seen above, the non-Oromo population even exceeds that of the Oromo in large 
towns, such as, Nazret (Adama) and Debre Zeit (Bishoftu). However, a non-
Oromo may not run for the city council of Nazret or Debre-Zeit unless that 
candidate happens to be able to speak afaan-oromo which is the working 
language of the region and, therefore, of the cities. It should also be noted that 
candidates from the ethnic migrants may compete only for 30 percent of the city 
council seats in Oromia even if they speak afaan-oromo; 70 percent of the seats 
are in any event reserved for Oromos.  
 
As was also discussed before,1996 the Afar, SNNPR, Benishangul-Gumuz, and 
Gambella regional governments use Amharic as a working language. However, 
                                                 
1996 See above at § 2.2.3.1. 
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some of the mono-ethnic nationality zones and liyu woredas in SNNPR have 
begun to use local languages for official purposes. Hence, ethnic migrants who 
are found in the urban areas of these liyu woredas and nationality zones may not 
run for election unless they know the local language.  The nationality zones and 
liyu woredas in Benishngul-Gumuz and Gambella have not begun using the local 
language for official purposes. In principle, a candidate, his/her ethnic 
background regardless, may thus run for elections. However, as many studies 
show, ethnic migrants are excluded from taking part in local elections.1997    
3.3.2.2. Language and cultural rights of ethnic migrants  
As was discussed above,1998  only an ethnic community which enjoys territorial 
autonomy at regional or local level may use its language as a working language. 
Therefore, needless to say, ethnic migrants may not demand to access public 
services in their own language. Ethnic migrants must use the working language of 
local government to access public services. 
‘[I]ndividuals moving into [other] regions must assimilate. That means Amharic–
speaking citizens moving to an Oromifa-speaking region have to leave behind any 
prior claim to language protection…this has created a problem in some areas where 
an important number of minorities are scattered in the midst of the regionally 
dominant linguistic groups, especially in major urban areas of some of the member 
states.’1999 
On the other hand, every ethnic community is entitled to receive education in its 
own language even if it does not enjoy territorial autonomy. It is not however 
clear whether the ethnic migrants may as of right demand to receive education in 
their own languages. The Gambella Constitution, after recognising the right of the 
                                                 
1997 See Asnake (2009); Berhanu (2005). 
1998 See above § 2.3.3.1. 
1999 Yonatan (2010) 197. 
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ethnic communities of the region to learn in their own language, provides that the 
'people in the region have the right to learn in Amharic’.2000 The term ‘the people 
in the region’ seems to refer to ethnic migrants. Thus, in this region Amharic is 
designated as the medium of education in which all ethnic migrants may legally 
demand to be educated. Hence, local government in this region is constitutionally 
enjoined to provide primary education in Amharic for the ethnic migrants by 
establishing either separate schools or separate classes. It should be noted that 
Amharic is designated as the only language of education for all ethnic migrants in 
the region. Hence, for instance, the Oromos in the region may not demand to 
learn in afaan-oromo nor may the Tigrawiyans demand a school or a class which 
offers education in Tigregna.  
 
The other regional constitutions are silent on the question of whether ethnic 
migrants may demand to receive education in their own languages. Thus, it is 
unclear whether ethnic migrants may demand a woreda or a city to establish a 
school for their children which provides education in their mother tongue.  
 
It may be argued though that the FDRE Constitution provides that ‘[t]he State has 
the obligation to allocate ever increasing resources to provide to the public health, 
education and other social services’. 2001 It further adds that ‘[e]very Ethiopian 
national has the right to equal access to publicly funded social services’. 2002 It 
should be noted that it is not a particular ethnic community which can demand 
                                                 
2000 GRS Constitution (2002) Art 6 (4). This sub-article is found only in the Amharic version of 
the regional Constitution, not in the English version.  
2001 FDRE Constitution (1995) 41 (4). 
2002 FDRE Constitution (1995) 41 (3). 
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access to government funded service; but ‘every Ethiopian’. Based on these 
constitutional principles, it may be argued that local government, being a part of 
the state, has the obligation to establish and finance schools for members of the 
ethnic migrants. Moreover, it can be argued that schools that are run by local 
government are state funded schools. Hence, ethnic migrants may demand equal 
access to these state funded schools. Equal access should be read to imply the 
right to be educated in one’s own language; since otherwise ethnic migrants may 
not be considered to have equal access to a state funded social service.  
 
Conversely, it may be argued that ethnic migrants may not demand to receive 
education in their own languages considering the fact that neither the 
communities nor their languages have received recognition in a regional 
constitution. The FDRE Constitution puts no constitutional obligation on the 
regional states either explicitly or impliedly to accommodate ethnic migrants in 
terms of providing education in their respective languages. It may further be 
argued that equal access to state funded education does not imply the right to be 
educated in one’s own language. It simply implies a right to be enrolled in the 
existing schools regardless of the language they use to teach.  
 
What the above shows is that both the federal and regional constitutions are 
vague on whether ethnic migrants are entitled to receive education in their own 
language. The federal policy on education is also silent on the matter.  
 
In spite of the constitutional ambiguity, ethnic migrants, who prefer to receive 
education in Amharic, are accommodated in almost all regions. Oromia has 
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adopted a policy to establish either separate schools or separate classes which 
provide primary education in Amharic. Accordingly, several cities with large 
ethnic migrants, including, Nazareth, Debre-Zeit, Assella, Nekemt, Zeway, and 
Jimma, have established either a separate school or separate classes which 
provide education in Amharic.2003  In SNNPR, the policy has been to use 
Amharic in the capitals of the nationality zones. In the capitals of mono-ethnic 
nationality zones Amharic is used for education together with the language of the 
dominant ethnic communities of the nationality zone.2004  In the multi-ethnic 
Bench-Maji and South Omo nationality zones, Amharic is used for primary 
education. Even some mono-ethnic nationality zones and liyu woredas in 
SNNPR, such as, the Guraghe nationality zone and the Alaba liyu woreda, use 
Amharic in primary school.2005.  
3.3.3. Assessment   
The discussion above reveals that even the smallest ethnic community in almost 
every regional state is represented in local councils either through the regular 
electoral process or through a special procedure. Many of the small ethnic 
communities in fact have their own woreda. Such an arrangement allows them to 
decide on certain social and economic matters. However, it should be noted that 
the constitutional protection and the extent of autonomy that a regular woreda 
                                                 
2003 Cohen (2006) 166; See also (Yonatan) 2010 228. 
2004 For instance Amharic is used along with sidamigna in primary schools of Awassa city which 
is the capital of Sidama nationality zone as well as of the SNNPR. Amharic is also used alongside 
with gamogna in Arba-Minch, the capital of Gamo-Gofa Nationality Zone, in Soddo, the capital 
of Wolayita nationality zone Amharic and wolayitegna are used in primary schools. In Hossana, 
the capital of Hadiya nationality zone Amharic is used in along with hadiyisa while in Dilla, the 
capital of Gedeo Nationality Zone, gedeofaa is used for the same purpose.  Cohen (2000) 199. See 
also (Yonatan) 2010 228. 
2005 Cohen (2000) 199. 
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enjoys is not on par with that of a liyu woreda or a nationality zone. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, 2006 individual woredas do not have 
constitutional protection and, therefore, the creation, division or amalgamation of 
woredas can be undertaken without any legal restraints. The Tigray regional 
government, for instance, may decide to eliminate the Irob woreda   at any time 
by amalgamating that woreda with other woredas. Moreover, as was discussed 
earlier, liyu woredas and nationality zones have the power to decide on cultural 
matters, including, the power to choose a language for official purposes and for 
primary education. Regular woredas, such as Irob woreda, however, do not have 
the competence to exercise functions that are particularly important for protecting 
an ethnic community’s identity, including the right to choose a working language. 
This is one of the reasons why Tigrigna, and not Saho (the language of the Irob 
ethnic community), is used as the working language of the Irob woreda.   
 
The above discussion also shows that the regional governments have devised 
various institutional arrangements to ensure that the political organs of cities 
remain within the control of ethnic communities, even if at the cost of 
marginalising ethnic migrants. It is bemusing to observe that the institutional 
designs are aimed at simply preventing any potential representation of ethnic 
migrants in city governments. No acceptable justification can be given, for 
instance, for putting 70 percent of city and kebele council seats out of the reach of 
ethnic migrants and thereby disenfranchising the majority of the cities’ residents 
                                                 
2006 See chapter 5; § 2.2.3. 
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as is the case in Oromia. This rather appears to be a measure of retribution for 
past injustices.2007  
 
The FDRE Constitution recognises the historical ‘interactions’ among several of 
the ethnic communities of the country ‘on various levels and forms of life’. 2008  
The Constitution recognises that these interactions have led to the creation of a 
‘common interest’ and ‘common outlook’ among the various ethnic communities 
of the country. 2009  These are more visible in cities than anywhere else where 
populations with different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds live 
together. It is also in the cities where non-ethnic or mixed ethnic populations are 
found in large number. The formal and informal restriction on the political 
representation in city councils of ethnic migrants belies this constitutionally 
recognised ‘common outlook’ and shared history. 2010 
 
Furthermore, the insistence on ensuring that cities remain under the political 
control of the autochthonous ethnic communities contradicts a major national and 
international trend viz. urbanisation. As many studies show, urbanisation is a 
global trend the importance of which is not even diminished by glocalisation.2011 
As a World Bank report indicates, urbanisation is rather reinforced by 
glocalisation. National and international firms seek to access the ‘sizable pool of 
labour, [sic] materials, services, and customers’ urban areas have to offer. 2012  
                                                 
2007 See chapter 3. 
2008 FDRE Constituion (1995) Preamble. 
2009 FDRE Constituion (1995) Preamble. 
2010 See Assefa (2007a) 254-255. 
2011 World Bank (2000) 125.  
2012 World Bank (2000) 125.  
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This, in turn, leads to a mobility of a large labour force and capital to urban areas 
leading to ethnic diversity in cities. 2013   
 
Presently, only 16 percent of the Ethiopian population lives in urban areas. 2014 
However Ethiopia is being urabnised at the rate of four percent, a rate which is 
higher than the average urbanisation rate of the African continent which stands at 
3.2 percent. 2015 Cities in every part of the country are already ethnically diverse. 
As the country becomes more and more urbanised, cities and municipalities are 
likely to become even more diverse. This trend has been visible particularly in 
recent years with the opening of higher learning institutions in different parts of 
the country. More than 23 universities have been opened in remote cities, such as, 
Neqemté, Jijiga, and Soddo. 2016 This is in addition to the cities, such as Jimma 
and Mekellé, which have had universities for a long time. Students from different 
parts of the country and with different ethnic backgrounds are sent to these cities 
to take up their studies. Moreover, the federal government is sending university 
lecturers and support staff with different ethnic backgrounds to these areas. Many 
of the lecturers and support staff even move with their families to these areas. All 
these factors reinforce the ethnic diversity of cities. Obviously, university 
students are not permanent residents of these cities and university workers 
constitute a small fraction of a city’s residents. However, the trend is clear: cities 
are likely to become more diverse rather than less. Therefore, to insist that a 
minority segment of the urban population should exercise absolute control over 
                                                 
2013 World Bank (2000) 125.  
2014 See MoWUD (2007) 2. 
2015 See MoWUD (2007) 2. 
2016 See Rayner  & Ashcrofte (2011). 
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cities to the exclusion of all others is a bizarre attempt to curtail a global and 
national trend. Moreover, it is undemocratic and discriminatory to restrict the 
representation of ethnic migrants in the manner described above. It is contrary to 
key civil and political rights of the ethnic migrants including the right to equality 
and non-discrimination. 2017   
 
The above should not, however, be construed to mean that the special interests of 
the autochthonous ethnic communities in the cities should not be protected. To do 
so would be unfair. To begin with, cities are the economic centres of the regions, 
nationality zones, and woredas. They are also the seats of regional, zonal, or 
woreda governments. Most of the existing infrastructures and social service 
centres, including schools and hospitals are found mainly in the cities. It is only 
rational to allow ethnic communities to exercise a certain measure of control over 
cities and their resources if they are to feel empowered.  It would also be unfair to 
restrict the control of the autochthonous ethnic communities to poorly resourced 
rural areas. However, this can be achieved without totally excluding other 
communities. For instance, where ethnic communities are found in the minority 
in urban areas, institutional arrangement such as, power sharing, ‘double-
majority’ or ‘minority-veto’ can be used to ensure that their interests are 
protected.  Macedonia is a good example in this respect. In Macedonia, when a 
particular identity group is found to be in the minority in a particular 
municipality, a decision specifically affecting the interests of the minority has to 
be approved in the municipal council by a majority vote. In addition, it has to be 
                                                 
2017 FDRE Constitution (1995) Arts 25 & 38. 
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supported by a majority of the particular identity group in the municipal 
council.2018  
4. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has examined the Ethiopian local governance system and its 
relevance for accommodating intra-regional minority ethnic communities. The 
discussion shows that territorial and non-territorial institutional arrangements are 
employed to accommodate intra-regional ethnic communities at local level. With 
a view to accommodate intra-regional ethnic communities ethnically defined 
local government units are established. An institutional arrangement that has 
elements of self-rule and shared-rule is put in place. As a manifestation of self-
rule of the intra-regional ethnic communities, ethnically defined local territorial 
units have been created. Government institutions are established in the local 
territorial units. As part of the shared-rule element intra-regional ethnic 
communities are represented in regional and federal government organs. The 
ethnic communities which are too small to exercise territorial autonomy are also 
allowed to be represented both in Article 39 and Article 50(4) local government  
units as well as regional and federal organs.   Yet the decentralised system has 
numerous shortcomings. The following stand out in particular: 
 
 The regional constitutions do not provide clearly defined competences nationality 
zones and liyu woredas which are relevant for the protection and promotion of the 
culture and identity of the relevant intra-regional ethnic communities. As 
indicated above nationality zones and liyu woredas have competences in the area 
of education and language. These are important culture related functions. Yet 
                                                 
2018 Lyon (2011) 31.  
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other culture related functions are not clearly listed in the regional constitutions 
including     
 
 Territorial autonomy is not accompanied with financial autonomy. Nationality 
zones do not have any plainly stated revenue raising power. Liyu woredas collect 
certain taxes as agents of the regional state. This negatively impacts on the 
political autonomy these local units.  
 
 The electoral process does not allow the diverse political views that exist within 
an ethnic community to be fairly represented in local councils. All the seats in 
nationality zone and liyu woreda councils are controlled by EPRDF or parties that 
are affiliated to it. Ethnic based opposition are completely unrepresented. 
Moreover, the principle of democratic-centralism based on which EPRDF and its 
affiliates operate undermines the autonomy the ethnic based local unit.  
 
 There are no institutional arrangements that ensure the political representation of 
ethnic migrants. On the contrary, their right for political representation in local 
councils are curtailed through various legislative measures. Their cultural rights 
are not given appropriate institutional recognition. They can access public service 
using only the working language of a regional state or a particular liyu woreda or 
nationality zone. They may not also demand a local government unit to provide 
them primary education in their own languages.  
 
This chapter and the preceding three chapters have examined the institutional 
design of Ethiopia’s local government system and its implication for development 
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and accommodation of intra-regional ethnic minorities. The following chapter 
will provide a conclusion of the thesis 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion  
1. INTRODUCTION  
The decentralisation programme that is being implemented in Ethiopia was 
intended to serve two principal objectives viz. to serve as an institutional 
mechanism for bringing about development by reducing the prevalence of 
poverty in the country and to respond to intra-regional ethnic diversity by 
accommodating intra-regional ethnic minority communities. This thesis, 
therefore, examined whether Ethiopia’s local government system has the 
institutional features that are deemed likely to enhance the prospect of a 
decentralisation programme for achieving development and accommodating 
ethnic minorities With a view to answering this question chapter two identified 
the institutional features that scholars, experts of decentralisation, and global 
development institutions, such as the World Bank, aver are likely to unleash the 
potential of a decentralisation programme to achieve development. The chapter 
also explored several territorial and non-territorial institutional options which 
may be implemented at the local level in order to accommodate ethnic minorities. 
The potential of Ethiopia’s decentralisation programme and local government 
system to achieve its intended purposes was examined in chapters four, five, six 
and seven against the backdrop of these institutional features.   
   
The study of Ethiopia’s local government system revealed that, with an eye to 
respond to the twin challenges of poverty and intra-regional ethnic diversity, the 
country has established two categories of local government which are based on 
two different constitutional principles. In order to tackle the challenges of 
poverty, Ethiopia has established what is referred to in this thesis as Article 50 (4) 
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local government. This category of local government is intended to have a certain 
degree of autonomy while under the overall supervisory power of the regional 
and, to some extent, the federal governments. In order to respond to the 
challenges of intra-regional ethnic diversity, the country has also established 
Article 39 local government units based on the federal principles of self-rule and 
shared-rule. This thesis separately examined the two categories of local 
government against the backdrop of the institutional features that are identified in 
chapter two. The following sections will summarise the findings of the thesis. 
2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
A study of international scholarly works on decentralisation and development in 
chapter two showed that political, financial, and administrative autonomy are 
defining elements of devolution. These are also critical institutional features of 
decentralised development.   
2.1. Political autonomy  
As was discussed in chapter two, political autonomy has four elements. The first 
element of political autonomy is the certainty of the existence of local 
government, which, in turn, has three aspects: The existence of local government 
as an autonomous sphere or order or level of government, the establishment of 
local government in every part of a country on wall-to-wall basis, and the 
protection of the institutional security of individual units of local government. 
Political autonomy also involves the establishment of governance structures, 
including legislative and executive organs, and local democracy. Moreover, it 
entails the devolution of original, clearly defined, and development-related 
functions. It also implies transferring full political power to local government on 
those functions.  International literature shows that each of these elements of 
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political autonomy impacts on the potential of local government to bring about 
development which is equitable and sustainable. 
2.1.1. Political autonomy and Article 50 (4) local government 
2.1.1.1. Certainty of existence  
Constitutional recognition  
The most preferable institutional option for ensuring the continuous existence of 
local government, as suggested by decentralisation and development scholars, is 
the recognition of local government as an order of government in a national 
constitution.  The thesis, therefore, examined whether local government is 
recognised as a level of government in the FDRE Constitution.  The finding was 
that the FDRE Constitution is generally vague with regard to the constitutional 
status of Article 50 (4) local government. The Constitution does not explicitly 
recognise this category of local government as an autonomous level of 
government. It rather makes a transient reference to it in Article 50 (4). This is 
despite the fact that a careful perusal of the entire text, and the drafting history, of 
the Constitution reveals that the Constitution certainly envisions this category of 
local government to exist as an autonomous order of government. The regional 
constitutions provide a certain measure of recognition to woredas, which belong 
to the Article 50 (4) category of local government. However, the regional 
constitutions are generally silent on the status of cities and municipalities. 
 
The vagueness of the FDRE Constitution with regard to the constitutional status 
of local government is problematic. It has rendered the very existence of local 
government insecure and dependent on the political will of the party in power at 
federal and regional level. This is evident from the fact that the decentralisation 
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programme that resulted in the creation of woredas and cities was instigated by a 
political rationale rather than by the purpose to meet the prescriptions of the 
FDRE Constitution.   
 
While the regional constitutions provide a certain measure of recognition to local 
government, practice shows that they do not provide adequate protection to local 
government since they are easily amended. Moreover, the regional constituions 
make distinction between rural woredas and urban local government in providing 
recognition. The recognition of woredas in regional constitutions to the exclusion 
cities and municipalities is a reflection of the EPRDF’s preference for a rural-
centred development policy. This in itself demonstrates the fact that the lack of 
explicit recognition of local government in the FDRE Constitution has rendered 
the existence of local government dependent on the policy of the party in power.   
 
It is, therefore, suggested that Article 50 (4) local government should be 
explicitly recognised as a democratically constituted autonomous level of 
government.   
Wall-to-wall local government  
The constitutional objective that Article 50 (4) local government is meant to 
serve is achieving participatory development. This rationale entails that this 
category of local government is established in every part of the country, on a 
wall-to-wall basis.  
 
In Ethiopia local government units are established on a -to-wall basis. Moreover, 
the structures of the local government units that are established in different parts 
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of the country reflect the developmental preferences of the communities in 
different parts of the country. In rural areas, woredas are established while in 
urban areas municipalities and cities are established. Within the urban category 
the different status and capacity of each local unit is taken into consideration for 
providing the status of a city or a municipality. Hence, Addis Ababa and Dire 
Dawa are established as autonomous federal cities with the status of a regional 
state. A distinction is also made in the manner in which cities and municipalities 
are structured. Cities are established as autonomous units of local government 
while municipalities are established as administrative units.  
 
The establishment of woredas, cities, and municipalities in all parts of the 
country is important for two reasons. First this is in line with what the FDRE 
Constitution envisions. Second, the establishment of woredas and cities in all 
parts of the country is important for it allows everyone, in every part of the 
country, to participate and share in the benefits of local development.     
Constitutional protection for individual local units  
The existence of each woreda and city is not adequately protected since there are 
no clearly defined and constitutionally entrenched substantive and procedural 
criteria for the creation, division, and/or amalgamation of woredas and cities. 
There is a trend to define the criteria for altering woredas’ and cities’ boundaries 
through regional proclamations. However, this is not likely to provide adequate 
protection for individual local units. Firstly the regional proclamations are 
effortlessly amended by the regional states. Second, the criteria for alteration of 
woreda boundaries are vaguely and widely defined by some of the regional 
proclamations. Thirdly, the role of community participation in the process of 
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altering woreda boundaries is not articulated. As a result individual woredas and 
cities are vulnerable for haphazard division and amalgamation. This in turn 
endangers the political autonomy of each individual woreda and city. This also 
jeopardises local democracy since a woreda or a city which chose to be governed 
by a party other than the one that governs the regional and/or federal government 
may be eliminated through division or amalgamation. This is not mere 
speculation but real danger in the Ethiopian context where the entire political 
space is controlled by one party (EPRDF) which has acrimonious relations with 
opposition parties.  
 
It is, therefore, recomended that the regional constitutions should provide clearly 
defined substantive and procedural criteria for creating, dividing, and 
amalgamating woredas and cities. The criteria may include population size, 
geographical location, resource distribution, administrative convenience, and the 
like. The procedural criteria should include a requirement for public engagement.  
2.1.1.2. Local democracy 
The discussion in chapter two showed that the establishment of political 
structures and local democracy are critical institutional features of local political 
autonomy and, therefore, of decentralised development. Decentralised 
development requires local democracy that is competitive (creating a chance for 
alternation in leadership) and representative (allowing the representation of all 
major political opinions). These are likely to optimise the potential of each local 
unit to be responsive to local developmental preferences by ensuring public 
accountability. Local elections should involve political parties and allow room for 
the participation of non-partisan candidates.  
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In Ethiopia woredas and cities have political structures which include legislative 
and executive organs. Members of the legislative organs are elected directly by 
voters. Local elections, in which political parties and independent candidates 
participate, are held more or less regularly. The electoral system in use in 
Ethiopia is block-voting: A system that uses a multi-member constituency and 
provides voters as many votes as the number of candidates that are elected from a 
particular constituency. To this extent the institutional features that are important 
for local democracy and, therefore, for decentralised development, are visible in 
Ethiopia’s local governance system. 
 
However, practice shows that local elections in Ethiopia are far from competitive 
and representative. All local electoral positions, except a few seats which are 
occupied by independent woreda and city councilors, are controlled by the 
EPRDF and by parties affiliated to it. The non-representativeness and non-
competiveness of local elections is compounded by the fact that EPRDF has a 
centralised structure and decision making procedure. The fact that opposition 
parties have hardly participated in local elections makes it difficult to assess 
whether the non-competiveness and non-representativeness of local elections is 
due to the electoral system in use. It is clear, however, that, the non-
competitiveness and non-representativeness of local elections diminish the 
political autonomy of woredas and cities. This jeopardises the institutional 
responsiveness of local government to local developmental preferences.  
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2.1.1.3. Local government’s functions  
Devolution by definition entails the transfer of certain functions to local 
government units. International literature shows that a decentralisation 
programme that aims to create developmental local government should devolve 
to local government functions that are original (entrenched in a national 
Constitution), clearly defined, and relevant for development.   
 
Article 50 (4) of the FDRE Constitution enjoins the regional states to provide 
local government with adequate functions. The principle of functional 
subsidiarity is implied in this Article which requires the devolution of certain 
functions to local government if public participation is vital for its 
implementation. Yet, the Constitution is silent on the specific functions that the 
regional states are required to devolve to local government. The Constitution 
contains a list of functions that are within the competence of the federal 
government and leaves residual functions to the regional states. Therefore, 
Article 50 (4) local government units do not have original functions that can be 
directly traced to the federal Constitution. Their functions are rather derivative of 
regional states’ functions.  
 
Moreover, the functions of Article 50 (4) local government units, especially those 
of the woreda as well as the state functions of the cities are not clearly defined. 
The regional constitutions do not contain a clear list of functions that are within 
the competence of woredas. Some regional states have attempted to define the 
competences of woredas in regional proclamations or executive regulations. 
Regional proclamations and executive regulations are however ordinary statutes 
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that can be easily repealed or amended by a regional council or by a regional 
executive council respectively. The regulations are particularly easier to repeal or 
amend as they are prepared and adopted by the executive organ of a regional 
state. Therefore, a regional government may take back the functions that it has 
devolved to woredas and cities by amending the proclamations and regulations. 
Moreover, those proclamations, which have already been enacted with the 
purpose of defining the functional competences of woredas, lack in clarity.   
 
Practice shows that woredas and cities exercise functions relating to health care, 
education, water, and agriculture. However as some studies show, the lack of 
clarity in their functional competences has a negative impact on the effectiveness 
of woredas and cities in planning and implementing development projects. It is 
submitted that the functions that woredas and cities in practice exercise are 
relevant for development. It is, therefore, recommended that these functional 
competences should be clearly listed in regional constitutions as the functions of 
woredas and cities.   
2.1.1.4. Local government powers  
As the discussion in chapter two shows, political power is an intrinsic element of 
political autonomy and an important feature of decentralised development. 
Political power may include the power to approve local developmental policies 
and plans, to translate policies and plans into legislation, and to implement the 
legislation.  
 
Under the regional constitutions woredas do not have full political power. It is 
not clearly stated whether woredas have any policy making power. Most of the 
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regional constitutions do not explicitly state whether woredas have legislative 
powers. It is arguable whether woredas have the power to legislate other than to 
determine their internal procedures. Even if it may be argued that a woredas have 
legislative power, the lack of clarity in its functional competences renders those 
legislative powers meaningless.  
 
The executive organs of woredas and cities are executive councils and mayoral 
committee respectively. The executive councils and mayoral committees are 
headed by a chief administrator and a mayor respectively. These executive organs 
are authorised to exercise executive power. The woreda chief administrator and a 
mayor of a city are accountable to the woreda and the city council respectively. 
In addition, they are accountable to a chief administrator of the nationality zone 
and/or the regional state depending on whether the relevant woreda or city is 
found within a nationality zone. This multiple accountability compromises the 
executive power, and therefore, the political autonomy of local government.    
 
It is therefore recommended that the policy making, legislative, and executive 
powers of woredas and cities should be clearly stated in the regional 
constitutions.  The accountability of a woreda chief administrator and a mayor 
should be exclusively to a woreda council and city council respectively. 
Therefore, the provisions in the regional constitutions and proclamations that 
require woreda chief administrators and mayors to be accountable to a regional 
chief administrator should be repealed. Instead it should be clearly stated that 
woreda chief administrators and mayors are exclusively accountable to the 
relevant local councils.      
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2.2. Financial autonomy  
Devolution implies financial autonomy which may involve revenue-raising and 
expenditure powers. A study of international literature in chapter two revealed 
that the extent to which a local unit enjoys financial autonomy impacts its success 
to achieve development.  Financial autonomy is so critical that it also impacts on 
the political and administrative autonomy of a local government unit. 
   
The evaluation of the financial autonomy of woredas and cities showed that these 
local units do not have full financial autonomy. This is mainly due to the fact that 
even though woredas and cities have expenditure autonomy, they lack adequate 
internal sources of revenue.  Woredas are authorised to collect land use fees, 
agricultural income tax, and income taxes from their employees. Cities and 
municipalities are also allowed to collect urban land lease fees, urban land use 
fees, and municipal service fees. However woredas do not have full authority 
over these taxes and fees since they do not determine their rates. They collect 
these on behalf of the regional states. That is why the revenue they collect from 
these taxes is offset with the revenue they receive in form of regional block-
grants. Moreover, the revenue that they collect from these taxes and fees is 
woefully inadequate to cover even the major portion of their expenditure needs. 
Hence woredas are principally dependent on inter-governmental grants.  
 
Since 2001, the regional governments have been transferring financial grants to 
woredas and cities. The grants are formula-based unconditional block grants.  
However, the entitlement of woredas to regional block grants is not entrenched in 
 
 
 
 
492 
 
the regional constitutions. Moreover, the grants are inadequate to cover the 
woredas’ fiscal gap.  
 
Some of the proclamations provide that cities may receive block grants.  
However practice shows that the grants received by cities are not formula-based. 
They are rather ad-hoc inter-governmental transfers. Moreover, cities may not 
use the block-grants for anything other than discharging their state functions. In 
other words, cities do not receive regional grants for their municipal functions.   
 
It is unclear whether woredas and cities may borrow. Some regional 
proclamations authorise cities and woredas to borrow from internal sources. 
However, under the federal constitution the regional states themselves need to 
secure the permission of the federal government to borrow. Given this it is 
unclear whether the regional states have the power to authorise woredas and 
cities to borrow.  Due to the legal uncertainty about the borrowing power of 
woredas and cities, very few financial institutions are willing to extend loans to 
woredas and cities.  
 
In general, therefore, woredas and cities lack financial autonomy. It is, therefore, 
recommended that certain clearly defined taxing powers should be devolved to 
woredas and city administrations. Woredas and cities should be allowed to 
exercise full authority with respect the taxes so devolved to them including the 
power to determine the rate of, and to assess and collect these taxes. Moreover, 
the regional constitutions should clearly and explicitly enjoin the regional states 
to transfer to woredas and cities formula based unconditional grants. The block 
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grants should be based on the expenditure needs of local government. To this 
effect, all regional states should use a grant formula that best responds to the 
expenditure needs of woredas. In addition, there is no justifiable reason for 
making a distinction between the cities’ state and municipal functions in 
providing block grants since the purpose of a block grant is to fill the fiscal gap 
of a local unit. Therefore, cities should be provided with block-grants both for 
their state and municipal functions.  
2.3. Administrative autonomy  
A study of international literature on decentralisation in chapter two shows that 
devolution entails the transfer of administrative power to local government units. 
It also showed that local administrative autonomy is one of the institutional 
features that are likely to impact on the success of a decentralisation scheme for 
achieving development. Administrative autonomy has two elements; the power to 
determine the organisational structure of administrative organs of local 
government and the power to hire and fire personnel.  
 
The evaluation of woredas and cities based on the above two elements showed 
that woredas and cities have constitutional and statutory power to determine the 
structure of their administrative organs. They also have power to hire and fire 
their own administrative staff.  Yet, practice shows that regional states interfere 
in administration of woredas and cities. Moreover, woredas and cities suffer from 
an acute lack of skilled man power.  This has a harmful impact on the potential of 
woredas and cities to achieve their developmental potential.  
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2.4. Central supervision	and	inter-governmental co-operation   
2.4.1. Central supervision 
International literature shows that when local government is meant to achieve 
development, local autonomy will not be sufficient. Local autonomy must be 
balanced with inter-governmental co-ordination. To this effect, scholars argue 
that a central government should regulate the activities of local government. It 
should also exercise oversight over the activities of local government units. In 
addition it should support and, if need be, intervene in local government. 
 
A perusal of the federal and regional constitutions shows that the federal 
government and regional governments both have the power to supervise the 
woredas and cities. The power of the federal government to supervise local 
government emanates from its constitutional power to formulate and implement 
general policies on social services and economic matters. The power of the 
federal government, among other things, to enact laws on the use of land and 
utilisation of natural resources also allows it to regulate the activities of local 
government. The regional states also have the power to regulate local 
government’s activities since matters relating to local government are within their 
competence. The federal and regional governments are further required, at least 
implicitly, to provide support to local government. In addition, each regional state 
has the authority to directly monitor the activities of woredas and cities within its 
jurisdiction. It has also the power to exercise oversight over the activities of local 
government by receiving periodical reports from woredas and cities and by 
conducting on-site inspections.  
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The regional constitutions, except the Tigray and Oromia Constitution, do not 
provide for a regional intervention in woredas. The Tigray Constitution and the 
proclamations of some other regions provide for regional intervention the 
woredas and cities. However, the substantive criteria for regional intervention in 
woredas are widely cast, paving the way for undue and unrestrained regional 
interventions. Moreover, the only method of intervention considered is 
suspending or disbanding the council of a malfunctioning woreda or city. Other 
less invasive means of intervention are not provided for.  
 
It is therefore recommended that the regional constitutions should provide for 
regional interventions in woredas and cities which fail to discharge their 
constitutional functions. The substantive and procedural criteria for regional 
intervention should be clearly and strictly defined in the regional constitutions. 
Moreover, methods of interventions which are proportional to the seriousness of 
the problems facing a woreda or a city should be provided in the regional 
constitutions.  
2.4.2. Inter-governmental co-operation  
It was argued in chapter two that decentralised development requires an 
institutional arrangement for co-operation between local government and senior 
levels of government. Co-operation should be based on the principle of equality 
between two or more levels of government. This entails the recognition of the 
institutional integrity of local government. It also entails an institutional scheme 
for vertical co-operation (co-operation between local government and senior 
levels of government) and horizontal co-operation (among local government 
units).  
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The evaluation of Ethiopia’s local governance system showed that the necessary 
institutions of inter-governmental co-operation either do not exist or are not 
adequately institutionalised. The federal Constitution does not contain a 
normative principle which guards the institutional integrity of local government 
from undue encroachment by federal and regional governments.  In fact, the 
regional constitutions and proclamation state that woredas and cities are 
subordinate to regional government. Therefore the normative principle of 
equality which is a central element of inter-governmental co-operation is absent 
in the regional constitutions.  
 
Some regional proclamations provide for horizontal co-operation, namely 
woreda-to-woreda, city-to-city and woreda-to-city co-operation.  Woredas may 
co-operate among themselves by creating associations. Cities are also allowed to 
do the same. These regional proclamations provide for an institutional link 
between rural woredas and cities through the representation of rural kebeles in 
city councils. Woredas and cities are also authorised to create joint committees 
for the purpose of co-operation. However the institutional schemes for co-
operation among local government are limited within a regional government.  It 
also appears that there is no institutional scheme of co-operations among woredas 
and cities at national level.  
 
There is no also a clear institutional arrangement for co-operation between local 
government and regional and federal government. In practice, interactions 
between woredas or cities and regional governments take place through sectoral 
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offices of the local government units and the regional governments. However, 
these interactions are ad hoc. Moreover, they are more co-ordinative in nature 
than co-operative. This is because the interactions are undertaken with the 
supposition that the woreda or the city is hierarchically subordinate to the 
regional government.     
 
It is therefore, recommended that the federal Constitution should explicitly 
recognise local government as an order of government. The regional constitutions 
should provide a normative principle for co-operation between regional 
government and local government.  Co-operation between regional and local 
governments should be clearly institutionalised. There should be an institutional 
mechanism through which the voices of local government can be heard at 
regional and federal levels. 
3. DECENTRALISATION AND ACCOMMODATION OF ETHNIC 
MINORITIES   
In chapter two four principles of accommodating ethnic minorities were 
identified which may be implemented at different levels depending on the 
demands of a particular minority ethnic community. Individual members of an 
ethnic minority community may demand equal treatment. A minority ethnic 
community may demand cultural autonomy. An ethnic minority ethnic 
community may demand territorial autonomy. Its demand may also extend to a 
power sharing scheme, which is known as consociationalism. It may demand 
secession. It was stated that local government may be used to accommodate 
ethnic minorities at the second and third level.        
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3.1. Territorial autonomy  
Territorial autonomy is principally about self-rule and aims to provide ethnic 
minorities a certain measure political autonomy at regional or local level. 
However, self-rule may be complemented with shared-rule which allows the 
ethnically strucutred local units to be represented at state and national 
government level.   
3.1.1. Self-rule  
The central defining features of self-rule are ethnically structured local territorial 
units, governance institutions including legislative and executive organs, and the 
devolution of functions to the local units that are relevant for the protection of 
ethnic identity, and revenue.  
3.1.1.1. Ethnically structured local territorial units  
In order to accommodate intra-regional ethnic minority communities, a distinct 
category of local government, which is referred to in this thesis as Article 39 
local government, is established in Ethiopia. Article 39 local government units, 
which include nationality zones and liyu woredas,  are structured based on ethnic 
criteria. Article 39 local government units are established in Afar, Amhara, 
Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and SNNPR.  
 
Territorial autonomy in Ethiopia includes the right to secession. Secession has 
two aspects as far as intra-regional ethnic minorities or the ethnic-based local 
territorial units are concerned: The right to secede from a regional state to form a 
separate regional state or the right to secede to form an independent state. The 
move towards secession starts with a demand for secession by members of an 
ethnic community. The demand must be approved by the council of the relevant 
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ethnic community which is either a nationality zone council or a liyu woreda 
council. (Therefore, the right to secession may only be exercised by an ethnic 
community which has its own liyu woreda or nationality zone). A referendum is 
then organised in the relevant liyu woreda or nationality zone by the regional 
government (in the case of secession from a regional state) or House of 
Federations (in the case of secession from the federation).  
 
It can be gathered from the above that the institutional features that are critical for 
accommodating ethnic minorities by creating autonomous territorial regimes at 
local level are clearly visible in Ethiopia’s federal and regional constitutions. In 
fact, the federal and regional constitutions place a high premium on the territorial 
arrangement. That is why the constitutions extend the territorial scheme to 
include secession. The problems associated with the territorial scheme, therefore, 
do not appear to emanate from the lack of an adequate constitutional framework. 
The problems are in fact associated with the overemphasis that the territorial 
scheme is given in constitutional terms, to the exclusion of other non-territorial 
arrangements. The constitutional principles have created expectations on the part 
of ethnic minorities. However, the ruling party has become reluctant to give 
adequate effect to the constitutional principles.  For instance demands by intra-
regional minority ethnic community to secede and form own regional state are 
discouraged and even refused by the ruling party. This shows that lawful 
demands for local territorial autonomy are often rebuffed for political or other 
reasons.    
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3.1.1.2. Governance structure  
In each liyu woreda and nationality zone a representative council, an executive 
council, and several executive organs are established. Members of a liyu woreda 
council are directly elected by the voters. In SNNPR, members of the nationality 
zone council are also elected by the voters. In Amhara, and Gambella, a portion 
of the seats in a nationality zone council are occupied by members who are 
elected in a special procedure from the councils of the woredas in the nationality 
zone. The remaining seats are occupied by members of a regional council who 
are elected from woredas within the nationality zone.   
 
The electoral system that is used in liyu woredas and nationality zones (in 
SNNPR) is a block voting system. The kebele is used as a multi-member 
constituency in liyu woreda elections. Because the liyu woreda is a collection of 
kebeles the majority of whose residents belong to a certain ethnic community, it 
is likely that the minority ethnic community for whom the liyu woreda is 
established will control the council of the particular liyu woreda.  The same can 
be said about the nationality zone elections in SNNPR. In Gambella and Amhara 
the members of a nationality zone council are elected in special procedure from 
woredas within the relevant nationality zone. It can be assumed that the woreda 
councils will elect individuals belonging to the ethnic community for whom the 
nationality zone is established.   
 
It does not appear, however, that the various political views within an ethnic 
community are reflected in the councils despite the fact that the councils of the 
nationality zones and liyu woredas can be assumed to be controlled by the 
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relevant ethnic communities. All nationality zones and liyu woreda councils are 
controlled by ethnic-based parties which are members of or affiliates to EPRDF. 
The opposition parties are not represented in any of these councils. Moreover, the 
ethnic political parties which are members of the EPRDF are subordinate to the 
central structure of the party. The domination of all nationality zone and liyu 
woreda councils by a single party and its affiliates, coupled with the centralised 
decision making system of the party seems to have undercut the benefit that the 
establishment of the ethnic based local units is expected to offer to the relevant 
ethnic community. 
3.1.1.3. Functions 
Nationality zones and liyu woredas have the power and duty to promote and 
protect the culture, language, and identity of the relevant ethnic community. The 
functions that they may exercise to discharge these responsibilities are generally 
unclear. However, it is clear that they may choose their working language. They 
may also choose the language or languages that may be used for the purpose of 
instruction in primary schools. These two functions are critical for the purpose of 
promoting and protecting the identity of the relevant ethnic communities.  
3.1.1.4. Revenue  
The political autonomy of nationality zones and liyu woredas is not 
complimented with financial autonomy.   It is unclear whether nationality zones 
have any taxing powers. A liyu woreda, like any other woreda, has the power to 
collect agricultural income taxes and land use fees on behalf of the regional 
states. However, the revenue that liyu woredas collect from these taxes and fees 
is not sufficient to allow them to discharge their functions. Nationality zones and 
liyu woredas are, therefore, financially dependent on regional grants.  
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The financial dependence of nationality zones and liyu woredas is likely to 
undermine their political autonomy. Moreover, they will be constrained from 
effectively discharging their responsibility of protecting and promoting the ethnic 
identity of the relevant ethnic communities. For instance, without adequate 
finance, they will not be able to build schools or publish books in the language of 
the relevant ethnic communities. It is therefore suggested that certain taxing 
power should be devolved to liyu woredas and nationality zones.     
3.1.2. Shared-rule 
One of the defining features of shared-rule is the representation of ethnic-based 
local territorial units at state and national level of government. In Ethiopia, the 
constitutional principle that allows ethnic minorities to exercise self-rule also 
entitles them to be represented in regional and national organs. This principle 
allows ethnic minorities to be represented in every regional and federal organ. 
However, only the regional and federal organs in which nationality zones and liyu 
woredas are directly or indirectly represented or those that make decisions 
directly impacting them were considered in this thesis.  
 
At regional level, nationality zones and liyu woredas are represented in various 
organs. In SNNPR, nationality zones and liyu woredas have the power to elect 
members of the Council of Nationalities (CoN), which has the power to interpret 
the regional constitution and to decide on matters relating to nationality zones 
and liyu woredas. In Amahara, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz, nationality 
zones and liyu woredas are represented in the Constitutional Interpretation 
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Commission (CIC) which also has the power to interpret the constitutions of the 
relevant regional states 
 
At the federal level, the House of Federation (HoF) has the power to make 
decisions directly impacting the autonomy of nationality zones and liyu woredas. 
The HoF has the power to decide whether a group of people constitutes an ethnic 
community. It may also decide on the demand of an ethnic community for 
territorial autonomy if such a case is brought to it as a constitutional dispute.  The 
HoF may be involved when a nationality zone or a liyu woreda approves a 
demand for secession, whether it is secession from a regional state or secession 
from the Ethiopian federation. Despite the fact that the decisions of the HoF may 
have far reaching consequences on nationality zones and liyu woredas, the latter 
are not directly represented in it. This is despite the fact that the relevant ethnic 
communities for whom the nationality zones and liyu woredas are established are 
represented. 
3.2. Non-territorial  
It was indicated in chapter two that territorial autonomy and the establishment of 
ethnically structured local units are useful only when the relevant ethnic minority 
community is territorially concentrated. When members of an ethnic community 
are territorially dispersed or, even if territorially concentrated, when they are too 
small in size to adequately exercise territorial autonomy, non-territorial options 
should be considered. The non-territorial options that were considered were 
power-sharing, cultural autonomy, or special representation in local councils.  
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In Ethiopia there are several ethnic minorities which, even though they are 
territorially concentrated, do not have their own nationality zones or liyu 
woredas. Some of the regional states have in fact established regular woredas 
and, as is the case in Gambella, ethnically organised kebeles to accommodate 
these communities. However, this arrangement is not considered as territorial 
autonomy as these units are not established based on ethnic criteria. Moreover, 
these local government units, unlike nationality zones and liyu woredas, do not 
have the powers that are relevant for the protection of ethnic identity such as the 
power to choose their own language/s of work and education and the power to 
secede.  
  
There are also several thousands of ethnic migrants in every region. The ethnic 
migrants may even constitute the majority in in several cities.  However, there is 
no institutional mechanism to accommodate these non-indigenous communities. 
On the contrary, they are excluded from political representation through formal 
and informal mechanisms. In regions such as Benishangul-Gumuz, SNNPR and 
Oromia, ethnic migrants are excluded from political representation through a 
quota system which reserves a disproportionate portion of the seats in city 
councils for the original inhabitants of the local units. Moreover, a candidate in 
local elections is required to be able to speak the working language of the 
relevant region, nationality zone, or liyu woreda which also has the effect of 
excluding ethnic migrants. Lastly, in these regions the office of the mayor is 
exclusively reserved for the original inhabitants of the regional state, liyu woreda, 
or nationality zone.    
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The above shows that non-territorial schemes are not given much attention. 
Ethnic migrants who are found dispersed in several urban areas are, therefore, left 
without any constitutional protection. They are marginalised in terms of political 
representation in local councils and in terms of cultural rights. This shows that 
there is a need to consider non-territorial institutional schemes that will 
accommodate ethnic migrants.  
4. Harmonsing Article 39 and Article 50 (4) local governments  
In Ethiopia two separate categories of local government are created which are 
meant to serve two different purposes. For the purpose of achieving development, 
woredas and cities (Article 50 (4) local government) are established throughout 
the country and for the purpose of accommodating ethnic minorities, nationality 
zones and liyu woredas (Article 39 local government) are established on top of 
one or more woredas. Now the question is how are the two categories of local 
government harmonised? 
 
It appears that attempts have been made to create a certain measure of 
institutional congruence between the two categories of local government. The 
first method of harmonising the two categories of local government is integrating 
them in one local unit.  This is the case with regard to a liyu woreda. As an 
Article 39 local government, a liyu woreda is organised on the basis of ethnic 
criteria as opposed to merely on the basis of geographic or economic criteria. 
Moreover, a liyu woreda exercises cultural function such choosing its own 
language. As an Article 50 (4) local government, a liyu woreda serves as a regular 
woreda and, therefore, provides basic services. 
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The other method that is used to create institutional harmony between the two 
categories of local government is by further decentralising nationality zones into 
several woredas and cities and by creating institutional links between the two 
categories of local government.  In Amhara and Gambella institutional link is 
created between a nationality zone and woredas inside it through the 
representation of the woredas in the nationality zone council. Woredas within the 
nationality zone send to the council of the nationality zones representatives who 
occupy a portion of the seats in the nationality zone council. This arrangement is 
likely to create some level of synchronisation between nationality zones and the 
woredas within them.  
 
While to the above extent the two categories of local government are 
institutionally harmonised, there still remain several areas of discord between the 
two categories of local government. As indicated above, in Gambella and 
Amhara, members of a nationality zone are not directly elected by the voters. 
They are elected in a special procedure by and from among members of councils 
of woredas that are found within the jurisdiction of the relevant nationality zone. 
This arrangement, even though likely to create a certain measure of institutional 
link and harmony between a nationality zone and the woredas within it, suffers 
from democratic deficiency since it does not allow the relevant ethnic community 
to directly elect members of the nationality zone council, an organ which is 
viewed as the highest political organ of the relevant ethnic community. On the 
other hand, in SNNPR, members of a nationality zone council are directly elected 
by voters. It is unclear how a nationality zone and woredas within it are 
institutionally linked with the nationality zones in this region. 
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 There is also a certain dissonance between the two categories of local 
government in terms allocation of functional competences. Functions with regard 
to culture, including the power to choose the language of work and school, are 
exclusive competences of Article 39 local government units. Regular woredas 
and cities do not have the power to choose their working languages or the 
languages to be used for primary education. However, the competences of Article 
39 local government are not limited to cultural matters. The regional constitutions 
allow a nationality zone to adopt and implement plans on social services and 
economic development. At the same time the regional constitutions authorise 
woredas to do the same. However, the particular areas of social services and 
economic matters that are within the competences of nationality zones and those 
within the competences of the woredas within them are left undefined. This is 
likely to hamper the political autonomy and, therefore, the developmental mission 
of woredas and cities within the nationality zones.    
 
It is, therefore, necessary to clearly demarcate the functional competences of the 
two categories of local government. In this regard, it is suggested that nationality 
zones should be limited to exercising culture related matters. Developmental 
functions should be left to woredas and cities as they are likely to be more 
efficient than nationality zones in planning and implementing developmental 
projects. The liyu woreda should continue exercising both developmental and 
cultural functions.  
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The other areas of dissonance relate to fiscal relation between nationality zones 
and liyu woredas within their jurisdiction. As the discussion in chapter 5 shows, 
regional block grants reach to woredas within a nationality zone through the 
nationality zone. This arrangement is likely to make unduly prolonged the process 
of transferring block grants to the woredas. Moreover, the block grants reach to 
the woredas   after the nationality zones have carved off a portion of the block 
grants for themselves and after they have made certain re-adjustment. The 
revenue that the woredas within the nationality zone receive after such a process 
of deduction and re-adjustment is likely to be less responsive to their expenditure 
needs.  
 
It may not, however, be suggested that block grants should directly go from a 
regional state to woredas within a nationality zones. This may allow the regional 
governments to undermine the autonomy of nationality zones. On the other hand, 
the efficient formulation and implementation of development projects by wordas 
require that they receive adequate and timely block grants. In order to balance the 
two interests, the regional governments may still continue to provide block grants 
to nationality zones. However, they may use their regulatory power to set 
minimum standard as to what percentage of the block grants, when, and how 
nationality zones should transfer to woredas and cities and follow up its 
implementation.  
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